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Heroes  of  the  Nations 

Series  of  Biographical  Studies  presenting  the 
lives  and  work  of  certain  representative  histori- 
cal characters,  about  whom  have  gathered  the 
traditions  of  the  nations  to  which  they  belong, 
and  who  have,  in  the  majority  of  instances,  been 
accepted  as  types  of  the  several  national  ideals. 


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•gjcroes  of  tbc  TRations 

EDITED  BV 
FELLOW  OF  BALLIOL  COLLEGE,  OXFORD 


FACIA   OUCIS    VIVENT    OPEROSAQUE 
GLORIA   RERUM. OVID,  IN  LIVIAM,  265. 

THE  HERO'S  DEEDS  AND    HARD-WON 
FAME  SHALL  LIVE. 


WELLINGTON 


THE  DUKE  OF  WELLINGTON. 
<After   the  painting  by  Sir  Thomas  Lawrence,  P.R.A.     Now  in   the  possession   of 

Lord  Bathurst.) 
(From  a  print  of  a  negative  owned  by  Goupil.) 


WELLINGTON 

SOLDIER  AND  STATESMAN 

AND  THE  REVIVAL  OF  THE  MILITARY  POWER 

OF  ENGLAND 


BY 

WILLIAM    O'CONNOR   MORRIS 

SOMETIME  SCHOLAR  OF  ORIEL  COLLEGE,  OXFORD 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW    YORK  LONDON 

27   WEST  TWF,NTY-THIRD    STREET  24   BEDFORD    STREET,    STRAND 

®^e  Xlnicktrboclur  |)r£S3 
1904 

648fJ4 

BTSEL  WORKS  CLUB  LIBRARY, 

JOLIET,  ILL, 


Copyright,  igo4 

BY 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


Published,  September,  1904 


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PREFACE 

IN  the  case  of  Wellington,  as  in  that  of  Napoleon, 
the  correspondence  of  the  great  soldier  and 
statesman  contains  the  fullest  and  best  record 
of  his  life  and  career.  That  correspondence  falls 
into  two  parts  :  the  exclusively  military  despatches 
edited  by  Gurvvood,and  the  supplementary  and  civil 
despatches,  edited  by  the  eldest  son  of  Wellington, 
the  second  Duke.  This  immense  collection  of 
papers,  which  contains  almost  innumerable  accounts 
of  military  events  and  of  affairs  of  State,  and  mem- 
oranda on  India,  on  the  Peninsular  War,  on  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  on  the  Campaign  of  1815,  on  the 
Army  of  Occupation,  and  on  Continental  and  Brit- 
ish politics,  during  nearly  half  a  century,  distinctly 
shows  us  what  Wellington  was  as  a  general,  a  mili- 
tary administrator,  and  an  illustrious  public  servant; 
we  can  gather  from  'it  the  best  estimate  that  can  be 
formed  of  his  nature  and  character.  But  the  general 
reader  would  be  lost  in  this  mighty  maze,  if  it  is 
not  without  a  plan  ;  he  properly  looks  to  large  con- 
densation and  abridgment,  and,  besides,  recourse 
must  be  had  to  other  sources  of  information,  in 
order  fully  to  comprehend  what  Wellington  was  in 
the  field,  in   Council,  in  the  Cabinet,  and   in   public 

V 


vl  Preface 

and  private  life.  A  "  selection  "  from  the  military 
despatches  has  been  made  by  Gurwood :  it  is  of 
considerable  value,  and  has  often  been  referred  to 
in  this  volume. 

For  Wellington's  exploits  and  career  in  India,  in 
addition  to  his  own  correspondence,  the  reader  may 
consult  the  Lives  of  Lord  Harris  and  of  Sir  David 
Baird,  and  especially  the  despatches  of  Lord  Welles- 
ley,  which  are  of  the  very  greatest  importance.  The 
different  histories  of  India,  relating  to  this  period, 
may  also  be  perused. 

The  authorities  on  the  Peninsular  War  are  numer- 
ous, and  some  of  sterling  value.  The  correspondence 
of  Napoleon  should  be  compared  at  every  point  of  the 
contest  with  that  of  Wellington ;  the  difference  be- 
tween the  direction  of  military  operations  at  a  distance 
and  on  the  spot  has  seldom  been  so  conspicuously 
made  manifest.  Napier's  History  of  the  Peninsular 
War  is  a  well-known  classic,  but  the  brilliant  and 
self-opinionated  soldier  is  far  from  just  to  the  British 
Government  of  the  day  ;  he  is  almost  a  blind  idolater 
of  Napoleon,  and  he  is  far  too  much  an  eulogist 
of  Soult.  Mr.  Oman's  new  History  of  the  Penin- 
sular War  as  yet  has  only  reached  the  end  of  the 
Campaign  of  1809,  but  when  complete  it  promises 
to  be  a  work  of  remarkable  merit ;  it  is  especially 
useful  in  its  descriptions  of  the  topography  of  Portu- 
gal and  Spain,  and  of  the  natural  characteristics  of 
those  lands,  as  bearing  upon  the  military  operations 
which  took  place ;  the  research  of  the  author  is  very 
commendable;  his  views  are  usually  discriminating 
and  just.     On  the  French  side,  Foy's  Guerre  de  la 


Preface  vil 

Peninsnle  is  only  a  fragment,  but  it  gives  us  many 
details  of  interest ;  its  account  of  the  organisation 
and  the  qualities  of  the  French  and  the  British  arm- 
ies, if  not  without  pardonable  national  bias,  is  in- 
structive, even  striking.  Hardly  any  of  the  French 
commanders  have  left  us  much  that  is  profitable 
on  the  Peninsular  War;  but  the  Memoirs  of  King 
Joseph  and  of  Marshal  Jourdan  deserve  attention  ; 
Marmont  has  explained  tolerably  well  the  Campaign 
of  Salamanca  and  the  battle  ;  Koch's  account  of 
Massena's  campaign  in  Portugal  has  real  merit  ;  and 
information  may  be  gathered  from  the  Memoirs  of 
Marbot  and  Thiebault.  For  general  histories,  Alison 
and  Thiers  may  be  consulted  ;  the  sieges  in  the 
Peninsula  have  been  described  by  Jones  and  Belmas. 
The  literature  of  the  Waterloo  campaign  fills  a 
library,  but  it  is  unnecessary  to  enlarge  upon  it  here. 
Napoleon's  account  in  his  Commentaries  is  very 
incorrect,  and  in  places  disingenuous,  but  it  traces 
the  main  incidents  of  this  passage  of  arms  with 
characteristic  superiority  of  insight :  the  tendency  of 
history  is  to  confirm  the  views  of  the  Emperor.  I 
pass  by  a  great  collection  of  authorities,  largely  ob- 
solete and  now  not  of  much  value,  and  shall  only 
refer  to  two  works,  recently  published,  the  Cam- 
paign of  Waterloo  by  the  late  Mr.  Ropes,  and 
i8i^  by  M.  H.  Houssaye.  These  narratives  arc 
fully  up  to  date,  and  abound  in  admirable  comments 
and  reflections  ;  they  are,  in  the  main,  candid  and  im- 
partial. I  may  also  notice  my  own  Campaigtt  of 
i8i§  which  has  been  received  with  more  than 
ordinary  favour, 


viii  Preface 

By  far  the  best  account  of  the  political  career  of 
Wellington  can  be  collected  from  the  Memoirs 
of  Greville,  the  English  St.  Simon.  Much,  too,  can 
be  learned  from  the  correspondence  of  Peel,  edited 
by  Parker,  from  debates  in  Parliament,  and  from 
contemporaneous  histories. 

The  biographies  of  Wellington  are  not  numerous, 
or  of  remarkable  merit.  That  of  Brialmont  is,  I 
think,  the  best ;  the  work  of  Sir  Herbert  Maxwell 
contains  some  very  valuable  papers  taken  from 
family  archives  and  correspondence. 

William  O'Connor  Morris. 
26th  November,  igoj. 

The  last  proofs  of  this  volume  had  been  passed  for  the  press 
before  the  author's  death,  an  event  which  will  be  regretted  by  all 
students  of  the  Napoleonic  period.  The  index  was  to  have  been 
made  by  Judge  O'Connor  Morris  ;  but  failing  health  prevented  him 
even  from  commencing  this  task,  and  it  has  consequently  been  exe- 
cuted by  another  hand.  The  present  volume  may  be  regarded  as 
complementary  to  the  author's  earlier  study  on  Napoleon,  than  which 
few  works  in  this  series  have  enjoyed  a  wider  popularity.  Welling- 
ton is  here  treated  mainly  as  a  soldier  ;  and,  in  telling  the  story  of 
his  life,  the  author  has  taken  the  opportunity  of  discussing  a  number 
of  disputed  questions  in  the  history  of  the  Peninsular  and  Waterloo 
campaigns.  The  Judge's  wide  acquaintance  with  the  memoirs  and 
papers  of  the  leaders  on  both  sides  led  him  to  conclusions  which, 
although  they  have  been  challenged  by  some  high  authorities,  de- 
serve the  attention  due  to  acute  independent  study  of  the  original 
sources  of  information. 

Oxford,  Sept.  i,  1904.  H.  W.  C.  Davis. 


EARLY  YEARS 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I 


PAGE 
I 


Birth  and  family  of  Wellington — The  Wellesleys  or  Wes- 
leys  in  Ireland — Arthur  Wesley,  his  boyhood — He  is  sent 
to  Eton  and  Angers — He  enters  the  army — His  attention  to 
his  military  duties,  and  his  studies — He  is  placed  on  the 
staff  of  Lord  Westmoreland,  the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ire- 
land— He  seconds  the  address  in  the  Irish  Parliament — 
The  Catholic  Relief  Bill  of  1793 — He  distinguishes  himself 
in  the  campaign  of  1794  in  Holland,  but  seeks  to  leave  the 
army. 


CHAPTER  II 


CAREER  IN  INDIA 


Wesley  fails  to  get  a  post  in  the  Civil  Service — He  is  pre- 
vented from  going  in  an  expedition  to  the  West  Indies — He 
is  sent  with  the  33rd  to  India — His  memorandum  on  mili- 
tary affairs,  the  first  instance  of  his  sagacious  views  on  this 
subject — Lord  Mornington  made  Governor-General — The 
two  brothers  in  India — State  of  our  Empire  and  of  the 
Company  at  this  conjuncture — The  name  of  Wesley  changed 
back  to  that  of  Wellesley  —  Operations  against  Tippoo 
Sahib — Arthur  Wellesley,  as  a  rule,  on  the  side  of  peace — 
His  failure  at  an  outpost — Fall  of  Seringapatam — Settle- 
ment of  Mysore — Wellesley  made  Governor — His  adminis- 
tration—  Defeat  of  Dhoondiah  Waugh — Baird  sent  to  Egypt 
instead  of  Wellesley — The  Mahratta  War — Assaye,   great 

ix 


X  Coiitcnis 

PAGK 

ability  shown  by  Wellesley  in  the  battle— Lord  Lake's 
operations— Defeat  of  Monson — Wellesley  leaves  India  for 
England. 

CHAPTER  III 

IRELAND COPENHAGEN VIMIERO    .  .  .  -43 

Wellesley  at  St.  Helena — He  is  consulted  by  Pitt — His 
interview  with  Nelson — He  enters  the  House  of  Commons, 
and  is  made  Chief  Secretary  for  Ireland,  under  the  Duke 
of  Richmond — State  of  Ireland  in  1S07-1808 — Wellesley's 
marriage — His  policy  and  conduct  when  Chief  Secretary — 
He  commands  a  division  at  the  siege  of  Copenhagen — 
Napoleon's  designs  against  the  Iberian  Peninsula — March 
of  Junot  on  Lisbon — Napoleon  extorts  the  crown  of  Spain 
from  the  Spanish  Bourbons — Great  national  rising  of  Spain 
— Reverses  of  the  French — Baylen — The  British  Govern- 
ment interferes — Rising  of  Portugal — Wellesley  lands  at 
Mondego  Bay — Burrard — Dalrymple — Wellesley's  plan  of 
operations — Rolica — Vimiero — Defeat  of  Junot — The  con- 
vention of  Cintra — The  Court  of  Inquiry, 

CHAPTER    IV 

THE  DOURO — TALAVERA 70 

Napoleon's  authority  on  the  Continent  weakened  after  Bay- 
len and  Vimiero — He  persists  in  his  purpose  to  conquer 
Spain  and  Portugal — His  interview  with  the  Czar  at  Erfurth 
— England  rejects  their  overtures  and  continues  the  war — 
Moore  at  Lisbon — He  marches  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Spanish  armies — Napoleon  invades  Spain — Espinosa,  Tudela 
— Moore's  march  to  Sahagun — Napoleon  crosses  the  Gua- 
darrama,  but  fails  to  destroy  Moore's  army — The  retreat  to, 
and  the  battle  of,  Corunna — Death  of  Moore — Faulty  dis- 
positions of  the  French  armies  after  the  departure  of  Na- 
poleon—  Soult  at  Oporto  —  Victor  on  the  Guadiana  — 
Wellesley  in  command  of  a  British  and  Portuguese  army 
at  Lisbon — His  masterly  views  on  the  Peninsular  War — 
'  He  advances  against  Soult  and  crosses  the  Douro — His 
great  ability  in  this  achieve-ment — Able  retreat  of  Soult — 
Wellesley,  after  some  delay,  advances  with  Cwesta,  up  the 


Contents  xl 


PAGE 


valley  of  the  Tagus — Danger  of  this  strategy — Battle  of 
Talavera — Retreat  of  Wellesley  after  a  narrow  escape — 
He  receives  the  title  of  Wellington. 

CHAPTER  V 

BUSACO,   TORRES  VEDRAS,   FUENTES  d'ONORO      .  .     I02 

The  supremacy  of  Napoleon  on  the  Continent  restored 
after  Wagram — His  efforts  to  extend  the  Continental  Sys- 
tem— Spain  and  Portugal  threatened  with  subjugation — 
This  might  have  happened  had  Napoleon  conducted  the 
war  in  person — False  operations  of  the  French  armies — 
The  invasion  of  Andalusia — Far-sighted  views  of  Wellington 
— His  presence  on  the  theatre  of  the  Peninsular  War  of 
supreme  importance — His  preparations  for  the  defence  of 
Portugal — Increase  and  reorganisation  of  the  Portuguese 
army — The  lines  of  Torres  Vedras — Grandeur  of  this  con- 
ception and  of  the  position  of  Wellington — Napoleon  pre- 
pares to  invade  Portugal  in  complete  ignorance  of 
Wellington's  arrangements — Fall  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and 
Almeida — Advance  of  Massena  —  Battle  of  Busaco  and 
defeat  of  the  French — Further  advance  of  Massena — He  is 
permanently  arrested  by  the  lines — His  position  at  Santarem 
— Soult  at  Badajoz — Retreat  of  Massena — Pursuit  of  Well- 
ington— The  French  army  forced  back  into  Spain — Battle 
of  Fuentes  d'Onoro — The  garrison  of  Almeida  escapes — 
Disgrace  of  Massena. 

CHAPTER   VI 

CIUDAD  RODRIGO,  BADAJOZ,  SALAMANCA,  BURGOS  .  139 
Wellington's  defence  of  Portugal  again  stirs  opinion  on 
the  Continent  against  Napoleon — Discontent  in  France, 
especially  with  the  Peninsular  War — Policy  of  Napoleon — 
Weakness  of  the  position  of  the  French  in  Spain— Joseph 
resigns  his  crown — Napoleon,  intent  on  war  with  Russia, 
menaces  the  Continent,  and  tries  to  restore  the  situation  in 
the  Peninsula,  to  little  purpose — The  Empire  apparently  at 
its  height  in  the  eyes  of  most  men — Distress  in  England — 
Confidence   of   Wellington  —  State    of    the  armies    in    the 


xii  Contents 

PAGE 

Peninsula — First  siege  of  Badajoz  —  Battle  of  Albuera  — 
Second  siege  of  Badajoz — It  is  raised— Junction  of  Soult 
and  Marmont  —  Wellington  on  the  Caya — The  marshals 
separate — Wellington  purposes  to  take  Ciudad  Rodrigo 
and  Badajoz — His  preparations — He  is  in  danger  at  El 
Bodon — Progress  of  the  French  army  in  the  East — Siege 
and  fall  of  Tarragona  —  Suchet  at  Valencia — Napoleon 
directs  a  large  part  of  his  forces  to  the  East — Arroyo  Molinos 
—  Wellington  takes  Ciudad  Rodrigo  —  Reduction  of  the 
French  armies  in  Spain — Third  siege  of  Badajoz  —  The 
place  taken  after  a  desperate  resistance  —  Wellington  in- 
vades Spain  —  Operations  of  Marmont  —  Wellington  out- 
manoeuvred— Great  victory  of  Wellington  at  Salamanca — 
Fine  retreat  of  Clausel — Wellington  occupies  Madrid — He 
besieges  Burgos  and  fails — Soult  forced  to  evacuate  Anda-  * 
lusia — Wellington  retreats  from  Burgos — He  is  threatened 
by  the  united  French  armies,  but  makes  good  his  way  to 
Ciudad  Rodrigo. 


CHAPTER  VII 

VITORIA 187 

The  invasion  of  Russia  in  1812 — The  Retreat  from  Moscow 
— Great  rising  in  Prussia  after  the  disasters  of  the  French 
— The  Czar  continues  the  war — Efforts  of  Napoleon  to  re- 
store his  military  power — Lutzen  and  Bautzen — Negotia- 
tions— Policy  of  Metternich — The  armistice  of  Pleisnitz — 
Events  in  Spain  largely  influence  the  conduct  of  the  Allies 
—  Position  of  the  French  armies  after  the  retreat  from 
Burgos  —  They  are  considerably  reduced — Directions  of 
Napoleon  for  the  Campaign  of  1813  in  Spain — They  reach 
Joseph  late  and  are  imperfectly  carried  out — Dissemination 
of  the  French  armies — Wellington  disposes  of  a  great  mili- 
tary force — His  plan  for  the  Campaign  of  1813 — He  turns 
the  position  of  the  French  on  the  Esla  and  the  Douro — 
Joseph  is  surprised  and  compelled  to  fall  back — Confused 
and  ill-managed  retreat  of  the  French  armies  from  Valla- 
dolid  to  Vitoria — Battle  of  Vitoria — Complete  defeat  of 
Joseph — Immense  results  of  the  victory. 


Contents  xiii 

CHAPTER  VIII 

PAGE 

FROM  THE  PYRENE-ES  TO  THE  GARONNE      ,  .  -215 

Wellington  made  a  Field  Marshal  and  Duque  di  Vitoria — 
Soult  reorganises  the  French  array — Battles  of  the  Pyrenees 
— Siege  of  San  Sebastian — Fall  of  the  place — The  Cam- 
paign of  1813  in  Germany — Complete  defeat  of  Napoleon 
at  Leipzig — The  French  armies  driven  across  the  Rhine — 
Wellington  crosses  the  Bidassoa — Soult  fortifies  his  lines  on 
the  Nivelle — The  lines  forced — Soult  had  previously  called 
on  Suchet  to  support  him — Soult  at  Bayonne — His  for- 
midable position — Wellington  crosses  the  Nive — Danger  of 
this  operation  —  The  allied  army  divided  on  the  river  — 
Soult  concentrates  his  forces  and  attacks  it  —  Indecisive 
battles  of  the  loth  and  13th  of  December — Hostilities  in 
the  field  resumed  in  February,  1814 — Difficulties  of  Soult 
and  Wellington — Wellington  attacks  Soult — Passage  of  the 
Adour — Battle  of  Orthes — Retreat  of  Soult  to  Toulouse — 
Rising  against  Napoleon  at  Bordeaux — Pursuit  of  Welling- 
t3n — Fall  of  Napoleon — Battle  of  Toulouse — End  of  the 
War. 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA — QUATRE    BRAS — WATER- 
LOO   255 

Wellington  made  a  Duke  in  1814 — He  is  sent  as  Ambas- 
sador to  France — His  position  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
— Napoleon's  escape  from  Elba — He  regains  the  throne — 
Conduct  of  the  Allies — The  Hundred  Days — Weakness  of 
the  Emperor's  Government — His  military  preparations — 
The  allied  plan  of  campaign  —  Wellington  proposes  to 
invade  France — Napoleon's  plan  of  campaign — Concen- 
tration of  the  French  army  on  the  Belgian  frontier — The 
operations  of  June  15,'  1815  —  Napoleon  fails  to  attain 
fully  his  objects,  but  gains  a  distinct  advantage — Bll'icher 
hastily  advances  to  encounter  Napoleon  with  only  part  of 
his  forces — Delays  of  Wellington — The  battle  of  Ligny 
— The  D'Erlon  incident — Bliicher  is  defeated,  but  not  de- 
stroyed— The  Battle  of  Quatre  Bras — Misconduct  of  Ney 


XIV  Contents 

PAGE 

on  the  i6th  of  June — Tactics  of  Wellington — Napoleon 
and  the  French  army  on  the  17th  of  June — Immense  op- 
portunity given  the  Emperor — Grouchy  is  detached  with 
a  restraining  wing — The  night  of  the  17th  of  June — Oper- 
ations of  the  1 8th  of  June — The  battle  of  Waterloo — 
Fine  defence  of  Wellington — Rout  of  the  French  army — 
Grouchy  the  real  cause  of  the  disaster. 

CHAPTER    X 

THE     ARMY     OF    OCCUPATION — ENTRANCE    INTO    PO- 
LITICAL LIFE   .......    308 

Wellington  and  Blucher  invade  France  —  Intrigues  of 
Fouche  to  effect  the  restoration  of  Louis  XVIII. — Na- 
poleon practically  deposed  by  the  Chambers — Duplicity  of 
Fouche — He  paralyses  the  defence  of  Paris — Envoys  sent 
to  Wellington  and  Blucher — Hazardous  advance  of  Blucher 
— Wisdom  and  moderation  of  Wellington — The  capitu- 
lation of  Paris — Great  position  of  Wellington — He  saves 
France  from  dismemberment,  and  does  her  other  services 
—  He  commands  the  Army  of  Occupation — He  enters 
political  life  in  1818,  and  is  made  Master  of  the  Ordnance 
and  Commander-in-Chief — The  period  from  1818  to  1827 
— Conduct  of  W^ellington — His  attitude  to  the  Irish  Cath- 
olic and  other  questions — His  dispute  with  Canning. 

CHAPTER  XI 

PRIME  MINISTER  OF  ENGLAND   .....    329 

The  Administration  of  Canning — Hopes  formed  as  regards 
his  policy — Death  of  Canning — The  Goderich  Ministry  a 
mere  stopgap  —  Wellington  becomes  Prime  Minister  — 
General  belief  that  his  Government  would  be  permanent — 
Hill  made  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army — Repeal  of 
the  Test  and  Corporation  Acts — Huskisson  and  the  fol- 
lowers of  Canning  leave  the  Ministry — Vesey  Fitzgerald — 
O'Connell  stands  for  Clare — The  Clare  election — Great 
results — Catholic  Emancipation  a  necessity  of  State — Policy 
of  Peel  and  of  Wellington — Great  diiificuUies  in  their  way 


Contents  XV 

PAGE 

— The  Emancipation  Bill  carried — Political  consequences 
— Indignation  of  the  high  Tory  party  and  of  Protestant 
England — The  question  of  Reform  pressed  to  the  front — 
Distress — Revolutions  in  France  and  in  Belgium  —  The 
Reform  movement  adopted  by  the  Whig  party — Unwise 
speech  of  Wellington — Fall  of  his  Government — Lord  Grey  ^ 
and  the  Whigs  in  office. 

CHAPTER  XII 
FROM   1830  TO  1 84 1  ,  .  .  .  .  .    349 

The  Grey  Government — It  introduces  the  Reform  Bill — 
Progress  of  the  rneasures  brought  in — Wellington  called 
upon  to  form  an  administration — He  fails — The  Reform 
Bill  becomes  law — Characteristics  of  the  measure — Welling- 
ton steadily  opposes  it  all  through — Agitated  and  critical 
state  of  England — The  Duke's  life  exposed  to  danger — 
The  first  Reformed  Parliament — Fall  of  the  Government 
of  Lord  Grey — Lord  Melbourne  Prime  Minister — William 
IV.  changes  his  Ministry  and  places  Wellington  at  the 
head  of  affairs — His  patriotic  conduct — Peel  Prime  Minis- 
ter— His  first  short  administration — The  Melbourne  Gov- 
ernment restored  to  office — Wise  and  moderate  attitude  of 
Wellington  in  opposition — Death  of  William  IV. — Acces- 
sion of  Queen  Victoria — Soult  in  England — Feebleness  of 
the  Melbourne  Government  — Wellington  and  Peel,  who 
'  had  been  estranged,  are  completely  reconciled  —  Fall  of 
the  Melbourne  Government — Peel  Prime  Minister. 


CHAPTER   XIII 

DECLINING  YEARS DEATH CHARACTER  .  .     365 

Wellington  in  the  Cabinet  of  Peel,  but  without  office — He 
returns  to  the  command  of  the  army  after  the  retirement  of 
Hill — State  of  England  when  Peel  became  Minister  in 
1 841 — His  great  fiscal  and  economical  reforms — Policy  of 
Free  Trade  —  The  Income  Tax  —  Peel's  administration 
gradually  undermined — The  failure  of  the  potato  in  Ireland 
—  Discussions  in   the    Caljinet — Altitud(;    of   Wellington — 


XVI 


Contents 


Resignation  of  Peel  and  return  to  office— The  ultimate 
repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  carried  through  Parliament  — 
"Wellington  succeeds  in  passing  the  measure  through  the 
House  of  Lords— Fall  of  Peel's  Ministry — The  Administra- 
tion of  Lord  John  Russell — Wellington  often  consulted — 
His  conduct  as  Commander-in-Chief  in  his  later  years 
— Universal  reverence  felt  for  him — His  death  and  funeral 
— His  character  as  a  general,  as  a  military  administrator, 
as  a  statesman,  and  in  public  and  private  life. 


PAGE 


INDEX 


387 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


THE  DUKE  OF  WELLINGTON     .         .         Frontispiece 

After    the    painting   by   Sir    Thomas    Lawrence, 

P.R.A.      Now  in  the  possession  of  Lord  Bath- 

urst.       From   a    print    of  a  negative  owned  by 

Goupil. 


ROBERT  STUART,   VISCOUNT  CASTLEREAGH         .  .  22 

After  the  painting  by  Sir  Thomas  Lawrence. 

PLAN  OF  ASSAYE      .......  38 

NAPOLEON  IN   HIS  STUDY 50 

From  a  steel  engraving. 

PLAN  OF  VIMIERO    .......  66 

SIR  JOHN   HOPE,   EARL  OF   HOPETOUN  ...  76 

From  the  painting  by  Sir  Henry  Raeburn,  R.A. 

LORD  WELLESLEY    .......  86 

From  the  painting  by  Sir  Thomas  Lawrence. 

PLAN  OF  TALAVERA 92 

MARSHAL  NEY 94 

After  the  painting  by  Gerard. 

MARSHAL  SOULT       .  .  .  .  .  .  .       II4 

After  the  painting  by  Rouillard. 
xvii 


XVI 11 


Illustrations 


PLAN  OF  BUSACO     ... 

ANDRE  MASSENA,    DUKE  DE   RIVOLI 
After  the  painting  by  Maurice 

BLUCHER  .... 

From  an  old  engraving 

PLAN  OF  BADAJOZ  . 

PLAN  OF  SALAMANCA 

VISCOUNT  ROWLAND  HILL 

From  the  painting  by  H.  W.  Pickersgill,  R.A. 

LORD  LYNEDOCH      . 

After  the  painting  by  Sir  Thomas  Lawrence. 

PLAN  OF  VITORIA    . 

PLAN  OF  PYRENEES 

SIR  GEORGE  MURRAY 

After  the  painting  by  H.  W.  Pickersgill. 

PLAN  OF  LINES  OF  THE  NIVELLE 

PLAN  OF  BAYONNE 

PLAN  OF  BATTLE  OF  ORTHES  . 

PLAN  OF  TOULOUSE 

PLAN  OF  QUATRE  BRAS  . 

PLAN  OF  ^VATERLOO 

NAPOLEON  BY  A  DYING    CAMP-FIRE 
From  a  drawing  by  Charlet. 

SIR  ROBERT  PEEL     . 

From  the  painting  by  John  Linnell,  in  the  National 
Portrait  Gallery. 

SIR  HENRY  HARDING         ...... 

After  the  painting  by  E.  Eddis. 


372 


Illust7'ations 


THE  DUKE  OF  WELLINGTON      . 
From  a  steel  enfrravin^. 


MAPS 


MAP  OF  INDIA   IN    1 804 


MAP  OF  SPAIN  AND  PORTUGAL 

To  illustrate  the  Peninsular  War. 


XIX 

PAGE 
-,80 


42 


WELLINGTON 


CHAPTER  I 


EARLY   YEARS 


Birth  and  family  of  Wellington— The  Wellesleys  or  Wesleys  in 
Ireland — Arthur  Wesley,  his  boyhood — He  is  sent  to  Eton  and 
Angers — He  enters  the  army — His  attention  to  his  military  du- 
ties, and  his  studies — He  is  placed  on  the  staff  of  Lord  West- 
moreland, the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland — He  seconds  the  ad- 
dress in  the  Irish  Parliament— The  Catholic  Relief  Bill  of  1793 
— He  distinguishes  himself  in  the  campaign  of  1794  in  Holland, 
but  seeks  to  leave  the  army. 

THERE  is  some  uncertainty  as  to  the  date  of  the 
birth  of  WeUington,  as  there  is  with  respect 
to  the  date  of  the  birth  of  Napoleon.  The 
evidence,  however,  is  nearly  conclusive  that  Napo- 
leon was  born  on  the  15th  of  August,  1769,  and 
that  Wellington  was  born  on  the  ist  of  May  in  the 
same  year  ;  "  Providence,"  said  Louis  XVIII.,  "  gave 
us  this  counterpoise."  The  family  of  the  future 
soldier  and  statesman  belonged  to  "  the  English  in 
Ireland,"  as  they  have  been  called  ;  it  may  be  traced 


2  Wellmgton 

back  to  Waleran  de  Wellesley,  a  Judge  of  the  An- 
glo-Norman Colony  of  the  Pale  in  the  thirteenth 
century.  The  descendants  of  the  Judge  had  no  dis- 
tinguished names ;  the)'  were  more  fortunate  than 
most  of  the  "  Old  English'ry,"  and  escaped  the  ef- 
fects of  confiscation  and  conquest ;  they  were  owners 
of  large  estates  in  Meath  and  Kildare  when  the  Act 
of  Settlement  confirmed  theCromwellian  forfeitures. 
The  surname  of  Wellesley  had,  before  this,  been  cor- 
rupted into  that  of  Wesley  about  the  time  of  the 
restoration  of  Charles  II.  Garret  Wesley  married  a 
daughter  of  a  gentleman  of  the  name  of  Colley,  of 
a  family,  also  of  English  blood,  which  had  been  set- 
tled in  the  County  of  Kilkenny,  since  the  reign  of 
Henry  V.  The  marriage  of  Garret  having  been 
childless,  he  transmitted  his  lands  to  a  nephew, 
Richard  Colley,  on  the  condition  of  his  taking  the 
name  and  arms  of  Wesley ;  and  Richard  Colley 
Wesley,  who,  like  many  of  the  Colonial  caste,  had 
considerable  borough  influence  in  the  Irish  House  of 
Commons,  was  created  Baron  Mornington  in-  the 
Peerage  of  Ireland  in  1747.  His  son  Garret,  not  a 
man  of  superior  parts,  and  remarkable  only  for  his 
skill  in  music,  which  attracted  the  notice  of  George 
III.,  was  made  Earl  of  Mornington  in  1760;  he  mar- 
ried a  daughter  of  the  House  of  Hill,  a  prominent 
House  of  the  Anglo-Irish  Colony ;  by  her  he  had 
five  sons  and  a  daughter,  the  fourth  son,  Arthur,  being 
the  Wellington  of  another  day.  It  may  thus  be  ob- 
served that  Wellington,  as  far  as  can  be  ascertained, 
had  nothing  in  common  with  the  native  Irish  race ; 
no  Celtic  blood,  probably,  ran  in  his  veins ;  his  na- 


Early   Years  3 

ture  was  the  very  opposite  of  that  of  the  Celt ;  he 
was  a  scion  of  the  English  conquerors  settled  in  Ire- 
land, identified  with  them  in  lineage  and  in  faith; 
and  through  life  he  had  strong  sympathies  with  this 
order  of  men,  the  representatives  of  Protestant  as- 
cendency, as  it  was  called. 

In  the  case  of  WeUington,  as  in  that  of  Napoleon, 
and  indeed  of  many  other  illustrious  men,  the  off- 
spring inherited  its  best  gifts  from  the  maternal  par- 
ent.    Lady  Mornington,  left  a  widow  in  1781,  was  a 
woman  of  no  ordinary  powers,  and  of  very  remarkable 
strength  of  character  ;  but  her  nature  was  imperious 
and  not  genial ;  her  temperament  was  rather  stern 
and  cold  ;  we  see  these  qualities  in  the  greatest  of 
her  sons.     It  is  a  singular  fact  that  she  had  no  per- 
ception of  what  Arthur,  even  in  boyhood,  must  have 
been  ;  she  thought  him  stupid  and  without  a  sign  of 
promise.     "  I  vow  to  God,"  she  once  exclaimed ;  "I 
don't  know  what  I  shall  do  with  him."     There  was, 
in  truth,  no  kind  of  sympathy  between  the  mother 
and  the  son ;  in  his  early  as  in  his  later  years,  the 
domestic  life  of  WeUington  was  not  happy;    this 
may,  in  part,  account  for  what  he  was  in  the  circle  of 
home.     The  lad  was  sent  for  a  short  time  to  Eton, 
but  unlike  Richard,  his  eldest  brother,  a  darling  of 
Eton  and   Oxford  tutors,  and  one  of  the  greatest 
English  masters  of  the  Latin  tongue,  he  made  no 
mark  at  that  celebrated  school,  though  certainly  he 
retained  an  affection  for  it;  "the   cricket  field   at 
Eton,"  he  once  said,  "had  its  effect  at  Waterloo." 
We  find  Arthur  next  at  a  kind  of  military  school  at 
Angers,  directed  by  a  distinguished  officer  of  French 


4  Wellington 

engineers;  Lady  Mornington  seems  to  have  gratified 
his  inclination  in  this  ;  she  had  destined  him  for  a 
small  place  in  the  Irish  Excise  ;  but  "  nothing  would 
satisfy  him  but  to  go  into  the  army."  She  sent  him 
to  Angers  to  learn  his  calling,  contemptuously  re- 
marking that  "  he  would  be  only  food  for  powder." 
We  know  little  or  nothing  about  Wellington's  life  at 
Angers  ;  but  probably  he  read  hard  and  with  profit : 
many  years  afterwards  he  said  to  a  friend  that  he 
"  had  made  it  a  rule  to  work  some  hours  at  his  books 
from  a  very  early  age."  In  1787,  he  obtained  his 
first  commission  ;  and,  perhaps  owing  to  family  influ- 
ence, passed  rapidly  through  the  lower  grades  of  the 
service.  He  was  raised  to  the  rank  of  major  within 
six  years ;  this,  for  that  age,  was  extremely  quick  pro- 
motion. We  now  begin  to  see  what  he  really  was; 
like  Turenne,  with  whom  he  had  some  points  in 
common,  he  became  an  excellent  infantry  of^cer,  and 
when  a  captain,  had  his  company  in  the  best  order ; 
and  he  addressed  himself  especially  to  the  mastery 
of  the  tactics  of  his  arm,  in  which  he  has  never,  per- 
haps, been  excelled,  as  Napoleon  was  pre-eminent 
in  all  that  pertained  to  artillery.  As  he  once  ob- 
served in  his  characteristic  fashion  :  "  I  was  not  so 
young  as  not  to  know  that  since  I  had  undertaken  a 
profession,  I  had  better  try  to  understand  it.  I  be- 
lieve that  I  owe  most  of  my  success  to  the  attention 
I  always  paid  to  the  inferior  part  of  tactics  as  a  regi- 
mental of^cer.  There  were  very  few  men  in  the 
army  who  knew  these  details  better  than  I  did  ;  it 
is  the  foundation  of  all  military  knowledge." 

Having  recently  obtained   a  troop   of  dragoons, 


Early   Years  5 

Arthur  Wesley,  in  the  autumn  of  1792,  was  placed 
on  the  staff  of  Lord  Westmoreland,  the  head  of 
the  Irish  Government.  The  social  life  of  Dublin  in 
those  days  was  very  brilliant ;  the  Protestant  aris- 
tocracy, proud  of  the  Revolution  of  1782,  which  had 
made  their  Parliament  independent  in  name,  gave 
free  rein  to  pleasure  carried  to  excess ;  their  gaiety, 
their  hospitalities,  their  high  play,  were  famous.  A 
young  aide-de-camp  of  the  Lord  Lieutenant  has 
always  been  a  favourite  in  the  Irish  capital ;  Arthur 
Wesley  took  part  in  the  State  balls,  the  dinners,  and 
the  other  festivities  of  the  time,  but  he  was  hardly 
conspicuous  among  his  brother  officers.  The  tradi- 
tions about  him,  when  at  the  Castle,  are  few ;  two 
anecdotes,  however,  may  be  mentioned  ;  he  is  said  to 
have  pointed  out  a  house  in  the  city,  which  com- 
manded a  number  of  leading  streets,  and  to  have 
advised  that  it  should  be  fortified  ;  and  I  have  my- 
self heard  a  veteran,  in  extreme  old  age,  tell  how  he 
was  near  fighting  a  duel  with  the  great  future  war- 
rior, and  how  well  it  was  that  his  pistol  had  not  the 
chance  of  perhaps  changing  the  fortunes  of  Europe! 
Wesley  had  entered  the  Irish  House  of  Commons 
in  1790,  as  a  member  of  the  pocket  borough  of  Trim, 
an  appanage  of  his  family  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
as  was  the  case  of  five-sixths  of  the  Irish  boroughs, 
petty  corporations,  feeble  and  corrupt,  the  mono- 
plies  of  the  dominant  lords  of  the  soil.  Nothing 
is  known  about  his  early  parliamentary  career;  but 
we  may  perhaps  guess  what  he  may  have  thought, 
with  characteristic  common  sense  and  judgment,  of 
an  assembly  which  was  a  mere    caricature  of   the 


6  Welli7igton 

greater  assembly  that  had  its  seat  at  Westminster ; 
which  did  not  represent  a  fifth  part  of  the  Irish 
people  ;  and  which,  though  it  contained  many  re- 
markable men,  abounded  in  factions  and  bad  ele- 
ments;  and  was  the  instrument  of  an  oligarchy  of 
sect  at  the  beck  of  the  Castle.  He  belonged,  how- 
ever, to  the  party  attached  to  the  Government,  which, 
practically,  was  supreme  in  College  Green,  and  in 
fact  was  a  dependent  of  the  Lord  Lieutenant ;  we 
may  rest  assured  that  he  would  have  denounced  L'ish 
parliamentary  reform  at  this  time,  as  he  denounced 
the  great  Reform  Bill  forty  years  afterwards.  The 
period  when  he  was  a  member  of  the  Irish  Parlia- 
ment was  one  filled  with  portentous  events,  and  of 
evil  omen  to  Ireland  and  Great  Britain  alike.  The 
French  Revolution  had  shaken  Ireland  and  her  social 
structure  to  its  base ;  Presbyterian  Ulster  was  dis- 
affected to  the  core,  and  was  falling  into  the  hands 
of  the  United  Irishmen  ;  Catholic  Ireland,  still  down- 
trodden and  oppressed,  was  beginning  to  stir  with  a 
dangerous  movement ;  the  institutions  of  the  country, 
founded  on  an  ascendency  of  race  and  creed,  exclu- 
sive and  unjust,  were  in  no  doubtful  peril.  At  the 
same  time,  notwithstanding  the  efforts  of  Pitt,  the 
Revolution  was  turning  England  against  France ; 
and  there  were  many  signs  of  a  tremendous  im- 
pending conflict. 

When  the  Irish  Parliament  had  assembled  for  the 
session  of  1793,  Arthur  Wesley  was  put  forward  to 
second  the  Address  to  the  Throne.  A  great  "  Roman 
Catholic  Relief  Bill,"  as  it  was  named,  was  the  prin- 
cipal measure  before  the  House  of  Commons ;  even 


Early   Years  7 

now  it  has  much  historical  interest.  During  a  period 
of  more  than  twenty  years,  the  fetters  which  bound 
the  Catholic  Irish  had  been  removed  by  degree^  ; 
they  had  been  allowed  to  Hve  in  peace,  in  their  own 
country,  and  even  to  acquire  lands  by  purchase; 
they  had  been  freed  from  the  worst  social  disabili- 
ties imposed  on  them,  but  they  were  still  almost  with- 
out political  power,  —  in  fact,  all  but  shut  out  from 
the  pale  of  the  State;  and  though  the  illustrious 
Grattan  and  his  followers  aimed  at  raising  them  to 
the  level  of  the  Protestants  in  their  midst,  a  large 
majority  at  College  Green  were  still  opposed  to  their 
claims.  The  condition  of  Ireland,  however,  had 
alarmed  Pitt,  and,  probably  at  the  instigation  of 
Burke,  through  life  a  champion  of  the  Irish  Catholic 
people,  the  Minister  had  resolved  to  bring  in  a 
measure  for  enlarging  the  rights  of  the  Catholic 
Irish,  and  to  carry  it  through  the  Irish  Parliament 
by  the  means  in  his  hands.  The  bill,  like  many 
other  projects  of  the  kind,  revealed  the  ignorance  of 
Ireland  characteristic  of  British  statesmen  ;  it  ad- 
mitted, but  with  great  and  invidious  exceptions,  the 
Irish  Cathohc  to  certain  offices  in  the  State;  but  — 
and  this  was  its  most  distinctive  and  worst  feature 
—  it  gave  the  electoral  franchise  to  the  great  body 
of  the  Irish  peasantry  —  a  priest-ridden  multitude  of 
Helot  serfs  —  and  closed  the  doors  of  Parliament  to 
the  Catholic  peer  and  gentlemen,  exactly  reversing 
the  course  of  what  should  have  been  a  true  policy. 
The  measure,  however,  passed  both  Houses;  the 
majority,  if  not  without  angry  protests,  being  in- 
duced or  bribed  to  give  their  assent ;  but  it  gave 


8-  Wellington 

rise  to  very  able  debates ;  more  than  one  of  the  Op- 
position pointed  out,  with  prophetic  insight,  what  — 
even  if  it  were  delayed  for  years — would  be  the 
natural,  perhaps  the  inevitable  result,  of  conferring 
immense  political  power  on  the  Catholic  masses, 
and  withholding  it  from  their  superiors  and  leaders. 
Wesley's  speech  on  this  occasion  was  confined  to  a 
few  words ;  it  was  the  speech  of  a  young  Castle  offi- 
cial; but  we  may  speculate  if  the  predictions  he 
heard  at  this  time  did  not  cross  his  mind  when  the 
Clare  election  of  1828  —  a  triumph  won  by  the 
peasantry  enfranchised  in  1793  —  extorted  Catholic 
Emancipation  from  his  reluctant  hands.  It  deserves 
notice  that  he  objected  to  the  policy  of  letting 
Catholics  into  the  Irish  Parliament,  on  the  ground 
only  that  this  project  might  cause  disunion,  and  not, 
as  the  school  of  Flood  did,  on  the  ground  of  princi- 
ple ;  this  is  perhaps  the  first  instance  of  the  spirit 
of  compromise,  which  was  characteristic  of  the 
statesman  of  another  age. 

Wesley  had  left  the  Irish  House  of  Commons 
within  a  few  months.  He  had  entered  on  his  ac- 
tive mihtary  career  in  the  early  spring  of  1794.  He 
had  been  made  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  33rd  Foot 
through  the  influence  of  Lord  Westmoreland  and 
of  his  eldest  brother,  who  had  succeeded,  of  course, 
to  his  father's  peerage  ;  he  sailed  from  Cork  under  the 
command  of  Lord  Moira  to  take  part  in  the  great 
war  which  was  being  waged  between  the  League  of 
Europe  and  revolutionary  France.  The  conflict  had 
been  a  fierce  struggle  of  opposing  principles;  the 
aristocracies  and  monarchies  of  the  eighteenth  cent- 


Early   Years  9 

ury  had  encountered  a  democracy  formidable  in  its 
strength  and  its  new  ideas:  a  great  nation,  appar- 
ently on  the  brink  of  destruction,  had  baffled  a 
coalition  which  seemed  impossible  to  resist,  had 
struck  down  a  host  of  domestic  foes,  and  was  now 
advancing  on  a  flood  tide  of  victory.  The  situation, 
nevertheless,  might  have  been  m-ade  desperate  for 
France  in  her  agony  in  the  later  months  of  1793. 
After  Neerwinden,  the  allied  armies  had  reached  the 
camp  of  Caesar  and  were  only  a  few  marches  from 
Paris,  with  weak  and  beaten  levies  in  their  path  ; 
they  could,  without  difficulty,  have  seized  the  capi- 
tal and  mastered  its  Jacobin  rulers  in  their  seat. 
France  was  being  invaded  on  all  her  borders ;  a  civil 
war  was  raging  in  the  West ;  Marseilles  and  Lyons 
were  in  revolt ;  Toulon  was  assailed  by  a  great  hos- 
tile fleet ;  the  Girondin  rising  stirred  whole  pro- 
vinces. But  the  Allies  were  divided  in  mind  and 
jealous  of  each  other;  there  was  no  real  unity  in 
their  councils ;  their  military  operations  were  ill-di- 
rected ;  disseminated  upon  an  immense  front,  they 
wasted  their  power  in  useless  sieges,  they  never 
combined  their  vast  forces  against  the  common 
enemy.  France  was  given  what  was,  above  all, 
needed,  time  ;  a  terrible  dictatorship,  the  Commit- 
tee of  Public  Safety,  laid  hold  of  the  resources  of 
the  country  and  of  its  head,  Paris,  and  summoned  the 
mass  of  the  nation  to  arms.  Frightful  as  the  Reign 
of  Terror  was,  its  results  were  decisive.  The  fourteen 
armies  of  the  Republic  stemmed  the  tide  of  inva- 
sion ;  the  Allies  were  discomfited  on  the  northern 
and  the  eastern   frontiers  ;    the  insurrection  of   La 


lo  Wellington 

Vendue  sank  in  blood  and  ashes;  the  genius  of  Bo- 
naparte saved  Toulon  ;  the  rebel  cities  of  the  South 
fell ;  the  Girondins  and  their  adherents  were  crushed. 
Before  the  summer  of  1794,  the  war  had  turned  de- 
cisively against  the  coalition.  While  Prussia  was  hesi- 
tating in  the  East,  Carnot  had  flung  armed  masses 
into  the  Low  Countries :  the  Duke  of  York  had 
been  defeated  near  Tournay ;  Jourdan  had  won  a 
great  battle  on  the  plains  of  Fleurus  ;  and  while  the 
Duke  was  in  full  retreat  in  Belgium,  his  Austrian 
colleagues  were  making  off  for  the  Rhine.  The 
League  of  Europe  was,  in  a  word,  fast  breaking  up  ; 
the  Republic  was  advancing  beyond  old  France  ;  her 
arms  and  her  evangel  of  liberty  were  spreading  her 
influence  far  and  near. 

Wesley,  even  before  this  time,  seems  to  have  been 
recognised  by  his  superiors  as  a  capable  officer.  The 
33rd  Regiment  was  a  model  corps;  its  organisation 
and  discipline  were  extremely  good  ;  it  was  a  speci- 
men of  the  admirable  work  and  care  of  a  commander 
who,  in  his  own  words,  "  was  always  on  the  spot, 
saw  everything  and  did  everything  himself."  Lord 
Moira  placed  the  young  colonel  at  the  head  of  a 
brigade ;  Wesley  had  soon  given  proof  of  military 
insight  and  skill.  The  Duke  of  York,  driven  from 
Oudenarde  and  the  adjoining  country,  was  now  in 
full  retreat  to  the  Lower  Scheldt,  with  Pichegru  and 
Moreau  on  his  track;  Moira  and  his  contingent  had 
landed  at  Ostend ;  Wesley  urged  his  chief  to  re- 
embark,  and  to  join  the  Duke  by  sea,  obviously 
the  proper  and  the  only  safe  course.  Moira,  how- 
ever, with  remarkable  want  of  judgment,  marched 


Early   Years  1 1 

from  Ostend  behind  the  screen  of  the  Great  Canal, 
exposhig  his  flank  to  a  victorious  enemy ;  he  fortu- 
nately escaped,  but  was  in  grave  danger;  Wesley 
actually  re-embarked  with  his  brigade  and  had  come 
into  Hne  with  the  Duke  before  his  commander.  It  is 
unnecessary  to  retrace  the  events  of  the  campaign 
that  followed,  glorious  to  France,  most  disastrous  to 
the  arms  of  the  Allies.  The  French  fortresses  which 
had  fallen  the  year  before  were  easily  recaptured 
after  the  late  defeats  of  the  League;  Pichegru,  Mo- 
reau,  and  Jourdan  had  erelong  entered  Brussels  and 
taken  possession  of  the  whole  of  Belgium  ;  the  Duke 
of  York,  isolated  and  without  his  supports,  retreated 
behind  the  Lower  Meuse  and  the  Wahal ;  the  Aus- 
trian Clerfait,  beaten  on  the  Ourthe  and  the  Roer, 
with  difficulty  escaped  across  the  Rhine  by  Cologne. 
The  French.now  advanced  into  Holland  in  triumph. 
The  Prince  of  Orange  and  the  aristocratic  party  en- 
deavoured for  a  time  to  make  a  stand  and  with  part 
of  the  army  to  help  the  Duke,  but  the  great  body 
of  the  people  had  had  sympathies  for  many  years 
with  France ;  it  had  been  leavened  with  the  Revo- 
lutionary hopes  and  doctrines ;  it  welcomed  the 
invaders  as  liberators  from  the  yoke  of  the  Stadt- 
holders,  and  as  bringing  them  freedom  at  the  point 
of  their  swords.  The  French  armies  swept  over  the 
States  like  a  torrent,  meeting  hardly  any  resistance 
on  their  way ;  fortress  after  fortress  opened  its  gates  ; 
the  line  of  the  Wahal  was  lost ;  the  Duke  of  York, 
who  had  gone  back  to  England  and  given  his  com- 
mand to  a  German  colleague,  had  left  his  army  in 
critical  straits ;  it  was  ultimately  compelled  to  fall 


1 2  Wellington 

back  behind  the  Ems,  and,  discomfited,  to  embark 
for  England  from  Bremen.  Meanwhile  a  winter  of 
extraordinary  severity  had  set  in,  the  great  rivers  of 
Holland  were  congealed  and  ceased  to  afford  any 
hnes  of  defence,  and  the  campaign  ended  with  the 
capture  of  Amsterdam  and  of  the  greater  part  of  the 
renowned  Dutch  fleet,  boarded,  strange  to  say,  by 
squadrons  of  Pichegru's  hussars. 

Wesley  played  a  not  undistinguished  part  in  this 
unfortunate  contest  in  the  Low  Countries.  He 
covered  the  retreat  of  the  Army,  on  more  than  one 
occasion  ;  beat  off  the  enemy,  in  a  bloody  struggle 
round  Boxtel,  a  village  not  far  from  the  Wahal,  and 
was  repeatedly  thanked,  by  his  superiors,  for  his  good 
services.  He  has  left  experiences  of  what  he  wit- 
nessed, and  has  written  a  few  words  on  the  state  of 
the  British  Army  at  this  time.  The  troops,  true  to 
their  nature,  were  stubborn  and  brave :  many  of  the 
regiments  were  well  ordered,  and  did  their  duty  ad- 
mirably in  a  most  severe  trial.  But  the  tactics  of  the 
Army  were  antiquated  and  bad  ;  its  formations  were 
cumbrous  and  heavy  in  the  extreme ;  it  was  ill  com- 
manded through  nearly  all  its  grades  ;  "  no  one  knew 
how  to  manage  it,"  as  a  collective  mihtary  force. 
The  Army,  in  fact,  at  this  period,  had  sunk  to  the 
lowest  point  of  inferiority  seen  in  its  history.  It 
gave  proof,  no  doubt,  of  the  great  qualities  of  the 
race ;  it  often  beat  the  French  soldiery  in  fair  fight, 
fired  as  these  were  with  patriotic  passions,  and  for- 
midable as  they  have  always  been  in  success.  But  it 
had  been  hastily  recruited,  and  had  few  seasoned 
men  ;  its  mechanism  and  organisation  were  very  de- 


Early   Years  1 3 

fective  ;  it  had  suffered  from  the  economising  policy 
of  Pitt,  who  would  not  prepare  for  war  until  the  last 
moment.  Its  leaders,  from  the  Commander-in-Chief 
to  the  subaltern,  had  little  or  no  knowledge  of  the 
military  art,  and  gave  little  attention  to  their  pro- 
fession ;  the  grossest  favouritism  prevailed  in  the 
service ;  political  interest,  jobbing,  anything  but 
merit,  were  the  passports  to  even  the  highest  promo- 
tion. The  Army,  in  a  word,  was  full  of  abuses  and 
defects;  Wesley  remarked  that  the  of^cers  in  1794 
were  careless  and  idle;  that  outpost  duties  were 
miserably  performed  ;  that  incapacity  was  conspicu- 
ous even  in  the  highest  places.  This,  too,  was  nearly 
the  view  of  Nelson  about  this  time  ;  and  in  truth, 
after  Saratoga  and  Yorktown,  the  British  Army 
stood  ill  in  opinion  in  England,  and  throughout 
Europe.  Arthur  Wesley  appears  to  have  had  a  con- 
viction that  he  had  no  opportunity  to  rise  in  such  a 
calling  ;  he  was  disgusted  with  what  he  had  seen  in 
the  Netherlands,  and  actually  applied  for  a  civil  post ; 
for  he  said,  "  I  see  the  manner  in  which  military  offi- 
ces are  filled."  Propitious  Fortune,  however,  refused 
his  prayer;  "  he  was  to  be  shown  to  her,"  like  the 
Roman,  in  a  very  different  aspect.  The  destinies 
of  the  greatest  men  have  thus  hung  upon  seeming 
trifles;  Cromwell  had  turned  his  eyes  to  New  Eng- 
land before  the  great  Civil  War  ;  Napoleon  sought  a 
mission  to  the  Turk  when  on  the  eve  of  command- 
ing the  Army  of  Italy. 


CHAPTER  II 

CAREER    IN   INDIA 

Wesley  fails  to  get  a  post  in  the  Civil  Service — He  is  prevented  from 
going  in  an  expedition  to  the  West  Indies — He  is  sent  with  the 
33rd  to  India — His  memorandum  on  military  affairs,  the  first 
instance  of  his  sagacious  views  on  this  subject — Lord  Morning- 
ton  made  Governor-General — The  two  brothers  in  India — State 
of  our  Empire  and  of  the  Company  at  this  conjuncture — The 
name  of  Wesley  changed  back  to  that  of  Wellesley — Operations 
against  Tippoo  Sahib — Arthur  Wellesley,  as  a  rule,  on  the  side  of 
peace — His  failure  at  an  outpost — Fall  of  Seringapatam — Set- 
tlement of  Mysore — Wellesley  made  Governor — His  adminis- 
tration— Defeat  of  Dhoondiah  Waugh — Baird  sent  to  Egypt  in- 
stead of  Wellesley — The  Mahratta  War — Assaye,  great  ability 
shown  by  Wellesley  in  the  battle — Lord  Lake's  operations — De- 
feat of  Monson — Wellesley  leaves  India  for  England. 

WE  know  nothing  of  what  occurred  as  to 
Arthur  Wesley's  attempt  to  enter  the 
Civil  Service  of  the  State,  save  that,  hap- 
pily, it  was  not  attended  with  success.  Fortune, 
too,  smiled  on  him  in  another  instance  ;  he  embarked, 
with  the  33rd,  to  take  part  in  an  expedition  against 
the  French  settlements  in  the  West  Indies,  objects 
of  British  attack  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  A 
tempest,  however,  put  a  stop  to  the  enterprise ; 
many  of  the  transports,  the  "wooden  coffins"  of  those 

14 


Career  in  India  15 

days,  were  wrecked,  a  considerable  number  of  the 
troops,  perished  and  the  33rd  and  its  chief  were  soon 
afterward  despatched  to  the  East.  Wesley  on  the 
voyage  devoted  studious  hours  to  acquiring  a  know- 
ledge of  the  affairs  of  India ;  his  natural  sagacity, 
even  now  remarkable,  made  what  he  had  thus 
mastered  of  sterling  value.  He  landed  at  Calcutta 
in  the  spring  of  1797 ;  our  rule  in  the  Peninsula  was 
being  already  threatened  by  rumours  of  war  gather- 
ing in  on  many  sides  ;  the  reins  of  government  were 
in  the  hands  of  Sir  John  Shore,  one  of  the  Viceroys, 
who  adopted  a  timid  policy  in  Hindustan  before  our 
Empire  had  been  fully  established.  The  Governor- 
General,  however,  did  not  perceive  any  immediate 
danger  ;  by  this  time,  we  were  at  war  with  Spain  ;  St. 
Vincent  had  been  won  by  the  genius  of  Nelson  ; 
Wesley's  services  were  first  put  in  request  for  a  pro- 
jected attack  against  Manila,  the  capital  of  the 
Philippine  Islands,  the  scene  of  one  of  our  triumphs 
in  the  Seven  Years'  War.  The  expedition  never  took 
place,  but  preparations  for  it  gave  to  Wesley,  then 
in  his  twenty-eighth  year,  his  first  opportunity  to 
place  on  record  his  clear  and  farsighted  views  on 
military  affairs,  conspicuous  for  their  mastery  of  de- 
tails of  all  kinds,  which  were  distinctive  features  of 
his  capacity  in  command.  Erelong  a  change  had 
passed  over  the  situation  in  the  East :  the  Peninsula 
had  been  stirred  by  echoes  of  French  victories  in 
the  West ;  French  ambition  and  intrigue  were  at 
work  against  our  rule  ;  Tippoo  Sahib  was  intent  on 
recovering  the  dominions  he  had  lost ;  some  of  our 
allies  were  hesitating,  even  ready  to  declare  against 


1 6  lVellmgto7i 

us.  In  these  circumstances,  Sir  John  Shore  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Wesley's  eldest  brother,  Mornington. 
The  new  Governor-General,  who  had  served  on  the 
Board  of  Control,  but  whose  great  powers  had  not  yet 
been  displayed,  even  if  he  was  well  acquainted  with 
Indian  affairs,  reached  Calcutta  in  May,  1798,  at  the 
very  moment  when  Napoleon  was  about  to  embark 
for  Egypt  and  to  make  an  effort  to  descend  from  the 
Nile  on  the  Indies,  an  enterprise  which,  extravagant 
as  it  may  appear,  he  maintained,  even  at  St.  Helena, 
was  quite  feasible.  The  youthful  conqueror  had 
already  negotiated  with  Tippoo  Sahib,  and  certainly 
had  designs  against  our  Empire  in  the  East ;  but  as 
he  was  baffled  by  Nelson  in  the  Bay  of  Aboukir,  so 
it  was  his  destiny  that  Richard  and  Arthur  Wesley 
should  place  that  Empire  on  foundations  which 
could  defy  his  genius,  and  make  subsequent  plans  of 
invasion  hopeless.  It  may  here  be  added  that  about 
this  time  the  two  brothers  reverted  to  the  old  name 
of  the  family ;  -the  more  aristocratic  Wellesley  re- 
placed the  more  plebeian  Wesley. 

When  Lord  Mornington  was  made  chief  Gover- 
nor, England  had  become  the  dominant  Power  in 
India,  but  our  Empire  was  even  yet  by  no  means 
assured.  The  supremacy  of  the  Moguls  was  a  thing 
of  the  past ;  a  mere  phantom  held  idle  state  at 
Delhi ;  the  Peninsula  was  ruled  by  the  great  Com- 
pany, or  was  parcelled  out  among  Princes  of  differ- 
ent races,  overawed  by  the  strangers  from  across  the 
ocean,  but  disunited  and  usually  at  feud  with  each 
other.  The  vast  basin  of  the  Ganges  was  completely 
in  our  hands  ;  the  Presidencies  of  Madras  and  Bom- 


Career  in  India  17 

bay,  once  the  seats  of  insignificant  trading  factories, 
had  extended  far  inland  from  either  sea,  and  em- 
braced large  provinces  under  subject  chiefs  ;  Oude, 
a  kingdom  in  itself,  had  been  reduced  to  vassalage ; 
our  authority  was  felt  by  the  tribes  and  the  peoples 
under  the  shadows  of  the  Himalayas,  and  along  the 
course  of  the  Indus.  The  arms  of  France  and  the 
genius  of  Dupleix,  for  a  time  threatening  our  very 
existence  in  the  East,  had  failed  against  Clive  and 
the  Lords  of  the  Sea;  a  succession  of  victories, 
sometimes  of  an  extraordinary  kind,  Plassy,  Wande- 
wash,  Porto-Novo,  and  many  more,  had  proved  that, 
even  against  enormous  odds,  the  islanders  of  Europe 
could  crush  Asiatics  in  fair  fight.  An  Empire,  in 
fact,  to  which  history  can  show  no  parallel,  had  been 
built  up,  in  the  space  of  less  than  half  a  century, 
out  of  the  wrecks  of  imposing  but  declining  dynas- 
ties, by  the  capacity  and  craft  of  two  or  three  master 
minds ;  and  a  handful  of  Englishmen  scattered  in 
their  midst,  had  become  the  rulers  of  populations  of 
many  millions,  or  kept  them  down  by  the  terror  of  the 
English  name.  Our  supremacy  in  India,  however, 
was  new,  and,  not  yet  deep-rooted,  it  was  menaced 
by  native  foes,  vanquished  but  still  able  to  strike,  and 
by  one  of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe.  It  depended 
in  part  on  the  faith  of  still  doubtful  allies;  it  owed, 
in  some  measure,  its  existence  and  its  strength  to 
the  jealousies  and  the  discords  of  still  great  poten- 
tates, who,  though  hostile  to  each  other  for  years, 
might,  should  an  opportunity  arise,  combine  their 
arms  against  it.  Tippoo  Sahib,  from  the  table-land 
of  Mysore,  was  ready,   as   Hydcr  Ali  had   been,  to 


1 8  '  Wellington 

descend  on  our  territories  round  Madras  and  Bom- 
bay, and,  at  the  head  of  a  great  army,  to  avenge  his 
defeats  at  the  hands  of  CornwaUis.  Revolutionary 
France  had  not  forgotten  the  efforts  of  Dupleix;  she 
was  eager  to  contend  again  for  empire  in  Hindu- 
stan. Napoleon,  we  have  seen,  had  stretched  a  hand 
to  Tippoo  ;  French  of^cers  had  organised  the  forces 
of  several  of  the  Indian  Princes,  and  were  awaiting 
the  moment  of  a  French  invasion.  The  Viceroy  of 
the  Deccan,  called  the  Nizam,  was  the  only  powerful 
ally  on  whom  we  could  reckon,  and  even  he  was  by 
no  means  trustworthy  ;  and  the  great  confederacy  of 
the  Mahrattas,  at  one  time  friendly,  was  gradually 
becoming  all  but  openly  hostile.  Tippoo  and  the 
Mahrattas  were  the  most  formidable  of  the  native 
Powers  ;  they  had  often  been  at  war  with  each  other, 
and  the  chiefs  of  the  Mahrattas  were  not  united; 
but  events  were  tending  to  make  them  the  foes  of 
England. 

The  internal  government  of  our  Indian  dominions, 
though  very  different  from  what  it  has  been  for 
years,  was  now  infinitely  better  than  it  was  at  its 
origin.  Burke  was  never  just  to  the  rule  of  the 
Company  ;  it  was  never  that  of  a  "  mere  rapacious, 
peculating,  and  unsteady  despotism  "  ;  its  "  posses- 
sion of  Hindustan  had  not  been  like  that  of  the 
ourangoutang  and  the  hyaena."  But,  as  has  usually 
happened  when  a  small  body  of  conquerors,  the  off- 
spring of  a  great  Imperial  race,  subdues  whole 
nations  of  races  of  a  less  powerful  type,  our  ascend- 
ency had  not  been  gained  without  deeds  of  violence 
and  wrong;    and   the  Company's  reign,  at    its   be- 


Career  i7i  India  19 

ginning,  had  this  special  evil  feature:  it  was  that  of 
adventurers  who  made  India  their  footstool,  in  order 
to  amass  money,  and  to  return  to  England  to  spend 
it.  Long  before  the  Wellesleys  had  made  their 
presence  felt  at  Calcutta,  crimes  such  as  those  which, 
in  a  few  instances,  can  be  fairly  laid  to  the  charge  of 
Clive  and  Hastings,  had  become  only  memories  con- 
demned by  history ;  the  measure  meted  out  to 
Omichund  and  Nuncomar,  the  Rohilla  War,  the 
oppression  of  the  Princesses  of  Oude,  were  no  longer 
possible  under  existing  conditions.  The  days,  too 
had  passed  away  for  ever,  when  the  administration 
of  the  Company  could  be  described  as  a  "  combina- 
tion of  rapine  and  fraud " ;  of  "  setting  up  king- 
doms for  sale  "and  of  "breaking  treaties";  when 
its  servants  could  be  called  "birds  of  prey  and  of 
passage  "  ;  when  whole  districts  were  given  up  to 
monopolists,  who  starved  terrified  populations  in 
the  midst  of  plenty  ;  when  traders  made  millions  by 
unlawful  gains,  and  formed  a  multitude  of  relentless 
Shylocks ;  when  "  boys  in  uniform,"  in  Burke's 
language,  could  riot  in  tyranny  without  a  thought 
of  justice ;  when  the  steady,  systematic,  and  grasp- 
ing rule  of  the  Englishman  was  more  dreaded  than 
the  swoop  of  the  Mahratta  horsemen.  The  Com- 
pany was  still  the  chief  power  in  India,  but  it  had 
■been  brought  under  the  control  of  the  State;  the 
substance  of  government  and  the  authority  of  the 
sword  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  proconsuls,  who 
had  not  abused  their  high  office,  and  usually  had  been 
worthy  of  it ;  immense  internal  reforms  had  been 
made,  conceived  in  a  good  spirit,  if  not  always  wise; 


20  Wellington 

a  system  of  law  had  been  established,  and  was  ad- 
ministered by  judges,  sometimes  mistaken  in  their 
views,  but  upright :  the  affairs  of  the  Peninsula  were, 
even  more  than  now,  subject  to  the  vigilant  scrutiny 
and  the  severe  eye  of  Parliament.  Nevertheless  the 
traces  of  the  evil  past  had  not  vanished ;  if  there 
was  little  open  violence,  there  was  much  secret  cor- 
ruption ;  the  functionaries  of  the  Company,  nay, 
British  officers,  were  too  often  accessible  to  the  worst 
kinds  of  bribes  ;  in  the  administration  of  the  ordin- 
ary affairs  of  life,  the  native  had  little  chance  against 
the  Englishman,  should  their  interests  happen  to 
come  into  conflict.  The  dominant  race  was  still 
dominant  in  a  bad  sense  ;  the  subject  races  were,  in 
its  eyes,  little  better  than  serfs. 

Lord  Mornington  had  hardly  been  placed  at  the 
head  of  affairs  in  India,  when  the  designs  of  Tippoo 
Sahib  had  become  manifest.  The  Governor  of  the 
Isle  of  France,  Malartic,  had  issued  a  proclamation 
to  the  effect  that  the  French  Republic  and  the  ruler 
of  Mysore  had  combined  to  expel  the  English  in- 
truders from  Hindustan ;  Tippoo,  it  was  known, 
was  in  communication  with  him.  Mornington  one 
of  the  series  of  the  great  proconsuls,  of  whom  Hast- 
ings and  Dalhousie  are  conspicuous  types,  was  de- 
sirous to  seize  the  occasion,  and  to  strike  down 
Tippoo  at  once ;  but  the  intended  expedition  was 
delayed  for  months.  The  finances  of  the  Company, 
diminished  by  recent  wars,  and  by  the  expenses  of 
administration  of  different  kinds,  were  by  no  means 
in  a  prosperous  state ;  and,  as  always  happened, 
there  was  a  party  among  the    Directors  thinking  of 


Career  in  India  21 

dividends  only,  and  eager  for  peace  at  any  price. 
Arthur  Wellesley  never  subscribed  to  these  ignoble 
views ;  but,  as  has  often  been  the  case  with  illus- 
trious soldiers,  he  did  not  wish  to  precipitate  war; 
he  had  a  stronger  will  than  his  more  accomplished 
brother,  and  exercised  great  influence  over  him; 
he  urged  Mornington  to  treat  with  Tippoo,  and  to 
afford  him  a  golden  bridge  to  escape.  We  see  here 
the  first  instance  of  the  different  lines  of  policy 
recommended  or  adopted  by  these  two  eminent 
men ;  Richard  Wellesley,  as  a  rule,  was  for  bold, 
even  aggressive  measures  ;  Arthur,  for  caution,  com- 
promise, and,  if  possible,  peace.  Arthur,  however, 
did  not  hesitate  when  it  had  become  apparent  that 
a  league  of  foreign  enemies  and  of  native  powers,  of 
which  Tippoo  was  to  be  the  head,  was  being  formed 
against  our  rule  in  India.  The  Nizam,  we  have 
seen,  was  our  strongest,  perhaps  our  only  ally;  as 
had  been  the  case  with  several  of  the  Indian  Princes, 
he  had  employed  Frenchmen  to  organise  and  train 
his  army  ;  this  was  a  well-equipped  force  of  about 
16,000  men;  its  French  chiefs  had  been  won  over 
by  the  intrigues  of  Tippoo.  A  mutiny,  however, 
had  broken  out  among  the  troops ;  the  officers  were 
powerless  ;  the  Nizam  was  willing  to  shake  off  the 
yoke  of  allies  he  feared,  and  to  throw  in  his  lot 
with  the  Governor-General :  at  the  instance  of 
Arthur  Wellesley  his  army  was  suddenly  disarmed, 
and  the  French  officers  were  made  prisoners  of  war. 
The  Nizam  now  openly  declared  for  England  ; 
Mornington  made  a  treaty  with  the  nominal  head 
of  the  Mahratta  chiefs,  binding  them  not  to  take  up 


2  2  Wellington 

arms  in  behalf  of  Tippoo  ;  every  effort  was  made  to 
fit  out  an  army  sufificiently  formidable  to  invade  and 
conquer  Mysore.  The  stroke  which  Wellesley  had 
advised  had  proved  masterly ;  it  was  an  early  ex- 
ample of  his  judgment  and  insight  in  war. 

Tippoo  may  not  have  heard  of  the  destruction  of 
the  French  fleet  at  the  Nile ;  he  had  been  buoyed 
up  by  a  pledge  given  by  Napoleon  that  "  an  invinci- 
ble army  was  on  the  march  to  join  him."  All  efforts 
at  negotiation  having  failed,  it  was  resolved  to  in- 
vade Mysore  upon  two  lines:  General  Stuart  with 
about  6000  men,  advancing  from  the  seaboard  of 
Bombay,  General  Harris  with  a  somewhat  larger 
force,  moving  from  the  low  country  around  Madras. 
Wellesley  was  still  the  chief  of  the  33rd  ;  an  accident 
gave  him  the  temporary  command  of  the  column  of 
Harris — that  general  had  been  detained  for  some 
weeks  in  the  rear ;  and  the  admirable  arrangements 
the  colonel  made  for  the  troops  elicited  from  his  su- 
perior a  tribute  of  well-merited  praise.'  Towards  the 
middle  of  February,  1799,  the  Army  of  the  Nizam, 
about  1 5,000  strong,  had  effected  its  junction  with  the 


'  This  was  the  first  occasion  when  Wellesley  was  in  any  kind  of 
independent  command.  I  quote  these  remarks  of  General  Harris: 
"I  have  much  satisfaction  in  acquainting  your  Lordship,  that  the 
very  handsome  appearance  and  perfect  discipline  of  the  troops  under 
the  orders  of  the  Hon.  Col.  Wellesley  do  honour  to  themselves  and 
to  him,  while  the  judicious  and  masterly  arrangements  as  to  supplies, 
which  opened  an  abundant  free  market,  and  inspired  confidence  in 
dealers  of  every  description,  were  no  less  creditable  to  Colonel  Welles- 
ley than  advantageous  to  the  public  service,  and  deservedly  entitle 
him  to  very  marked  approbation." — Wellesley' s  Dispatches,  i.,  425. 
Wellington's  conduct  in  the  Peninsular  War  was  thus  prefigured. 


ROBERT  STUART,  VISCOUNT  CASTuEREAGH    2r.D  MARQUESS 

OF    LONDONDERRY. 

(After  the  painting  by  Sir  Thomas  Lawrence.) 


Career  in  India  23 

force  of  Harris  ;  that  chief,  appreciating  the  conduct 
of  his  young  heutenant,  placed  this  large  contingent 
under  the  command  of  Wellesley,  a  selection  beyond 
all  question  the  best,  but  which  Avas  bitterly  resented 
by  General  Baird,  a  distinguished  and  a  much  senior 
officer.  The  main  Army  was  soon  on  its  march 
through  the  passes  between  the  hills  that  surround 
the  uplands  of  Mysore  ;  but  the  vast  bodies  of  camp 
followers,  and  the  masses  of  baggage  always  in  the 
train  of  Asiatic  forces, —  ingens  belli  lues,  in  the 
phrase  of  Tacitus, —  considerably  retarded  the  in- 
vader's movements,  and  their  transport  service  well- 
nigh  broke  down.  Tippoo  fell  on  Stuart  in  the 
first  instance,  but  he  was  defeated  with  heavy  loss ; 
he  then  attacked  Harris  at  a  place  called  Malavelly, 
a  short  distance  only  from  his  great  fortified  capital, 
Seringapatam.  A  sharp  engagement  was  bravely 
fought,  Wellesley  being  in  command  of  the  left  wing 
of  the  Army;  he  turned  Tippoo's  right  and  drove 
him,  routed,  from  the  field.  The  march  of  Harris, 
however,  continued  to  be  slow,  owing  to  the  many 
difficulties  in  his  w^ay  and  the  prodigious  burden  of 
his  impedimenta:  he  was  not  before  Seringapatam 
until  the  first  week  of  April. 

Tippoo  had  had  time  to  prepare  for  a  defence. 
Seringapatam,  he  felt  sure,  could  defy  his  enemy. 
Yet  Cornwallis  had  appeared  before  the  place  a  few 
years  before ;  his  army  had  stormed  a  great  en- 
trenched camp,  which  had  been  made  to  cover  the 
fortress ;  Tippoo,  fearing  an  assault,  showed  himself 
willing  to  treat.  He  had  now  assembled  the  flower 
of  tlic  army  of  Mysore,  about  22,000  men,  to  make 


24  Wellington 

a  resistance,  from  which   he    expected   a   triumph ; 
more   than    200   guns    crowned    the    ramparts    and 
bastions.     The    attacking    force   was   about    35,000 
strong,  with  100  guns.    Before  the  regular  approaches 
were  made,  an  incident  occurred,  which  was  one  of 
the  rare  examples  of  failure  in  Wellesley's  military 
career.    There  were  two  outposts  held  by  the  enemy, 
about  4000  yards  from  the  walls ;  the  fire  of  these 
annoyed   our  men ;    one  was  successfully   attacked 
and  occupied  ;  Wellesley  and  the  33rd  were  beaten  off 
from  the  other.     The  effort,  in  fact,  had  been  made 
after   dark  and  without   sufficient   care;  Wellesley 
has  left   it   on   record  that  this  reverse  taught  him 
"never    to   attack   by    night    a   post   that   had   not 
been    reconnoitred  by    day."     The  work  was   cap- 
tured without  difficulty  within   twenty-four  hours; 
but,  owing  to   a  mischance,  Wellesley  was  late  in 
appearing   on    the   scene ;    Harris   saved    him   from 
anything  like  a  reprimand  ;   but  during  the  opera- 
tions that   followed   he  was   rather  under   a  cloud. 
This  is  not  the  place  to  describe  the  siege  of  Ser- 
ingapatam,    one    of   the    innumerable    instances    in 
which  the  best   men  of  the  East  have  gone  down 
before  British  valour ;  in  truth,  Wellesley  had  little 
part  in  the  attack;  he  was  left  in  the  rear,  at  the 
head   of   the   reserve.     The  fortress   rose  upon   an 
islet   in    the   Cavery,   and   was   formidable   from   its 
position  and  its  means  of  defence  ;  but  Tippoo  had 
chiefly  directed  his  attention  to  the  northern  front, 
that    before    which    Cornwallis   had    drawn    up    his 
forces;  Harris,  who  conducted  the  operations  with 
no  little  skill,  concentrated  his  strength  upon   the 


25 

southern  front,  where  the  fortified  defences  were 
comparatively  weak.  Fire  opened  from  the  trenches 
in  the  last  days  of  April ;  ramparts,  curtains,  and 
forts  were  swept  by  a  tempest  of  shot ;  sallies  of 
the  horsemen  of  Mysore  made  no  impression  on 
their  foes ;  a  breach  was  declared  practicable  on  the 
2nd  of  May.  On  the  4th,  Baird  led  some  five  thou- 
sand men,  partly  auxiliaries,  partly  choice  British 
troops,  to  the  assault  ;  as  always,  he  proved  himself 
to  be  a  brave  and  able  soldier.  Crossing  the  bed  of 
the  Cavery,  at  this  moment  dry,  and  disregarding  the 
fire  directed  against  them,  the  assailants  had  soon 
mastered  the  breach,  though  they  encountered  a  fierce 
and  stern  resistance,  Tippoo  fighting  hand-to-hand 
at  the  head  of  his  guards.  The  ramparts  had  been 
won ;  but  there  was  still  an  obstacle,  in  a  wide  fosse, 
which  appeared  impassable  ;  nothing,  however,  could 
stop  Baird  and  his  exulting  men  ;  they  forced  their 
way  across  on  planks  and  beams  ;  the  garrison  was 
driven  from  point  to  point  ;  its  remains  surrendered 
after  a  murderous  conflict.  Tippoo  had  struggled 
"  like  an  Indian  tiger,"  to  the  last  ;  he  had  called  on 
his  warriors  to  do  or  die  ;  his  dead  body  was  found 
amidst  heaps  of  the  slain. 

Baird  struck  the  decisive  stroke  at  Seringapatam ; 
he  had  given  proof  of  heroism  and  resource  at  the 
imminent  deadly  breach.  Having  left  the  camp  to 
make  his  report  to  the  General-in-Chief,  Wellesley 
was  placed  in  temporary  command  of  the  city  ;  scenes 
were  witnessed  like  those  which,  at  this  period,  al- 
ways occurred  after  a  successful  assault.  Wellesley 
dealt  with  the  subject  with  the  grim,  cynical  coolness 


26  Wellington 

shown  afterwards  at  Badajoz  and  San  Sebastian ; 
he  allowed  pillage  to  run  riot  for  several  hours,  he 
thought  this  a  lawful  perquisite  of  war  ;  but  he 
soon  repressed  these  excesses  and  restored  discipline. 
"  It  was  impossible  to  expect  that  after  the  labour 
which  the  troops  had  undergone  in  working  up  to 
the  place,  and  the  various  successes  they  had  had  in 
six  different  affairs  with  Tippoo's  troops,  in  all  of 
which  they  had  come  to  the  bayonet  with  them, 
they  should  not  have  looked  to  the  plunder  of  the 
place.  Nothing,  therefore,  can  have  exceeded  what 
was  done  on  the  night  of  the  4th.  Scarcely  a  house 
in  the  town  was  left  unplundered,  and  I  understood 
that  in  camp  jewels  of  the  greatest  value,  bars  of 
gold,  etc.,  have  been  offered  for  sale  in  the  ba- 
zaars of  the  Army  by  our  soldiers,  sepoys,  and  for- 
eigners. I  came  in  to  take  command  on  the  5th, 
and  by  the  greatest  exertion,  by  hanging,  flogging, 
etc.,  in  the  course  of  the  day  I  restored  order 
among  the  troops,  and  I  hope  I  have  gained  the 
confidence  of  the  people.  They  are  returning  to 
their  houses,  and  beginning  to  follow  again  their 
occupations,  but  the  property  of  every  one  is  gone."  ' 
Wellesley's  command  was  made  permanent  by  the 
orders  of  his  chief,  who  had  formed  a  very  high 
opinion  of  him  ;  this  not  unnaturally  incensed  Baird  : 
he  complained  that  he  had  been  twice  unfairly  sup- 
planted. The  appointment,  however,  was  confirmed 
by  the  Governor-General ;  the  ties  of  blood  may 
have  had  some  influence ;  but  Mornington  emphati- 

'  Wellesley  to  Lord  Mornington.      Quoted  by  Sir  H.   Maxwell. 
Life  of  Wellington,  i.,  35. 


Career  in  India  27 

cally  approved  of  the  selection  that  had  been  made. 
He  wrote  thus  to  Harris :  "  My  opinion  or  rather 
knowledge  of  my  brother's  discretion,  judgment, 
temper,  and  integrity,  are  such,  that  if  you  had  not 
placed  him  in  Seringapatam,  I  would  have  done  so 
of  my  own  authority,  because  I  think  him  in  every 
point  of  view  the  most  proper  for  that  service." 
In  fact,  Baird,  though  an  excellent  ofiflcer,  was  not 
the  man  to  rule  Seringapatam.  Wellington  wrote  of 
him  in  these  words  thirty-two  years  afterwards, 
when  the  passions  of  the  time  had  long  been  forgot- 
ten and  the  great  Duke  was  at  the  topmost  height 
of  renown:  "  Baird  was  a  gallant,  hard-headed,  lion- 
hearted  officer,  but  he  had  no  talent,  no  tact ;  had 
strong  prejudices  against  the  natives,  and  he  was 
peculiarly  disqualified  from  his  manners,  habits,  etc. 
and  it  was  supposed  his  temper,  for  the  management 
of  them.  He  had  been  Tippoo's  prisoner  for  years. 
.  .  .  I  must  say  that  I  was  the  fit  person  to  be 
selected.  It  is  certainly  true  that  this  command 
afforded  me  opportunities  for  distinction,  and  thus 
opened  the  road  to  fame,  which  poor  Baird  always 
thought  was,  by  the  same  act,  closed  upon  him. 
Notwithstanding  this,  he  and  I  were  always  upon 
the  best  of  terms." 

The  spoil  of  war  taken  at  Seringapatam  was  im- 
mense, notwithstanding  the  pillage  after  the  fall  of 
the  place.  The  annihilation  of  the  power  of  Tippoo 
Sahib  removed  the  greatest  obstacle  to  our  Empire 
in  the  East ;  with  his  father,  Hyder  Ali,  he  had  long 
been  our  most  dangerous  foe,  but,  as  has  repeatedly 
happened  in  the  affairs  of  India,  this  triumph  was 


28  Wellingto7i 

only  the  prelude  to  future  conflicts.  Lord  Morning- 
ton  was  made  Marquis  Wellesley  for  these  brilliant 
achievements ;  but  the  peace  party  in  the  Company 
uttered  vexatious  protests ;  nay,  affronted  the  Gov- 
ernor-General in  many  ways ;  unworthy  murmurs 
were  even  heard  in  the  House  of  Commons.  India, 
however,  was  in  too  critical  a  state  to  permit  Lord 
Wellesley  to  leave  his  post,  and  the  remaining  years 
of  his  rule  were  marked  by  a  great  advance  of  British 
power  in  the  East.  The  settlement  of  the  kingdom 
of  Mysore  was  the  first  subject  that  needed  atten- 
tion ;  it  was  effected  in  the  manner  of  which  the 
Roman  Republic  gave  many  examples  in  like  in- 
stances, and  which  had  been  a  feature,  too,  of  our 
policy  in  Hindustan.  Hyder  Ali  and  Tippoo  had 
been  usurpers  ;  a  child,  the  heir  of  a  Rajah  they  had 
dispossessed,  was  restored  to  the  best  part  of  his 
ancestral  domains ;  the  other  parts  were  divided 
between  the  Company,  the  Nizam,  and  the  suzerain 
of  the  Mahratta  League.  The  sons  of  Tippoo, 
however,  received  a  large  indemnity ;  it  deserves 
especial  notice  that  Arthur  Wellesley  was  the  chief 
counsellor  of  his  brother  in  making  these  wise  ar- 
rangements, and  contributed  more  than  any  one  else 
to  a  generous  act  of  justice.  Arthur  was  now  made 
military  Governor  of  Mysore ;  though  a  civilian 
Resident  was  placed  by  his  side,  the  whole  adminis- 
tration of  this  great  territory  passed  into  his  hands. 
He  was  for  a  short  time  engaged  in  a  fierce  struggle 
with  a  predatory  chief,  who  had  been  a  lieutenant 
of  Tippoo,  and  who,  gathering  together  irregular 
bands  of  armed  men,  had  proclaimed  himself  "  the 


Career  in  India  29 

king  of  the  world,"  and  was  threatening  the  borders 
of  the  lands  of  Mysore ;  but  Wellesley  literally 
hunted  Dhoondia  Waugh  down  in  a  succession  of 
marches  of  extreme  celerity,  a  characteristic  of  most 
of  his  operations  in  the  East.  Wellesley's  govern- 
ment of  Mysore  marks  a  turning-point  in  the  admin- 
istration of  our  rule  in  Hindustan.  He  insisted  on 
having  a  free  hand  to  act,  and  on  being  exempted 
from  the  control  of  the  Company,  —  "for  I  know 
that  the  whole  is  a  system  of  job  and  corruption 
from  beginning  to  end,  of  which  I  and  my  troops 
would  be  made  the  instruments"  ;  the  results  were 
in  the  highest  degree  significant.  An  admirable 
change  passed  over  the  service ;  integrity  was  en- 
forced and  became  general ;  the  practice  of  taking 
presents  and  douceurs  was  stopped  ;  the  spirit  of 
Wellesley's  conduct  is  seen  in  these  words  ad- 
dressed to  a  soldier  under  his  command :  "  In  re- 
spect to  the  bribe  offered  to  you  and  myself,  I 
am  surprised  that  any  man  in  the  character  of  a 
British  officer  should  not  have  given  the  Rajah  to 
understand  that  the  offer  would  be  considered  an 
insult."  It  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  what  was 
done  at  Mysore  was  done,  but  on  a  large  scale,  at 
Calcutta.  Lord  Wellesley  had  set  an  example  by 
refusing  to  accept  the  great  sum  of  ;^  100,000,  as  his 
share  in  the  prize  money  of  Seringapatam  ;  like  his 
brother  he  made  war  on  administrative  misconduct 
of  all  kinds,  especially  on  the  taking  gifts  from  the 
native  princes  and  chiefs.  It  has  been  truly  re- 
marked :  "  Of  all  the  changes  effected  by  the  brothers 
Wellesley,  none  was  so  vital  —  so  valuable  to  British 


(^ 


30  Wellington 

ascendency  in  India  —  as  the  end  which,  between 
them,  they  put  to  the  old  system  of  private  pecula- 
tion and  corruption.  The  administrative  body  be- 
came for  the  first  time  what  it  had  long  been  in 
name,  the  Honourable  East  India  Company." ' 

The  great  events  which  had  occurred  in  the  West 
had,  meanwhile,  made  their  influence  felt  in  Hindu- 
stan. Napoleon  had  become  the  ruler  of  France ; 
Marengo  and  Hohenlinden  had  been  fought;  the 
Continent  had  succumbed  at  the  peace  of  Luneville. 
But  England,  unaided,  maintained  the  struggle  ;  the 
French  army  in  Egypt  was  imprisoned  within  its 
conquest ;  a  British  expedition  was  being  made 
ready  to  reach  the  Nile.  Lord  Wellesley  resolved 
to  second  this  enterprise ;  he  had  placed  his  brother 
at  the  head  of  a  force  intended  to  descend  on  the 
Isle  of  France ;  but  he  directed  this,  which  he  con- 
siderably increased,  to  take  part  in  our  operations  in 
Egypt;  he  made  Baird  the  commander  of  this  de- 
tachment, Arthur  Wellesley  not  being  of  sufficient 
rank  in  the  service.  This  irritated  the  young  Gov- 
ernor of  Mysore,  and  even  caused  a  coolness  between 
the  brothers ;  and  yet  fortune  favoured  Arthur 
again,  —  the  victory  of  Abercromby  had  been  won 
before  Baird  appeared  on  the  scene,  and  he  took 
no  part  in  the  triumph  of  our  arms.  The  con- 
quest of  Mysore  had  been  consolidated  by  this  time; 
it  had  greatly  strengthened  our  authority  in  the 
East ;  as  a  natural  consequence,  it  brought  us  in 
contact  with  the  powers  of  India,  which  were  still  un- 


Sir  H.  Maxwell's  Life  of  Wellington,  i.,  72. 


Career  m  India  31 

subdued.  The  confederacy  of  the  Mahrattas  was 
the  chief  of  these  ;  it  was  supreme  in  the  dominions 
which  the  mighty  Sevajee  had  carved  out  of  the 
wrecks  of  the  Mogul  Empire  ;  springing  originally 
from  a  race  of  freebooters,  spread  along  the  hills  of 
the  western  coast,  it  now  extended  to  the  confines 
of  Bengal  and  the  Deccan.  The  head  of  the  League 
was  called  the  Peishwa  ;  but  his  authority,  I  have 
said,  was  nominal  only,  as  was  the  case  of  many 
dynasties  in  Hindustan ;  real  power  centred  in 
independent  princes,  lords  of  a  vast  territory  reach- 
ing nearly  from  Bombay  to  the  Upper  Ganges.  The 
Rajah  of  Berar  held  a  great  province  around  his 
capital,  Nagpore ;  the  Guikwar  was  ruler  of  Baroda 
and  a  large  adjoining  region  ;  Scindiah  was  the 
master  of  an  immense  domain  between  the  Ner- 
budda  and  the  Chambal ;  Holkar,  more  to  the 
north,  occupied  the  country  on  the  banks  of  the 
Jumna.  All  these  potentates  could  place  great 
armies  on  foot,  those  of  Scindiah  and  Holkar  disci- 
plined by  French  of^cers ;  their  light  cavalry,  like 
that  of  Hyder  Ali,  was  an  arm  not  to  be  despised. 
If  united  they  might  have  been  irresistible  in  the 
field  ;  but  they  were  always  divided,  and  often  at 
war  with  each  other;  they  had  been  our  doubtful 
allies  or  our  secret  foes ;  but  they  had  never  com- 
bined to  challenge  our  Empire.  It  was  the  fortune 
of  England,  as  it  had   been  of    Rome,'  to  rise  to 

'  Compare  the  pregnant  language  of  Tacitus.  De  moribus  Ger- 
manorum  XXXUI.  "  Maneat  quaeso,  duretque  gentibus,  si  non  amor 
nostri  ...  at  certe  odium  sui,  quando,  urgentibus  Imperii 
fatis,  nihil  jam  praestare  Fortuna  majus  potest,  quam  hostium  dis- 
cordiam." 


32  Wellington 

supremacy  in  many  lands,  owing  to  the   discord  of 
races  which  stood  in  her  path. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  comment  on  the  events 
which  ended  in  a  war  with  the  chief  Mahratta 
Princes.  Lord  Wellesley  and  the  leading  men  at 
Calcutta,  foreseeing  that  a  rupture  could  not,  per- 
haps, be  avoided,  and  not  superior  to  sagacious 
statecraft,  —  true  to  the  principle  "  divide  and  rule," 
they  had  won  the  Guikwar  of  Baroda  over,  —  were 
desirous  of  striking  when  an  occasion  offered  ;  Arthur 
Wellesley  characteristically  condemned  this  policy, 
and  even  wrote  of  it  in  no  measured  language : 
"  They  breathe  nothing  but  war,  and  appear  to  have 
adopted  some  of  the  French  principles  on  that  sub- 
ject. They  seem  to  think  that  because  the  Mahrat- 
tas  do  not  choose  to  ally  themselves  with  us  more 
closely  .  .  .  it  is  perfectly  justifiable  and  proper 
that  we  should  go  to  war  with  them." '  The  ani- 
mosities, however,  of  the  Mahratta  Princes  precipi- 
tated a  conflict  already  impending.  The  Peishwa, 
reduced  almost  to  a  puppet,  like  the  representative 
of  the  Imperial  Moguls,  had  turned  to  the  Governor- 
General  to  seek  his  aid  ;  but  he  had  been  overawed 
by  Scindiah  who  had  practically  made  him  a  vassal ; 
the  negotiations  had  proved  fruitless.  The  in- 
fluence, however,  of  Scindiah  over  his  suzerain  in 
name  provoked  the  jealousy  and  suspicion  of  Hol- 
kar;  he  took  the  field  with  a  great  army,  defeated 
Scindiah  and  the  Peishwa  in  a  decisive  battle,  and 
had  soon  seized  the  city   of    Poona,   the  supposed 

'  Supplementary  Despatches  ii.,  255-258.  Sir  H.  Maxwell's  Life 
of  Wellington,  i.,  51. 


Career  in  India  33 

seat  of  the  Mahratta  power.  The  Peishwa  appealed 
to  British  protection  ;  he  signed  the  treaty  of  Bas- 
sein  with  Lord  Wellesley  ;  Stuart,  with  a  consider- 
able army,  was  despatched  from  the  frontier  of 
Mysore,  and  Colonel  Stevenson,  with  a  body  of  the 
Nizam's  auxiliaries,  to  avenge  our  ally  and  punish 
his  enemies ;  Wellesley  now  raised  to  the  rank  of 
General,  was  placed  in  command  of  a  detachment 
under  Stuart's  orders.  As  usual,  advancing  with 
great  celerity,  Wellesley  recaptured  Poona,  and 
made  Holkar  retreat  northwards  ;  the  Peishwa  re- 
turned in  state  to  his  capital.  But  the  presence, 
perhaps,  of  a  common  danger  had  drawn  Scindiah 
and  Holkar  together;  they  induced  the  Rajah  of 
Berar  to  join  them  ;  a  large  army,  of  which  Scindiah 
was  the  head,  was  assembled  to  confront  the  islanders 
on  the  Mahratta  frontier.  Hostilities  had  now  be- 
gun in  earnest;  Lord  Lake  had  marched  across  tl  e 
Jumna  against  Holkar,  and  had  compelled  that  chi'  f 
to  defend  his  provinces.  Wellesley  had  been  give  1 
the  chief  command  of  our  forces  round  Poona,  with 
full  powers  to  treat  with  Scindiah  and  the  Rajah  of 
Berar.  He  made  a  real  effort  to  negotiate;  but  he 
was  forced  with  reluctance  to  draw  the  sword.  The 
words  he  addressed  to  Scindiah  were  characteristic  of 
the  man  :  "  I  offered  you  peace  on  terms  of  equality, 
and  honourable  to  all  parties ;  you  have  chosen  war 
and  are  responsible  for  all  consequences."  ' 

The  campaign  had  begun  in  the  summer  of   1803. 
On  the    8th  of  August,  Wellesley,  at  the  head  of 


'  Despatches  i.,  287. 
3 


34  Wellington 

some  13,000  men,  —  5000  of  these  were  Indian 
troops,  —  advanced  against  Ahmednagar,  a  fortified 
town  commanding  the  roads  from  Poona  into  the 
country  inland.  The  place  fell  after  a  sharp  resistance; 
the  British  General  marched  northwards  to  effect 
a  junction  with  Stevenson,  who,  perhaps  6000 
strong,  had  marched  from  the  Deccan  to  meet  his 
superior.  The  two  forces,  diminished  by  some  de- 
tachments, came  into  line  on  the  21st  of  September  ; 
the  enemy,  it  was  known,  was  not  distant ;  Wellesley 
resolved  to  fall  upon  him  as  quickly  as  possible.  Two 
passes  led  through  a  range  of  hills  which  separated 
him  from  the  hostile  armies ;  each  was  at  least  seven 
or  eight  miles  from  the  other.  Wellesley  ordered 
Stevenson  to  advance  by  the  eastern  pass,  while 
the  General-in-Chief  advanced  on  the  west.  In  pure 
strategy  this  was  a  false  movement,  which  might 
have  been  fatal  before  a  great  chief  of  Europe ;  but 
it  gave  Wellesley  increased  freedom  of  action  ;  the 
result  justified  a  decision  which  he  always  defended. 
On  the  23rd  the  British  Commander  —  he  had, 
perhaps,  been  ill-served  by  his  cavalry  scouts  — 
learned  that  the  united  forces  of  Scindiah  and  the 
Rajah,  30,000  footmen  and  20,000  horse,  had  taken 
a  position  only  a  few  miles  distant.  Wellesley  had 
but  8000  men  in  hand,  as  the  division  of  Stevenson 
had  not  joined  him,  but  he  instantly  and  rightly 
resolved  to  attack  ;  a  retreat,  he  probably  argued, 
would  cause  his  ruin.  The  position,  however,  of  the 
enemy,  enormously  superior  in  force  as  he  was,  was 
well  chosen,  and  formidable  in  the  extreme.  His 
armies  were   covered    in    front    by    the   stream  of 


Career  171  India  35 

the  Kistna,  flowing  between  rocky  banks,  and 
seemingly  without  a  ford  ;  his  left  flank  and  rear 
were  protected  by  the  Juah,  and  in  part  by  the  vil- 
lage of  Assaye:  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  dis- 
lodge him  from  these  points  of  vantage.  His  troops, 
too,  made  an  imposing  show ;  masses  of  infantry 
stood  in  well-ordered  array,  thousands  of  horsemen 
filled  the  surrounding  plains ;  more  than  a  hundred 
guns  were  drawn  up  in  grim  batteries.  But  Welles- 
ley  knew  how  immense  was  the  difference  between 
the  British  and  the  Asiatic  soldier  ;  the  odds  against 
him  w^ere,  no  doubt,  prodigious  ;  but  they  were  less 
than  those  which  Clive  had  faced  at  Plassy,  and,  as 
in  the  case  of  Clive,  the  course  of  daring  was  the 
course  of  prudence.  So  Hannibal  had  exclaimed 
two  thousand  years  before  when  he  beheld  a  multi- 
tudinous host  of  the  East,  brought  within  the  reach 
of  a  few  legions  of  Rome :  "  Yes  that  is  a  brave 
army,  and  a  brave  show ;  it  will  be  enough  for  the 
Romans,  greedy  as  they  are." 

Having  reconnoitred  the  ground  with  care,  Welles- 
ley  quickly  made  his  dispositions  for  the  attack. 
The  enemy's  cavalry  was  his  most  formidable  arm ; 
its  resplendent  masses  spread  far  on  his  right ;  his 
less  trustworthy  infantry  held  his  left ;  the  British 
General  resolved  to  turn  and  to  fall  on  this  wing. 
An  accident,  indicating  Wellesley's  admirable  coup 
d'oeil  on  the  field,  determined  his  well-designed 
purpose  ;  a  village  on  his  side  of  the  Kistna  rose  oppo- 
site to  Assaye  on  the  other  side ;  despite  the  assur- 
ances of  his  Indian  guides,  he  calculated  that  there 
must  be  a  ford  connecting  the  two :  his  movements 


36  Wellington 

were  made  upon  this  assumption. '  His  little  army, 
with  only  seventeen  guns,  made  a  long  flank  march 
across  the  front  of  the  enemy,  covered  indeed  by  the 
Kistna,  but  dangerously  exposed  had  Scindiah  been 
a  capable  chief ;  it  was,  however,  not  molested  in 
this  critical  march ;  its  advanced  guard  had  soon 
safely  mastered  the  ford.  The  hostile  commanders 
had  missed  the  occasion  ;  they  had  not  made  an  at- 
tempt to  get  over  the  river,  and  to  fall  on  their  ad- 
versary's imperilled  flank ;  they  only  effected  a  great 
change  of  front,  their  inferior  infantry  filling  the 
space  between  the  Kistna,  the  Juah,  and  Assaye ; 
their  fine  cavalry  was  rendered  well-nigh  useless. 
Wellesley,  his  whole  force  now  across  the  Kistna, 
advanced  rapidly  against  foes  showing  signs  of  weak- 
ness ;  he  directed  his  main  effort  against  the  Mah- 
ratta  right :  the  result  was  hardly  for  a  moment 
doubtful.  His  few  guns,  indeed,  were  nearly 
silenced  ;  a  destructive  fire  thinned  his  line  as  it 
pressed  forward  ;  but  a  single  Highland  regiment, 
backed  by  a  body  of  native  troops,  carried  every- 
thing before  it  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet ;  the 
routed  enemy  was  soon  in  headlong  flight.  On 
Wellesley's  right  the  struggle  was  more  stern  and 
prolonged  ;  the  officer  in  command,  mistaking  his 
orders,  attacked  Assaye,  making  a  circuitous  move- 


'  Wellington's  only  remark  on  this  fine  tactical  inspiration  was  : 
"That  was  common  sense.  When  one  is  strongly  intent  on  an 
object,  common  sense  will  usually  direct  one  to  the  right  means." 
Napoleon  {Corr.,  xxxii.,  Ii7,)thus  commented  on  a  somewhat  similar 
movement  of  Turenne  :  "Cette  circonstance  ne  parait  rien  ;  cepen- 
dant  c'est  ce  rien  qui  est  un  des  indices  du  genie  de  la  guerre." 


Career  171  India  37 

ment ;  a  gap  was  opened  in  the  British  line ;  a  few 
of  the  Mahratta  squadrons  made  a  brilHant  charge. 
But  Wellesley  pushed  forward  his  handful  of  horse- 
men ;  the  enemy  was  driven  back  in  defeat ;  Assaye 
was  stormed  by  the  78th  Highlanders  ;  as  on  the 
left,  the  bayonet  swept  away  every  foe  on  the  right. 
Scindiah's  army  was  soon  in  full  retreat ;  it  had  lost 
all  its  guns  and  4000  or  5000  men  killed  and 
wounded  ;  an  admirably  planned  attack,  against 
enormous  odds,  had  led  to  a  most  decisive  victory. 

The  operations  of  Wellesley  at  Assaye  set  at 
naught  the  maxims  of  the  military  art,  as  these  are 
drawn  from  European  warfare.  He  ought  not,  ac- 
cording to  these  principles,  to  have  detached  Steven- 
son and  divided  his  forces ;  he  ought  not  to  have 
attacked  in  the  absence  of  his  lieutenant,  with  only 
apart  of  a  very  small  army,  insignificant  in  size  com- 
pared with  its  enemy  ;  he  ought  not  to  have  made 
a  long  flank  march,  so  to  speak,  under  Scindiah's 
beard,  and  to  have  forded  a  river  in  the  face  of  over- 
whelming numbers  ;  these  moves  would  have  been 
fatal  against  an  able  general  and  really  good  troops. 
Nevertheless,  Wellesley  adopted  the  true  course; 
a  hundred  fields  had  shown  that  the  armed  swarms 
of  the  East  could  not  make  a  stand  against  the 
discipline  of  the  West,  however  great  the  seeming 
disproportion  of  strength ;  his  decision  was  that  of  a 
master  of  war,  and  his  conduct  in  the  battle  deserves 
the  highest  praise.  He  acted  like  Miltiades  at 
Marathon,  like  Alexander  before  Arbela,  like  Colin 
Campbell  and  Havelock,  during  the  great  Mutiny; 
the   children    of   Shem,  in    all   ages,  save  in  a  few 


4  as  4 


38  Wellington 

instances,  have  been  no  match,  in  a  fair  fight,  for 
the  children  of  Japheth.  And  had  he  retreated,  he 
would  have  been  lost ;  Scindiah's  horsemen  would 
have  crossed  the  Kistna,  would  have  hemmed  in 
and  at  last  destroyed  the  small  force  that  alone 
stood  in  their  way ;  nothing  would  ultimately  have 
prevailed  against  their  overpowering  numbers.  A 
notable  example  of  what  such  a  retreat  must  have 
been  was  unfortunately  given  a  few  months  after- 
wards. I  shall  glance  at  Lord  Lake's  operations 
against  the  Mahratta  chiefs :  here  I  shall  only  refer 
to  what  happened  to  one  of  his  best  lieutenants. 
In  the  summer  of  1804,  Lake,  a  very  able  but  some- 
what incautious  chief,  had  moved  forward  Colonel 
Monson  with  4000  or  5000  men,  to  a  great 
distance  beyond  the  main  army ;  and  Monson  had 
pushed  forward  outside  the  positions  he  had  been 
directed  to  hold  in  the  lands  of  Malwa.  Holkar 
instantly  prepared  to  cut  his  enemy  off ;  he  reached 
the  Chambal,  no  doubt,  in  immensely  superior 
numbers ;  and  had  Monson  attacked  like  Wellesley 
at  Assaye  —  and  certainly  he  had  a  better  chance  — 
he  might  have  plucked  safety,  nay,  a  brilliant  tri- 
umph, out  of  danger :  most  unhappily  he  fell  back 
before  his  antagonist ;  one  of  the  most  calamitous 
of  retreats  followed  ;  the  small  British  division  was 
all  but  cut  to  pieces  and  ruined  in  a  march  of  hun- 
dreds of  miles ;  a  mere  shattered  wreck  drifted  under 
the  walls  of  Agra.  The  comment  of  Wellesley  was 
brief  but  decisive:  "These  are  woful  examples  of 
the  risk  to  be  incurred  by  advancing  too  far  without 
competent  supphes,  and  of  the  danger  of  attempting 


Career  in  India  39 

to  retreat  before  such  an  army  as  Holkar's.  He 
would  have  done  much  better  to  attack  Holkar  at 
once,  and  he  would  probably  have  put  an  end  to  the 
war."' 

VVellesley  did  not  attempt  to  pursue  the  defeated 
army  ;  we  may,  perhaps,  see  here  one  of  his  pecu- 
liarities in  war  ;  his  were  not  the  lightning  strokes  of 
Napoleon,  in  annihilating  an  enemy  beaten  in  the 
field.  But  he  successfully  closed  a  very  brilliant 
campaign.  Stevenson,  having  joined  him  after 
Assaye,  was  despatched  to  overrun  Scindiah's 
country  ;  he  captured  two  of  the  Prince's  strong- 
holds;  negotiations  ensued,  but  they  came  to  no- 
thing. Wellesley  and  Stevenson  having  come  into 
line,  they  now  advanced  northwards,  and  met  the 
hostile  forces  drawn  up  around  the  petty  town  of 
A.rgaum,  still  greatly  superior  in  numbers.  The 
British  General  was  now  at  the  head  of  18,000  men; 
he  made  his  arrangements  for  an  immediate  attack ; 
the  result  of  the  battle  was  never  doubtful,  though 
three  native  battalions  were  struck  with  panic,  and 
were  only  rallied  by  Wellesley  himself.  The  enemy 
was  routed  with  hardly  any  loss  to  the  victors ; 
Wellesley  laid  siege  to  the  fortress  of  Gawilghur,  a 
point  of  vantage  not  far  from  Argaum  ;  the  place 
was  stormed  after  a  feeble  resistance.  Meanwhile, 
Lord  Lake  had  struck  decisive  blows  against  the 
confederacy  of  the  Mahrattas  in  the  north-west. 
Scindiah  was  supreme  in  the  League :  he  had  made 
Holkar  and  the  Rajah  of  Berar  his  mere  dependents ; 


'  Supplementary  Despatches,  iv. ,  466. 


40  Wellington 

he  was  still  a  formidable  and  determined  foe.  He 
had  a  powerful  army  upon  the  Jumna,  commanded 
by  Perron,  a  French  officer ;  he  had  made  Shah 
Alum,  the  Emperor  in  name,  a  vassal,  and  held  him 
captive  in  the  old  seat  of  his  State,  Delhi ;  he  had 
stretched  hands  to  the  chiefs  of  the  races  in  the 
lands  of  the  Punjaub.  Lake,  however,  breaking  up 
from  Cawnpore,  had  soon  mastered  the  fortress  of 
AUighur;  Delhi  was  stormed  after  a  brilliant  attack; 
the  Mogul  puppet  was  restored  to  his  throne ;  the 
important  city  of  Agra  fell.  Perron  had,  mean- 
while, treated,  and  abandoned  his  troops ;  his  sub- 
ordinates followed  his  example,  and  gave  themselves 
up :  the  French  alliance  had  proved  worse  than  a 
broken  reed.  The  remains  of  Scindiah's  army  were 
brought  to  bay  by  Lake,  near  the  little  town  of 
Laswarree  ;  the  enemy  made  a  gallant  stand,  but 
the  victory  of  the  British  chief  was  complete.  Dur- 
ing these  operations,  though  Scindiah's  ally,  Hol- 
kar  had  done  httle  or  nothing  in  the  field :  he  had 
acted  after  the  fashion  of  Indian  Princes  seldom 
really  united  against  the  common  foe ;  but  after  the 
defeat  of  Monson  he  took  up  arms  in  great  force 
and  even  laid  siege  to  the  sacred  city  of  Delhi. 
Before  this  time  Scindiah  and  the  Rajah  of  Berar 
had  treated  ;  the  negotiations  were  entrusted  to  the 
victor  of  Assaye  ;  he  obtained  for  the  Company  im- 
mense concessions.  Holkar  was  soon  afterwards 
beaten  off  from  Delhi,  and  completely  defeated 
near  the  fortress  of  Dieg.  The  power  of  the  Mah- 
rattas  was  now  shattered,  and  though  Lake  failed 
against  the  stronghold  of  Bhurtpore,  the  confeder- 


Career  in  India  41 

acy  which  had  been  so  threatening  was  broken  up 
for  the  time  ;  Hindustan  was  at  peace,  from  the 
Himalayas  to  Cape  Comorin ;  the  ascendency  of 
the  British  arms  had  been  once  more  established, 
the  borders  of  the  Empire  had  been  enlarged  and 
strengthened. 

The  spirit  of  the  trader,  however,  shortsighted 
and  mean,  had  again  made  its  influence  felt  in  the 
Company  ;  the  "  forward  "  policy  of  Lord  Wellesley 
was  condemned,— even  the  operations  against  the 
Mahrattas,  which  may  have  saved  India;  in  Parlia- 
ment itself  he  was  ill  supported  ;  Pitt  allowed  the 
aged  Cornwallis  to  be  placed  in  his  stead.  But  his 
resignation  was  deplored  at  Calcutta;  addresses  of 
homage  and  regret  poured  in  ;  history  has  named 
him  as  one  of  the  greatest  of  our  Proconsuls  in  Hin- 
dustan. He  filled  great  offices,  in  after  life,  in  the 
State;  but  he  thought  his  administration  of  our 
Empire  in  the  East  his  best  title  to  renown  ;  ''Super 
et  Garamantas  et  Indos  Protulit  Iniperium  "  he  de- 
signed as  his  epitaph.  Arthur  Wellesley,  after  the 
defeat  of  Holkar,  had  been  replaced  in  the  govern- 
ment of  Mysore,  but  he  conceived  that  he  had  not 
been  well  treated  at  home,  though  Parliament  had 
voted  him  its  thanks  with  one  voice,  and  George  HI. 
had  singled  him  out  for  a  special  mark  of  favour. 
His  letters  at  this  time  breathe  a  captious  spirit ;  in 
truth  he  was  a  very  ambitious  man,  and  his  temper 
was  irritable,  even  if,  as  a  rule,  kept  under  control ; 
what  we  call  amiability  was  not  a  part  of  his  character. 
But  the  people  of  Mysore  understood  his  worth  ;  an 
address  from  the  natives  of  Seringapatam,  in  which 


42  Wellington 

they  "  implored  the  God  of  all  castes  and  of  all 
nations  to  hear  their  constant  prayer ;  and  whatever 
greater  affairs  than  the  government  of  them  might 
call  him,  to  bestow  on  him  health,  happiness,  and 
glory"  is  not  the  least  in  the  splendid  roll  of  his 
honours.  During  the  seven  years  of  his  career  in 
India,  he  had  proved  himself  to  be  a  real  general 
and  had  given  promise  of  great  achievements  in  the 
field ;  but  his  civil  administration  had  been  even 
more  deserving  of  praise.  With  his  brother  he  had 
raised  the  Company  to  a  moral  height,  which  hap- 
pily was  ever  afterwards  maintained  ;  he  had  put  an 
end  to  corruption  within  the  limits  of  his  rule ;  he 
had  done  justice  to  the  Asiatic  as  well  as  to  the 
European ;  he  had  set  a  magnificent  example  of 
integrity,  probity,  and  public  virtue.  We  may 
have  some  idea  of  what  the  effects  of  these  quali- 
ties were,  could  we  imagine  one  of  Napoleon's 
rapacious  lieutenants  put  in  his  place  ;  had  Massena 
or  Soult  been  governor  of  Mysore,  the  population 
would  have  been  driven  to  rise  in  arms ;  the  Mah- 
rattas  would  have  found  powerful  aUies ;  our  Em- 
pire would  have  been  in  no  doubtful  peril.  Like  Lord 
Wellesley,  Wellington  used  to  look  back  with  pride 
on  India;  after  the  reverse  of  Chillianwallah,  when 
in  extreme  old  age,  he  contemplated  leading  an 
army  in  India  again,  in  order  to  restore  authority 
which  he  feared  was  shaken. 


BritUli  Domi/iianx  >    .    I 

Indefitndrnt  Sbltei     ■  

Fcnuyiirir  I     •    I 

Cngdah  HUcs 


7a  Lon^tude  Eosl  SO  from.  Greemrich 


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CHAPTER  III 

IRELAND — COPENHAGEN — VIMIERO 

Wellesley  at  St.  Helena — He  is  consulted  by  Pitt — His  interview 
with  Nelson — He  enters  the  House  of  Commons,  and  is  made 
Chief  Secretary  for  Ireland,  under  the  Duke  of  Richmond — 
State  of  Ireland  in  1807-1808 — Wellesley's  marriage — His  policy 
and  conduct  when  Chief  Secretary — He  commands'  a  division  at 
the  siege  of  Copenhagen—  Napoleon's  designs  against  the  Iberian 
Peninsula — March  of  Junot  on  Lisbon — Napoleon  extorts  the 
■  crown  of  Spain  from  the  Spanish  Bourbons — Great  national 
rising  of  Spain — Reverses  of  the  French — Baylen — The  British 
Government  interferes — Rising  of  Portugal — Wellesley  lands  at 
^londego  Bay — Burrard — Dalrymple — Wellesley's  pian  of  oper- 
ations— Rolica — Vimiero — Defeat  of  Junot — The  convention  of 
Cintra — The  Court  of  Inquiry. 

GENERAL  Wellesley  touched  at  St.  Helena  on 
his  voyage  home  from  India ;  he  had  been  in 
bad  health  for  some  months  ;  he  dwelt  in  let- 
ters on  the  salubrious  air  of  the  island  ;  this  incident 
possibly  may  have  affected  the  decision  of  the  Allies, 
many  years  afterwards,  as  to  the  spot  that  was  selected 
for  Napoleon's  exile.  On  his  return  to  England,  he 
was  consulted  by  Pitt,  who  had  the  highest  opinion  as 
to  the  sagacity  of  his  views,  on  the  expediency  of  des- 
patching a  body  of  British  troops  to  the  seaboard  of 
the  North,  in  order  to  lend  a  hand  to  Prussia,  already 

43 


44  Wellington 

meditating,  in  a  half-hearted  way,  falling  upon  Na- 
poleon in  his  first  great  march  on  Vienna ;  but  Wel- 
lesley  declared  that  the  project  was  not  feasible'; 
Austerlitz  had  erelong  decided  the  contest.  Nelson 
at  this  time  was  about  to  take  command  of  the  fleet 
which  was  to  annihilate  the  navies  of  France  and 
Spain  on  the  great  and  terrible  day  of  Trafalgar ; 
his  only  interview  with  Wellesley  has  been  well  de- 
scribed ;  one  warrior  had  already  made  England  the 
mistress  of  the  seas ;  the  other  was  to  restore  her 
military  power  on  the  land.  Wellesley,  even  after 
his  feats  of  arms  in  India,  at  first  obtained  only  a 
brigade  at  home  ;  he  not  unreasonably  chafed  at  this 
appointment ;  but  he  was  soon  afterwards  made  full 
colonel  of  the  33rd,  the  regiment  in  which  he  had 
made  his  earliest  mark  in  the  field.  He  entered  the 
House  of  Commons  of  the  United  Parliament  for 
the  Borough  of  Rye ;  the  Ministry  of  "  All  the  Tal- 
ents "  were  now  in  office ;  he  took  his  seat,  in  the 
main,  for  the  purpose  of  defending  Lord  Wellesley 
from  the  attacks  of  an  obscure  Scotsman,  who  was 
threatening  to  repeat  against  the  great  Proconsul 
charges  like  those  made  in  the  case  of  Hastings. 
These  accusations,  however,  came  to  nothing  ;  on 
the  fall  of  the  Ministry  of  Fox  and  Grenville,  due  to 
the  obstinacy  of  George  HI.,  as  regards  the  Catholic 
claims,  and  when  a  Tory  Government  came  again 


'  Pitt's  estimate  of  Wellesley  deserves  to  be  quoted:  "I  never  met  a 
military  officer  with  whom  it  is  so  satisfactory  to  converse.  He 
states  every  difficulty  before  he  undertakes  any  service,  but  never 
after  he  has  undertaken  it.  " — Sir  H.  Maxwell,  Life  of  Wellington, 
i.,  2. 


Ireland — Copenhagen —  Vimiero  45 

into  power,  Wellesley  was  made  Chief  Secretary  for 
Ireland,  under  the  Duke  of  Richmond,  a  Viceroy 
whose  only  distinction  was  the  splendid  hospitality 
which  still  lives  among  the  traditions  of  the  Irish 
capital.  Wellesley  accepted  this  place  on  the  ex- 
press condition  that  it  was  not  to  interfere  with  his 
military  career ;  he  was  erelong  to  be  called  into  a 
nobler  sphere  of  action.  Some  months  before  this 
time  he  had  married  Catherine  Pakenham,  the  well- 
known  "  Kitty "  of  Maria  Edgeworth,  a  lady  to 
whom  he  had  been  engaged  many  years  before,  when 
he  was  a  youthful  aide-de-camp  of  Lord  Westmore- 
land; their  troth  was  honourably  kept  by  both  but  the 
marriage  can  hardly  be  pronounced  fortunate.  The 
future  Duchess  was  an  amiable  and  affectionate 
wife,  but  not  a  woman  of  mental  gifts ;  she  was  not 
a. fit  mate  for  one  of  the  greatest  men  of  his  age, 
whose  nature,  besides,  was  unsympathetic  and  stern. 
Ireland  was  in  a  deplorable  state,  and  extremely 
ill-governed,  w'hen  Wellesley  was  virtually  made  the 
head  of  the  Castle.  The  Rebellion  of  1798  had  been 
suppressed,  but  fires  were  alive  under  the  smould- 
ering ashes;  the  rising  of  Emmet  was  a  dangerous 
symptom  ;  the  leaders  of  the  United  Irishmen  had 
been  received  by  Napoleon,  with  the  welcome  he 
gave  to  men  whom  he  wished  to  make  his  tools;  an 
Irish  Legion,  akin  to  the  Old  Brigade,  had  been 
formed ;  it  had  been  encamped  along  the  coasts  of 
Brittany  to  co-operate  with  the  Grand  Army  in  the 
projected  descent  on  England.  In  the  war  now 
being  waged  between  England  and  France,  the  im- 
mense majority  of  Irishmen  might  be  reckoned  as 


46  Wellington 

our  foes ;  a  hostile  landing  in  Leinster,  in  Munster, 
in  Connaught,  would  have  united  against  us  five- 
sixths  of  the  people.  The  Union,  too,  by  destroying 
the  Irish  Parliament,  had  provoked  widespread  con- 
stitutional discontent ;  the  pledges  which  had  practi- 
cally been  given  by  Pitt,  to  effect  a  settlement  of 
the  Catholic  cause,  had  been  broken,  partly  owing 
to  the  Minister  himself,  partly  to  the  purblind 
bigotry  of  a  half-mad  King  ;  the  Irish  Catholics  were 
disaffected  to  a  man,  if  we  except  a  small  minority 
of  the  principal  landed  gentry.  The  institutions  of 
the  country,  besides,  had  remained  based  on  the  bad 
assumption  that  a  mere  oligarchy  of  race  and  faith 
was  to  be  supreme ;  the  Protestant  establishment, 
an  appanage  of  the  men  in  office,  and  a  symbol  of 
confiscation  and  conquest,  was  a  preserve  for  less 
than  a  fifth  part  of  the  nation  ;  the  Catholic  Church, 
representing  the  mass  of  Irishmen,  was  kept  down 
in  degraded  subjection.  Protestant  ascendency 
monopolised  all  high  places  in  the  State;  the  Irish 
Catholics  were  still  largely  excluded  from  its  pale. 
The  condition  of  Ireland,  at  this  time,  was  so  critical 
that  even  Grattan,  the  noble  champion  of  her  rights, 
had  assented  to  measures  of  severe  repression ;  in 
fact,  the  population  could  be  only  held  down  by 
the  sword.  Simultaneously  Irish  public  opinion  had 
been  distorted  and  envenomed  by  the  extinction  of 
the  Irish  Parliament,  an  organ  of  national  sentiment 
in  a  certain  sense ;  and  the  representation  of  the 
whole  country  had  been  made  distinctly  worse.  The 
Liberal  party,  which  in  College  Green  had  powerfully 
supported  the  Catholic  claims,  and  other  wise  and 


Ireland — Copenkage?i — Viviiero  47 

enlightened  reforms,  had  still  eminent  names  at 
Westminster,  but  it  was  swamped  by  a  majority  of 
the  United  Parliament  ;  it  was  now  well-nigh  reduced 
to  impotence.  And  bad  as  the  representation  of  the 
country  was  in  the  Irish  Parliament,  it  had  markedly 
deteriorated  in  the  greater  Assembly.  It  was  still 
mainly  in  the  hands  of  the  great  Irish  families;  but, 
even  more  than  ever  had  been  the  case  before,  it  had 
become  the  instrument  of  the  most  odious  corrup- 
tion ;  Irish  seats  were  either  engrossed  by  the  gov- 
ernment, or  were  shamelessly  bought  and  sold  in  the 
open  market.  Worse  than  anything  else,  perhaps, 
the  social  conditions  of  the  country  were  in  the 
highest  degree  vicious,  in  fact,  pregnant  with  mani- 
fold evils.  The  tithes  of  the  Established  Church 
were  wrung  from  the  Catholic  tillers  of  the  soil ; 
hundreds  of  the  landed  gentry  never  beheld  their 
estates,  or  had  sublet  them  to  rack-renting  tyrants  ; 
even  the  resident  landlords  were  in  many  instances 
the  harsh  superiors  of  a  down-trodden  peasantry. 
The  pernicious  results  of  this  state  of  things  were 
seen  in  illegal  associations  of  many  kinds,  and  in 
lawless  and  widespread  disorders. 

Wellesley  was  at  the  Castle  a  few  months  only ; 
his  conduct  in  his  ofifice  was  characteristic  of  the 
man.  He  was  a  subordinate  of  a  Tory  Ministry,  en- 
gaged in  an  internecine  and,  as  yet,  in  a  not  suc- 
cessful contest,  and  governing  Ireland  on  the  old 
bad  principles,  without  a  thought  of  change  or  re- 
form ;  he  faithfully  carried  out  the  instructions  he 
received,  and  kept  himself  strictly  within  his  inferior 
sphere.     He  was  elected  for  Tralee,  the  chief  town 


48  Wellington 

of  the  County  of  Kerry,  through  the  customary 
means  of  corrupt  patronage  ;  strange  to  say,  O'Con- 
nell,  then  a  rising  lawyer,  in  after  years  an  adversary 
of  the  most  formidable  kind,  was  already  making  his 
mark  on  the  Munster  Circuit ;  but  as  yet  the  warrior 
and  the  great  tribune  had  not  crossed  each  other. 
Wellesley  devoted  his  time  to  the  manipulation  of 
Irish  seats  for  the  supporters  of  the  Government  in 
the  House  of  Commons  ;  he  stooped  to  bribery  and 
similar  arts,  as  a  soldier  obeys  his  officers'  commands  *; 
he  framed  measures  of  repression,  as  a  matter  of 
course ;  in  common  with  all  the  Tories  of  the  day, 
he  looked  upon  Ireland  as  a  conquered  and  rebel- 
lious country,  a  natural  ally  of  France,  to  be  ruled 
by  sheer  force.  Yet  though  he  ran  in  the  grooves 
of  a  vicious  routine,  his  capacity  as  Chief  Secretary 
was  not  wholly  obscured.  He  laid  down  an  excel- 
lent plan  for  the  military  defence  of  Ireland,  on  the 
assumption  of  French  invaders  landing  on  her 
shores,  and  of  a  general  rising  of  a  disaffected 
people  ;  his  observations  are  even  now  of  value  ;  the 
dream  of  a  "  Pacata  Hibernia  "  is  still  an  illusion' 


'  These  few  lines  from  a  letter  of  Wellesley  illustrate  the  Parlia- 
mentary corruption  of  Ireland  at  this  time.  "  Evan  Foulkes,  Esqr., 
of    Southampton    Street,    London,    to   be   the   member   for  Tralee 

.  .  .  Mr.  Justice  Day,  Mr.  Ilandcock  and  Mr,  Pennefather  to 
draw  upon  Messers.  Drummond  for  ;^5000  British  cash  at  ten  days 
sight.  ...  It  will  be  convenient  to  us  if  you  can  delay  to  give 
them  these  directions." 

'  These  remarks  of  Wellesley  on  the  state  of  Ireland  in  1S07  are  not 
wholly  inapplicable  to  the  state  of  Ireland  in  1903,  notwithstanding  all 
that  has  taken  place  in  that  interval  of  time  :  "  The  people  are  dis- 
affected to  the  British  Government,  they  don't  feel  the  benefits  of 
their  situation  ;  attempts  to  render  it  better  do  not  reach  their  minds." 


Irelaiid —  CopenJiagen —  Vimiero  49 

He  waged  a  steady  war,  as  Peel  did  a  few  years 
afterwards,  against  the  jobbery  for  minor  places,  and 
the  low  corruption,  which  marked  the  regime  of  the 
Castle  ;  it  was  enough  for  him  to  traffic  for  Irish 
seats  ;  he  did  something  to  cleanse  an  Augean  stable. 
Above  all,  in  this  far  superior  to  Peel,  who  resisted 
the  Catholic  claims  on  principle,  he  perceived  that 
Protestant  ascendency  was  a  dangerous  state  of 
things ;  he  wrote  sharply  against  absentee  and  unjust 
landlords,  and  against  the  abuses  in  the  Established 
Church :  he  saw  that  something  would  ultimately 
have  to  be  done  for  Catholic  Ireland.  If  his  utter- 
ances on  the  subject  are  not  distinct,  in  this  he  was 
consistent  with  his  attitude  in  1793,  and  with  his 
attitude,  as  Minister,  in  1829.  Wellesley  gave  proof, 
certainly,  of  ability  in  his  present  office  ;  but  un- 
questionably his  views  on  Irish  affairs  were  never 
marked  by  the  profound  wisdom  he  displayed  in 
the  province  of  European  politics  ;  the  associations 
of  Protestant  ascendency  clung  to  him  to  the  last. 

As  he  had  stipulated,  when  the  occasion  arose, 
Wellesley  was  transferred  from  the  Castle  to  his 
more  proper  sphere,  the  camp.  The  Treaty  of  Tilsit 
was  a  hollow  compact,  but  it  made  Napoleon  the 
lord  of  nearly  half  of  the  continent ;  Prussia  was  for 
the  moment  utterly  crushed  ;  Austria  had  missed  an 
opportunity,  and  meekly  bowed  to  the  conqueror ; 
Alexander  had  agreed  to  follow  in  the  wake  of  the 
victor  of  Friedland  ;  and  was  animated,  besides,  by 
intense  dislike  of  England,  whose  vacillating  policy 
he  deeply  resented.  In  this  position  of  affairs,  the 
two  potentates  made  professions  of  offering  peace  to 


STEEL  WORKS  CLUB  LIBIRABY, 


50  Wellington 

England  ;  and  while  Napoleon  had  resolved  to  carry 
out  to  the  utmost  his  audacious  design  of  ''  subduing 
the  land  by  the  sea,"  and  of  excluding  England 
from  all  commerce  with  Europe,  by  means  of  what 
is  known  as  the  Continental  System,  the  new  allies 
prepared  to  combine  all  the  navies  they  could  con- 
trol in  a  decisive  attack  on  the  Mistress  of  the  Seas. 
This  boasted  league,  if  carried  into  effect,  would 
give  the  Emperors  a  superiority  of  force  on  paper, 
though,  probably,  it  would  have  only  led  to  a  second 
Trafalgar ;  and  Denmark,  a  nation  of  brave  seamen 
—  they  had  shown  what  they  were  in  i8oi — pos- 
sessed a  strong  and  well-equipped  fleet,  which  could 
be  made  available  should  it  pass  into  the  hands  of  our 
enemies.  Canning,  when  made  aware  of  the  secret 
articles  of  Tilsit,  determined  to  keep  this  armament 
out  of  Napoleon's  clutches  ;  a  formidable  expedition 
was  sent  from  England  to  demand  a  surrender  of 
the  Danish  fleet,  to  be  held  as  a  pledge  until  peace 
should  have  been  made ;  Lord  Cathcart  was  at  the 
head  of  a  land  force  of  27,000  men  ;  Wellesley  and 
his  old  comrade,  Baird,  were  in  command  of  two  of 
its  divisions.  The  Crown  Prince  of  Denmark  indig- 
nantly refused  to  accept  terms  which  he  deemed  an 
affront,  and  which  nothing  could  justify  but  a  most 
grave  crisis  ;  Copenhagen  was  invested  by  land  and 
by  sea  ;  the  result  was  never  for  a  moment  doubtful. 
Wellesley  fought  a  successful  action  at  Roskilde, 
easily  defeating  levies  of  armed  peasants.  There  is 
nothing  remarkable  in  his  conduct,  except  that,  with 
the  humanity  which  was  one  of  his  qualities,  he 
wished  to  save  Copenhagen  from  bombardment,  and 


NAPOLEON   IN   HIS  STUDY. 
(From  a  steel  engraving.) 


Ireland —  Copenhagen —  Vimiero  5 1 

to  compel  a  capitulation  by  cutting  off  its  supplies. 
Cathcai't,  however,  adopted  the  sterner  course ;  a 
considerable  part  of  the  city  was  destroyed  ;  the 
Danes  found  it  impossible  to  hold  out ;  their  fleet 
was  in  a  few  days  on  its  way  to  England. 

Napoleon,  meanwhile,  had  been  straining  every 
nerve  to  shut  England  out  from  trade  with  the  Con- 
tinent, and  to  strike  a  mortal  blow  at  his  one  re- 
maining enemy.  British  merchandise  was  seized 
along  an  immense  seaboard  ;  British  subjects  were 
imprisoned  on  different  pretexts ;  an  attempt  was 
made  to  raise  a  Chinese  Wall  against  England  in 
five-sixths  of  Europe,  At  the  same  time  he  made 
strenuous  efforts  to  increase  his  naval  power  ;  squad- 
rons were  sent  into  the  Mediterranean  to  threaten 
Sicily  to  be  annexed  to  Joseph's  kingdom  of 
Naples ;  from  Dantzic  and  Riga  to  Trieste,  all 
around  the  Continent,  his  vassals  and  allies  were 
directed  to  make  war  upon  British  commerce ;  his 
policy  was,  to  some  extent,  furthered  by  the  anger 
which  the  expedition  to  Copenhagen  had  aroused  in 
the  councils  of  the  lesser  maritime  Powers.  His  eyes 
had  soon  turned  towards  the  Iberian  Peninsula,  and 
had  fastened  on  Portugal  in  the  first  instance.  That 
little  state,  an  ancient  ally  of  England,  had  been 
tossed  to  and  fro  in  the  tremendous  conflict  which  had 
raged,  with  scarcely  an  interruption,  since  1793  ;  but 
it  had  inclined  at  heart  to  its  British  protector ;  it 
had  numberless  associations  with  British  traders. 
It  was  now  ruled  by  a  Regent,  in  the  place  of  an  in- 
sane sovereign  ;  Napoleon  peremptorily  commanded 
him  to   close   his   ports  against  British  ships,  and, 


52  Wellington 

without  any  declaration  of  war,  to  seize  the  persons 
and  the  property  of  British  merchants  at  this  time 
in  Portugal.  The  Regent,  a  weak  and  incapable 
ruler,  endeavoured  to  make  a  compromise,  but  to  no 
purpose :  Napoleon  resolved  to  invade  Portugal, 
an  object  he  had  already  had  in  view.  A  French 
Army,  about  25,000  strong,  was  gradually  gathered 
together  at  Bayonne ;  it  was  backed  by  other  forces 
already  menacing  Spain;  Junot,  a  dashing  soldier, 
was  placed  at  its  head.'  He  had  crossed  the  Bidas- 
soa,  in  October,  1807;  meantime  a  treaty  had  been 
made  at  Fontainebleau  between  the  French  Em- 
peror and  the  Court  of  Spain  ;  Portugal  was  to  be 
dismembered  and  given  in  part  to  Godoy,  the 
favourite  of  Charles  IV.  and  his  adulterous  Queen  ; 
a  Spanish  Army  was  to  be  employed  to  support 
Junot.  Whether  this  compact  was  in  any  sense 
sincere,  or  was  a  mere  mask  to  conceal  the  designs 
Napoleon  entertained  against  the  Spanish  Bourbons 
can  only  be  matter  for  conjecture  ;  but  it  secured 
Junot  the  aid  of  a  Spanish  contingent ;  he  invaded 
Portugal  with  perhaps  40,000  men,  to  a  considerable 
extent  very  inferior  soldiers.  He  had  been  ordered 
to  advance  by  the  route  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo ;  but 
Napoleon  changed  his  mind,  and  to  ensure  celerity 
bade  him  press  forward  along  the  banks  of  the 
Tagus;  the  invaders  plunged  into  an  almost  im- 
passable country  and  lost  thousands  of  men  on  the 
march :  scarcely  2000  spectres  in  rags  reached  Lis- 
bon by  the  close  of  November,  leaving  a  wretched 

'  The  very  valuable  History  of  the  Peninsular  War  by  Mr.  Oman 
begins  at  this  point, 


Ireland —  Copcnhage^i —  Vimiero  5  3 

multitude  of  stragglers  far  behind.  The  Regent 
ought  to  have  crushed  this  handful  of  men ;  but  the 
terror  of  Napoleon's  arms  prevailed  :  he  fled  from 
his  capital,  and  with  the  Court  crossed  the  Atlantic 
under  the  escort  of  a  British  fleet;  Junot  had  soon 
taken  possession  of  Lisbon. 

By  this  time,  Napoleon  had  matured  his  projects 
against   Spain.      That   unfortunate  land,   under  an 
imbecile  Government,  had  been  in  decline  for  many 
years;    but    Spain    had    made   herself  a  satellite  of 
France  :  she  had  lavished  her  resources  on  an  exacting 
ally  ;  she  had  olTered  up  her  Navy,  at  Trafalgar,  with- 
out hope,  as  a  sacrifice.     But  Napoleon  had  resolved 
on  annexing  the   kingdom  ;    he  was   partly  moved 
to  his  purpose  by  the  obvious  reason  that  a  Bourbon 
dynasty    on    the    throne   of    Spain    was    a  possible 
menace  to  Revolutionary  France  ;  partly  by  a  deter- 
mination to  enforce  the  Continental  System  ;  partly 
by  a  real  wish  to  regenerate  a  people  shamefully 
ruled ;  and   to   create   institutions   in   Spain   of   the 
Imperial  type.     Personal  resentment,  too,  played  a 
distinct  part ;  Godoy,  the  evil  genius  of  the  Spanish 
Monarchy,  had  issued  a  proclamation  before  Jena, 
calling  on  the  Spanish  nation  to  take  up  arms,  and  a 
threat,  evidently  directed  against  France.    From  this 
time  the  fate  of  Spain  was  resolved  on  ;  Talleyrand 
not  improbably  seconded  his  master's  pohcy,  though 
he  did  not  approve  of  the  acts  of  fraud  and  violence 
that  were  soon  to  follow.     In  the  autumn  of  1807 
and    the    first    days    of    1808,    French    troops    were 
poured  into  Spain  on  different  pretexts  ;  the  Spanish 
frontier  fortresses  were   treacherously   seized  ;   in  a 


54  Wellington 

short  time  nearly  100,000  men  were  encamped  be- 
yond the  southern  verge  of  the  Pyrenees,  and  occu- 
pied the  chief  approaches  to  Madrid.  The  miserable 
intrigues  of  the  Spanish  royal  family,  an  odious 
exhibition  of  squalid  discord,  may  perhaps  have 
quickened  Napoleon's  purpose,  but  it  appears  cer- 
tain that,  long  before  these  events,  he  had  marked 
Spain  down  as  a  spoil  for  his  arms.  Godoy,  supreme 
in  the  councils  of  Charles  IV.  and  the  Queen,  got 
wind  of  the  Emperor's  evident  designs  ;  he  urged 
his  dupes  to  imitate  the  example  of  the  Portuguese 
Regent,  and  to  take  ship  for  Spanish  America;  but 
a  rising  at  Aranjuez  put  an  end  to  this  scheme  ;  he 
was  maltreated  by  a  furious  populace ;  the  King 
abdicated,  and  his  son  Ferdinand  was  placed  in  his 
stead.  By  this  time  the  North  of  Spain  had  been 
flooded  with  French  troops ;  Murat,  as  lieutenant 
of  Napoleon,  occupied  Madrid  ;  he  refused  to  recog- 
nise Ferdinand's  title  to  the  throne,  obeying  the 
Machiavellian  commands  of  his  master.  Ferdinand 
was  now  skilfully  enticed  to  Bayonne,  where  Napo- 
leon, holding  the  threads  of  an  infamous  intrigue, 
had  gone  in  order  to  efTect  his  object ;  Charles  IV., 
his  consort,  and  Godoy  fell  at  the  conqueror's  feet ; 
after  dishonourable  scenes  of  recrimination  and 
passion,  a  renunciation  of  all  right  to  the  crown  of 
Spain  was  extorted  from  the  whole  royal  family, 
Napoleon,  like  fate,  swaying  his  puppets  to  his  will. 
The  victims  of  this  crime  were  banished  into  gilded 
exile  in  France ;  as  if  in  irony  Talleyrand  was  made 
their  keeper. 

The  conduct  of  Napoleon  at  this  juncture  was 


Ireland —  Coperihagen —  Vimie^'o  5  5 

perhaps  the  worst  of  his  poHtical  acts  ;  it  was  a  com- 
bination of  evil  statecraft,  and  wrong ;  it  was  far 
more  censurable  than  what  he  had  done  at  Venice. 
Years  afterwards,  in  the  sohtude  of  St.  Helena,  he 
acknowledged  that  it  was  profoundly  immoral,  and 
that  the  end  he  proposed  to  himself,  the  regenera- 
tion of  Spain,  was  not  justified  by  the  detestable 
means.  He  transferred  the  throne  of  Spain,  made 
vacant  in  this  way,  to  his  amiable,  but  not  able 
elder  brother,  Joseph,  placing  Murat  on  Joseph's 
throne  of  Naples;  a  Junta  of  nobles,  high  ecclesi- 
astics, and  officials  was  assembled  to  confirm  the 
choice  of  the  conqueror.  Napoleon,  occupying  a 
large  part  of  the  Peninsula  by  his  armies,  believed 
that  his  success  had  been  completely  assured  ;  he 
was  convinced  that  he  could  exclaim  with  Louis 
XIV.,  that  the  Pyrenees  had  been  effaced  as  a  bar- 
rier. But  the  great  despot,  hitherto  accustomed 
only  to  deal  with  peoples  of  a  very  different  type, 
had  not  reckoned  on  the  nature  of  a  proud  and  ob- 
stinate race,  which  had  held  Rome  at  bay  for  more 
than  a  century  and  a  half ;  and  which,  only  three 
generations  before  this  time,  had  risen  against  the 
Pretender  of  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  and  against 
the  heretic  English  and  Dutch,  when  the  position 
of  affairs  appeared  desperate.  The  nation  sprang  to 
arms  as  a  man  ;  the  mountaineers  of  Asturias  lit  the 
flame ;  it  spread  into  Galicia  and  Leon ;  like  a  con- 
flagration blazing  from  many  a  range  of  hills,  it 
illuminated  Andalusia  and  the  Eastern  Kingdoms ; 
it  was  an  ubiquitous  and  universal  movement.  The 
regular  armies  —  they  were  less  contemptible  than 


V 


5  6  Wellington 

has  been  supposed  —  were  swept    into  the  general 
rising ;  self-governing  Juntas  estabhshed  themselves ; 
and  though  vengeance  was  taken,  in   too  many  in- 
stances, on  the  partisans  of  the  French  usurper,  and 
there  was  a  fierce  outbreak    of  Revolutionary  pas- 
sion, the  insurrection  was  a  grand,   nay,  an  heroic 
spectacle.      The   results  were  seen  in  a  very  short 
time;  they  astounded  a  Continent  that  had  licked 
the  feet  of  Napoleon.     Bessieres,  holding  the  great 
line  of  communication  between  Bayonneand  Madrid, 
no  doubt  won  a  battle  at    Medina    Rio  Seco,  and 
scattered  in  flight  the  rude  levies  of  the  West.     But 
notwithstanding  the  great  force  which  the  Emperor 
had  perfidiously  moved  into  Spain,  the  French  arms 
were    unsuccessful    everywhere   else.     Moncey   was 
driven  back  from  Valencia  in  defeat ;  Lefebvre  Des- 
noettes  was  foiled    before   Saragossa,  a  memorable 
name.     Erelong  a  terrible  disaster  took  place,  which 
threw  a  dark  shadow  on  the  Imperial  glories,  and 
was  execrated  by  Napoleon,  through  his  life,  as  an 
indelible  military  disgrace.     Dupont,  after  invading 
Andalusia     and    sacking     Cordova     with     reckless 
cruelty,   was   caught   on   the   verge   of    the    Sierra 
Morena,  and  compelled  to  lay  down  his  arms  with 
some    20,000    men.      The    blow    seemed    for    the 
moment  decisive ;  Joseph  evacuated  Madrid  in  hot 
haste,  and  took  refuge  behind  the  hne  of  the  Ebro. 
The  great  rising  of  Spain  made  a  profound  im- 
pression on  England ;  the  leading  parties  and  men 
in  the  State  gave  it  heartfelt  sympathy.     It  was  the 
first  symptom  of  a  real  national  effort  to  shake  off 
the  yoke  which  Napoleon   had   laid  on  the  Conti- 


Ireland —  Copenhagen —  Vimiero  5  7 

nent ;  Pitt  had  predicted  before  his  death  that  there 
would  be  such  a  movement.  The  Junta  of  the 
Asturias  had  judiciously  sent  two  emissaries  to 
England  to  plead  their  cause ;  Parliament  pro- 
nounced for  an  armed  intervention  in  Spain.  This 
resolve  was  quickened  by  an  insurrection  in  Portu- 
gal, not  so  fierce  or  so  general  as  that  of  Spain,  but 
formidable  enough  to  menace  Junot,  and  to  embarrass 
him,  cut  off  as  he  now  was  from  France ;  the  British 
Ministers  determined,  in  the  summer  of  1808,  to 
make  a  descent  on  the  Iberian  Peninsula,  and  to  send 
an  armed  force  to  support  the  insurgents.  The 
British  army  was  now  much  more  powerful  and 
more  efificient,  as  an  instrument  of  war,  than  it  had 
been  in  1 793-1 794,  when  it  had  made  its  unfortu- 
nate essays  in  the  Low  Countries.  Its  organisation, 
indeed,  was  still  very  defective ;  the  bad  influence 
of  favouritism  still  hung  on  it ;  it  was  very  different 
from  the  mighty  force,  which  in  the  language  of 
Wellington  at  a  subsequent  time,  "  could  go  any- 
where and  do  anything."  But  its  numbers  had 
been  largely  increased  by  a  regular  admixture  with 
the  militia  ;  it  had  been  improved  by  the  reforms  of 
the  Duke  of  York;  Moore,  the  most  brilliant,  per- 
haps, of  living  British  soldiers,  had  done  much  to 
make  its  tactics  better,  more  flexible,  more  adapted 
to  modern  war :  as  usually  happens  in  a  great  and 
free  country,  comparatively  young  men  had  made 
their  mark  in  it ;  its  discipline,  if  severe,  was  excel- 
lent ;  it  reckoned  Alexandria  and  Maida  among 
recent  victories,  in  which  it  had  fairly  beaten  the 
renowned  legions  of  France.     The  Ministry,  at  this 


58  Wellinglon 

juncture,  possessed  the  means  of  sending  a  consid- 
erable expedition  to  the  Peninsula,  unlike  the  petty 
expeditions  despatched  in  former  years,  from  our 
shores.  Trafalgar  had  made  invasion  hopeless ; 
Wellesley  was  in  command  of  9000  men,  intended 
to  attack  the  Spanish-American  Colonies ;  propitious 
fortune  favoured  him  once  more;  he  was  directed 
to  sail  with  this  force  from  Cork  to  Portugal.  He 
was  to  be  joined  by  General  Spencer  with  5000 
troops  from  Gibraltar  and  Cadiz ;  Generals  An- 
struther  and  Acland  were  to  embark  from  England 
with  about  4000  men,  Moore  was  to  be  despatched 
from  the  Baltic  with  10,000  men.  An  army,  there- 
fore, nearly  30,000  strong,  was  to  be  assembled 
and  to  land  on  the  Portuguese  seaboard ;  this  was 
a  bold  enterprise,  of  which  the  credit  was  due  to 
Castlereagh. 

Wellesley  had  been  made  a  lieutenant-general  by 
this  time  ;  but  he  was  the  junior  ofificer  of  that  rank 
in  the  British  army  :  remarkable  as  his  career  in 
India  had  been,  he  was  to  be  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  Burrard  and  Dalrymple,  veterans  of  the 
past,  who  were  to  mar  the  operations  that  ensued. 
For  the  moment,  however,  he  was  given  a  free  hand 
to  direct  his  own  forces  and  those  of  Spencer;  it 
was  characteristic  of  him  that,  on  his  voyage  from 
Cork,  he  endeavoured  to  make  himself  acquainted 
with  the  Spanish  tongue.  Having  preceded  the  ex- 
pedition in  a  light  vessel,  he  had  interviews  with  the 
Galician  Junta,  and  with  the  leaders  of  the  rising  in 
Portugal  ;  but  he  was  not  favourably  impressed  by 
their  boastful  reports ;  he  resolved    to   confine   his 


Ireland — Copenhagen —  Vimiero  59 

movements  to  the  interior  and  the  seacoast  of  Por- 
tugal. He  was  now  at  the  head  of  rather  more  than 
13,000  men,  Spencer  having  come  into  hne  with  him. 
The  landing  was  effected  at  Mondego  Bay,  a  consid- 
erable distance  to  the  north  of  Lisbon ;  it  was  com- 
pleted in  the  first  days  of  August;  this  was  the 
beginning  of  the  great  Peninsular  War,  with  respect, 
at  least,  to  the  arms  of  England.  Wellesley  lost 
some  days  from  a  deplorable  want  of  means  of 
transport,  a  delay  that  told  greatly  in  the  enemy's 
favour,  who  otherwise  might  have  been  taken  by 
surprise:  he  was  in  full  march  by  the  14th  of 
August;  the  plan  of  his  operations  had  been  ar- 
ranged. His  object  was  to  attack  and  defeat  Junot, 
known  to  be  in  Lisbon  with  a  large  part  of  the 
French  army.  Wellesley 's  project,  though  ques- 
tionable in  pure  strategy,  was,  nevertheless,  essen- 
tially well  conceived.  He  resolved  to  move,  with 
his  own  force,  along  the  coast-line,  protected  on  his 
right  f^ank  by  the  British  fleet;  but  he  knew  that 
Moore  with  his  10,000  men  was  at  hand;  he  pro- 
posed that  Moore  should  march  inland  on  Santarem, 
and  that  the  united  army  should  converge  on  Lis- 
bon, bringing  Junot  to  bay,  and  driving  him  away 
from  that  capital.  This  advance  on  a  double  line 
was  opposed  to  the  ordinary  rules  of  the  art,  but  it 
has  long  ago  been  justified  by  the  best  critics  of  war  ; 
it  may  be  compared  to  Napoleon's  movement  against 
Wurmser   on    both  shores  of  the  Lake  of  Garda," 

'  For  Wellesley's  plan  of  operations,  see  Gurwood's  Selection,  p. 
231,  an  excellent  work.  Napier's  History  of  the  Peninsular  War, 
i.,  106,  Routledge  Edition,  completely  justifies  Wellesley. 


6o  Wellington 


i> 


after  Castiglione,  and  the  raising  of  the  siege  of 
Mantua.  It  deserves  special  notice  that  Wellesley, 
one  of  the  greatest  masters  of  tactics,  was  con- 
vinced, even  at  this  time,  that  the  French  mode  of 
attack  in  the  field  would  probably  fail  against  the 
robur  pedituni  of  the  British  army  :  the  Column,  he 
felt  assured,  was  no  match  for  the  Line,  as  the 
Carthaginian  Phalanx  was  no  match  for  the  Roman 
Legion.  ' 

By  this  time  Junot  had,  since  the  preceding  winter, 
established  himself  in  his  late  conquest  —  Lisbon. 
He  kept  the  capital  down  by  threats  and  by  force ; 
his  administration  of  it  was  marked  by  the  fraudulent 
rapine  and  by  the  severities  which,  as  a  rule,  dis- 
graced the  French  generals  in  Portugal  and  Spain, 
and  were  not  the  least  causes  of  the  Emperor's 
failure.^  He  had  reorganised  and  strengthened  his 
exhausted  army,  and  though  it  was  still  to  some  ex- 
tent an  assemblage  of  conscripts,  it  had  several  regi- 
ments of  good  soldiers  ;  the  cavalry  and  artillery 
were  efficient  arms  ;  it  had  soon  reached  the  number 
of  30,000  Frenchmen.     For  months  Junot  felt  him- 

'  Wellesley's  remarks  to  Croker  are  well  known.  See  Sir  H.  Max- 
well's Life  of  Wellington,  i.,  97-98  :  "  My  die  is  cast  ;  the  French 
may  overwhelm  me,  but  I  don't  think  they  will  outmanoeuvre  me. 
First,  because  I  am  not  afraid  of  them,  as  everybody  else  seems 
to  be  ;  and  secondly,  because,  if  what  I  hear  of  their  system  of 
manoeuvres  is  true,  I  think  it  a  false  one,  as  against  steady  troops. 
I  suspect  all  the  Continental  Armies  were  more  than  half  beaten  be- 
fore the  battle  was  begun.  I,  at  least,  will  not  be  frightened 
beforehand." 

*  The  conduct  of  Junot  and  of  the  French  at  Lisbon  is  well  de- 
scribed by  Thiebault,  who  was  Junot's  Chief  of  tlie  Staff.  Mdmoires, 
iv.,  139,  199. 


Irelajtd —  Copejihageti —  Viiniero  6 1 

self  completely  secure,  and  spent  his  time  in    idle 
pleasures  in  Lisbon  ;  but  he  was  roused  from  this 
dalliance  by  the  insurrection  of  Spain  ;  this  suddenly 
made  his  situation  one  of  real  danger.     He  lost  part 
of  his  Spanish  contingent,  and  was  compelled  to  dis- 
arm and  imprison  the  remaining  part ;  the  popula- 
tion of  Lisbon  became  menacing,  and  seemed  eager 
to  take  up  arms ;  Portugal  had  soon  risen  in  insur- 
rection, like  Spain  ;  he  was  cut  off  from  communica- 
tion with  France ;  he  obtained  no  assistance  from  a 
Russian  fleet  in  the  Tagus,  the  commander  of  which 
was  secretly  hostile  ;  he  received  intelligence  that  a 
British  force  might  make  a  descent.      His  position, 
no  doubt,  had  become  critical,  and  he  gave  proof  of 
a  rather  fitful  energy  ;  but  his  measures  were  not 
those  of  a  real  general.     He  did  not   form  an  en- 
trenched camp  to  defend  Lisbon,  as  Wellesley  did 
on  a  greater  occasion  ;  he  left  too  many  of  his  troops 
in  the  capital,  —  dangerous  negligence  in  the  existing 
state  of  affairs.     Above  all,  he  made  no  strenuous  ef- 
forts to  concentrate  his  army  against  enemies  known 
to  be  at  hand  :  he  kept  garrisons  in  fortresses  to  no 
purpose ;  he  allowed  a  detachment  to  remain  on  the 
eastern  bank  of  the  Tagus,  where  it  could  hardly  be 
of  any  conceivable  use.'      In   a  word,  he  did  not  as- 
semble his  forces  toward  the  decisive  scene  of  action, 
which  he  must  have  known  would  be  where  the  British 
army  would  appear ;   a  third  part  at  least  of  these 
were  turned  to  no  account  and  wasted.     He  heard, 
however,  almost  at  once  of  the  landing  of  Wellesley, 

'  For  the  faulty  dispositions  of  Junot  see  the  admirable  observa- 
tions of  Napoleon.      Thiebault,  Mdrnoires,  iv.,  261,  271. 


62  Wellington 

and  he  prepared  with  his  present  means  to  confront 
his  enemy  ;  the  delay  that  followed  the  landing  was 
a  godsend  to  him.  He  sent  forward  Laborde,  a 
skilful  officer,  with  some  6000  men,  to  hold  the 
British  chief  in  check  ;  he  directed  a  lieutenant,  Loi- 
son,  who  had  been  on  the  other  bank  of  the  Tagus, 
to  march  by  Santarem  and  to  join  Laborde ;  he 
made  ready  with  the  main  army  to  march  out  of 
Lisbon,  and  to  offer  battle  to  Wellesley  near  Torres 
Vedras.  He  left,  however,  a  large  detachment  be- 
hind—  clinging  to  his  error  at  the  critical  moment. 

Wellesley,  meanwhile,  had  been  marching  along 
the  coast-line,  by  Leira  and  Alcobaca,  to  attack 
Junot.  Laborde  had  advanced  to  meet  the  British 
General ;  but  rightly  fell  back  to  a  defensive  position 
in  the  midst  of  a  plain  enclosed  by  hills,  through 
which  the  road  from  Obidos  to  Torres  Vedras  and 
Lisbon  passes.  The  French  General  first  took  his 
stand  on  an  eminence  near  Rolica,  a  petty  village. 
He  was  assailed  with  greatly  superior  forces  on  the 
17th  of  August,  Wellesley  endeavouring  to  sur- 
round him  on  both  flanks;  but  he  effected  his  escape 
with  admirable  skill,  and  took  another  position  a 
short  way  off,  in  the  rear,  on  a  range  of  wooded 
heights,  by  the  hamlet  of  Columbeira.  The  attack 
was  repeated  in  the  same  manner  ;  but  the  outflank- 
ing movement  was  made  late  ;  the  British  suffered  a 
good  deal  in  a  frontal  attack ;  but  the  second  posi- 
tion was  at  last  carried  ;  the  French  lost  three  guns, 
and  perhaps  500  men  in  the  combat.  Laborde,  how- 
ever, whose  manoeuvres  had  deserved  the  highest 
praise,  retreated,  scarcely  molested,  to  join  his  chief; 


Ireland — Copcjihagen —  Vhniero  63 

the  loss  of  Wellesley  was  about  the  same  as  that  of 
his  enemy;  more  than  one  of  his  subordinates  might 
have  done  better;  in  fact  they  were  not  equal  to 
their  adversaries  in  an  encounter  of  this  kind. 
Loison,  meantime,  after  a  very  fatiguing  march,  had 
reached  Torres  Vedras  from  Santarem  ;  Laborde  had 
fallen  back  some  miles  to  the  southward.  Junot 
had  marched  out  of  Lisbon  on  the  15th  of  August ; 
by  the  19th  his  two  lieutenants  had  joined  him ; 
Junot,  on  the  next  day,  resolved  to  attack  Wellesley, 
now  at  Vimiero,  at  a  short  distance.  The  French 
General  was  at  the  head  of  nearly  14,000  men ;  he 
had  nearly  2000  good  cavalry  ;  his  artillery  num- 
bered twenty-three  guns. 

Anstruther  and  Acland  had  disembarked  by  the 
20th  of  August ;  they  brought  Wellesley  a  reinforce- 
ment of  some  4000  men.  The  veteran  Burrard  was 
in  their  wake,  but  fortunately  he  did  not  assume  the 
command ;  Wellesley,  now  at  Vimiero  for  two  or 
three  days,  was  allowed  to  make  his  arrangements 
for  the  battle  at  hand.  The  position  he  chose  was 
one  of  formidable  strength  ;  but,  in  the  case  of  a  re- 
verse, by  no  means  free  from  danger.  His  right  and 
right  centre,  where  he  placed  his  main  force,  rested 
on  a  line  of  steep  and  broken  heights,  exceedingly 
difficult  to  be  stormed  by  an  enemy  ;  but  should  such 
an  effort  prove  successful,  the  defeated  Army  would 
be  close  to  the  sea,  and  would  find  it  no  easy  task  to 
retreat.  Before  the  British  centre  rose  an  isolated 
liill,  affording  excellent  means  of  defence  ;  Wellesley 
occupied  this  with  some  3000  men  ;  it  was  favourable 
for  the  play  of  artillery  ;  it  was,  perhaps,  the  key  of 


64  Wellington 

the  position  of  the  British  centre.  The  left  of 
Wellesley  held  his  weakest  ground ;  this  was  a  low 
range  of  hills,  sinking  down  by  degrees,  and  capable 
of  being  turned  at  its  verge  ;  but  it  was  covered  by 
a  kind  of  ravine  on  its  front,  which  ran  like  a  huge 
fosse  before  this  part  of  the  line.  The  whole  of 
Wellesley 's  front  spread  along  a  short  space,  so  that 
his  troops  could  be  quickly  moved  from  one  point  to 
another ;  this  was  fortunate  in  the  events  which  fol- 
lowed. He  was  now  in  command  of  not  far  from 
17,000  British  troops;  to  these  should  be  added 
some  2000  Portuguese,  rude  and  ill-armed  levies  of 
very  little  value.  He  was,  besides,  exceedingly  weak 
in  cavalry,  having  only  about  260  British  sabres ;  he 
had  not  more  than  eighteen  guns. 

Clouds  of  dust  rising  along  the  road  from  Torres 
Vedras  disclosed  the  approach  of  the  French  Army 
in  the  early  forenoon  of  the  2 1st  of  August.  Junot 
was  recklessly  impatient  to  begin  the  attack  ;  he  may 
have  learned  that  British  reinforcements  were  at 
hand ;  but  his  dispositions  gave  proof  of  precipitate 
haste.  He  hardly  reconnoitred  the  ground  at  all ' ; 
he  left  detachments  behind  which  might  have  joined 
him ;  his  soldiers  were  fatigued  by  a  march  under  a 
burning  sun  ;  he  did  not  give  them  even  an  hour  to 
rest.  He  was  not,  however,  without  coup  d' ceil  on 
the  field ;  the  plan  of  his  attack  was  not  badly  con- 
ceived, though  in  executing  it  unpardonable  mistakes 
were  made.     He,  probably,  wisely  avoided   Welles- 


'  Napoleon  fastened  on  this  palpable  error  of  his  lieutenant. 
Thiebault,  Mdmoires,  iv.,  265.  "  Rien  ne  pent  justifier  I'attaque 
d'une  position  qui  n'a  pas  ete  reconnue." 


Ireland — Copenhagen — Vimiero  65 

ley's  right,  for  this  part  of  the  position  was  of  great 
strength ;  he  properly  decided  on  turning  his  ad- 
versary's left,  while  he  would  fall  on  the  British 
centre  in  front  with  the  mass  of  his  army.  But  the 
outflanking  movement  was  made  with  much  too 
small  a  force,  and  the  distance  to  be  traversed  by 
the  French  was  great  and  difficult ;  Wellesley  was 
given  time  to  detach  from  his  right  to  support  his 
left,  and  thus  to  be  superior  to  his  enemy  on  this 
part  of  the  field.  Meanwhile  Junot  had  marched 
against  the  hill  in  advance  of  the  British  centre  ;  the 
French  soldiery  came  on  in  their  wonted  dashing 
style,  but  they  were  mown  down  by  the  destructive 
fire  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  and  charged  by  the 
overlapping  line  as  the  shaken  columns  fell  back  ; 
the  attack  was  boldly  repeated  three  times ;  but  it 
had  never  a  chance  of  a  successful  issue.  Wellesley 
made  a  counterstroke  with  his  handful  of  cavalry; 
but  as  too  commonly  has  happened  with  British 
troopers,  they  rushed  forward  too  far,  and  got  out  of 
control  ;  they  were  charged  by  a  superior  body  of 
Junot's  horsemen,  which  covered  the  retreat  of  the 
already  broken  infantry.  Meantime  the  battle  had 
gone  decisively  against  the  French  on  Wellesley's 
left,  which  had  only  been  weakly  menaced.  While 
the  British  centre  was  being  assailed,  Junot,  seeing 
that  the  outflanking  movement  had  not  sufificient 
support,  detached  a  brigade  of  his  army  to  second 
this  attack  ;  but  this  body  of  men  was  almost  de- 
stroyed by  the  superior  forces  which  Wellesley  had 
sent  off  to  the  aid  of  his  left.  Brennier,  the  leader 
of  the  outflanking  movement,  having  been  retarded 


66  Wellington 

by  the  ravine  he  unexpectedly  met,  and  having  been 
compelled  to  make  a  long  circuitous  march,  made  a 
gallant  attempt  to  retrieve  the  fortunes  of  the  day  ; 
but  he,  too,  was  completely  beaten,  in  turn,  and 
driven  back  in  precipitate  flight.  The  whole  of 
Junot's  army  was  now  falling  back  in  confusion  ;  its 
retreat  was  covered  by  its  still  nearly  intact  cavalry ; 
but  it  had  lost  half  its  guns,  and  fully  2300  men  ;  it 
would  have  been  scattered  in  rout  by  a  bold,  decisive 
stroke. 

Assuredly  Wellesley  would  have  dealt  this  blow ; 
he  had  lost  little  more  than  700  men  ;  his  troops 
were  in  the  full  flush  of  victory  ;  he  could  easily 
have  cut  Junot  off  from  Lisbon,  and  driven  him,  in 
ruin,  across  the  hills  on  Santarem,  where,  probably, 
he  would  have  been  forced  to  lay  down  his  arms. 
But  the  purpose  of  the  British  commander  was 
crossed  by  Burrard,  who  reached  the  scene  when  the 
battle  was  won  ;  the  timid  veteran  forbade  any  at- 
tempt at  a  pursuit  ;  he  anriounced  that  he  would 
make  a  halt  until  he  had  been  joined  by  the  10,000 
men  of  Moore,  who,  in  opposition  to  Wellesley 's 
plan,  had  been  ordered  not  to  march  on  Santarem, 
but  to  come  into  line  with  the  main  army  by  sea. 
The  vexation  of  Wellesley  may  be  conceived  ;  the 
fruits  of  victory  had  been  wrested  from  his  grasp  ; 
Junot  and  his  beaten  forces  had  been  allowed  to 
escape ;  they  reached  Torres  Vedras  unmolested, 
and  were  free  to  return  to  Lisbon.  Dalrymple  super- 
seded Burrard  on  the  22nd  of  August ;  the  change 
of  commanders,  seldom  a  judicious  course,  made 
what  was  already  bad   enough,  worse  ;  Dalrymple 


Ireland —  Copenhagen —  Viniiero  6  7 

decided  on  prolonging  the  halt  ;  he  would  not  even 
menace  the  enemy  until  Moore  had  effected  his 
junction  with  him  ;  this  involved  a  delay  of  eight  or 
nine  days,  during  which  Junot  might,  perhaps,  have 
made  a  successful  stand  at  Lisbon,  But  the  French 
commander,  after  Vimiero,  had  lost  heart :  he  had 
been  defeated  in  a  battle  that  could  have  been  made 
decisive;  he  was  isolated  in  a  hostile  country;  he 
could  not  expect  to  hold  Lisbon  for  any  time,  or  to 
make  his  way  through  Spain,  insurgent  as  it  was,  from 
the  Tagus  to  the  Pyrenean  frontier.  He  sent  Keller- 
man,  the  brilliant  chief  of  Marengo,  to  offer  terms, 
which  Dalrymple  was  glad  to  accept  :  the  French 
army  was  to  quit  Lisbon,  and  to  evacuate  Portugal; 
it  was  to  be  conducted  to  France  in  British  transports. 
Wellesley  chafed  against  these  proposals,  but  could 
not  resist  them  ;  the  Convention  of  Cintra,  as  it  was 
called,  was  signed  ;  Junot  and  his  army  were  before 
long  at  sea ;  they  were  at  length  safely  landed  on 
the  shores  of  their  country.  The  Convention  of 
Cintra  was  not,  perhaps,  the  pusillanimous  act  it  has 
generally  been  supposed,  but  it  aroused  a  storm  of 
indignation  in  England,  where  timidity  in  the  field 
has  always  been  fiercely  condemned  ;  Byron  has 
indicated,  in  bitter  verses,  the  tone  of  the  opinion  of 
the  day.  A  Court  of  Enquiry  was  soon  held  ;  the 
report  was  cautious,  undecided,  and  to  little  purpose  ; 
but  enough  transpired  to  free  Wellesley  from  blame, 
and  to  mark  him  out  for  future  distinction.  Burrard 
and  Dalrymple  were  never  placed  in  command  again. 
The  Campaign  of  Vimiero  is  of  real  interest ;  it 
was  the  first  instance  in  which  Wellesley  commanded 


68  Wellington 

a  British  against  a  French  army.  His  dispositions, 
if  not  very  remarkable,  were  excellent,  and  not  un- 
worthy of  the  victor  of  Assaye.  He  was  never  su- 
preme in  the  grand  sphere  of  strategy,  but  his 
project  of  an  advance  in  double  lines  to  close  round 
Junot,  as  if  in  a  vice,  if  it  has  been  censured,  was 
worthy  of  high  praise.  His  right  at  Vimiero  was 
in  danger,  in  a  certain  sense ;  but  the  enemy  did 
not  dare  to  attack  it ;  he  showed  his  characteristic 
resource  in  arraying  his  army  in  the  field ;  the 
movement  by  which  he  detached  from  his  right  to 
strengthen  his  left  was  perfectly  conceived.  He 
conducted  the  battle  with  judgment  and  insight :  had 
he  not  been  superseded  by  Burrard  at  the  decisive 
moment,  the  French  army  must  have  been  com- 
pletely routed.  The  arrangements  of  his  adversary 
were,  from  first  to  last,  ill-considered,  and  not  those 
of  a  true  commander.  Junot  might  have  assembled 
at  least  20,000  men  to  give  battle  to  Wellesley,  had 
he  understood  war ;  he  left  too  great  a  force  behind 
him  in  Lisbon  ;  he  never  entrenched  himself  in  a 
position  outside  the  city.  At  Vimiero  he  was  cul- 
pably rash  ;  he  attacked  his  enemy  without  examin- 
ing the  ground ;  if  he  was  correct  in  his  idea  that  he 
ought  to  turn  Wellesley's  left,  the  execution  of  this 
movement  was  a  series  of  mistakes.  He  was  fortu- 
nate in  escaping  the  fate  of  Dupont :  had  Wellesley 
been  free  to  act,  Junot  would,  all  but  certainly,  have 
succumbed.  As  for  the  armies  that  encountered 
each  other  in  this  short  passage  of  war,  they  gave 
proof  of  the  qualities  by  which  they  were  long  dis- 
tinguished,   The  French  were  as  yet  superior  in  skill 


Irela7id —  Copenhageji —  Vimiero  69 

in  mancEuvring ;  their  three  arms  worked  together 
better  than  those  of  their  enemy ;  they  were  more 
agile  and  ready  in  the  field.  But  they  had  nothing 
to  equal  the  British  infantry,  when  on  the  defensive  ; 
their  masses  were  unable  to  contend  against  the 
British  line,  with  its  enveloping  fire,  and  with  its  de- 
termined and  steady  onset.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
British  army  was  still  slow  when  on  the  march :  it 
was  as  yet  very  badly  supplied  with  different  appli- 
ances  required  in  the  field  ;  its  impedimenta  were 
heavy  and  cumbrous  ;  its  cavalry  and  artillery  were 
much  too  weak,  as  was  to  be  expected  in  the  case  of 
a  force,  transported  to  a  great  distance  from  the 
British  Isles. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  DOURO — TALAVERA 

Napoleon's  authority  on  the  Continent  weakened  after  Baylen  and 
Vimiero — He  persists  in  his  purpose  to  conquer  Spain  and  Portu- 
gal— His  interview  with  the  Q?ar  at  Erfurt— England  rejects 
their  overtures  and  continues  the  war — -Moore  at  Lisbon — He 
marches  to  the  assistance  of  the  Spanish  armies — Napoleon  in- 
vades Spain — Espinosa,  Tudela — Moore's  march  to  Sahagun — 
Napoleon  crosses  the  Guadarrama,  but  fails  to  destroy  Moore's 
army — The  retreat  to,  and  the  battle  of,  Corunna — Death  of 
Moore — Faulty  dispositions  of  the  French  armies  after  the  de- 
parture of  Napoleon — Soult  at  Oporto — Victor  on  the  Guadiana 
— Wellesley  in  command  of  a  British  and  Portuguese  army  at 
Lisbon — His  masterly  views  on  the  Peninsular  War — He  ad- 
vances against  Soult  and  crosses  the  Douro — His  great  ability  in 
this  achievement — Able  retreat  of  Soult— Wellesley,  after  some 
delay,  advances  with  Cuesta,  up  the  valley  of  the  Tagus — 
Danger  of  this  strategy — Battle  of  Talavera — Retreat  of 
Wellesley  after  a  narrow  escape — He  receives  the  title  of 
Wellington. 


NAPOLEON  had  marked  down  Spain  and  Por- 
tugal as  an  easy  prey,  but  Baylen  and   Vimi- 
ero, followed   by  the  flight  of  the  forces  of 
the  invaders  behind  the  Ebro,  —  a  pusillanimous  mili- 
tary mistake,  for  which  King  Joseph  was  mainly  to 
blame,  —  had  not  only  subverted  his  power  through- 

70 


The  Doiiro — Talavera  71 

out  the  Peninsula,  but  had  weakened  his  authority 
on  the  subject  Continent.  A  thrill  of  amazement 
and  hope  ran  through  Europe  at  the  intelligence 
that  rude  Spanish  levies,  and  a  small  British  army, 
thrown  on  the  coasts  of  Portugal,  had  defeated  the 
legions  which  had  been  the  terror  of  the  world,  and 
had  completely  baffled  the  evil  policy  of  the  con- 
queror at  Bayonne.  Austria,  humiliated  and  dismem- 
bered since  the  rout  of  Austerlitz,  and  ever  willing  to 
wound,  even  if  afraid  to  strike,  began  to  increase  her 
military  power;  the  Archduke  Charles  was  placed  at 
the  head  of  her  War  Ofifice  ;  her  regular  army  was 
largely  augmented,  and  made  more  national.  Prussia, 
trodden  under  foot  since  Jena  and  Friedland,  indig- 
nantly chafed  in  her  degrading  chains,  and  was 
deeply  affected  by  what  had  occurred  in  Spain ; 
Germany,  hitherto  divided  into  feeble  and  almost 
hostile  states,  stirred,  in  the  presence  of  her  French 
oppressors,  with  a  movement  which,  in  the  fulness  of 
time,  was  to  become  a  mighty  patriotic  rising, 
spreading  from  the  Rhine  and  the  Vistula  to  the 
Danube.  In  Russia  the  nobles  and  the  mer- 
chants,—  two  powerful  orders  of  men,  —  seriously 
injured  in  their  direct  and  vital  interests,  had  always 
disliked  the  policy  of  Tilsit ;  even  Alexander  had 
ceased  to  be  overawed  and  won  by  the  fascination  of 
Napoleon's  personality  and  wiles.  At  the  same  time 
the  Emperor  had  engaged  in  a  quarrel  with  the 
Pope,  and  had  marched  an  army  into  the  Papal 
States  ;  his  expeditions  in  the  Mediterranean  had 
failed  ;  the  Continental  System,  if  doing  England 
much  harm,  had  not  produced  decisive  results;  even 


72  Wellington 

in  France  there  were  symptoms  of  popular  alarm 
and  discontent.  The  gigantic  but  unnatural  fabric 
of  despotic  force,  which  had  been  suddenly  raised 
by  the  genius  of  a  single  man,  seconded  by  an  extra- 
ordinary succession  of  events,  was,  in  a  word,  shaken 
by  recent  mischances  ;  signs  were  not  wanting  that 
it  would  not  be  a  permanent  structure.  In  these 
circumstances,  Napoleon  resolved  to  avenge  the 
disasters  that  had  befallen  his  arms  beyond  the 
Pyrenees,  and  to  subjugate  the  whole  Iberian  Penin- 
sula ;  but  he  sought  in  the  first  instance  to  secure 
the  loyal  support  of  his  newly  made  ally,  the  great 
monarch  beyond  the  Niemen,  of  whose  sincerity  he 
had  already  misgivings. 

An  interview,  accordingly,  between  the  two  poten- 
tates was  arranged  in  Germany,  at  the  town  of 
Erfurt,  not  far  from  the  historic  battlefield  of  Jena. 
Princes  and  nobles  from  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine  and  several  ambassadors  of  foreign  Powers 
graced  the  meeting  of  the  Czar  and  Napoleon ; 
Goethe  and  Wieland,  forgetting  patriotic  feelings, 
and  the  independence  which  is  the  glory  of  letters, 
bowed  in  admiration  to  the  mighty  conqueror  ;  the 
scene  prefigured,  in  some  measure,  the  greater  scene 
which  Dresden  beheld  four  years  afterwards.  The 
ascendency  of  Napoleon  again  triumphed  ;  Alex- 
ander yielded  to  an  overmastering  spell ;  he  recog- 
nised Joseph  as  King  of  Spain  ;  he  gave  his  ally  a 
free  hand  in  the  Iberian  Peninsula,  and  once  more 
promised  to  maintain  the  Continental  System.  He 
obtained,  however,  advantages  for  himself ;  the  prize 
of    Constantinople  was    dangled  before    his   eyes, 


The  Douro — Talavera  73 

though  Napoleon  had  resolved  that  it  should  never 
fall  into  his  hands  ;  he  was  permitted  to  do  what  he 
pleased  in  Finland,  and  to  subdue  the  lands  on  the 
Danube  which  marched  with  his  Empire.  The  inter- 
view, however,  was  most  important  for  this, — the  al- 
lied sovereigns  for  the  second  time  made  overtures 
to  England,  offering  peace,  though  it  is  tolerably 
certain  that,  on  Napoleon's  part  at  least,  this  was 
either  an  attempt  to  mask  his  ulterior  designs,  or  to 
win  the  opinion  of  the  Continent  again  to  his  side. 
The  two  Emperors  parted  with  efTusive  professions 
of  friendship;  they  were  soon  to  become  deadly 
enemies ;  but  Napoleon  had  gained  what  he  wanted, 
a  pledge  for  the  moment  that  the  Czar  would  not  in- 
terfere with  the  conquest  of  Portugal  and  Spain. 
The  British  Government,  as  Napoleon  no  doubt  ex- 
pected, refused  to  treat  unless  the  Juntas  of  Spain 
should  be  recognised  as  the  de  facto  ruling  powers  ; 
this  implied  that  Joseph  was  a  mere  usurper ; 
nothing  remained  but  to  continue  the  war.  At  this 
juncture  the  events  of  the  last  few  months  had,  per- 
haps, unduly  elated  the  British  Ministry,  and  had  in- 
creased the  enthusiasm  of  the  nation  in  behalf  of 
Spain  ;  the  Convention  of  Cintra  was  quickly  forgot- 
ten ;  Junot  had  been  defeated  and  forced  to  abandon 
Portugal ;  the  invaders  had  been  driven  nearly  to 
the  verge  of  the  Pyrenees  ;  every  ship  brought  news 
of  fresh  Spanish  triumphs,  and  of  the  irresistible 
might  of  the  great  Spanish  rising. 

It  was  determined  to  invade  Spain  with  a  British 
force,  to  be  supported  by  the  Spanish  levies;  the 
army  which  had  won  Vimiero  and  for  some  time  had 


74  Wellington 

remained  under  the  command  of  Dalrymple,  was 
to  be  raised  to  the  strength  of  30,000  men  at  least, 
and  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  Moore,  who,  we 
have  seen,  had  been  balked  in  the  recent  campaign. 
'  Moore,  I  have  said,  was  a  distinguished  soldier  ;  he 
had  done  much  to  improve  the  British  infantry  and 
to  make  its  tactics  and  formations  more  efficient. 
He  probably  had  not  the  profound  designs  of  Welles- 
ley,  as  to  the  true  method  to  cope  with  Napoleon  in 
the  Peninsula,  but,  be  this  as  it  may,  his  orders  were 
to  co-operate  in  the  field  with  the  Spanish  armies. 

Moore  had  reached  Lisbon  in  the  first  days  of 
October,  1808  ;  he  made  his  preparations  for  the  in- 
tended movement.  But  Dalrymple,  as  was  his  wont, 
was  timid  and  dull-minded;  he  had  kept  his  army 
around  Lisbon,  and  had  done  nothing  to  further  a 
march  eastward  ;  above  all,  he  had  not  explored  the 
roads  leading  from  Portugal  into  Spain.  Moore, 
nevertheless,  gave  proof  of  praiseworthy  diligence, 
though  the  organisation  of  his  army  was  still  defec- 
tive ;  in  fact,  it  was  greatly  wanting  in  means  of 
transport,  and  in  supplies.  But  he  was  on  his  way 
from  Lisbon  in  the  third  week  of  October :  he  was 
to  be  joined  by  Baird  with  a  fine  division  of  some 
12,000  men,  to  be  disembarked  at  Corunna,  and  to 
come  into  line  with  him  ;  the  collective  array  was 
about  24,000  strong.  Moore's  object  was  to  advance 
on  Burgos,  and  to  lend  an  effective  hand  to  the  Span- 
ish armies,  still  described  by  popular  report  as  victori- 
ous. His  movement,  however,  was  very  slow,  partly 
because  his  impedimenta  were  cumbrous  and  bad  ; 
partly  because  he  followed  the  least  available  route 


The  Douro — Talavera  75 

from  Portugal ;  and  he  detached  the  greater  part  of 
his  artillery,  and  his  whole  cavalry,  by  a  circuitous 
road,  far  outside  the  true  line  of  march,  because  he 
had  received  information  that  these  arms  could  not 
advance  with  the  main  army,  —  unquestionably  a 
grave  military  mistake.  He  was  at  Salamanca  by 
the  last  week  of  November,  at  the  head  of  about 
15,000  men;  Baird,  who  had  marched  from  Corunna, 
was  at  no  great  distance,  but  Hope,  with  the  horse- 
men and  guns,  was  near  the  Escurial,  that  is,  sepa- 
rated from  headquarters  by  nearly  a  hundred  miles 
of  a  mountainous  and  very  difficult  country.  The 
British  General  could  not  stir  for  ten  or  twelve  days, 
until  he  had  drawn  his  forces  together,  especially 
two  of  his  necessary  arms  ;  meantime  ominous  intel- 
ligence reached  him  from  every  side.  The  Spanish 
arrnies  were  unable  to  make  any  real  impression,  even 
on  the  forces  of  Joseph  behind  the  Ebro  ;  they  were 
checked  and  defeated  more  than  once  ;  and  Moore, 
like  most  soldiers,  underrated  the  power  of  the 
Spanish  rising,  as  a  means  of  resisting  an  organised 
enemy.  Erelong  an  overwhelming  tempest  of  war 
had  burst  through  the  Pyrenean  barrier,  and  was 
sweeping  away  all  obstacles  in  its  destructive  course. 
Napoleon  had  collected  a  great  army,  composed  of 
his  best  and  veteran  troops,  and  fully  120,000  strong  ; 
he  had  moved  it  rapidly  through  Germany  and 
France ;  he  had  crossed  the  frontier  of  Spain  in  the 
first  days  of  November.  He  had  hoped  to  surround 
and  annihilate  the  Spanish  armies;  he  was  foiled  in 
this  purpose  by  the' movements  of  Joseph  ;  but  one 
Spanish  army  was  routed  at  Espinosa,  another  met 


76  Wellington 

the  same  fate  at  Tudela ;  the  conqueror,  having 
forced  the  Somo  Sierra  Pass,  was  erelong  marching 
in  triumph  on  Madrid. 

The  position  of  Moore  had  become  critical ;  he 
could  expect  little  or  no  assistance  from  the  defeated 
Spaniards ;  Napoleon  might  turn  against  him  in 
irresistible  force.  For  a  short  time  he  contemplated 
a  retreat  on  Portugal ;  but  he  was  reluctant  to  take 
so  untoward  a  step  ;  happily  for  his  fame  as  a  warrior, 
he  changed  his  purpose.  He  received  information 
that  Madrid  would  make  a  stand,  like  that  of  Sara- 
gossa ;  he  resolved  to  make  a  real  effort  to  assist  the 
capital,  and  to  fall  on  the  line  of  the  French  com- 
munications with  Bayonne,  a  bold  and  a  perilous, 
but  a  well-conceived  design.  His  army,  still  sepa- 
rated from  Baird,  but  joined  by  Hope,  broke  up 
from  Salamanca  on  the  nth  of  December;  Moore's 
object,  for  the  moment,  was  to  reach  Valladolid,  and 
so  to  draw  the  enemy  away  from  Madrid.  But  an 
intercepted  letter  from  Berthier  induced  the  British 
commander  to  advance  northwards;  Soult  was  iso- 
lated on  the  Carrion  with  an  insignificant  force ; 
Madrid  had  fallen  after  a  mere  show  of  resistance  ; 
Napoleon  was  about  to  march  to  the  south,  and  to 
complete  the  subjugation  of  Portugal  and  Spain. 
Moore  resolved  to  attack  and  defeat  Soult,  gracing 
his  arms  with  at  least  a  passing  triumph :  he  concen- 
trated his  whole  army,  perhaps  26,000  strong,  and, 
assisted  by  a  division  of  Spanish  levies,  pushed  on- 
ward to  Sahagun  not  far  from  the  French  Marshal's 
camp.  But  in  the  meantime  Napoleon  had  changed 
his  plans  ;  hearing  of  the  audacious  movement    of 


SIR  JOHN   HOPE,   EARL  OF  HOPETOUN. 
(From  the  painting  by  Sir  Henry  Raeburn,  K.A.) 


The  Douro — Talavera  yj 

Moore,  he  determined  on  crushing  an  enemy  he 
deemed  in  his  grasp  :  he  rapidly  assembled  a  great 
army,  and  having  crossed  the  Guadarrama  after  an 
extraordinary  march,  was  in  full  pursuit  of  Moore 
by  the  last  days  of  December.  That  General,  how- 
ever, instantly  decamped,  and  hastened  to  effect  his 
retreat  through  Leon  ;  Napoleon,  after  many  efforts, 
could  not  bring  him  to  bay  ;  at  Astorga  the  Emperor 
gave  up  the  attempt,  perhaps  because  he  had  learned 
that  Austria  was  threatening  to  draw  the  sword;  he 
committed  the  task  of  following  Moore  to  Soult. 
It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  on  the  tale  of  the  subse- 
quent retreat ;  the  British  soldiery  gave  proof  of 
their  wonted  valour  in  more  than  one  sharp  and 
bloody  fight ;  but  they  also  showed  their  tendency  to 
become  demoralised  under  the  stress  of  severe 
hardship  and  want ;  there  were  miserable  scenes  of 
excess,  and  of  a  fatal  lack  of  discipline.  Moore,  never- 
theless, made  good  his  way  to  Corunna,  and  com- 
pletely beat  off  Soult  in  a  well-contested  battle :  he 
fell  gloriously  in  the  very  arms  of  victory.  But  he 
had  accomplished  a  really  great  achievement ;  his 
march  to  Sahagun  had  drawn  away  Napoleon  from 
his  plans  of  conquest,  which  most  probably  might 
have  been  realised  ;  it  had  a  marked  effect  on  the 
issues  of  the  Peninsular  War. 

Important,  however,  as  the  operations  of  Moore 
had  been,  the  Emperor,  it  is  likely,  might  have  at- 
tained his  object  at  last,  had  he  been  able  to  remain 
in  Spain,  and  to  have  conducted  the  war  in  person. 
He  had  more  than  200,000  soldiers  beyond  the  Pyre- 
nees,   half    of    these   being  excellent   troops ;     the 


78  Wellington 

Spanish  armies  had  been  utterly  beaten  though  the 
national  insurrection  was  still  full  of  life  ;  the  British 
army,  after  Corunna,  had  returned  to  England.  It 
is  difificult  to  suppose  that  the  greatest  of  warriors, 
employing  forces  for  the  time  irresistible  in  the  field, 
possessing  the  unity  of  supreme  command,  and  the 
absolute  master  of  submissive  lieutenants,  would  not 
have  planted  his  eagles  at  Lisbon  and  Cadiz,  and 
have  held  the  whole  Peninsula  in  his  grasp,  had  he 
been  on  the  spot  to  watch  the  march  of  events,  and 
to  give  his  armies  the  impulse  and  the  direction  he 
alone  could  give.  And  undoubtedly,  after  the  fall  of 
Madrid,  when  Joseph  was  restored  to  his  usurping 
throne,  large  classes  in  Spain  thought  the  contest 
hopeless  ;  even  lassitude  of  a  kind  was  to  be  per- 
ceived in  some  parts  of  the  kingdom.  But  at  this 
juncture,  as  was  often  to  be  seen  again,  the  war,  as  a 
whole,  was  not  well  conducted,  regard  being  had  to 
existing  facts,  though  its  general  operations  were 
controlled  by  Napoleon,  who,  however,  was  hun- 
dreds of  miles  away  from  its  theatres.  It  is  not  easy 
to  understand  why  immense  forces  were  employed 
in  overrunning  the  Eastern  kingdoms,  by  no  means 
the  decisive  scene  of  events,  and  were  not  moved 
westwards  against  Portugal,  though  all  honour  is  due 
to  Saragossa  and  its  heroic  defence,  and  the  patriotic- 
levies  in  this  region  were  not  contemptible  foes.  But 
the  French  armies  were  disseminated  over  too  vast 
an  area,  considering  the  still  formidable  power  of  an 
ubiquitous  rising,  though  Napoleon  believed  that 
they  were  strong  enough  to  effect  his  purpose,  to 
subjugate  Portugal  in  the  first  instance,  and  to  be- 


The  Doiiro — Talavera  79 

come  masters  of  Andalusia.  Soult,  after  Corunna, 
was  ordered  to  invade  Portugal  from  the  north,  while 
Victor  was  to  advance  from  Estremadura  into 
Alemtejo;  Lapisse,  with  a  division  of  considerable 
strength,  was  to  maintain  a  communication  between 
the  two  commanders.  But  Soult  was  harassed  on 
his  march  by  a  partisan  warfare,  and  by  obstacles  of 
many  kinds ;  he  was,  besides,  not  well  supported  by 
his  colleague,  Ney, — an  early  example  of  the  divi- 
sions which  in  the  Peninsula  were  so  disastrous  to 
France;  he  did  not  take  Oporto  until  the  close  of 
March,  1809,  with  an  army  greatly  reduced  in  num- 
bers. Victor  won  a  bloody  battle  at  Medellin  on  the 
Guadiana  ;  but  he,  too,  suffered  much  in  his  move- 
ments ;  and  Lapisse,  instead  of  obeying  his  orders, 
joined  Victor  and  lost  all  contact  with  Soult,  The 
two  French  generals  were  now  much  too  weak  to  at- 
tempt to  overrun  and  conquer  Portugal. 

The  campaign  of  Moore,  though  a  seeming  failure, 
ended  in  a  brilliant  victory  for  the  British  arms,  and 
rather  stimulated  English  opinion  to  go  on  with  the 
war.  An  idea  was  indeed  abroad  that  the  power 
of  Napoleon,  notwithstanding  his  recent  success  in 
Spain,  was  already  declining,  nay,  might  soon  fall : 
great  hopes  were  raised  when  Austria  became  hostile, 
and  the  Continent  was  stirred  by  a  movement  against 
its  tyrant.  The  English  Ministry  determined  to 
make  a  great  effort ;  an  expedition  was  to  be  fit- 
ted out  to  destroy  Antwerp,  and  even  to  invade  the 
Low  Countries ;  a  liritish  army  was  to  be  sent  out 
again  to  support  the  Spanish  and  the  Portuguese 
risings.      Wcllcsley,  whose  ability  in  Portugal  was 


8o  Wellmgton 

now  fully  recognised,  and  who  in  Castlereagh  had  a 
faithful  and  lifelong  friend,  was  fortunately  placed  at 
the  head  of  this  new  force  ;  he  had  already  given 
proof  of  profound  sagacity  in  considering  the  nature 
of  the  Peninsular  contest,  and  in  perceiving  how  it 
could  be  made  disastrous  to  the  arms  of  France  and 
be  turned  to  advantage  for  those  of  England.  His 
deep-laid  plans  were  not  as  yet  to  be  realised  ;  but 
even  now,  in  more  than  one  masterly  despatch, '  he 
had  indicated  how  Portugal  was  exactly  the  theatre 
in  which  Napoleon  was  to  be  encountered  in  his 
career  of  conquest.  England's  command  of  the  sea 
made  that  little  country  easy  of  access  to  any  army 
she  might  land  on  its  shores,  and  afforded  facilities 
of  retreat  to  that  army.  Portugal  could  only  with 
difficulty  be  invaded  by  France  ;  at  the  same  time  it 
formed  a  kind  of  sallyport  from  which  even  a  com- 
paratively small  force  might  fall  on  the  long  line  of 
the  communications  of  the  French  with  Spain,  and 
might  check  and  mar  their  operations  with  very  great 
effect.  Portugal,  besides,  had  long  been  a  friendly 
State  ;  the  people,  like  the  Spaniards,  detested  the 
French;  and  a  Portuguese  army  could,  no  doubt, 
be  formed,  which,  aided  by  levies  of  partisans,  could 
give  powerful  assistance  to  a  British  commander, 
Portugal,  in  a  word,  was  a  formidable  place  of  arms 
for  England  ;  and  if  the  Spanish  armies  in  the  field 
had  been  scattered  like  sheep,  the  Spanish  insurrec- 
tion, breaking  out  from  the  Pyrenees  to  Cadiz,  and 
wasting  the  strength  of  the  invaders,  wherever  they 

'One  of  the  earliest  of  these  despatches,  dated  7th  March,  1809, 
will  be  found  in  the  Selections,  pp.  248-249. 


The   Douro — Talavera  8i 

were  found,  was  a  real,  nay,  a  great  element  of 
resisting  force,  especially  in  such  a  land  as  Spain, 
with  its  ranges  of  sierras,  its  intricate  defiles,  its  ill- 
cultivated  and  poor  tracts,  its  numerous  and  difficult 
river  lines,  —  all  obstacles  to  the  operations  of  regular 
armies,  notably  under  Napoleon's  peculiar  system  of 
war. ' 

Wellesley  landed  at  Lisbon  in  the  last  days  of 
April,  1809,  ^nd  was  welcomed  in  that  capital  with 
general  acclaim  ;  his  conduct  at  Vimiero  had  not 
been  forgotten.  Time  had  not  been  lost  to  enable 
him  to  take  the  field  ;  preparations  for  a  campaign 
had  been  diligently  made.  Sir  John  Cradock  had  a 
force  of  some  10,000  men  in  Portugal,  and  had  done 
something  to  provide  for  transports  and  magazines ; 
considerable  reinforcements  had  arrived  from  Enir- 

o 

land  ;  the  regular  Portuguese  army,  nearly  20,000 
strong,  had  been  organised  by  Beresford  and  other 
British  ofificers,  and  there  were  large  bodies  of  irregu- 
lar Portuguese  levies.  Wellesley  was  in  command 
of  from  40,000  to  50,000  men,  26,000  of  these  being 
British  and  German  troops :  he  held  a  central  posi- 
tion between  Victor  and  Soult,  now  divided  from 
each  other  by  a  great  distance;  the  first  question 
for  him  was  which  of  the  marshals  he  should  attack. 
Victor  certainly  was  the  enemy  nearest  at  hand  ;  he 
had  won  two  battles,  besides  that  of  Medellin ; 
he  lay  around  Merida  on  the  Guadiana ;  with  La- 
pisseand  Sabastiani  he  was  more  than  30,000  strong. 

'  For  an  excellent  account  of  the  topography  of  Spain  from  a  mili- 
tary point  of  view,  see  Mr.  Oman's  History  of  the  Peninsular  War, 
i.,  72-89. 


82  Wellington 

But  he  had  been  singularly  inactive  since  his  late 
victories ;  he  had  refused  to  invade  Portugal  at  the 
instance  of  King  Joseph ;  he  had  shown  that  he  had 
no  wish  to  co-operate- w^ith  Soult — another  example 
of  the  jealousies  and  the  discords  of  the  French 
commanders.  Wellesley  resolved  to  make  his  prin- 
cipal effort  against  Soult ;  but  he  took  precautions 
against  an  offensive  movement  by  Victor;  detach- 
ments of  about  14,000  men  were  marched  towards 
the  frontier  to  hold  that  Marshal  in  check;  Welles- 
ley  set  off  with  an  army  25,000  strong — nearly  10,- 
000  were  Portuguese  troops  —  to  begin  his  opera- 
tions against  Soult.  He  had  reached  Coimbra  in 
the  first  days  of  May,  even  now  not  very  far  from 
his  enemy,  who,  since  the  fall  of  Oporto,  after  fright- 
ful deeds  of  blood,  had  remained  almost  inactive 
around  the  city,  endeavouring,  not  in  vain,  to  re- 
store peace  and  order,  but  apparently  ignorant  that 
the  British  General  was  on  the  march.  Soult  un- 
questionably was  a  very  able  man,  and  showed  re- 
markable energy  in  grave  crises ;  but  his  disposition 
was  somewhat  indolent  and  remiss,  faults  of  which 
he  gave  many  proofs  in  his  career.  His  army  was 
now  divided  into  two  parts,  one  on  the  Vouga,  one 
on  the  Tamega,  feeders  of  the  Douro  on  either  side 
of  the  great  river ;  they  were  separated  by  a  rather 
wide  distance ;  and  he  was  also  harassed  by  a  kind 
of  peasant  warfare.  He  was  beset,  moreover,  by 
another  danger,  of  which  at  this  moment  he  knew 
nothing, — a  conspiracy  had  been  formed  by  officers 
in  his  camp,  with  the  object  of  returning  to  France, 
and,  perhaps,  of  overthrowing  Napoleon.     This  de- 


The  Douro —  Talavera  83 

sign,  insensate  as  it  may  seem,  was  not  without  real 
mischief;  it  was  injurious,  in  the  highest  degree,  to 
military  subordination  and  trustworthy  discipline.' 
The  army  of  the  Marshal,  disseminated  and  weak- 
ened in  this  way,  was  probably  not  more  than  20,- 
000  strong;  it  was  thus  inferior  in  numbers  to  that 
of  Wellesley. 

The  British  General  was  on  the  march  for  Oporto, 
by  Coimbra,  on  the  9th  of  May  ;  he  had  detached 
Beresford,  with  some  6000  men,  aided  by  irregular 
bodies  of  Portuguese,  to  turn  the  enemy's  left  wing 
on  the  Tamega,  and,  if  possible,  to  intercept  the  line 
of  his  retreat.  Wellesley  had  been  in  communica- 
tion with  one  of  the  traitors,  and  had  ascertained  the 
positions  of  the  French  army;  he  advanced  along 
the  line  of  the  coast  to  Vouga,  taking  advantage  of 
a  lake,  which  formed  a  ferry  for  part  of  his  army. 
The  right  wing  of  the  French  was  soon  turned ;  an 
indecisive  engagement  was  fought  at  a  place  called 
Grijon,  but  the  French  General  in  command  made 
good  his  retreat,  and,  having  reached  Oporto  with- 
out much  loss,  destroyed  the  bridge  of  boats  on  the 
Douro,  which  formed  the  only  means  of  communi- 
cation across  the  river.  Meanwhile  Soult  had  been 
informed  of  the  treason  around  him,  and  of  the 
approach  of  Wellesley's  army ;  he  instantly  made 
preparations  to  break  up  from  Oporto,  and  to  make 
good  his  vv'ay  into  Spain,  through  the  province  of 
Trasos  Montes,  the  line  which  he  had  taken  when  in- 

'  There  seems  to  be  little  real  authority  for  the  statement  made 
by  Thiebault  and  other  writers,  that  Soult  was  aspiring  to  the  crown 
of  Portugal, 


84  Wellington 

vading  Portugal.  His  dispositions  seemed  to  make 
him  perfectly  secure,  and  he  probably  would  have 
been  so,  if  he  had  not  had  to  deal  with  an  adversary 
of  extraordinary  skill  and  resource  in  the  field.  The 
Marshal  took  care  to  seize  every  boat  and  barge  by 
which  the  passage  of  the  Douro  could  be  effected  ; 
he  collected  these  craft  on  the  bank  he  held,  and 
placed  bodies  of  troops  to  guard  it.  The  Douro 
was  about  three  hundred  yards  wide ;  how  could 
Wellesley  cross  it,  in  the  face  of  a  brave  army?  the 
obstacle  might  well  have  been  deemed  impossible 
to  surmount.  At  the  same  time  Soult  made  arrange- 
ments to  secure  the  line  of  his  retreat,  which  ap- 
peared to  be  ample  and  indeed  ought  to  have  been 
sufificient.  His  retrograde  movement  would  be 
across  the  Tamega,  at  the  bridge  of  Amarante,  which 
afforded  the  only  means  of  passage;  he  directed 
his  lieutenant,  Loison,  to  occupy  that  point,  and 
to  keep  any  enemy  away  from  it ;  it  was  almost  the 
only  avenue  of  escape  for  the  French  army.  A 
most  disastrous  incident,  however,  here  occurred, 
for  which  the  Marshal  was  in  no  sense  responsible, 
but  which  nearly  brought  ruin  down  on  him  in  the 
events  which  followed.  Beresford,  operating  with 
his  detachment,  crossed  the  Tamega ;  Loison  fell 
back,  making  hardly  any  resistance;  the  bridge  at 
Amarante  was  thus  seized  by  Wellesley 's  lieutenant, 
and  the  true  line  of  retreat  for  Soult  and  his  army 
was  closed  !  At  the  same  time  Soult  had  not,  per- 
haps, taken  all  the  precautions  he  ought  to  have 
taken  against  a  bold  and  able  enemy.  The  con- 
spiracy among  his  officers  still  existed,  causing  dan- 


The  Douro — Talavera  85 

gerous  slackness  and  neglect  of  duty:  the  Marshal 
did  not  guard  his  bank  of  the  Douro  with  a  suf- 
ficient force ;  he  was  convinced  that  if  the  passage 
were  attempted  at  all,  it  would  be  attempted  lower 
down  the  river  near  its  mouth ;  he  turned  his  atten- 
tion in  that  direction  ;  above  all,  thinking  himself 
perfectly  safe,  he  lingered  at  Oporto  at  least  a  day 
too  long,  and  contented  himself  with  sending  part 
of  his  impedimenta  out  of  the  city. 

It  was  the  12th  of  May.  Wellesley  could  not 
know  that  Beresford  was  closing  on  the  French  line 
of  retreat ;  but  he  had  determined,  if  it  were  possible, 
to  cross  the  Douro.  On  the  i  ith,  he  had  sent  Colo- 
nel John  Murray  with  a  detachment  of  a  few  thou- 
sand men  to  try  to  effect  a  passage  higher  up  the 
river;  but  how  was  he  to  cross  it  himself  under  the 
very  beard  of  Soult?  His  dispositions,  favoured  by 
peculiarities  of  the  ground,  and  seconded,  in  a  most 
remarkable  way,  by  an  accident,  were  as  admirable 
as  have  ever  been  made  in  an  operation  of  the  kind, 
and  were  attended  with  brilliant  and  complete  suc- 
cess. A  high  eminence,  on  which  a  convent  was 
built,  rose  on  the  bank,  occupied  by  his  outposts ; 
a  large  edifice,  called  the  Seminary,  which  in  its  en- 
closures could  form  a  shelter  for  some  hundreds  of 
men,  spread  along  the  French  bank,  opposite  to  the 
convent;  the  British  General  chose  this  point  as 
that  in  which  he  would  make  his  venture.  He  had 
carefully  reconnoitred  the  ground  on  which  the  con- 
vent stood  ;  he  had  perceived  that  the  French  bank 
was  not  well  guarded  ;  but  the  principal  difficulty 
still  remained, — he  was  as  yet  without  the  means 


86  Wellington 

to  ferry  his  army  across  the  Douro.  Propitious 
Fortune  here  came  to  his  aid :  a  poor  citizen  of 
Oporto  had,  before  daybreak,  rowed  a  skiff  unob- 
served to  the  British  bank;  he  recrossed  the  stream 
with  a  bold  staff  officer  ;  three  or  four  barges  were 
brought  to  the  selected  spot ;  meanwhile  some 
twenty  guns  were  placed  on  the  height  around  the 
convent,  and  troops  were  secretly  posted  behind  the 
hill,  the  forlorn  hope  that  was  to  make  the  first 
effort.  The  Seminary  was  soon  seized,  but  only  by 
a  handful  of  men :  it  is  a  signal  proof  how  ill  the 
French  outposts  did  their  work,  that  three  barges  at 
least  had  got  over  the  Douro,  and  had  occupied  the 
Seminary,  with  a  not  inconsiderable  force,  before 
the  enemy  had  the  least  notion  of  what  was  taking 
place ;  the  surprise,  in  fact,  was  discreditable  and 
complete.  The  French  now  fell  on  the  troops,  who 
had  gathered  within  the  kind  of  fortress  marked  out 
for  them  ;  but  they  were  ravaged  by  the  fire  of  the 
guns  from  the  hill  and  the  convent ;  the  population 
of  Oporto  sent  a  number  of  barges  to  the  help  of 
Wellesley ;  the  British  army  was  before  long  across 
the  Douro.  Meanwhile  the  columns  of  Murray  were 
seen  advancing;  they,  too,  had  passed  the  river 
higher  up  ;  this  was  the  signal  for  a  precipitate  re- 
treat of  the  enemy ;  Soult's  whole  army  hastened 
out  of  Oporto,  leaving  guns  and  stores  behind,  and 
losing  many  men  ;  it  made  for  the  roads  leading  to 
Amarante,  where  the  Marshal  expected  to  find  Loi- 
son.  Had  Murray  acted  with  vigour  he  must  have 
destroyed  a  large  part  of  the  defeated  host  ;  it  ex- 
posed, in  its  flight,  its  flanks  to  him ;  but  he  missed 


LORD  WELLESLEY. 
(From  the  painling  by  Sir  Thomas  Lawrence.) 


The  Dotcro — Talavera  87 

his  opportunity,  whatever  the  cause  ;  he  allowed  the 
enemy  to  escape  scot-free. 

The  campaign  on  the  Douro,  above  all,  the  passage 
of  the  great  river  under  the  very  eyes  of  Soult, 
were  signal  instances  of  what  Wellesley  could 
achieve  in  war.  He  owed  something,  indeed,  to 
treason  in  his  adversary's  camp,  and  something  to 
the  remissness  shown  by  the  French  Marshal;  an 
accident  enabled  him  to  find  the  means  of  sending  a 
petty  detachment  across  the  stream ;  but  all  this 
does  not  in  the  least  detract  from  his  merit.  He 
gave  proof  of  marked  skill  in  sending  Beresford  to 
threaten  the  French  line  of  retreat,  though  he  could 
hardly  have  anticipated  the  success  he  gained ;  he 
took  the  right  course  in  advancing  from  Coimbra 
upon  Oporto.  But  the  passage  of  the  Douro  was 
the  great  exploit ;  it  was  a  most  conspicuous  exhi- 
bition of  resource  in  tactics.  Wellesley  properly  de- 
tached John  Murray  to  cross  the  river  higher  up  : 
had  his  lieutenant  acted  with  boldness  and  energy, 
the  French  army  must  have  suffered  enormous 
losses.  The  selection,  however,  of  the  true  point 
where  to  make  the  passage  was  the  finest  specimen 
on  this  occasion  of  Wellesley 's  powers;  remarkable 
insight  was  shown  in  choosing  the  Seminary  as  a 
kind  of  place  of  arms,  where  the  British  troops  on 
landing  would  be  comparatively  safe ;  the  hill  and  the 
convent  formed  excellent  screens  behind  which  the 
assailants  could  be  formed,  and  good  points  of  van- 
tage for  artillery  be  obtained  ;  the  surprise,  in  a 
word,  was  most  admirably  contrived.  The  dispo- 
sitions of  Soult,    on    the    other   hand,    though    the 


88  Wellington 

conspiracy  in  his  army,  of  which  he  had  no  idea  until 
the  last  moment,  did  him  much  harm,  were  hardly 
equal  to  the  reputation  of  that  distinguished  soldier. 
He  divided  his  forces  on  two  rivers:  they  were 
parted  by  the  great  stream  of  the  Douro  ;  he  did 
not  sufificiently  guard  the  bank  he  held  at  Oporto; 
he  may  perhaps  have  left  Loison  too  few  troops  to 
cover  what  was  all  but  his  sole  line  of  retreat. 
Yet  the  conduct  of  the  Marshal,  after  his  first  re- 
verse, was  worthy  of  a  general  of  no  ordinary 
powers.  When  he  found  Amarante  and  its  bridge 
seized,  and  his  best  avenue  of  escape  closed,  he 
might  have  been  involved  in  another  Baylen  ;  pusil- 
lanimous voices  urged  him  to  treat,  like  Junot  at  the 
Convention  of  Cintra.  But  the  Marshal  scorned 
these  counsels  of  despair;  rising  to  meet  a  terrible 
crisis  with  a  bold  decision,  he  destroyed  his  impedi- 
menta, abandoned  his  guns,  and  led  his  army  by 
mere  mountainous  tracks  across  a  range  of  sierras 
from  which  a  retreat  might  be  yet  possible  though 
the  dil^culties  were  extreme.  The  toilsome  march 
of  the  French  was  impeded  by  torrents  and  obstacles 
of  many  kinds;  the  heroism  of  individual  soldiers 
was  conspicuously  displayed,  and  at  last  12,000  or 
14,000  men,  a  disorganised  wreck,  for  the  moment 
worthless,  made  good  their  way  to  Orense  beyond 
the  Portuguese  frontier.  Wellesley  did  not  at  once 
pursue  Soult,  he  only  just  reached  the  retiring 
enemy  :  for  this  he  has  incurred  some  censure.  He 
certainly  was  not  at  his  best  in  following  a  defeated 
enemy :  but  there  were  sound  military  reasons  for 
the  halt  he  made  at  Oporto  for  a  single  day. 


The  Douro — Talavera  89 

After  the  passage  of  the  Douro,  Wellesley  fell 
back  on  Abrantes,  in  order  to  watch  the  operations 
of  Victor,  and  of  the  other  forces  that  seemed  to 
menace  Portugal.  A  long  pause  in  his  movements 
followed:  it  was  not  until  nearly  the  end  of  June 
that  his  army  was  on  the  march  again.  This  delay 
has  been  made  a  charge  against  him, — and  he  was 
different  from  Turenne  and  Napoleon,  when  in  a 
central  position  between  divided  enemies, — but  it 
should  be  more  justly  ascribed  to  causes  independ- 
ent of  himself.  His  soldiers  were  exceedingly  ill 
supplied,  owing  to  the  neglect  of  the  men  in  power 
in  Portugal :  they  lost  a  great  number  of  comrades 
by  disease :  even  their  pay  was  very  considerably 
in  arrears,  for  the  treasury  at  home  was  severely 
pressed.  Under  these  adverse  conditions  they  began 
to  give  proof  of  one  of  the  characteristic  defects  of 
a  British  army,  the  tendency  to  break  up,  and  to 
lose  heart,  when  in  the  presence  of  continual  hard- 
ship ;  and  they  plundered  the  whole  country  around 
with  audacious  licence.  Despite  its  commander's 
angry  complaints,  and  the  severe  examples  that  he 
was  forced  to  make,  it  was  some  time  before  the  dis- 
cipline of  his  forces  was  restored  ;  meanwhile  ar- 
rangements had  been  made  for  another  effort  to 
co-operate  with  the  Spanish  armies,  and  to  assist  the 
national  insurrection  of  Spain.  A  plan  of  campaign 
was  formed,  the  least  well-conceived  of  Wellesley 's 
projects  in  war,  and  based  on  complete  ignorance 
of  facts  of  supreme  importance.  By  this  time  Napo- 
leon, repairing  the  false  steps  taken  by  Berthier,  had 
utterly  defeated  the  Archduke  Charles  in  operations 


90  Wellington 

as  fine  as  any  in  his  career ;  he  had  entered  Vienna 
in  triumph  for  the  second  time ;  but  he  had  met  a 
serious  rebuff  at  Aspern  ;  he  appeared  to  be  in  grave 
peril  upon  the  Danube  ;  the  opinion  that  his  fall  was 
not  distant  had  strengthened  in  England  and  else- 
where. His  armies,  too,  in  Spain,  had  been  reduced  ; 
the  passage  of  the  Douro  was  an  augury  of  success ; 
the  French  had  not  ventured  to  invade  Portugal ; 
it  was  in  these  circumstances  that  the  design  to  which 
we  have  referred  was  formed.  Wellesley's  army  had 
been  reinforced  and  was  perhaps  22,000  strong  ;  a 
Spanish  army  of  about  40,000  men  was  in  Estre- 
madura  under  Cuesta ;  another  Spanish  army  com- 
manded by  Venegas  was  behind  the  Sierra  Morena, 
perhaps  25,000  strong  ;  it  was  agreed  that  Wellesley 
and  Cuesta  should  unite  their  forces,  and  should 
march  up  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  on  Madrid,  while 
Venegas,  advancing  through  La  Mancha,  should 
second  the  movement.  The  combined  forces,  should 
they  join  hands,  would  thus  be  a  host  of  nearly 
90,000  men ;  but  such  a  concentration  was  improb- 
able in  the  extreme;  and  the  project  did  not  make 
sufficient  allowance  for  the  miserable  quality  of  the 
Spanish  armies :  for  the  risk  of  Wellesley's  and 
Cuesta's  march :  for  the  strength  of  the  French 
armies  around  Madrid  :  above  all,  for  the  hostile  forces 
that  might  be  arrayed  behind  the  screen  of  the  lofty 
sierras,  overlooking  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  from  the 
north,  and  might  be  directed  with  terrible  effect  on 
the  flank  and  the  rear  of  the  enemy  in  his  advance. 
Wellesley  and  Cuesta,  advancing  at  wide  dis- 
tances, moved  up  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  in  the  first 


The  Doiiro — Talavera  91 

days  of  July,  and  were  at  Placencia  and  Almaraz  by 
the  loth  of  the  month.  The  British  General  trusted 
to  Beresford,  in  Trasos  Montes,  and  to  some  Portu- 
guese levies,  to  protect  his  march,  and  to  cover  his 
flank  and  rear,  should  any  enemy  descend  through 
the  Sierra  passes,  but  these  supports  were  far  away 
and  wholly  inadequate  ;  he  had  no  conception  of  the 
forces  that  might  be  combined  against  him.  Mean- 
while Venegas  had  begun  to  move  through  La 
Mancha;  but  though  his  operations  disconcerted 
King  Joseph,  and  caused  a  dangerous  division  of 
the  French  armies,  the  Spanish  commander  never 
approached  Madrid,  or  came  into  line  with  the  allies 
he  was  intended  to  join  ;  it  has  been  said  this  was 
the  fault  of  one  of  the  Spanish  juntas.  For  a  time, 
however,  the  prospects  of  Wellesley  and  Cuesta 
seemed  good  :  they  advanced  without  any  apparent 
sign  of  peril  at  hand  ;  on  the  23rd  of  July  an  oppor- 
tunity arose  to  attack  and  to  defeat  Victor,  who  was 
isolated  near  Talavera,  Joseph  and  Sebastiani  hav- 
ing marched  from  the  capital  in  order  to  observe 
the  movement  of  Venegas :  Wellesley  urged  his  col- 
league to  fall  on  the  enemy,  but  Cuesta,  an  aged, 
obstinate,  and  ill-tempered  man,  lost  precious  time, 
and  practically  refused  to  move ;  Victor  fell  back 
towards  Toledo,  and  was  for  the  moment  safe. 
Cuesta,  when  apprised  of  Victor's  retreat,  recklessly 
pushed  forward  to  attack  the  Marshal ;  Wellesley 
sent  him  a  reinforcement  of  a  small  body  of  troops, 
but  would  not  follow  his  imprudent  ally ;  in  fact, 
his  army  had  been  wretchedly  supplied  on  its 
march,  in  consequence  of  Spanish  carelessness  and 


92  Wellington 

neglect,  and  was  already  suffering  from  many  priva- 
tions. A  transformation  was  soon  seen  on  the 
theatre  of  events  ;  Joseph,  assisted  by  Jourdan,  the 
veteran  chief  of  his  staff,  and  Sebastian!  ceasing  to 
watch  Venegas, — that  General  was  many  leagues 
distant, — united  their  forces  with  those  of  Victor  ; 
the  combined  armies  advanced  to  Talavera  in  the 
last  days  of  July :  Cuesta  with  difficulty  made  his 
escape.  More  than  50,000  excellent  French  soldiers 
were  thus  being  concentrated  against  an  enemy 
whose  army  was  mainly  composed  of  bad  troops, 
and  of  men  weakened  by  severe  hardships ;  mean- 
while another  peril  was  already  not  far  off,  which 
might  have  proved  simply  fatal  to  the  allies.  Na- 
poleon, from  the  banks  of  the  Danube,  had  perceived 
the  risk  Wellesley  and  Cuesta  ran,  in  marching  up 
the  valley  of  the  Tagus  towards  Madrid,  when 
largely  superior  forces  could  be  thrown  on  their  flank 
and  rear  ;  with  characteristic  insight  and  resource 
this  greatest  of  strategists  saw  the  favourable  chance ; 
he  directed  Soult,  whom  he  placed  in  supreme  com- 
mand, to  assemble  a  great  force  composed  of  his 
own  corps,  which  had  been  quickly  reorganised  and 
restored,  of  the  corps  of  Ney,  and  of  the  corps  of 
Mortier ;  and  with  these  combined  armies,  to  pass 
through  the  Sierras  from  the  north,  to  join  hands 
with  all  the  armies  under  the  command  of  Joseph, 
and  then  to  fall  in  irresistible  strength  on  the 
enemy,  who,  should  he  continue  his  march,  could 
hardly  be  saved  from  complete  destruction.' 


'  Napier  has  misdescribed  Napoleon's  project,  as  his  correspond- 
ence was  not  then  published.     It  will  be  found  in  Corr.,  xix.,  p.  263,  in 


The  Douro — Talavera  93 

Partly,  however,  owing  to  the  distances  between 
the  French  marshals,  but  largely  to  dissensions  be- 
tween them, — the  curse  of  the  French  in  the  Penin- 
sular War,  — and  to  orders  wrongly  given  by  Joseph 
to  Mortier,  the  march  of  Soult  was  considerably 
delayed  ;  the  grand  conception  of  Napoleon  was  not 
realised.  Nevertheless,  Soult,  with  the  three  corps 
of  which  he  had  been  made  the  chief,  was  around 
Salamanca  in  the  latter  days  of  July ;  that  is,  he  was 
now  only  four  or  five  marches  distant  from  the  gap 
in  the  Sierras  which  would  lead  him  into  the  Tagus 
valley,  and  would  place  him  on  the  flank  and  rear 
of  the  enemy,  with  a  veteran  army  fully  50,000 
strong.  The  Marshal  wrote  to  King  Joseph  by  a 
confidential  officer,  the  General  Foy  of  another  day, 
entreating  the  King  not  to  attempt  "  to  fight  a  gen- 
eral action  until  all  his  forces  were  near  Placencia," 
that  is,  had  emerged  from  the  passes  in  the  Sierras, 
and  were  on  the  line  of  the  allied  retreat ;  in  that 
event,  he  insisted,  "  the  most  important  results  might 
be  obtained  :  the  enemy  would  be  lost  if  he  did  not 
retrace  his  steps."  This  plan,  if  less  perfect  than 
that  of  the   Emperor,  for  it  involved  an  operation 


a  letter  written  from  Schoenbrunn,  July  18,  1809:  "  Recommandez 
au  Roi  d'  Espagne  que,  si  les  Anglais  debouchaient  en  Espagne,  il 
ne  leur  livre  point  de  bataille  qu'il  ne  soit  reuni.  II  a  le  4*=  Corps,  le 
garnison  de  Madrid,  le  1*'  Corps  ;  ce  qui  fait  plus  de  50,000 liommes. 
I.es  2"=,  6«,  et  5"=  Corps  forment  une  soixantaine  de  inille  hommes  :  il 
peut  done  donner  bataille  aux  Anglais  avec  110,000  hommes."  The 
project  is  more  fully  developed  in  Corr.,  xix.,  p.  373.  The  Emperor 
disapproved  of  all  the  French  operations  that  followed,  and  indicated 
the  very  means  by  which  Wellesley  actually  escaped  the  net  that 
seemed  closing  around  him.     See  Corf.,  xix.,  pp.  315,  346,  379. 


94  Wellington 

conducted  on  double  lines, — strategy,  as  a  rule,  not 
to  be  commended, — was,  nevertheless,  promising  in 
the  highest  degree,  if  only  Joseph  would  not  make 
a  premature  attack,  and  Wellesley  and  Cuesta  re- 
mained where  they  were ;  and  at  this  moment,  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind,  neither  Wellesley  nor  Cuesta 
had  an  inkling  of  the  approach  of  Soult.  Two 
armies,  therefore,  each  of  50,000  good  troops,  might 
not  improbably  be  assembled  to  fall  on  a  single 
army,  not  nearly  half  equal  in  real  strength  ;  the 
overthrow  of  the  allies  would,  in  that  event,  be 
almost  assured,  especially  as  one  of  the  armies  would 
be  on  their  flank  and  rear ;  their  escape,  indeed, 
would  be  difficult  in  the  extreme.  But  Joseph,  con- 
fident in  the  power  of  the  forces  of  which  he  was 
nominally  the  head,  and  like  Marmont  on  another 
occasion,  eager  to  secure  a  victory  for  himself  alone, 
resolved  to  attack  Wellesley  and  Cuesta,  before  he 
could  be  joined  by  Soult, — presumptuous,  reckless, 
and  wrong  conduct,  which  justly  incensed  the  Em- 
peror when  made  aware  of  the  facts. 

Wellesley  and  Cuesta  were  at  Talavera  by  this 
time,  a  small  town  on  the  northern  bank  of  the 
Tagus.  The  Spaniard  gave  the  command  to  the 
Englishman,  but  with  a  bad  grace  ;  Wellesley  rightly 
determined  to  await  the  attack  of  the  enemy  ;  re- 
treat, in  truth,  would  have  been  fatal  to  his  com- 
posite and  weakened  army.  His  arrangements  gave 
proof  of  the  skill  in  tactics  in  which  he  had  hardly 
an  equal  among  the  generals  of  his  age.  He  arrayed 
the  Spanish  army,  about  34,000  strong,  but  un-trust- 
>yprthy  troops   in  every  sense   of   the    word,    from 


MARSHAL  NEY. 
(After  the  painting  by  Gerard.) 


The  Dotiro — Talavera  95 

Talavera  on  its  extreme  right,  to  an  eminence 
crowned  with  a  redoubt  on  its  extreme  left ;  its  front 
was  protected  by  a  convent,  a  breastwork,  ditches, 
and  stockades ;  its  rear  was  supported  by  its  own 
and  some  British  cavalry.  Its  position  was  thus 
very  difficult  to  assail ;  Wellesley's  army  extended 
from  Cuesta's  left  to  a  hill  which  was  the  key  of  the 
whole  battlefield ;  the  united  forces  held  a  front  of 
about  two  miles.  The  Spanish  army  numbered,  we 
have  seen,  some  34,000  men,  the  British  19,000  or 
20,000,  the  allies  had  perhaps  100  guns;  in  real 
strength  they  were  far  inferior  to  their  foes.  A 
prelude  to  the  battle  that  followed  took  place ;  it 
was  not  of  the  best  omen  to  the  allied  armies. 
The  French  crossed  the  Alberche  near  Talavera  on 
the  27th  of  July ;  they  were  at  least  50,000  with  80 
guns :  they  were  good  soldiers,  nearly  all  of  one 
brave  nation,  the  British  soldiers  alone  were  worthy 
of  their  steel.  A  sharp  skirmish,  that  began  with  a 
surprise,  was  fought  at  a  spot  called  the  Casa  de 
Salinas;  Wellesley  narrowly  escaped  being  made  a 
prisoner ;  signs  of  confusion  appeared  in  one  or  two 
British  regiments;  a  great  mass  of  Spaniards  left 
the  field  in  precipitate  flight.  This  brilliant  effort 
had  been  conducted  by  Victor.  The  Marshal,  elated 
with  his  first  success,  made  a  bold  attempt  to  storm 
the  height  on  Wellesley's  left ;  he  very  nearly 
attained  his  object,  but  his  men  were  at  last  beaten 
off  after  a  fierce  struggle.  It  was  now  nightfall; 
both  armies  took  their  ground,  and  made  prepara- 
tions for  the  fight  of  the  morrow. 

The  stern  battle  of  Talavera  was  fought  on   the 


96  Wellington 

28th  of  July,  1809.  Victor  insisted  on  a  trial  of 
strength  against  Jourdan's  counsels.  The  French 
chiefs  were  already  at  odds  with  each  other;  the 
ground  was  scarcely  reconnoitred,  an  unpardonable 
fault.  Victor,  however,  had  perceived  the  true  point 
of  attack ;  almost  disregarding  the  Spanish  army, 
he  directed  the  divisions  of  Ruffin  and  Villatte, 
covered  by  a  heavy  fire  of  guns,  against  the  decisive 
spot,  the  hill ;  a  bloody  and  well-contested  fight  was 
the  result ;  the  French  more  than  once  almost  reached 
the  summit ;  the  losses  were  considerable  on  both 
sides,  but  Victor's  men  were  again  driven  off  in 
defeat.  A  long  pause  in  the  operations  followed: 
Jourdan  urged  Joseph  to  run  no  further  risk,  and  to 
wait  until  he  should  be  joined  by  Soult ;  Victor,  im- 
petuous and  thoughtless,  exclaimed  that  "  one  might 
give  up  war  if  the  hill  could  not  be  stormed."  The 
attack  was  now  conducted  by  the  mass  of  the 
French  army,  and  was  somewhat  better  directed 
than  it  had  been  before.  The  Spaniards  were  again 
almost  unassailed  ;  but  the  divisions  of  Sebastiani, 
Lapisse,  and  Rufifin  were  marshalled  to  fall  on 
Wellesley's  centre  and  left ;  Villatte  was  ordered  to 
reach  the  hill  by  a  turning  movement,  through  a  valley 
that  spread  beyond  the  British  left ;  a  small  body  of 
cavalry  was  to  second  the  movement.  The  superior- 
ity in  numbers  of  the  French  thus  collected  to  attack 
the  British  was  enormous,  ;:early  two  to  one,  but 
Wellesley  had  his  arrangements  made;  he  had  ex- 
tended his  left  beyond  the  hill  to  cover  the  valley, 
when  Villatte's  movement  was  being  developed ;  he 
steadily  awaited    a    most    formidable    attack.     The 


The  Douro — Talavera  97 

battle  raged  fiercely  for  several  hours :  Villatte's 
men  were  stopped  in  their  advance  by  the  British 
cavalry,  and  ultimately  were  compelled  to  fall  back; 
but  a  British  regiment  of  dragoons  was  well-nigh  cut 
to  pieces,  having — a  common  fault — rushed  forward 
and  got  out  of  hand.  Meantime  a  furious  on- 
slaught had  been  made  on  the  hill,  and  the  whole 
of  Wellesley's  line  was  searched  by  the  enemy's 
guns,  while  the  hostile  columns  boldly  advanced 
and  endeavoured  to  break  it.  The  attack  was  all 
but  crowned  with  success ;  the  British  centre  was 
forced  at  one  point,  the  troops  having  got  out  of 
order  on  uneven  ground,  always  a  danger  for  a  line 
in  its  movements ;  but  the  battle  was  restored  by  a 
veteran  regiment,  the  48th  ;  the  French  gradually 
relaxed  their  efforts,  and  ultimately  drew  off  from 
the  blood-stained  field.  The  losses  on  both  sides 
were  very  large,  from  6000  to  7000  men;  but  17 
French  guns  were  abandoned  and  taken ;  Wellesley 
remained  victorious  on  the  position  he  had  held. 
Owing  probably  to  the  disputes  between  Jourdan 
and  Victor,  the  reserve  of  the  French  army,  12,000 
strong,  was  not  engaged,  and  did  not  fire  a  shot,  an 
exhibition  of  weakness  succeeding  rash  confidence. 
After  Talavera  King  Joseph  fell  back  towards 
Madrid,  leaving  Victor  on  the  Alberche  to  join 
hands  with  Soult,  but  isolated  for  the  moment,  with 
Wellesley  in  his  front.  The  British  General,  how- 
ever, did  not  venture  to  fall  on  ;  he  was  always,  per- 
haps, overcautious  on  occasions  of  this  kind  ;  but  his 
army  had  cruelly  suffered,  and  was  greatly  weak- 
ened ;  his  Spanish  allies  were  but  of  little  worth. 
7 


98  Wellmgton 

Meanwhile  a  storm  was  gathering  on  his  flank  and 
rear,  the  approach  of  which  he  had,  very  unaccount- 
ably, hardly  considered  possible.  By  the  4th  of 
August  Soult  had  traversed  the  passes  through  the 
Sierras;  his  whole  army  could  be  assembled  in  a  few 
days  ;  he  made  ready  to  attack  his  enemy,  though 
Talavera  had  baffled  his  excellent  advice.  Wellesley 
had  not  even  yet  been  informed  of  the  Marshal's  ad- 
vance, he  had  marched  to  Oropesa,  near  the  enemy's 
mouth,  so  to  speak ;  but  gradually  he  ascertained  a 
part,  at  least,  of  the  truth  ;  learning  that  Soult  was  at 
no  great  distance,  he  brushed  Cuesta'sidle  entreaties 
aside,  fell  back  on  the  Tagus,  and  crossed  at  the 
bridge  of  Arzopisbo,  the  very  point  Napoleon  had 
foreseen  he  might  select  in  the  case  of  the  operations 
conducted  by  Soult.  The  Marshal,  however,  did 
not  abandon  his  quarry  ;  he  directed  Mortierto  seize 
the  bridge  at  Almaraz,  lower  down  the  river,  and  to 
intercept  the  enemy's  retreat ;  he  endeavoured  in  per- 
son to  press  the  pursuit ;  he  urged  Joseph  and  his 
lieutenants  to  advance  and  join  him.  But  Joseph 
set  off  again  to  observe  Venegas,  and  had  recalled 
Victor  from  the  Alberche  ;  Wellesley  safely  effected 
his  retreat  on  Merida  and  reached,  unmolested,  the 
Portuguese  frontier,  at  Badajoz.'  Yet  the  chances 
were  that  he  would  have  been  meshed  in  the  toils 
Soult  had  carefully  prepared,  had  Joseph  not  gone 
off  in  a  false  direction,  and  had  he  not  been  terrified 
by  the  movement  of  some  of  Wellesley's  levies;  the 
"  fate  of   the  Peninsula  hung  for  a  few  days  on  a 

'  Wellesley's  account  of  his   campaign  of  1809  will  be  found  in 
Selection,  pp.  325-337. 


The  Dotiro — Talavera  99 

thread  which  could  not  have  borne  the  weight  for 
even  twenty-four  hours.'"  Soult,  however,  did  not 
forego  his  purpose,  though  his  first  combination  had 
been  a  failure;  he  proposed  to  assemble  his  army 
at  Coria,  near  the  borders  of  Portugal,  and,  sup- 
ported by  Joseph  in  force,  to  invade  that  kingdom, 
perhaps  even  to  descend  on  Lisbon.  But  Ney  re- 
fused to  obey  his  orders ;  the  King  was  too  timid  to 
give  his  consent ;  Napoleon  always  contended  that 
even  at  the  eleventh  hour  a  grand  opportunity  had 
been  thrown  away. 

Wellesley  was  given  a  peerage  for  Talavera,  in 
spite  of  querulous  and  shallow  Opposition  protests ; 
thenceforward  he  was  to  be  known  by  the  honoured 
name  of  Wellington.  His  skill  and  resource  appear 
in  this  campaign  on  the  Tagus ;  he  rightly  accepted 
the  challenge  of  Victor ;  he  arranged  his  enfeebled 
army  ably  on  the  ground  ;  he  plucked  not  safety, 
but  victory,  out  of  no  doubtful  danger.  His  retreat 
by  the  bridge  of  Arzopisbo  was  also  an  excellent 
movement,  giving  proof  of  quick  resolution  and 
firmness  of  purpose  ;  he  extricated  himself  admirably 
from  foes  who  seemed  closing  around  him.  But  his 
strategy  in  the  campaign  was  faulty ;  it  was  not  well 
designed,  it  was  founded  on  false  assumptions.  The 
advance  on  double  and  distant  lines  was  a  hazardous 
scheme ;  the  quality  of  the  Spanish  armies  was  not 
sufificiently  gauged  :  above  all,  the  strength  of  the 
French  behind  the  Sierras  was  not  even  guessed  at ; 
it  was  deemed  impossible  that  they  could  descend 
on  the  allied  flank  and  rear.     Wellesley,  in  a  word, 

'Napier,  i.,  p.  384. 


I  oo  Wellino-ton 


^>' 


was  in  the  air  as  he  moved  along  the  Tagus,  and  ex- 
posed to  attacks  that  might  well  have  been  fatal ; 
had  Napoleon  directed  the  French  armies  he  could 
hardly  have  avoided  an  immense  disaster ;  and  but 
for  the  presumptuous  recklessness  of  Victor  and  the 
weakness  of  Joseph,  the  chances  were  that  he  would 
have  been  beaten,  perhaps  surrounded,  by  Soult. 
The  best  proof  that  he  knew  he  had  made  grave  mis- 
takes was  that  he  never  ventured  on  such  an  enter- 
prise again  ;  the  conditions  had  changed  when  he 
invaded  Spain  on  two  other  occasions.  As  for  the 
operations  of  his  adversaries,  if  we  except  those  of 
Soult,  who  proved  his  capacity  as  a  real  chief,  they 
were  badly  conducted  from  first  to  last.  Victor 
ought  not  to  have  fought  at  Talavera  at  all,  until 
Soult  had  come  into  line  with  Joseph  and  himself ; 
this  was  a  gross,  nay,  an  inexcusable  fault ;  Joseph 
more  than  once  allowed  his  enemy  to  escape  through 
weakness,  irresolution,  and  absolutely  false  move- 
ments.' The  French  commanders  of  a  fine  army 
also  were  found  wanting  at  Talavera ;  they  did  not 
really  examine  the  ground  ;  they  wasted  their 
strength  in  premature  attacks;  above  all,  they  left 
the  field  without  engaging  their  reserve,  irresolution 
that  [incensed  their  master."     Owing  to  these  many 


'  Napoleon  was  justly  indignant  at  the  results  of  the  campaign, 
Corr.,  xix.,  362:  "Quelle  belle  occasion  on  a  manque  ;  30,000  Anglais 
i  150  lieues  des  cotes  devant  100,000  hommes  des  meillieurs  troupes 
du  monde  !     Mon  dieu  !     Qu'est-ce  qu'une  arme'e  sans  chef !  " 

'  The  comments  of  the  Emperor  on  Talavera  were  rightly  severe. 
I  have  only  space  for  a  few  words.  Cwr.,  xix.,  379:  "  Cette position 
de  I'ennemi  exigeaitdonc  des  reconnaissances  prealables,  et  qu'on  a 
conduit  mes  troupes  sans  discernement,  comme  a  la  boucherie  ;  qu  ' 


The  Do7cro — Talavera  loi 

faults  and  shortcomings,  Wellesley  eluded  his  foes, 
and  even  marred  the  operations  of  Soult ;  the  cam- 
paign ultimately  was  of  advantage  to  him.  It  taught 
him  not  to  trust  Spanish  levies ;  it  impressed  Napo- 
leon with  the  false  belief  that  he  "  was  a  rash,  pre- 
sumptuous, and  ignorant  man,  "  a  fixed  idea  that  he 
held  to  even  on  the  field  of  Waterloo.  The  British 
General  now  resolved  to  establish  himself  in  Portugal, 
and,  in  pursuance  of  his  original  design,  to  defend  the 
Peninsula  from  that  strong  point  of  vantage.  He 
was  soon  to  enter  on  a  passage  of  arms,  the  real 
crown  of  his  military  career;  he  was  to  make  his 
position  in  Portugal  secure,  and,  as  it  were,  from 
this  impregnable  lair  to  defy  his  enemies  ;  he  was  to 
become  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  giant,  which  was 
to  fester  and  produce  the  "  Spanish  ulcer,"  not  the 
least  of  the  manifold  causes  of  the  giant's  collapse. 

enfin,  etant  resolu  a  la  bataille,  on  I'a  donnee  mollement,  puisque  mes 
armes  ont  essaye  un  affront,  et  que  12,000  hommes  de  reserve  sont 
cependant  restes  sans  tirer.  " 


CHAPTER  V 

BUSACO,  TORRES  VEDRAS,  FUENTES  D'ONORO 

The  supremacy  of  Napoleon  on  the  Continent  restored  after  Wag- 
ram — His  efforts  to  extend  the  Continental  System — Spain  and 
Portugal  threatened  with  subjugation — This  might  have  hap- 
pened had  Napoleon  conducted  the  war  in  person — False  opera- 
tions of  the  French  armies — The  invasion  of  Andalusia — 
Farsighted  views  of  Wellington — His  presence  on  the  theatre  of 
the  Peninsular  War  of  supreme  importance — His  preparations  for 
the  defence  of  Portugal — Increase  and  reorganisation  of  the  Por- 
tuguese army — The  lines  of  Torres  Vedras — Grandeur  of  this  con- 
ception and  of  the  position  of  Wellington — Napoleon  prepares 
to  invade  Portugal  in  complete  ignorance  of  Wellington's 
arrangements — Fall  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Almeida — Advance 
of  Massena — Battle  of  Busaco  and  defeat  of  the  French — 
Further  advance  of  Massena — He  is  permanently  arrested  by 
the  lines — His  position  at  Santarem — Soult  at  Badajoz — Retreat 
of  Massena — Pursuit  of  Wellington — The  French  army  forced 
back  into  Spain — Battle  of  Fuentes  d'Onoro — The  garrison  of 
Almeida  escapes — Disgrace  of  Massena, 

BY  the  close  of  1809  and  during  the  months  that 
followed,   Napoleon    might    have   exclaimed 
with  Richard,  that  the  "  lowering  clouds  had 
been  buried  in  the  ocean's  bosom."     After  the  re- 
verse at  Aspern,  he  had  risen   superior  to   fortune, 
had  boldly  maintained  his  hold  on  the  Danube,  and 

102 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fuentes  d'Onoro   103 

gathering  his  forces  together  with  marvels  of  re- 
source and  skill,  had  defeated  the  Archduke  Charles 
in  the  hard-fought  battle  of  Wagram.  Austria  had 
bowed  once  more  to  the  will  of  her  victorious 
enemy,  had  ceded  territory,  and  had  accepted  an 
humiliating  peace ;  ere  long  she  had  thrown  her 
Imperial  daughter  into  the  arms  of  her  conqueror, 
as  a  pledge  of  submission  to  his  all-powerful  man- 
dates. The  Continent  hid  again  its  diminished 
head :  the  Czar,  who  had  been  lukewarm  in  the 
campaign  on  the  Danube,  returned,  in  profession  at 
least,  to  the  policy  of  Tilsit  and  Erfurt ;  the  patri- 
otic movement  in  Germany  ceased  ;  the  supremacy 
of  France  seemed  assured  from  the  Rhine  to  the 
Vistula.  In  Italy  Murat  had  been  placed  on  the 
throne  of  Naples,  and  had  been  ordered  to  make  a 
descent  on  Sicily.  The  Pope  had  been  carried  off 
from  the  Vatican,  and  had  been  thrown  into  gilded 
bondage ;  a  French  army  occupied  Rome ;  the 
spiritual  power  of  many  centuries  seemed  effaced 
by  the  material  tyranny  of  the  sword.  England 
remained,  no  doubt,  the  mistress  of  the  seas,  and 
still,  though  unaided,  maintained  the  contest ;  but 
she  had  lost  a  fine  army  in  the  swamps  of  Walcheren  ; 
the  Douro  and  Talavera  seemed  fruitless  triumphs. 
Her  finances  were  subjected  to  a  tremendous  trial ; 
and  though  her  commerce  and  manufactures  still 
bore  the  strain,  and  her  real  prosperity  had  not  been 
decidedly  checked,  she  was  suffering  much  from  the 
effects  of  the  Continental  System,  and  from  the 
attempts  to  shut  her  out  from  trading  with  the  civ- 
ilised world.     The  quarrel,  too,  between  Castlereagh 


1 04  Wellington 

and  Canning  had  weakened  her  Government,  and 
distracted  her  councils ;  there  was  a  prospect  that 
the  Opposition  might  acquire  power  :  if  so,  the  new 
Ministry  would  hardly  continue  the  war.  Mean- 
while, Napoleon,  again  the  lord  of  the  best  part 
of  Europe,  was  concentrating  his  strength  against 
his  one  obstinate  enemy :  notwithstanding  repeated 
defeats  and  failures,  he  was  building  fleets  and  fit- 
ting out  expeditions  at  sea:  he  still  looked  forward 
to  his  great  "  battle  of  Actium."  But  his  indom- 
itable will  and  commanding  energies  were  chiefly 
directed,  at  this  conjuncture,  to  the  extension  and 
the  perfection  of  the  Continental  System,  from  which, 
blind  to  what  experience  was  already  proving,  and 
ignorant  of  what  the  future  was  to  bring  forth,  he 
drew  a  certain  presage  of  the  approaching  ruin  of 
England.  Reckless  that  the  prohibition  of  trade 
with  his  foe  impoverished  and  exasperated  every 
State  on  the  Continent,  and  that  his  policy  urged 
him  on  to  universal  conquest,  he  annexed  Holland  to 
his  overgrown  Empire  ;  he  made  the  Hanse  towns 
departments  of  France,  and  carried  her  frontier  sea- 
wards far  beyond  the  Elbe,  in  the  fixed  conviction 
that  by  these  acts  of  unscrupulous  force  he  would,  in 
his  own  phrase,  "  subdue  the  sea  by  the  land,"  and 
compel  England  to  become  one  of  his  many  vassals. 
The  domination  of  Napoleon  over  the  Continent 
seemed  also  about  to  be  made  complete,  in  the 
spring  and  the  summer  of  1810,  by  the  subjugation 
of  the  whole  Iberian  Peninsula.  The  results  of 
the  Campaign  of  1809,  especially  the  operations 
upon  the  Tagus,  had  filled  the  Emperor  with  indig- 


BusacOy  Torres  Vedras,  Fucntes  d'Onoro    105 

nant  w  rath  ;  his  arms  in  Spain  and  in  Portugal  were 
to  be  defied  no  longer.  As  had  happened  after 
Baylen,  so  after  Wagram  he  moved  enormous  forces 
across  the  Pyrenees  ;  100,000  soldiers  at  least  were 
added  to  the  legions  that  maintained  the  war ;  his 
armies  were  fully  370,000  strong,  and  were  largely 
composed  of  his  best  troops.  For  a  time  it  appeared 
as  if  nothing  could  withstand  the  overwhelming  tor- 
rent of  French  invasion  that  spread  from  beyond  the 
Ebro  to  the  Pillars  of  Hercules.  In  the  East  Suchet 
kept  down  Aragon,  quenched  the  flame  of  insur- 
rection in  Navarre,  was  preparing  to  attack  Valen- 
cian  fortresses.  Catalonia  had  yielded  to  the  arms 
of  St.  Cyr  and  Augereau  ;  Gerona  had  fallen  after 
a  memorable  siege,  worthy  of  the  heroic  defence 
of  Saragossa.  An  army  upheld  the  throne  of  the 
usurper  at  Madrid  ;  and  occupied  the  valley  of  the 
upper  Tagus;  a  great  force  had  been  assembled  to 
avenge  Baylen,  to  overrun  Andalusia,  and  to  com- 
plete its  conquest.  This  host,  directed  by  Soult, 
with  Joseph  at  its  head,  swept  easily  through  the 
Sierra  Morena  passes,  spread  over  the  fine  adjoining 
regions  until  it  approached  the  sea,  took  Cordova, 
Seville,  and  other  important  cities,  and,  carrying 
desolation  and  terror  in  its  train,  was  stopped  only 
before  the  lagoons  of  Cadiz,  which  seemed  the  last 
refuge  of  the  independence  of  Spain.  Meanwhile 
Napoleon  had  fixed  his  gaze  on  Portugal,  and  had 
resolved  not  only  to  annex  that  country,  but  to 
make  it  a  theatre  for  a  reverse  to  England  and  to 
the  British  army,  which  had  appeared  on  its  coasts. 
Another  great    force  was   being    assembled   on  the 


io6  Wellington 

frontiers  of  Leon  ;  it  was  amply  sustained  by  power- 
ful reserves ;  its  mission  was  to  crush  every  enemy 
in  its  path  and  to  advance  in  triumph  to  the  Portu- 
guese capital.  Nor  could  even  the  most  experienced 
soldier,  nay,  the  conqueror  himself — conducting  the 
war  from  a  distance,  and  far  removed  from  the 
scene  of  events — understand  how  a  real  resistance 
could  be  made  to  this  formidable  display  of  the 
military  force  which  had  laid  the  Continent  at  the 
feet  of  its  master.  The  Spanish  rising,  indeed,  was 
perhaps  fiercer  than  ever ;  the  Spanish  levies  had 
been  formed  into  warlike  bands  known  by  the  signif- 
icant name  of  Guerrillas,  and  had  found  skilful  and 
patriotic  leaders  ;  several  of  the  Spanish  towns  had 
long  kept  the  invaders  at  bay.  But  the  Spanish 
armies  were  being  routed  over  and  over  again  ;  a 
pitched  battle  had  been  fought  at  Ocana,  and  had 
only  lead  to  a  frightful  disaster,  and  though  their 
shattered  fragments  invariably  drew  towards  each 
other,  and  were  animated  by  a  really  national  spirit, 
it  seemed  impossible  that  they  could  keep  the  field. 
And  what  could  a  handful  of  British  soldiers,  even 
though  backed  by  Portuguese  levies,  effect  against 
the  gigantic  might  of  Napoleon  employed  to  bring 
the  Peninsula  within  his  grasp  ?  It  appeared  to  be 
no  idle  boast  when  the  Emperor  announced  to  his 
Senate  that  "  the  English  Leopard  would  be  driven 
into  the  sea,"  and  that  "  the  Tricolor  would  soon 
wave  over  Lisbon  and  Cadiz." 

Had  Napoleon  at  this  turning-point  in  his  career 
seized  the  occasion  when  he  bestrode  the  Continent, 
and  had  he  directed  the  war  in  Portugal  and  Spain 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fue7ites  d'  Onoro    107 

himself;  had  he  followed  the  principles  of  his  own 
strategy,  and  made  the  best  use  of  his  military 
power ;  had  he  established  a  real  Government  at 
Madrid,  and  made  his  quarrelling  lieutenants  obey 
his  commands,  it  is  probable  that  in  spite  of  all  the 
obstacles  he  would  have  met,  he  would  have  con- 
quered the  Iberian  Peninsula,  at  least  for  a  time. 
But  the  Continental  System  was  at  present  his  prin- 
cipal care,  and  this  detained  him  at  Paris,  the  centre 
of  his  affairs  ;  he  could  hardly  leave  his  young  con- 
sort, Marie  Louise ;  he  had  begun  to  dislike  a 
national  struggle  in  a  most  difficult  country,  which 
an  Austerlitz  or  a  Jena  could  not  bring  to  a  close'  ; 
he  kept  away  from  what  was  now  the  main  scene  of 
events ;  and  yet,  like  Louis  XIV.  in  another  age,  he 
controlled  from  his  capital  a  war  far  beyond  the 
Pyrenees,  conduct  certain  to  lead  to  defeats,  nay, 
disasters.  This  was  one  of  the  principal  mistakes  of 
his  life;  it  was  characteristic,  not  of  a  master  of  war, 
but  of  a  mere  despot;  he  acknowledged  it,  in  exile, 
many  years  afterwards.  How  the  colossal  edifice  of 
his  tyranny  in  three-fourths  of  the  Continent  toppled 
down  and  fell  in  a  tremendous  ruin,  belongs  to  the 
province  of  European  History ;  how  it  came  to 
the  same  end  in  Portugal  and  Spain  is  largely  con- 
nected with  the  same  subject ;  and  it  was  due  to 
many  and  different  causes.  But  of  these  not  the 
least  was  the  presence  on  the  theatre  of  war  of  the 
great  soldier  who  maintained  the  contest  for  England, 


'  Wellington  was  an  admirable  military  critic.  He  has  remarked 
over  and  over  again,  that  impatience  was  a  defect  of  Napoleon 
in  war. 


io8  Wellhigton 

and  his  commanding  influence  on  the  course  of 
events ;  it  is  unquestionable  that  the  wisdom  and 
the  sword  of  Wellington  threw  a  decisive  weight  in- 
to the  scales  of  Fortune.  By  this  time  the  British 
commander  had,  with  a  capacity  and  insight  pecu- 
liar to  himself,  mastered  the  conditions  of  the 
struggle  in  the  Peninsula  hopeless  as  it  appeared 
to  the  majority  even  of  the  ablest  men  ;  he  believed 
that,  in  certain  circumstances,  it  could  be  carried  on 
with  success,  even  against  the  overwhelming  power 
of  Napoleon.  He  had  never  abandoned  the  idea  he 
had  from  the  first,  that  Portugal  was  the  true  point 
from  which  the  Peninsula  could  be  defended  by 
England  ;  his  deep-laid  projects  for  such  a  defence 
had  been  formed  ;  they  had  been  confirmed  by  his 
recent  experiences  in  Spain,  especially  by  what  had 
happened  after  Talavera.  At  this  conjuncture,  he 
had  grasped  the  real  state  of  affairs,  in  Spain  and 
Portugal,  with  unerring  judgment  ;  being  on  the 
spot  he  understood  it  much  better  than  the  Emperor 
could  do,  hundreds  of  miles  away  in  Paris.  He  had 
rightly  deemed  that  Napoleon's  principal  effort  in 
the  Peninsula  would  be  made  against  Portugal  '  ; 
but  having  regard  to  the  position  of  the  French 
armies,  he  believed  that  that  effort  could  be  made 
a  failure.  He  had  properly  condemned  the  invasion 
of  Andalusia  and  the  consequent  dissemination  of 
the  enemy's  forces  as  a  distinct  and  momentous 
military  mistake  ■* ;  this,  he  was  convinced,  would 
tell  powerfully  in  the  operations  at  hand.  He  put 
little  or  no    trust    in    the    Spanish    armies,    as   was 

'  Selection,  pp.  313-317.  *  Ibid.,  p.  434. 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Ftientes  d'  Onoro   109 

natural  after  the  events  of  1809;  he  possibly  esti- 
mated them  below  their  worth  ;  but  he  clearly  per- 
ceived that  the  Spanish  rising  would  prove  an 
immense  obstacle  to  the  invaders  ;  would  impede 
check,  nay,  perhaps  paralyse  their  movements  on 
the  general  theatre  of  the  war.  In  these  circum- 
stances Wellington  contended  that  if  the  resources 
of  Portugal  were  properly  employed,  and  if  England 
remained  true  to  herself,  that  nook  in  the  Peninsula 
could  even  now  be  made  a  stronghold  from  which 
the  forces  of  Napoleon  could  be  made  to  recoil.* 

Wellington,  after  his  retreat  from  Talavera,  had 
kept  his  army  around  Badajoz  for  some  time.  His 
troops  suffered  from  disease  in  unhealthy  canton- 
ments, and  for  this  he  has  been  somewhat  rudely 
blamed  ;  but  his  position  on  the  Guadiana  can  be 
fully  justified.  The  juntas,  which  had  been  the 
heads  of  the  great  rising  of  Spain,  had  been  repre- 
sented by  a  Central  Junta,  which  had  been  assem- 
bled at  Aranjuez  and  Seville;  the  Central  Junta  had 
taken  refuge  at  Cadiz,  and  had  been  replaced  by  a 
more  regular  government ;  a  project  had  been  formed 
to  convene  the  Cortes,  the  time-honoured  Parliament 
of  the  Spanish  monarchy.  At  the  same  time  Cadiz 
was  making  a  stubborn  defence ;  the  place  was  ex- 
ceedingly  difHcult    to    attack;    it    had    successfully 

'  Wellington  wrote  this  in  November  1809:  "I  conceive  that 
until  Spain  shall  have  been  concjuered  and  shall  have  submitted 
to  the  conqueror,  the  enemy  will  find  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to 
obtain  possession  of  Portugal;  if  His  Majesty  should  continue  to 
employ  an  army  in  the  defence  of  this  country,  and  if  the  improve- 
ments in  the  Portuguese  military  service  should  be  carried  to  the 
extent  of  which  they  are  capable." — Selection,  pp.  313-314. 


I  lo  Wellington 

defied  the  efforts  of  Victor ;  it  had  the  support  of  a 
British  fleet ;  a  considerable  force,  composed  partly  of 
Spanish,  partly  of  British  troops,  had  been  collected 
to  oppose  the  besieging  enemy.  Wellington  wished, 
when  near  Badajoz,  to  be  within  reach  of  the  new 
Spanish  Government,  and  to  give  it  countenance  as 
well  as  he  could  ;  in  this  position,  besides,  he  threat- 
ened the  French  invaders  in  the  valley  of  the  Tagus 
and  in  Andalusia, — these  already  greatly  scattered 
and  weakened, — and  he  protected  the  south-eastern 
frontier  of  Portugal.  But  during  this  period  his 
powerful  mind  was  bent  on  carrying  out  the  profound 
designs  he  had  made  for  the  defence  of  that  king- 
dom, and  for  resisting  the  attack  he  had  clearly  fore- 
seen ;  his  steadfast  energies  were  directed  to  effect 
his  purpose.  He  stipulated  that  he  should  have  the 
command  of  a  British  army  to  be  kept  at  a  strength 
of  thirty  thousand  men,  and  to  be  properly  rein- 
forced from  the  sea ;  this  was,  so  to  speak,  to  be  his 
right  arm  in  the  field.  But  he  had  been  placed  at 
the  head  of  all  the  Portuguese  forces,  under  the 
honoured  title  of  Marshal  General ;  the  men  in 
ofifice  in  Lisbon,  now  called  the  Regency,  who 
though  often  divided,  factious,  and  jealous  of  his 
power,  nevertheless  bowed  to  his  superior  will,  were 
persuaded  or  compelled  to  put  the  whole  military 
resources  of  the  State  in  his  hands ;  he  had  soon 
turned  these  to  the  very  best  advantage.  The  Por- 
tuguese army,  which  had  already  done  good  work, 
was  largely  increased  and  better  organised,  great 
additions  were  made  to  the  Portuguese  levies,  and 
the  whole  male  population  was  summoned  to  arms, 


Busaco,  Torres  Vcdras,  Fuentes  ifOnoro    iii 

under  the  ancient  feudal  laws  of  the  Portucfuese 
monarchy.  By  these  means  Wellington's  British 
force  would  have  the  support  of  a  regular  foreign 
army,  and  of  a  kind  of  militia  as  it  may  fitly  be 
called  ;  both  were  probably  not  less  than  one  hundred 
thousand  strong;  and  there  were,  besides,  large  masses 
that  could  do  much  service.  This  combination  of 
military  arrays  was  to  form,  as  it  were,  the  human 
rampart  which  was  to  defend  Portugal,  and  to  offer 
the  resistance  which  man  could  make  to  the  enemy. 
The  forces  of  nature,  however,  as  well  as  those  of 
man,  were  to  be  employed  in  the  accomplishment  of 
the  British  General's  design.  Napoleon's  masterly 
offensive  strategy  largely  depended  on  the  facilities 
given  by  good  roads,  and  on  the  products  of  agri- 
culture on  the  lines  of  march  ;  these  enabled  his 
armies  to  move  rapidly,  and  to  find  the  means  of 
subsistence  in  the  lands  they  traversed.  His  combi- 
nations had  in  a  great  measure  failed  when  these 
conditions  of  success  were  absent;  this  had  been 
conspicuously  seen  in  his  winter  campaign  in  Poland, 
and  already  in  some  of  the  French  operations  in 
Spain.  The  circumstance  did  not  escape  the  pene- 
trating eye  of  Wellington  ;  he  was  alive  to  its  signi- 
ficance for  the  defence  of  Portugal.  He  obtained 
from  the  Government  at  Lisbon  a  reluctant  consent 
that  the  population  should  break  up  the  main  roads, 
should  destroy  the  crops  and  harvests ;  should  lay 
the  country  waste  along  the  whole  front  of  the  com- 
ing invasion  ;  this  devastation,  even  if  imperfectly 
carried  out,  would  greatly  embarrass  and  retard  the 
enemy.     But  this  was  not  the  only  natural  obstacle 


1 1 2  Wellington 

which  was  to  be  thrown  across  the  advance  of  the 
hostile  army  ;  there  was  an  obstacle  which  perhaps 
would  be  made  impassable,  if  aided  by  the  resources 
of  the  military  art.  Armed  lines  had  become  all 
but  obsolete  in  war ;  but  they  had  repeatedly  proved 
of  supreme  importance  ;  the  lines  of  Villars,  what- 
ever has  been  said,  saved  France  in  1710-1711  ;  the 
features  of  the  region  beyond  Lisbon  could  make 
these  defences  play  a  most  remarkable  part.  Two 
ranges  of  heights  rose  between  the  Tagus  and  the 
sea,  twenty-nine  and  twenty-four  miles  in  length, 
and  considerably  north  of  the  Portuguese  capital ; 
they  formed  a  barrier  to  the  approach  of  the  enemy ; 
they  enclosed  a  vast  intervening  space  which  could 
be  held  by  a  defending  force,  in  fact,  to  be  compared 
to  a  huge  entrenched  camp.  These  eminences  were 
occupied  by  the  British  chief  along  their  whole  ex- 
tent, and  fortified  with  admirable  skill  and  care  ;  low 
uplands  were  scarped  down  and  made  precipitous ; 
valleys  were  inundated  and  turned  into  inaccessible 
swamps ;  points  of  vantage  were  chosen  for  the  com- 
manding fire  of  artillery  ;  hills,  villages,  streams,- — in 
a  word,  every  part  of  the  ground, —  were  made  to 
contribute  to  the  great  projected  work.  In  this  way 
two  formidable  defensive  lines,  each  supporting  the 
other,  and  of  prodigious  strength,  were  formed  along 
the  ranges  in  front  of  Lisbon  ;  they  were  protected 
by  about  a  hundred  and  fifty  redoubts,  and  armed 
by  nearly  seven  hundred  cannon  ;  they  were  to  be 
held  by  a  powerful  army,  and  in  constructing  them 
care  had  been  taken  that  the  army  should  possess 
the  means  of  a  counter-attack,    and  should  not  be 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fuentes  d'Onoro    1 13 

confined  to  a  mere  passive  resistance.  But  Welling- 
ton's preparations  did  not  stop  here  ;  foreseeing  that 
conceivably  the  lines  could  be  forced,  he  formed  a 
third  line,  behind  the  first  two,  on  the  verge  of  the 
sea  near  Lisbon,  of  narrow  breadth,  but  well-nigh  im- 
pregnable ;  this  would  cover  his  army,  if  compelled 
to  embark,  and  would  make  its  retreat  to  its  ship- 
ping secure.  Tens  of  thousands  of  men  were 
employed  in  making  these  gigantic  works,  rightly  de- 
scribed as  "  a  stupendous  citadel,  wherein  to  deposit 
the  independence  of  the  whole  Peninsula";  and  it  is 
a  most  astonishing  fact  that  these  vast  creations 
were  planned  and  completed  with  such  secrecy — this 
was  a  masterpiece  of  Wellington's  art — that  their 
very  existence  was  unknown  in  Europe  and  even  in 
England. 

The  lines  of  Torres  Vedras,  the  name  they  bear 
in  history,  and  Wellington's  other  arrangements  for 
the  defence  of  Portugal,  in  conception  and  execu- 
tion were  one  of  the  most  splendid  specimens  of 
the  military  art,  in  the  great  war  between  France 
and  Europe.  They  were  illustrations,  on  the  very 
grandest  scale,  of  sagacity,  of  forethought,  of  the 
adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  in  resisting  the  gi- 
gantic power  of  Napoleon  ;  and  they  were  the  first 
permanent  check  in  his  career  of  conquest.  And  it 
adds  to  our  admiration  of  this  magnificent  design 
that  it  was  carried  out  in  spite  of  misgivings  in  Eng- 
land, in  spite  of  fears  openly  avowed  by  the  British 
Government ;  in  spite  of  alarm  and  scepticism  in 
Wellington's  camp.  A  Tory  Ministry  had  retained 
office  and  the  hopes  of  the  Opposition  had  vanished ; 

8 


114  Wellington 

but  with  the  single  exception  of  Lord  Wellesley, 
the  successor  of  Canning  as  Foreign  Minister,  the 
Cabinet  of  Percival  had  little  faith  in  the  possibility 
of  a  successful  defence  of  Portugal  ;  and  this  was 
the  opinion  of  most  of  the  distinguished  officers  on 
the  spot.  From  this  point  of  view  the  attitude 
of  the  British  commander  was  an  exhibition  of  con- 
stancy, of  resolution,  of  moral  power,  to  which 
hardly  a  parallel  can  be  found  in  war;  he  stood  as 
it  were,  on  a  rock  in  Portugal,  defying  all  that 
Napoleon  could  do  against  him,  his  countrymen 
and  his  lieutenants  filled  with  forebodings,  depend- 
ing on  himself,  and  himself  alone.  Meanwhile  his 
great  adversary  had  his  preparations  made  for  re- 
invading  Portugal,  and  for  what,  he  was  convinced, 
would  prove  an  easy  conquest.  Had  Napoleon  had 
the  slightest  idea  that  the  Portuguese  auxiliaries 
now  formed  a  real  army,  and  that  the  lines  of  Torres 
Vedras  were  practically  not  to  be  assailed  with 
success  in  front,  he  would  doubtless  have  drawn 
together  the  mass  of  his  forces  in  Spain,  and  moved 
them  in  overwhelming  numbers  upon  Portugal ;  and 
had  he  entered  that  kingdom  from  the  south,  as  well 
as  from  the  north,  the  lines  might  perhaps  have  been 
turned,  and  the  defences  of  Wellington  made  to  fall. 
Such  a  combination  would  not  have  been  difficult, 
had  not  an  army  been  almost  thrown  away  in  false 
operations  in  Andalusia ;  but  even  now  it  was  not 
impossible,  had  the  Emperor  thought  the  occasion 
had  come.  But  Napoleon  persisted  in  a  belief  that 
a  small  British  army,  of  which,  too,  he  much  under- 
rated the  strength,  was  the  only  enemy  to  be  found 


MARSHAL  SOULT. 
(After  the  painting  by  Rouillard.) 


^ 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fuentes  cV  Onoro    115 

in  Portugal ;  he  thought  the  Portuguese  levies 
beneath  contempt ;  above  all,  he  remained  in  com- 
plete ignorance  of  the  formidable  obstacle  laid  in  his 
path,  should  a  French  army  try  to  make  a  direct 
march  on  Lisbon.  It  will  always  be  a  mystery  that 
this  consummate  master  of  war,  who  had  spies  and 
partisans  in  every  part  of  Europe,  was  absolutely 
uninformed  as  to  the  most  essential  fact,  when  he 
formed  his  plans  in  18 10  for  a  descent  on  Portugal. ' 
The  preparations  of  Napoleon  were,  nevertheless, 
imposing,  even  if  really  insufficient  for  the  intended 
enterprise.  Armies,  probably  120,000  strong,  had 
been  concentrated  in  Leon  and  Castile,  to  carry  the 
war  across  the  Portuguese  frontier ;  the  first  line 
was  composed  of  some  650,00  men,  largely  veterans 
of  the  best  quality  ;  the  second  was  not  much  in- 
ferior in  numbers  and  was,  if  necessary,  to  reinforce 
the  first,  and  to  guard  the  long  line  of  communi- 
cations with  France,  always  infested  by  the  active 
Spanish  guerrillas.  These  collective  arrays  had 
been  placed  under  the  command  of  Massena,  con- 
fessedly the  ablest  of  the  Imperial  marshals  ;  he  had 
been  directed,  in  the  first  instance,  to  take  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  and  Almeida,  frontier  fortresses  on  the 
northern  verge  of  Portugal, — Ciudad,  indeed,  is  just 
within  Spain, — and  then  gathering  together  his  fore- 
most line,  the  corps  of  Ney,  of  Junot,  of  Reynier — 
this  last  moving  from  the  valley  of  the  Tagus,  to 
reach  Wellington,  to  overthrow  him,  and  to  march 
straight  on  Lisbon.     A  word  here  may  be  said  on 

'  The    Correspondence   of  Napoleon  at  this  time    shows    that    he 
did  not  give  the  affairs  of  the  Peninsula  the  attention  they  required. 


1 1 6  Wellington 


<:> 


the  renowned  French  chief  who  had  been  entrusted 
with  a  mission  he  could  not  fulfil,  and  of  which, 
strange  to  say,  he  had  had  grave  misgivings.  Mas- 
^sena  was  inferior,  perhaps,  as  a  strategist  to  Soult, 
inferior  certainly  as  a  tactician  to  Ney ;  he  was  not 
a  master  of  the  great  combinations  of  war;  he  was 
licentious,  rapacious,  not  liked  by  his  troops ;  but 
he  was  capable  of  splendid  efforts  in  the  field,  as 
his  great  victory  of  Zurich  proves  ;  his  tenacity  and 
energy  deserve  the  highest  praise,  as  was  seen  in  his 
heroic  defence  of  Genoa  ;  we  may  accept  Welling- 
ton's decisive  judgment,  that  he  was  the  best  of  all 
his  Imperial  opponents.  The  Marshal  assumed  his 
command  in  June;  Ciudad  Rodrigo  had  fallen  on 
the  nth  of  July,  after  a  siege  on  which  it  is  un- 
necessary to  dwell ;  Almeida  surrendered,  in  the  last 
days  of  August,  in  a  great  measure  from  the  effects 
of  an  accident.  Meanwhile,  Wellington,  who  for 
some  time,  had  concentrated  the  main  part  of  his 
army  in  the  valley  of  the  Mondego,  around  Guarda, 
had,  when  made  aware  of  the  operations  of  the 
French,  advanced  cautiously  beyond  Celorico,  not 
far  from  Almeida,  in  order  to  observe  his  antago- 
nists' movements  ;  but  he  properly  refused  to  accept 
a  trial  of  strength,  to  which  Massena  endeavoured 
to  lure  him,  by  feints,  demonstrations,  and  an  ap- 
parently careless  attitude.  This  conduct  was  marked 
by  his  characteristic  wisdom ;  he  had  not  more  than 
24,000  men  in  hand,  his  best  lieutenant,  Hill,  being 
still  far  away,  another  lieutenant,  Leith,  being  many 
leagues  distant ;  a  lost  battle  in  his  position  would 
have    been  his  ruin,  and  a  lost  battle  would  have 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fuentes  d'  Onoro    1 1 7 

been  well-nigh  a  certainty.  Disregarding,  therefore, 
the  taunts  of  his  enemy  and  angry  recriminations 
from  Spanish  and  Portuguese  allies,  nay,  even  mur- 
muring voices  in  his  own  camp,  the  British  General 
allowed  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Almeida  to  fall,  with- 
out making  an  attempt  at  relief ;  in  this  course  he 
was  unquestionably  right.  Rash  movements,  indeed, 
of  a  brilliant  lieutenant,  Crawford,  which  nearly  led 
to  a  grave  reverse,  proved  that  Wellington's  judg- 
ment was,  as  usual,  correct. 

After  the  fall  of  Almeida,  Massena  made  a  rather 
long  halt ;  his  army  had  not  begun  its  advance  until 
the  1 6th  of  September.  This  has  been  charged  to 
the  Marshal  as  a  grave  error ;  it  certainly  gave  Wel- 
lington what  he  needed,  time  ;  but  Reynier  was  late 
in  joining  the  main  army  ;  the  French  were  already 
straitened  for  supplies.  Massena's  first  object  was 
to  gain  Coimbra,  a  large  town  which  he  may  have 
wished  to  make  a  secondary  base,  and,  if  possible,  to 
bring  Wellington  to  bay.  After  making  a  series  of 
dextrous  feints,  he  marched,  not  down  the  valley  of 
the  Mondego,  a  comparatively  fertile  and  prosper- 
ous tract,  but  just  north  of  the  river,  through  a 
barren  and  difficult  country.  This  appears  distinctly 
to  have  been  an  error  ;  but  the  Marshal  relied  on  Por- 
tuguese nobles  in  his  camp,  who  had  traitorously 
taken  the  side  of  the  French  ;  he  knew  nothing  of 
the  region  he  was  passing  through  ;  he  took,  too,  the 
nearest  route  to  Coimbra.  His  soldiers,  however, 
had  begun  to  murmur,  and  Ney  and  Junot  already 
were  complaining  of  their  chief;  a  train  of  his  artil- 
lery had  been  nearly  surprised  and  cut  off;  he  had 


1 1 8  Wellington 

hostile  bands  on  his  flank  and  rear  ;  he  did  not  reach 
Viseu  until  the  23rd  of  September,  a  place  three  or 
four  marches  at  least  from  Coimbra.  Wellington 
had  fallen  back  through  the  valley  of  the  Mondego, 
watching  his  enemy,  but  not  molested  by  him  ;  but 
he  had  summoned  Hill  and  Leith  to  come  into  line. 
These  lieutenants  were  even  now  at  hand  ;  he  could 
dispose  of  not  far  from  fifty  thousand  men.  The 
British  commander  resolved  to  offer  battle  to  his 
adversary  in  a  strong  position.  This  undoubtedly 
was  running  considerable  risk,  but  military  reasons 
did  not  determine  his  purpose.  He  was  condemned 
by  the  men  in  power  at  Lisbon  for  what  they 
deemed  an  ignominious  retreat,  as  he  had  been  con- 
demned for  leaving  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Almeida 
to  their  fate.  His  own  officers  and  soldiers  who 
were  in  ignorance  of  the  lines,  and  thought  that  all 
before  them  was  a  long  march  to  the  sea,  were 
vexed  that  they  had  not  measured  themselves  with 
the  enemy  ;  and  though  Massena's  advance  had  been 
slow,  the  population  had  only  partially  wasted  the 
country,  and  the  Marshal  had  all  the  moral  advan- 
tage of  a  bold  offensive.  Under  these  conditions 
Wellington  crossed  the  Mondego,  and  standing  be- 
tween Viseu  and  Coimbra  drew  up  his  army  along 
the  ridge  of  Busaco,  a  kind  of  spur  of  the  Sierra 
Alcoba,  itself  an  offshoot  of  the  great  Sierra  Cara- 
mula.  The  position  of  the  British  General  was  ad- 
mirably chosen  for  the  defensive  battle  he  had 
decided  to  fight.  The  ridge  afforded  a  formidable 
obstacle  to  the  onset  of  the  French,  for  they  could 
only   attack   from  a  deep  valley  below,    and    they 


Busaco,  Tori'es  Ved7'as,  Fuentcs  d' Onoro    119 

would  have  to  ascend  very  difficult  heights.  Its 
crest  afforded  space  for  the  first  British  line,  but 
screened  the  reserves  which  were  arrayed  behind. 
It  made  Massena's  powerful  cavalry  completely  use- 
less, for  they  could  not  act  on  ground  of  the  kind,  and 
it  greatly  impeded  the  effective  fire  of  the  French  ar- 
tillery. The  front  of  the  position  extended  about 
five  miles ;  it  was  to  be  occupied  by  nearly  forty 
thousand  men  ;  it  was  probably  not  to  be  stormed 
by  a  direct  attack.  But  it  might  have  been  turned 
on  the  left  by  a  pass  of  the  name  of  Boyalva,  and 
this  had  been  left  well-nigh  unguarded,  a  mistake 
which  might  have  cost  Wellington  dear. 

The  advance  guard  of  the  French  had  reached 
the  approaches  to  Busaco  on  the  25th  of  September ; 
the  corps  of  Ney  and  Reynier  were  close  to  the 
ridge  on  the  26th  ;  they  numbered  more  than  thirty- 
five  thousand  men,  for  the  most  part  veterans  of  the 
Imperial  army.  At  this  moment  Leith  and  Hill 
were  nearly  half  a  march  distant ;  Wellington  had 
not  more  than  twenty-five  thousand  men  in  hand  ; 
his  position  had  not  been  completely  occupied. 
Ney  and  Reynier  were  eager  to  fall  on  at  once,  but 
Massena  was  at  Montagoa  in  the  rear ;  very  prob- 
ably he  had  much  to  attend  to,  but  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that  he  wasted  time  on  the  object  of  a  dis- 
creditable amour.  The  Marshal,  bringing  with  him 
the  corps  of  Junot,  did  not  join  his  lieutenants  until 
the  afternoon.  The  attack  was  postponed  to  the 
next  day.  Ney  and  Reynier,  it  is  said,  were  now 
opposed  to  the  attempt. 

Meanwhile  Leith  and  Hill  had  come  into  line  with 


1 20  Wellington 

their  chief;  the  position  was  held  by  the  mass  of 
his  forces ;  his  arrangements  had  been  perfected  for 
the  impending  conflict.  It  had  been  decided,  in  the 
enemy's  camp,  that  the  attack  was  to  be  conducted 
by  Ney  and  Reynier,  the  corps  of  Junot  being  kept 
in  reserve  ;  it  was  to  be  made  by  their  troops  at  the 
same  time ;  but  it  was  not  so  made,  and  this  was 
a  capital  mistake.  At  daybreak  on  the  27th,  Ney 
being  still  motionless,  the  columns  of  Reynier, 
throwing  out  their  cloud  of  skirmishers,  advanced 
against  Wellington's  right  and  right  centre ;  they 
had  soon  emerged  from  the  valley  below ;  they 
scaled  the  difficult  height  before  them  with  exult- 
ing cheers,  and  though  but  little  supported  by  the 
fire  of  their  guns,  they  had  reached  the  summit  in 
less  than  half  an  hour,  "  with  astonishing  power  and 
resolution  overthrowing  everything  that  opposed 
their  progress."  The  division  of  Picton  and  the 
Portuguese  auxiliaries  were  driven  back  ;  this  part  of 
the  position  had  been  nearly  won,  spite  of  a  stern 
and  fierce  resistance ;  it  might  perhaps  have  been 
won  had  the  assailants  had  a  reserve  at  hand.  But 
if  Wellington's  line  had  been  broken  at  one  point, 
and  his  retreat  on  Coimbra  had  been  threatened,  his 
troops  would  not  confess  defeat ;  the  division  of 
Leith  restored  the  battle,  plying  the  enemy  with  a 
murderous  fire,  and  gradually  forcing  him  from  the 
crest  of  the  height ;  Hill,  coming  up  from  the  ex- 
treme right,  made  victory  secure.  Meanwhile  Ney, 
after  a  delay  of  some  hours,  had  begun  his  attack 
against  Wellington's  left.  This  was  more  skilfully 
directed  than  that  of  Reynier,  but  the  ground  was 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fziejties  d'Onoro    121 

more  difficult,  and  it  met  the  same  fate.  One  of 
the  Marshal's  divisions,  that  of  Loison,  ascended  the 
height  before  it,  and  nearly  attained  the  top  ;  the 
men,  who  had  retained  their  formation,  though  hardly 
pressed,  made  an  effort  to  fall  on  the  enemy  in  their 
front  ;  but  as  usual,  the  column  was  overcome  by  the 
line  ;  "  the  head  was  violently  overturned  and  driven 
upon  the  rear ;  both  flanks  were  lapped  over  by  the 
English  wings,  and  three  terrible  discharges  at  five 
yards'  distance  completed  the  rout."  The  second  of 
Ney's  divisions — the  third  was  held  in  reserve — en- 
deavoured to  turn  the  right  of  Crawford,  to  whom 
the  honour  of  Loison's  defeat  was  due ;  but  it  was 
kept  completely  in  check,  and  it  fell  back,  beaten. 

In  this  hard-fought  engagement  the  French  army 
was  weakened  by  at  least  4500  men,  for  the  most 
part  soldiers  of  the  first  quality, — many  of  the  regi- 
ments had  seen  Jena  and  Austerlitz ;  it  had,  in  fact, 
suffered  a  terrible  reverse.  Massena  had  not  con- 
ducted the  battle  well;  his  troops  gave  proof  of 
heroic  valour,  but  they  were  not  sustained  by  a  re- 
serve at  any  point  ;  their  three  arms  could  not  act 
together  ;  the  position  ought  not  to  have  been  assailed 
in  front.  And  the  blame  the  Marshal  deserved  was 
increased  by  this ;  before  he  made  an  ill-conceived 
attack,  he  had  been  made  aware  that  his  enemy's 
left  could  be  turned  by  the  pass  of  Boyalva ;  but  it 
has  been  said  that  he  yielded  to  the  first  counsels  of 
Ney  and  Rcynier,  with  whom  he  was  already  at  odds, 
through  fear  that  the  Emperor  would  be  informed 
that  an  opportunity  of  success  had  been  missed. 
The  losses  of  Wellington  were  not    1500  men,  his 


k 


122  Wellington 

tactical  dispositions  had  been  as  good  as  possible  ;  if 
his  right  centre  was  for  a  moment  in  peril,  he  gained 
a  real  victory  along  his  whole  line ;  what  was  more 
important,  the  moral  power  of  his  army,  which  had 
been  impaired,  was  restored  ;  the  Portuguese  auxil- 
iaries inspired  daily  increasing  confidence. 

The  defeat  of  Busaco  had  been  such  a  weighty  stroke 
that  Massena's  lieutenants  were  for  an  immediate  re- 
treat ;  this,  too,  was  the  judgment  of  the  British  chief ; 
he  had  written  that  the  invaders  ought  not  to  have 
gone  farther,  unless  they  could  be  largely  reinforced 
from  Spain.'  But  tenacity  was  one  of  Massena's  dis- 
tinctive qualities:  he  had  been  positively  ordered  to 
proceed  to  Lisbon,  and  he  had  no  notion  of  what  he 
would  have  to  encounter  ;  he  is  hardly  to  be  censured 
for  continuing  his  onward  march.  The  Marshal  now 
did  what  he  ought  to  have  done  before :  leaving  the 
corps  of  Junot  to  cover  the  movement,  and  aban- 
doning hundreds  of  his  wounded  men,  he  made,  on 
the  evening  after  the  battle,  for  the  pass  of  Boyalva  ; 
he  found  no  hostile  force  in  the  defile ;  the  excuse 
that  a  detachment  of  Portuguese  had  been  employed 
to  guard  it  and  was  not  on  the  spot  for  some  unex- 
plained reason,  appears  to  be  of  little  or  no  value. 
Within  a  few  hours  the  whole  French  army  had 
emerged  from  the  pass ;  but  this  was  a  flank  march 
in  the  presence  of  a  victorious  enemy,  at  a  distance 
of  only  eight  or  ten  miles  ;  Wellington  has  been  con- 
demned for  not  seizing  an  advantage  that  might  have 
had  immense  results  ;  in  this,  one  of  his  few  short- 
comings in  a  memorable  campaign,  we  perhaps  may 

'  Selection,  pp.  399,  400.     Wellington's  language  is  emphatic. 


AiNDRE    MASSENA,   DUKE  DE   RIVOLI. 
(After  the  painting  by  Maurice  ) 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fucntes  d'  Oiioro    123 

see  a  defect  in  war  characteristic  of  him,  he  very 
seldom  made  the  most  of  success.  The  left  of  the 
British  General  had  now  been  turned,  but  he  crossed 
the  Mondego  safely,  and  made  good  his  retreat ;  his 
adversary  made  no  attempt  to  molest  him.  Massena 
had  entered  Coimbra  by  the  ist  of  October ;  he  halted 
on  the  spot  for  three  days — a  delay  for  which  he  can 
hardly  be  blamed — to  form  a  depot  and  to  restore 
his  army;  leaving  only  a  small  detachment  and  his 
wounded  behind,  he  boldly  advanced  with  the  mass 
of  his  forces.  His  pursuit,  however,  was  feeble  and 
slow  ;  the  country  on  his  line  of  march  had  been 
harried  and  wasted  ;  Wellington  was  chiefly  harassed 
by  the  crowds  of  refugees  from  Coimbra  who  followed 
his  columns. 

From  the  8th  to  the  loth  of  October,  the  allied 
army  had  almost  made  its  way  within  the  celebrated 
lines.  Hill  lay  along  the  heights  of  Alhandra  to  the 
right ;  Crawford  held  the  centre  between  Aruda  and 
Sobral ;  Leith  and  Picton  stood  on  the  left  beyond 
Torres  Vedras  toward  the  sea ;  the  first  line  of 
defence  was  fully  occupied  ;  the  second  was  guarded 
by  a  sufficient  reserve.  After  a  slight  brush  with 
the  British  General's  rearguard,  Massena  had  attained 
the  lines  by  the  i  itli ;  he  had  heard  a  few  days  before 
that  some  defensive  works  had  been  thrown  up ;  but 
he  had  not  the  slightest  conception  of  the  stu- 
pendous barrier  which  now  rose  before  him,  and  was 
defended  by  the  men  who  won  Busaco.  The  veteran, 
however,  would  not  flinch  ;  he  searched  the  position 
from  right  to  left,  examining  two  or  three  of  the 
most   vulnerable  points  ;    it  has  been    said   that   he 


5X11:1  WORKS  CLUB  LIB^^.RV, 


124  Welli7igto7i 

contemplated  for  a  moment  an  attack  pressed  home. 
But  such  an  effort,whatever  French  critics  have  urged, 
could  only  have  led  to  a  crushing  defeat ;   the  army 
of  Wellington  was  daily  increasing  by  additions  of 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  troops ;  the  second  line  was 
even  more  formidable  than  the  first ;  it  may  safely  be 
asserted  that  the   twofold  mighty  obstacle  could  not 
have  been  overcome  by  an  attack  in  front  even  though 
made  by  one  hundred  thousand  men  ;  it  could  only 
have  been  turned  by  a  movement  from  the  other  bank 
of  the  Tagus.     In  this  position  of   affairs  Massena 
rightly  gave  up  any  idea  of  a  direct  assault  on  the  lines; 
he  adopted  a  course  not  justified  by  the  event,  perhaps 
not  strategically  wise,  but  characteristic  of  the  man, 
and  from  his  point  of  view  not  without  reason.  Impos- 
ing silence  on  his  discontented  lieutenants,  who  in- 
sisted that  a  retreat  had  become  a  necessity,  he  re- 
solved to  take  a  position  before  the  lines  from  which  he 
could  hold  Wellington  in  check,  perhaps  induce  the 
British  General  to  fight,  and  on  which  he  could  at  once 
menace  Lisbon,  carry  out   as  well  as  he  could  his 
master's  orders,  and,   as  might    be  expected,  could 
obtain  the   large   reinforcements   from  Spain,    even 
from  France,  he  had  right  to  look  for.    Drawing  off, 
therefore,  skilfully  from  the  front  of  his  enemy,  he  es- 
tablished his  army  around  Santarem  and  the  adjoin- 
ning  country,  a  tract  only  a  few  miles  distant  from 
the  lines,  comparatively  fertile  and   not  ravaged,  af- 
fording points  for  a  defensive  battle,  and  commanding 
the  routes  that  extend  to  Coimbra.     At  the  same 
time  he  made  preparations  to  bridge  the  Tagus,  and 
its  affluent  the  Zezfere,  in  the  hope  that  assistance 


B^isaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fuentes  d'Onoro    125 

might  reach  him  from  the  South,  and  he  sent  that 
distinguished  officer,  Foy,  to  inform  Napoleon  of  the 
events  that  had  happened,  and  to  demand  the  rein- 
forcements required  if  he  was  to  fulfil  his  task.  The 
arrangement  was  a  masterly  one  if  Massena's  project 
could  be  accomplished. 

Napoleon  has  severely  condemned  the  conduct 
of  his  lieutenant  in  thus  standing  before  the  lines. 
This  view  was  strengthened  by  an  unlucky  accident : 
Coimbra  had  been  seized  by  a  levy  of  Portuguese ; 
Massena's  detachment  and  his  wounded  had  been 
captured  or  slain ;  the  French  army  had  lost  a  depot 
and  fully  4000  men.  The  Emperor  has  insisted  that 
the  Marshal,  after  Busaco,  ought  to  have  occupied 
Coimbra  in  force;  to  have  taken  possession  of  the 
country  around  ;  to  have  extended  his  right  wing  as 
far  as  Oporto ;  and  to  have  awaited  the  arrival  of  re- 
inforcements from  Andalusia  and  the  south.'  Wel- 
hngton,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say,  thought  Massena 
completely  in  the  wrong:  as  he  ought  to  have  fallen 
back  from  Busaco,  he  ought  the  more  certainly  to 
fall  back  now;  this  was  "the  measure  which  it  was 
the  most  expedient  for  the  French  to  adopt." ' 
Nevertheless,  despite  these  weighty  opinions,  much 
is  to  be  said  for  what  Massena  did  ;  he  kept  his  ad- 
versary confined  within  a  nook  of  Portugal ;  the  mili- 
tary power  of  France  in  the  Peninsula  was  immense  ; 
it  was  practicable,  at  least  from  his  point  of  view,  to 
send  him  large  aid  from  Andalusia  and  the  Castiles ; 
in  that  case  the  lines  might  have  been  turned  from 
the  eastern  bank  of  the  Tagus,  and  Lisbon  might 

'  Nap.  Corr.,  pp.  31-362.  «  Selection,  p.    344. 


126  Wellington 

have  been  reduced  to  submission  ;  it  hardly  lay  in 
Napoleon's  mouth  to  censure  operations  which  real- 
ly conformed  to  his  commands.  Wellington,  after 
Massena's  movement  on  Santarem,  was  at  the  head 
of  60,000  or  70,000  men,  to  a  considerable  extent 
very  good  soldiers ;  the  French  army  was  probably 
not  more  than  50,000  strong,  and  was  suffering  from 
all  kinds  of  privations ;  the  British  General  has 
been  sharply  criticised  for  not  falling  on  his  adversary 
under  these  conditions.  We  may,  perhaps,  see 
here  his  characteristic  caution  and  his  occasional 
neglect  to  appeal  to  Fortune ;  but  his  seeming  in- 
action was  probably  in  all  respects  justified.  Mas- 
sena's army,  if  weakened,  was  still  powerful,  and, 
what  is  more  important,  had  not  lost  heart ;  it  would 
have  been  very  formidable,  had  it  been  attacked  in 
one  of  the  excellent  positions  it  might  have  taken ; 
in  the  event  of  a  defeat  of  the  British  commander, 
"  failure,  "  in  his  own  words,  "  would  be  the  loss  of 
the  whole  cause." '  It  should  be  added  that  Wel- 
lington probably  believed  that  Massena's  troops 
could  not  long  find  the  means  of  subsistence  in  the 
country  they  held,  and  would  soon  be  compelled  to 
make  a  disastrous  retreat ;  he  thus  took  a  position 
not  far  from  Santarem,  hoping  to  assail  his  enemy 
when  success  would  be  certain.  This  expectation, 
however,  was  not  fulfilled  ;  the  hostile  armies  re- 
mained watching  each  other  for  months  ;  this  was  a 
striking  instance  of  the  resolution  of  the  veteran 
Marshal,  and  also  of  the  extraordinary  skill  with 
which  an  army  of  Napoleon  could  organise  rapine 

■  Selection,  p.  413. 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fuentes  d'  Onoro    127 

and  exist  on  scanty  resources  found  on  the  spot. 
Meanwhile  Massena  threw  a  bridge  across  the 
Zczere,  and  hoped  to  be  able  to  bridge  the  Tagus, 
ever  looking  forward  to  the  assistance  of  his  Imperial 
master. 

During  these  events  Foy  had  safely  arrived  in 
Paris;  had  informed  Napoleon  of  the  position  of 
affairs ;  and  had  urged  the  necessity  of  reinforcing 
Massena  in  strength,  with  an  army  possibly  as  large 
as  that  which  had  invaded  Portugal,  and  operating 
on  both  banks  of  the  Tagus.  He  found  the  Emperor 
angry  with  his  great  lieutenant,  who,  he  said,  had 
made  a  series  of  mistakes,  and  deceived  by  the  illu- 
sions to  which  he  yet  clung ;  the  Portuguese  levies 
were  completely  worthless  ;  Wellington  had  not  more 
than  twenty-five  thousand  good  troops  ;  the  lines 
might  have  been  stormed  by  a  vigorous  effort.  Nev- 
ertheless, seeing  that  Massena  was  in  a  difficult  plight, 
he  gave  directions  that  supports  should  be  sent  to  the 
Marshal  from  Leon,  the  Castiles,  and  Andalusia  ;  the 
war  must  be  brought  to  an  end  by  the  defeat  of  Wel- 
lington and  the  occupation  of  the  Portuguese  capi- 
tal. Orders  were  given  that  D'Erlon  should  advance 
from  the  north,  and  join  hands  with  the  army  before 
the  lines ;  that  Dorsenne  should  co-operate  with  the 
same  purpose;  that  Joseph  should  send  divisions 
from  Madrid  ;  above  all,  that  Soult  should  push  for- 
ward from  Andalusia  and  come  into  line  with  Mas- 
sena on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Tagus.  By  these 
means  eighty  thousand,  even  one  hundred  thousand 
men  might  be  assembled  to  force  and  turn  the  de- 
fences of  Wellington;  the  Emperor  still  believed  that 


128  Wellington 

success  was  certain.  In  principle  these  directions 
were  well  conceived  ;  but  the  great  warrior,  still  ig- 
norant  of  the  real  facts,  had  miscalculated  his  military 
resources  in  Spain  and  was  once  more  conducting 
war  from  a  distance.  It  was  scarcely  possible  to 
array  such  a  mass  of  forces  to  assail  the  lines,  even 
had  Napoleon  taken  the  supreme  command ;  the 
communications  with  the  North  were  in  continual 
danger;  the  army  of  Joseph  was  held  in  check  at 
Madrid  ;  the  siege  of  Cadiz  paralysed  Victor  and  was 
keeping  the  besiegers  upon  the  spot  ;  Soult,  though 
disposing  of  a  still  powerful  force,  was  harassed  in 
Andalusia  by  the  guerrillas  and  by  the  wrecks  of 
the  beaten  Spanish  armies.  Napoleon  in  truth  had 
missed  an  occasion  which  he  might  have  seized  in 
the  first  months  of  i8io,  and  besides  he  had  turned 
his  attention  from  the  Peninsula.  His  relations  with 
the  Czar  had  become  unfriendly ;  he  had  annexed 
the  Duchy  of  Oldenburg,  a  state  of  one  of  the  Czar's 
kinsmen  ;  he  was  impoverishing  Russia  by  the  Con- 
tinental System  ;  he  had  refused  to  declare  that  Po- 
land should  not  be  restored  ;  his  ally  was  jealous  of 
his  marriage  with  Marie  Louise.  In  these  circum- 
stances, the  Imperial  orders  were  ill  obeyed  ;  Dor- 
senne  never  approached  the  Tagus ;  D'Erlon  only 
reached  Massena  with  some  ten  thousand  men  ;  Soult, 
moving  from  Andalusia  with  perhaps  twenty  thou- 
sand, was  delayed  for  weeks  in  laying  siege  to  Bada- 
joz,  and  remained  far  away  from  the  decisive  point, 
the  Tagus.  For  this  conduct  the  Marshal  has  been 
severely  blamed,  but  it  is  difficult  to  say  that  he 
made  a  mistake :  the  enterprise  would  have  been  very 


Busaco,  Toi^res  Vedras,  Fiientes  d'Onoro    129 

dangerous,  and  Massena  and  Soult,  even  if  united, 
would  not  have  compelled  Wellington  to  abandon 
the  lines. 

It  had  becon:ie  manifest,  by  the  first  days  of  March, 
181 1,  that  Massena  could  no  longer  maintain  his  po- 
sition. His  army  was  not  more  than  fifty  thousand 
strong,  even  with  the  reinforcements  that  had  been 
brought  by  D'Erlon  ;  it  was  isolated  in  a  hostile 
country,  which  had  been  ravaged  and  turned  into  a 
waste ;  it  had  only  supplies  for  a  few  days ;  the 
prospect  of  obtaining  further  support  had  vanished. 
The  sound  of  artillery  on  the  side  of  Badajoz  had 
been  heard,  but  it  had  ceased,  or  at  least  was  at  a 
great  distance  ;  Massena  had  not  been  able  to  bridge 
the  Tagus,  a  necessity  if  he  was  to  be  joined  by 
Soult.  The  veteran  made  up  his  mind  with  pain  to 
retreat ;  in  truth,  no  other  conceivable  course  was 
open.  The  retrograde  movement,  if  marked  by 
more  than  one  mistake,  was  conducted,  on  the  whole, 
with  admirable  skill ;  but  the  French  and  the  Portu- 
guese had  become  deadly  foes ;  it  was  disgraced  by 
reckless  barbarities  and  shameful  excesses.'  On  the 
4th  of  March  Massena  drew  off  his  sick  and  wounded 
men  ;  he  contrived  to  screen  this  operation  from  the 
British  chief ;  on  the  5th  and  6th  his  army  was  in 
full  march  by  the  main  roads  that  led  to  Coimbra. 
Massena  had  thus  gained  an  advantage ;  Wellington 
cautiously  followed  the  retiring  columns  ;  Ney  fought 
a  brilliant  engagement  at  Redinha  of  the  same  char- 
acter as  that  of  Rolica,  in  which  the  manoeuvring 
power  of  the  French  was  very  apparent.     Massena 

^Selection,  p.  449. 
9 


1 30  Wellington 

resolved  if  possible  to  prolong  the  contest,  and,  eager 
to  resume  an  offensive  attitude,  sought  to  cross  the 
Mondego  and  to  hold  Coimbra ;  from  that  place  he 
would  be  in  a  region  which  had  not  suffered  much  ; 
he  still  hoped  that  his  master  would  reinforce  his 
army.  But  the  main  bridge  on  the  Mondego  had 
been  broken  down  ;  Ney  had  not  defended  the  pass 
of  Condeixa,  which  covered  the  approaches  to  Coim- 
bra ;  the  French  army  was  compelled  to  march  to 
the  frontier  by  the  southern  branch  of  the  Mondego 
through  a  difficult  country.  A  series  of  partial  com- 
bats took  place,  to  the  advantage  generally  of  the 
allied  army;  the  French  suffered  a  real  defeat  at  Sa- 
bugal,  not  far  from  the  borders  of  Spain  ;  in  the  last 
days  of  March  Massena  had  crossed  the  Portuguese 
frontier ;  his  army  was  not  more  than  forty  thousand 
strong ;  it  was  a  shattered  and  disorganised  wreck. 
Yet  the  Marshal  would  not  forego  his  purpose ;  he 
insisted,  when  his  men  had  had  time  to  recruit  their 
strength,  on  making  an  effort  to  descend  on  Coria, 
and  co-operating  with  Soult  to  advance  to  the  Tagus, 
and  to  renew  the  campaign  under  better  auspices. 
But  his  lieutenants  had  been  quarrelling  for  months 
with  him  ;  Ney,  notably,  refused  to  obey  his  orders  ; 
Jie  instantly  deprived  the  Marshal  of  his  command. 

Massena,  after  his  calamitous  retreat,  spread  his 
army  in  cantonments  around  Salamanca;  the  move- 
ment on  Coria,  had  to  be  given  up  ;  it  is  impossible 
to  suppose  that  it  could  have  been  successful. 
Meanwhile  Wellington  had  invested  Almeida,  and, 
believing  that  he  could  not  be  attacked  for  a  time, 
had    gone    in   person  into    Estremadura,   vvliere   his 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fuejites  d'  Onoro   1 3 1 

presence  on  the  spot  would  no  doubt  be  of  much  ad- 
vantage. Events  in  Spain  had  taken  an  unfortunate 
turn  for  the  French,  while  Massena  was  painfully 
making  his  way  out  of  Portugal.  Soult  had  taken 
Badajoz  after  a  protracted  siege,  and  other  places  of 
little  value ;  but  Wellington  had  sent  Beresford  and 
Hill,  with  a  considerable  force,  to  retake  the  fort- 
ress. The  Marshal  was  being  involved  in  a  sea  of 
troubles.  The  siege  of  Cadiz  had  become  a  great 
operation  of  war  ;  Victor  still  persisted  in  clinging  to 
the  spot ;  he  had  had  enormous  cannon  made  for 
bombarding  the  city  ;  he  had  placed  a  flotilla  on  the 
lagoons ;  but  the  resistance  he  encountered  defied 
his  efforts.  Cadiz,  rising  from  a  peninsula,  enclosed 
by  the  sea,  was  exceedingly  difificult  to  attack  from 
the  land  ;  it  had  the  support  of  a  British  squadron, 
and  of  an  army  weekly  increasing  in  strength  ;  in 
fact,  Victor  was  menaced  in  his  own  camp,  and  had 
become  less  a  besieger  than  a  besieged.  A  mixed 
British  and  Spanish  force  had  been  told  off  to  fall  on 
his  lines,  but  the  Marshal  had  advanced  to  give  it 
battle ;  he  had  been  defeated  with  heavy  loss  at 
Barrossa,  but  he  had  averted  a  disaster  that  might 
have  been  fatal.  Soult,  in  supreme  command  in 
Andalusia,  found  the  affairs  in  that  kingdom  in  a 
deplorable  state  ;  the  conquerors  had  nearly  been 
imprisoned  within  their  own  conquest.  Murat  had 
failed  to  make  a  descent  on  Sicil)' ;  a  British  detach- 
ment had  been  sent  to  take  part  in  the  defence  of 
Cadiz;  Murcia  was  stirring  with  a  fast-spreading 
revolt ;  the  French  armies  in  Andalusia,  greatly 
reduced  in    numbers,  were   beset  by   guerrillas  on 


132  Wellington 

every  side,  and  by  the  remains  of  the  Spanish  armies  ; 
they  held  only  the  wasted  tracts  that  they  occupied, 
and  were  disseminated  over  an  immense  region. 
Such  had  been  the  results  of  an  invasion  utterly 
ill  conceived  ;  a  fine  army  of  eighty  thousand  men, 
which,  if  rightly  directed,  might  have  done  great 
things,  had  been  nearly  reduced  to  impotence,  and 
was  now  probably  not  sixty  thousand  strong.'  Soult 
had  only  a  small  garrison  to  throw  into  Badajoz ;  it 
seemed  that  the  fortress  would  erelong  fall ;  it  was 
this  that  had  brought  Wellington  near  the  scene  of 
events. 

The  army  of  Massena  had,  meanwhile,  been  reor- 
ganised more  rapidly  than  could  have  been  supposed, 
and  had  been  made  again  an  efificient  instrument  of 
war.  Napoleon,  however,  was  now  bent  on  con- 
ducting a  mighty  crusade  of  the  West  against  the 
East,  and  on  beginning  the  enterprise  which  was  to 
lead  to  the  retreat  from  Moscow.  The  Czar  had 
resented  the  annexation  of  the  domain pf  a  kinsman, 
had  refused  to  carry  out  to  extremes  the  Continental 
System,  and  was  making  slight  preparations  for  war. 
Napoleon  was  incensed  at  what  he  deemed  a  chal- 
lenge, and  was  making  ready  for  a  campaign  far 
beyond  the  Niemen.  Bodies  of  troops  were  being 
slowly  moved  from  Italy  and  across  Germany,  every 


'  Wellington  has  clearly  pointed  out  the  mistake  made  by  Napo- 
leon in  sanctioning  the  invasion  of  Andalusia:  "It  was  obvious 
that  the  French  were  in  error  when  they  entered  Andalusia.  They 
should  have  begun  by  turning  their  great  force  against  the  English 
in  Portugal,  holding  in  check  the  Spanish  force  in  Andalusia." — 
Selection,  p.  434. 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  F^centes  d' Onoro    133 

precaution  being  taken  to  assure  secrecy  ;  the  French 
armies  in  Spain  were  being  weakened  by  degrees; 
the  reinforcements  sent  to  Massena  were  small; 
they  consisted  of  only  a  few  thousand  men  added 
to  D'Erlon's  division,  and  of  a  detachment  of  the 
Imperial  Guard  under  Bessiferes,  a  good  cavalry 
officer,  but  in  no  sense  a  general.  Massena  had 
soon  collected  about  50,000  men,  but  Bessi^res  was 
a  jealous  and  unsympathetic  colleague  ;  Loison,  who 
had  been  given  the  command  of  Ney,  was  an  unwill- 
ing lieutenant,  disliked  by  his  soldiers  ;  Junot  and 
Reynier  had  never  ceased  to  have  disputes  with 
their  veteran  chief.  The  Marshal,  however,  when 
made  aware  that  Wellington  was  many  leagues  dis- 
tant, resolved  to  advance  to  the  relief  of  Almeida, 
and  if  possible  to  fight  a  great  battle,  which  might 
retrieve  a  reputation  somewhat  impaired,  and  recall 
victory  once  more  to  the  Imperial  standards.  He 
had  reached  Ciudad  Rodrigo  in  the  last  days  of 
April,  181 1,  and  was  soon  on  the  way  to  Almeida, 
at  the  head  of  some  40,000  good  troops,  of  whom 
5000  were  very  fine  cavalry;  he  found  the  allies  in  a 
position  before  Almeida,  which  was  still  invested 
and  seemed  on  the  point  of  falling.  Wellington  had 
only  resumed  his  command  on  the  28th  ;  it  is  not 
certain  whether  the  dispositions  made  for  his  army 
were  arranged  by  himself  or  by  a  subordinate,  but 
they  did  not  give  proof  of  his  remarkable  tactical 
skill.  His  front  was  covered  by  the  stream  of  the 
Dos  Casas,  by  the  village  of  Fuentes  d'Onoro,  and 
by  a  large  ravine,  but  the  position  could  be  turned 
on  the  right,  where  the  ravine  ended  in  marshy  flats. 


134  Wellingtorl 

which  were  passable,  however,  even  by  cavalry. 
His  army  occupied  a  kind  of  tableland  between  the 
Dos  Casas,  and  the  Turones,  a  stream  fordable  indeed, 
but  deep;  Almeida  and  the  river  Coa  were  in  his 
immediate  rear.  Should  his  right,  therefore,  be 
forced  and  the  position  lost,  he  ran  the  risk  of  a 
very  grave  defeat.  He  was  much  inferior  in  num- 
bers to  his  opponent ;  he  had  some  32,000  men  and 
only  1200  cavalry;  these  last  in  by  no  means  good 
condition  for  battle. 

Fuentes  d'Onoro  was  attacked  by  a  part  of  the 
French  army  on  the  3rd  of  May.  This  seems  to 
have  been  a  distinct  mistake;  the  attack,  as  at 
Busaco,  was  made  in  front ;  the  position  was  for  a 
time  imperilled,  but  the  allies  ultimately  beat  back 
the  enemy.  Massena  spent  the  4th  in  carefully 
reconnoitring  the  ground  ;  he  soon  perceived  the 
weak  point  of  his  adversary's  line,  he  resolved  to 
turn  Wellington's  right  by  a  powerful  force  and  si- 
multaneously to  fall  on  the  British  General's  front ; 
had  his  dispositions  been  properly  carried  out  he 
probably  would  have  gained  a  victory,  considering  the 
superiority  in  numbers  of  the  French  army.  Wel- 
lington made  arrangements  to  meet  an  effort  of  this 
kind ;  but  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  these  were  ade- 
quate ;  he  extended  his  right  along  the  marsh,  which 
possibly  he  may  have  thought  impassable,  but  he 
placed  only  a  body  of  partisans  on  the  spot,  and  at 
first  but  a  single  division  of  British  infantry.  The 
attack  of  the  French,  intended  to  have  been  made 
at  daybreak,  was  delayed  for  some  unknown  reason  ; 
but  in  the  early  forenoon  of  the  5th  of   May  a  mass 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fueiites  d'0?ioro    135 

of  cavalry,  sustained  by  the  corps  of  Junot,  was  seen 
advancing  across  the  flat,  menacing  Poco  Velio  and 
Nava  d'Aver  on  the  British  right.  The  detachment 
of  partisans  was  driven  off  the  field,  and  the  single 
British  division  was  placed  in  extreme  danger;  it 
has  been  said  that  had  Loison  seconded  Junot,  as 
he  might  have  done,  the  British  right  might  not 
only  have  been  turned,  but  overwhelmed.  The  ar- 
rival, however,  of  two  British  divisions,  and  of 
the  small  and  feeble  body  of  British  horse,  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  restored  the  battle  ;  but  the  superiority 
of  the  enemy,  especially  of  his  cavalry,  was  great  ; 
Wellington  had  to  make  new  dispositions  for  his 
defence.  Withdrawing  slowly  his  endangered  right, 
he  effected  a  change  of  front  in  retreat ;  and  took 
another  position  on  rising  ground  between  the  Dos 
Casas  and  the  Turones,  falling  back  a  distance  of 
more  than  two  miles.  This  was  a  most  difficult  and 
delicate  movement ;  the  French  horsemen  showed 
astonishing  boldness,  and  though  their  onset  was 
checked  by  the  retiring  infantry,  which  halted  when 
pressed,  and  formed  squares,  "  in  all  the  war  there 
was  not  a  more  dangerous  hour  for  England."  In- 
deed had  Bessi^res,  at  a  crisis  perhaps  decisive,  sent 
a  few  squadrons  of  the  Imperial  Guard  to  support 
Montbrun,  the  all  but  victorious  chief  of  the  attack- 
ing cavalry,  the  British  General  could  hardly  have 
averted  a  defeat ;  but  this  help  was  refused  on  a 
frivolous  pretext  ;  the  retrograde  movement  was 
maintained  in  order;  the  new  position  was  success- 
fully won.  The  French  now  opened  a  heavy  can- 
nonade on   the   narrow  front  which  had  thus  been 


1 36  Wellington 

formed  ;  this  caused  much  loss,  but  was  kept  under 
by  the  opposing  guns  ;  the  efforts  of  the  French  cav- 
alry were  made  fruitless  ;  the  assailants  were  brought 
completely  to  a  stand.  Meanwhile  the  original  front 
of  Wellington  along  Fuentes  d'Onoro  had  been  at- 
tacked;  but  here,  too,  the  attack  was  late;  D'Erlon 
gave  little  proof  of  energy  or  resource.  Reynier,  on 
Massena's  extreme  right,  remained  almost  motionless. 
It  has  been  said  that  this  remissness  was  caused  by 
want  of  sufficient  munitions,  which  Bessi^res  might 
have  supplied,  but  refused  ;  it  was  at  least  as  probably 
due  in  the  main  to  thesupineness  and  faults  of  Mas- 
sena's lieutenants,  suffering  from  the  fatigues  of  the 
campaign,  and  discontented  with  their  chief.  The 
allied  army  remained  master  of  the  field,  but  Fuentes 
d'Onoro  can  hardly  be  called  a  British  victory ;  it 
was  a  fierce  encounter  in  which  a  reverse  was  for  a 
time  imminent.  If  we  bear  in  mind  the  defects  of 
the  British  chief's  position,  a  defeat  might  have  had 
grave  results.' 

Massena  retreated  after  the  battle,  gnashing  his 
teeth  at  his  lieutenants  and  notably  at  Bessiferes, 
who  seems  to  have  been  a  very  disloyal  colleague. 
The  surrender  of   Almeida  now  appeared  certain  ; 


'  Wellington  was  one  of  the  most  truthful  of  men.  His  remarks 
on  the  battle  deserve  notice.  "  Lord  Liverpool  was  quite  right  not 
to  move  thanks  for  the  battle  of  Fuentes,  though  it  was  the  most 
difficult  I  was  ever  concerned  in,  and  against  the  greatest  odds.  We 
had  very  nearly  three  to  one  against  us  engaged;  above  four  to  one 
of  cavalry,  and  moreover  our  cavalry  had  not  a  gallop  in  them,  while 
some  of  that  of  the  enemy  was  fresh  and  in  excellent  order.  If  Bony 
had  been  there  we  should  have  been  beaten." — Supp.  Despatches,  pp, 
7-176. 


Busaco,  Torres  Vedras,  Fiientes  d'Onoro     i 


J/ 


but  the  garrison  escaped  through  a  most  skilful 
and  brilliant  feat  of  arms  ;  the  fortress  was  partially 
blown  up  and  was  not  taken.  Massena  was  erelong 
superseded  by  Napoleon,  an  unjust,  nay,  a  cruel 
sentence;  Marmont,  a  very  inferior  man,  was  placed 
in  his  stead.  The  veteran  was  never  at  the  head 
of  an  army  again ;  he  was  wanting  to  his  master 
when  the  days  of  fatal  disasters  came ;  but  history 
has  not  forgotten  Zurich  and  Genoa.  In  the  cam- 
paign in  Portugal  he  made  a  few  mistakes  ;  his  health 
was  perhaps  in  some  degree  impaired,  but  he  gave 
proof  of  his  great  qualities  in  war;  his  discomfiture 
was  partly  due  to  the  misconduct  of  his  colleagues, 
mainly  to  his  having  been  committed  to  an  enter- 
prise in  utter  ignorance  of  the  most  important  facts 
of  the  case,  and  with  wholly  inadequate  forces.  Mis- 
takes, too,  may  be  laid  to  Wellington's  charge:  he 
ought  not  to  have  neglected  the  pass  of  Boyalva ;  he 
may  have  been  rather  slow  in  pressing  his  enemy's  re- 
treat ;  it  is  difficult  to  suppose  that  his  position  at 
Fuentes  d'Onoro  was  chosen  by  himself.  But  these 
are  only  spots  on  the  sun ;  they  disappear  in  the 
splendour  of  his  designs  for  the  defence  of  Portugal; 
in  the  construction  of  the  invincible  lines  ;  in  the  ad- 
mirable arrangement  of  a  magnificent  campaign.  He 
seized  the  true  decisive  points  on  the  theatre  of  the 
war ;  made  Portugal  a  fortress  fronted  by  impregna- 
ble works  and  garrisoned  by  a  powerful  army,  which 
defied  the  efforts  of  the  best  of  the  Imperial  mar- 
shals ;  he  completely,  above  all  secretly,  carried  out 
his  purpose,  in  spite  of  misgiving  at  home  and  mur- 
murs in    his   own  camp;   and,  perceiving  fully  and 


1 38  Wcllingiou 

clearly  the  faults  of  his  enemy,  he  never  hesitated, 
but  brought  to  a  triumphant  issue  a  defence  which 
astounded  soldiers  and  statesmen  throughout  the 
civilised  world.  A  limit  had  now  been  placed  on 
Napoleon's  conquests;  a  French  army  never  entered 
Portugal  again  ;  Spain  was  thenceforward  to  be  the 
theatre  of  the  Peninsular  War.  No  impartial  mind 
can  doubt  but  that  in  this  contest  the  British  General 
eclipsed  and  defeated  Napoleon  :  not  that  he  was  the 
equal  in  war  of  the  modern  Hannibal,  but  that  he 
conducted  his  operations  with  admirable  skill  and  re- 
source on  the  spot  while  the  Emperor,  by  directing 
them  from  an  immense  distance,  made  a  whole  series 
of  palpable  mistakes,  which  inevitably  led  to  por- 
tentous failures ;  in  fact  seemed  to  be,  in  more  than 
one  instance,  like  the  blind  leading  the  blind.  Wel- 
lington, too,  owed  something  to  the  disputes  of  the 
French  commanders ;  but  this  was  not  the  main 
cause  of  what  happened  in  the  campaign  of  1810- 
181 1,  decidedly  the  finest  exhibition  of  his  superi- 
ority in  war. 


CHAPTER    VI 

CIUDAD    RODRIGO,    BADAJOZ,    SALAMANCA, 
BURGOS 


Wellington's  defence  of  Portugal  again  stirs  opinion  on  the  Conti- 
nent against  Napoleon — Discontent  in  France,  especially  with 
the  Peninsular  War — Policy  of  Napoleon — Weakness  of  the 
position  of  the  French  in  Spain  — Joseph  resigns  his  crown — 
Napoleon,  intent  on  war  with  Russia,  menaces  the  Continent, 
and  tries  to  restore  the  situation  in  the  Peninsula,  to  little  pur- 
pose— The  Empire  apparently  at  its  height  in  the  eyes  of  most 
men — Distress  in  England — Confidence  of  Wellington — State  of 
the  armies  in  the  Peninsula — First  siege  of  Badajoz — Battle  of 
.  Albuera — Second  siege  of  Badajoz — It  is  raised — Junction  of 
Soult  and  Marmont — Wellington  on  the  Caya — The  marshals 
separate — Wellington  purposes  to  take  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and 
Badajoz — His  preparations — He  is  in  danger  at  El  Bodon — 
Progress  of  the  French  army  in  the  East — Siege  and  fall  of 
Tarragona — Suchet  at  Valencia — Napoleon  directs  a  large  part 
of  his  forces  to  the  East — Arroyo  Molinos — Wellini^ton  takes 
Ciudad  Rodrigo — Reduction  of  the  French  armies  in  Spain — 
Third  siege  of  Badajoz — The  place  taken  after  a  desperate 
resistance — Wellington  invades  Spain — Operations  of  Marmont 
— Wellington  outmanceuvred — Great  victory  of  Wellington  at 
Salamanca  — Fine  retreat  of  Clausel — Wellington  occupies  Mad- 
rid—  He  besieges  Burgos  and  fails — Soult  forced  to  evacuate 
Andalusia — Wellington  retreats  from  Burgos — He  is  threatened 
by  the  united  French  armies,  but  makes  good  his  way  to  Ciudad 
Rodrigo. 

THE  successful  defence  of  Portugal  in   1810-11 
sent    again    a   thrill  through    the    submissive 
Continent.     Massena  had   recoiled   from   the 
lines    of    Torres     Vedras ;    had  been    compelled  to 
make    a    disastrous    retreat ;    had    brought  back   to 

139 


1 40  Wellington 

Spain  only  the  wreck  of  an  army.  The  opera- 
tions of  Wellington  in  war  began  to  be  studied, 
as  the  operations  of  Napoleon  had  been  studied 
before ;  the  importance  of  wasting  a  country,  and 
of  a  great  material  obstacle  in  checking  French 
invasion  and  conquest,  had  been  fully  perceived. 
The  overthrow  of  Massena  and  the  means  by  which 
it  had  been  effected  encouraged  the  Czar  to  take 
a  bolder  attitude ;  he  increased  his  preparations  to 
resist  his  late  ally,  and  moved  part  of  his  armies 
from  the  Danubian  provinces ;  Russia  could  assur- 
edly make  as  good  a  stand  as  Portugal.  The  Aus- 
trian Court,  directed  by  Metternich  and  in  some 
measure  bound  by  the  recent  marriage  alliance, 
remained  openly  on  good  terms  with  the  French 
Emperor,  though  the  Austrian  aristocracy  was,  as 
always,  hostile  ;  but  Germany  was  stirred  again  with  a 
patriotic  movement,  unchecked  by  vassals  of  the  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine,  especially  manifest  in  down- 
trodden Prussia.  The  regular  army  of  that  Power 
had,  at  Napoleon's  bidding,  been  reduced  to  an  in- 
significant force ;  but  a  man  of  genius,  Scharnhorst, 
had  continued  to  increase  its  strength  fourfold  by 
passing  recruits  through  its  ranks  in  rapid  succession ; 
it  was  now  burning  to  avenge  Jena ;  one  of  its  chiefs, 
Blucher,  though  only  a  rude  soldier,  had,  with  insight 
quickened  by  hatred,  seen,  as  Wellington  with  the 
eyes  of  wisdom  had  seen,  that  the  stability  of  the 
French  Empire — a  defiance  to  European  history — 
was  not  assured,  and  might  not  be  permanent. 
Meantime,  the  excesses  of  the  Continental  System 
were  provoking  indignation,  ever  on   the  increase ; 


k_ 


laS  JLUiTUL  iilMRY  FILLEO  THK  fi'OJU^. 


BLUCHER. 
(From  an  old  engraving.) 


Ciudad  Rodrigo  141 

this  was  much  aggravated  by  devices  of  a  fraudulent 
kind,  employed  to  make  it  less  onerous  to  France 
and  to  Napoleon's  policy.  The  quarrel,  too,  with 
the  Pope  had  been  embittered  ;  Pius  VII.  had  ex- 
communicated his  Imperial  tyrant,  and  had  indi- 
rectly challenged  his  temporal  power  by  refusing  to 
institute  French  bishops ;  the  Emperor  had  hastily 
convened  an  episcopal  council,  and  this  had  even 
openly  sympathised  with  the  imprisoned  Pontiff. 
And  in  France  herself  there  were  signs  of  weakness 
and  discontent  which  the  most  despotic  of  Gov- 
ernments could  not  conceal  or  suppress.  England, 
supreme  at  sea,  had  destroyed  French  maritime 
commerce ;  grass  grew  in  the  streets  of  Bordeaux 
and  Marseilles  ;  several  industries  of  importance  were 
in  decay,  and  the  Continental  System  had  stimu- 
lated French  production  in  some  directions  to  such 
a  dangerous  extent  that  this  had  led  to  widespread 
bankruptcy  and  distress.  France,  too,  was  sick  of 
war,  and  especially  of  the  war  with  Spain,  with  its 
reverses  and  its  devouring  waste ;  a  cry  had  gone 
forth  that  "  our  youth  were  being  sent  to  the  sham- 
bles "  ;  at  this  very  time  fifty  or  sixty  thousand 
conscripts  had  eluded  the  summons  to  the  Imperial 
eagles,  and  were  being  hunted  down,  as  malefactors, 
from  Brittany  to  Provence.  Napoleon  had  ceased 
to  be  the  idol  of  a  few  years  before  ;  it  was  signifi- 
cant that  the  birth  of  the  young  King  of  Rome  made 
little  or  no  impression  on  the  national  mJnd. 

Symptoms  of  decline  that  might  ultimately  lead  to 
its  fall  were  thus  showing  themselves  in  the  colossal 
Empire,  which  was  still  dominant  in  three-fourths  of 


142  Wellington 

the  Continent.  These  were  now  strikingly  apparent 
on  the  theatre  of  events,  where  Napoleon  had  hoped 
to  find  an  easy  conquest.  It  was  not  only  that  a 
comparatively  small  army,  directed  by  a  chief  whose 
powers  had  become  manifest,  had  repeatedly  defeated 
the  Imperial  legions  and  had  made  the  Iberian  Pen- 
insula a  kind  of  place  of  arms  of  the  highest  ad- 
vantage to  England  in  her  European  contest.  It 
was  not  only  that  the  resources  of  the  French  Empire 
were  heavily  taxed  to  keep  up  the  war  in  Portugal 
and  Spain  :  more  than  500,000  invaders  had  crossed 
the  Pyrenees  ;  of  these  fully  150,000  had  disappeared  ; 
nearly  400,000  were  required  to  keep  up  the  struggle, 
and  yet  the  prospects  of  success  seemed  every  year 
darkening.  Nor  was  it  only  that  the  Portuguese 
levies  had  been  gradually  formed  into  a  real  army 
growing  in  numbers  and  becoming  very  efficient  in 
the  field ;  that  the  universal  Spanish  rising  had 
proved  impossible  to  put  down,  and  was  wasting 
away  the  hosts  of  the  enemy;  that  the  remains  of 
the  Spanish  armies,  still  of  little  value  in  the  field, 
were  being  reorganised  in  all  parts  of  the  country, 
and  were  becoming  a  force  that  could  not  be  de- 
spised ;  that  Spain  had  acquired  a  kind  of  regular 
government  which,  though  presumptuous,  revolu- 
tionary, often  unwise,  and  notably  jealous  of  Eng- 
land, its  true  support,  nevertheless  represented  the 
united  Spanish  people.  The  usurping  authority 
Napoleon  had  set  up  in  Spain  had  lost  any  influence 
it  might  have  acquired,  and  seemed  at  this  juncture 
on  the  verge  of  extinction.  The  Emperor  had  pro- 
mised to  make  Joseph  a  national  sovereign,  ruling 


Ciudad  Rodrigo  143 

Spain  in  independence  of  France;  but  Spain  had 
been  treated  as  the  mere  spoil  of  conquest ;  her  ter- 
ritory had  been  parcelled  out  among  French  mar- 
shals, who  preyed  on  it  to  support  their  armies,  or 
wasted  it  to  maintain  licence  and  rapine ;  her  re- 
sources had  been  employed  to  pay  for  the  war ;  it 
had  openly,  been  avowed  that  she  was  to  be  dismem- 
bered and  to  be  deprived  of  her  provinces  north 
of  the  Ebro.  The  Government  of  Joseph  had  been 
completely  set  at  naught ;  he  vegetated  at  Madrid 
with  an  empty  treasury,  surrounded  by  a  mock 
Court  in  distress,  often  affronted  by  Napoleon's  lieu- 
tenants, in  fact,  a  scarecrow  of  royalty,  not  a  king; 
all  this  had  exposed  him  to  general  and  profound 
contempt,  while  his  brother's  arbitrary  and  iniquitous 
conduct  in  Spain,  his  despotism,  his  exactions,  above 
all,  his  threat  to  annex  a  great  part  of  the  mon- 
archy to  France,  had  stimulated  the  national  rising 
to  the  highest  pitch,  and  had  made  all  hopes  of  con- 
ciliation and  peace  vanish.  Joseph  declared  his  po- 
sition had  become  impossible  to  endure;  he  went  to 
Paris  and  gave  up  the  uneasy  crown  of  Spain  about 
the  time  when  Fuentes  d'Onoro  had  been  fought. 
The  new  dynasty  which  Napoleon  had  set  up  beyond 
the  Pyrenees  had  effaced  itself ;  the  symbol  of  his 
power  had  suddenly  disappeared,  and  this  at  the 
moment  when  his  armies  had  suffered  a  terrible 
reverse ;  when  his  lieutenants  in  Spain  were  ex- 
asperated by  defeat,  and  were  more  than  ever  di- 
vided by  jealousy  and  mutual  ill-will.' 

'  Long  before   this  time    Wellington    had    perceived  the    growing 
dissension  between  Napuleon  and  Josei)h.     lie  wrote  thus  in  June, 


1 44  Wellijigton 

Napoleon,  still  confident  in  his  genius  and  his 
sword,  had  little  or  no  remedy  but  military  force  to 
apply  to  this  threatening  position  of  affairs.  He  was 
so  indignant  with  Alexander  that  he  thought  for  a 
moment  of  invading  Russia  before  the  Czar's  prepar- 
ations had  been  made  ;  but  he  soon  abandoned  this 
premature  design  ;  he  spent  the  later  months  of  i8i  i 
and  the  months  that  followed  in  arranging  for  his 
attack  on  the  Empire  of  the  East,  the  difficulties  of 
which  he  had  completely  fathomed.  Nor  did  he 
neglect  any  means  of  assuring  success  ;  he  dangled 
the  Illyrian  provinces  before  Austria  as  a  possible 
reward  in  the  contest  at  hand ;  he  peremptorily 
warned  Prussia  that,  should  she  prove  false,  she 
would  be  blotted  out  from  the  map  of  Europe ;  he 
insisted  on  the  contingents  of  the  Confederation  of 
the  Rhine  being  ready  ;  he  summoned  a  great  army 
across  the  Alps  from  Naples  and  Italy.  For  the 
present  he  temporised  with  Pius  VII.,  having  wrung 
from  him  the  chief  concessions  he  wanted ;  and 
though  he  imprisoned  two  or  three  recalcitrant  bish- 
ops, he  did  not  pit  the  Empire  against  the  Church, 
always  more  afraid  of  moral  than  of  material  power, 
as  was  manifest  in  several  passages  of  his  career.  As 
for  France,  he  employed  expedients,  but  to  no  great 
purpose,  to  mitigate  her  commercial  distress ;  but  he 


1810:  "I  think  there  is  something  discordant  in  all  the  French 
arrangements  in  Spain.  Joseph  divides  his  kingdom  into  prefect- 
ures, while  Napoleon  parcels  it  out  into  governments  ;  Joseph  makes 
a  great  military  expedition  into  the  south  of  Spain  and  undertakes 
the  siege  of  Cadiz,  while  Napoleon  places  all  the  troops  and  half  the 
kingdom  under  the  command  of  Massena." — Selection,  367. 


Ciudad  Rodrigo  145 

would  not  in  any  sense  relax  the  Continental  System  ; 
and,  reckless  of  the  murmurs  heard  far  and  near, 
he  left  nothing  undone  to  pursue  his  "  refractory 
conscripts,"  and  he  pushed  the  conscription  to  its 
extreme  limits ;  at  this  time  there  were  one  million 
men  under  the  Imperial  eagles,  composed,  however, 
of  many  races  and  tongues.  At  this  -juncture  he 
once  more  devoted  much  attention  to  the  Iberian 
Peninsula ;  he  did  not  wish  to  leave  a  destructive 
conflict  in  his  rear,  while  he  was  about  to  lead  the 
armed  hosts  of  the  West  beyond  the  Niemen.  It  ap- 
pears certain  that  for  some  weeks  he  contemplated 
taking  the  field  in  person  in  Spain  and  Portugal ;  this 
can  be  gathered  from  parts  of  his  correspondence ; 
the  rumour  was  so  prevalent  that  Wellington 
strengthened  the  lines,  and  made  ready  again  to  de- 
fend Lisbon.  But  the  Emperor  gave  up  a  half- 
formed  purpose,  which  might  have  had  momentous 
results,  and,  bent  on  his  crusade  against  Russia,  he 
treated  the  Peninsula  as  but  a  secondary  object.  He 
increased,  however,  at  least  for  a  time,  the  forces  he 
had  in  Spain  and  on  the  Portuguese  frontier;  these 
were  raised  to  nearly  four  hundred  thousand  men, 
but  they  were  largely  troops  of  not  the  best  quality. 
As  to  the  dispositions  to  be  made  of  these  vast 
arrays,  the  armies  in  Spain  were  to  be  kept  to  their 
strength,  and  the  provinces  they  occupied  were  to  be 
held;  but  Portugal  was  not  to  be  invaded  again; 
the  fate  of  Massena  had  been  a  significant  lesson. 
Napoleon,  however,  appears  to  have  been  convinced 
that  the  Peninsula  could  still  be  subdued  when  he 
had  brought  his  enterprise  in  Russia  to  a  triumphant 


146  Wellingioii 

close;  meanwhile  he  believed  that,  even  in  181 1, 
Suchet  and  Soult  could  crush  all  resistance  in  the 
South,  and  that  Marmont  and  the  army  in  the  North 
had  nothing  to  fear  from  Wellington.  At  the  same 
time  he  persuaded  Joseph  to  play  the  part  of  a  pup- 
pet king  again,  and  to  return  in  idle  state  to  Madrid  ; 
he  replenished,  to  a  certain  extent,  his  treasury  ;  he 
he  gave  him  the  nominal  command  of  all  the  French 
armies  in  Spain.  But  he  refused  to  say  a  word  as 
to  the  threatened  dismemberment,  he  did  not  really 
limit  the  power  of  his  rapacious  lieutenants  ;  he  could 
not  put  a  stop  to  their  animosities  and  ruinous  dis- 
cords. These  half  measures  only  filmed  over  the 
ulcerous  part ;  they  left  affairs  in  Spain  hardly  im- 
proved or  changed. 

To  ordinary  observers,  nevertheless,  nay,  to  the 
great  majority  of  soldiers  and  statesmen,  the  suprem- 
acy and  the  power  of  Napoleon  seemed,  at  this  junc- 
ture, as  overwhelming  as  ever.  He  was  master  of  the 
Continent,  except  in  Spain  and  Portugal ;  war  with 
Russia  had  not  yet  been  declared  ;  the  belief  was 
general  that  the  Czar  w^ould  not  resist,  or  that  re- 
sistance would  end  in  another  Friedland.  It  was  as- 
sumed, too,  as  the  event  was  to  show,  that  Germany 
and  Italy  would  bow  to  the  will  of  their  lord,  and 
would  march  with  his  eagles  beyond  the  Niemen  ; 
and  how  could  a  half  barbarian  Empire  cope  with 
the  armed  strength  of  three-fourths  of  the  European 
world  ?  England  remained  the  only  great  Power  at 
war  with  Napoleon  ;  and  though  she  was  still  om- 
nipotent at  sea,  and  had  conducted  a  successful 
campaign  in  Portugal,  it  seemed  in  the  highest  de- 


Ciudad  Rodrigo  147 

gree  unlikely  that  she  could  permanently  shake  the 
structure  of  the  French  Empire.  And  England,  at 
this  time,  had  gravetroubles  of  herown  ;  shevvasbeing 
drawn  into  a  quarrel  with  the  United  States ;  her  in- 
ternal condition  had  become  menacing  ;millionsofher 
poor  population  were  suffering  from  distress,  showing 
itself  too  often  in  riotous  discontent ;  the  pressure  of 
taxationonall  classes  was  intense.  Theglory  of  Torres 
Vedras  no  doubt  had  stirred  the  national  mind:  the 
Ministry  maintained  a  bold  attitude  ;  the  cavillings 
of  the  Opposition  had  ceased  ;  the  army  in  the  Penin- 
sula was  being  strengthened  ;  things  were  very  dif- 
ferent from  what  they  had  been  when  a  descent  on 
Portugal  was  deemed  a  forlorn  hope.  But  very  few 
of  the  leading  men  of  England  believed  that  the 
Peninsular  War  could  be  as  ruinous  to  Napoleon  as 
it  was  to  be  ;  Wellington  probably  was  the  only  real 
exception.  His  defence  of  Portugal  had  naturally 
increased  his  confidence;  his  profound  calculations 
had  been  realised  ;  he  was  now  convinced  that  the 
war  could  be  carried  on  with  good  hope  in  Spain, 
and  that  it  might  be  destructive  of  what  he  described 
as  "the  fraudulent  tyranny"  which  kept  down  the 
Continent.  The  fears,  too,  of  his  subordinates 
had  become  things  of  the  past ;  his  lieutenants  and 
officers  recognised  the  capacity  of  their  chief;  his 
army,  though  largely  composed  of  Portuguese,  had 
become  a  most  formidable  and  efficient  instrument 
of  war.  And  yet  the  inequality  of  his  forces  ap- 
peared prodigious  when  compared  to  those  which 
could  be  arrayed  against  him.  English  descents  on 
the  coast  of  Spain  could,  no  doubt,  assist  him  ;  he 


1 48  Wellington 

expected  that  a  British  contingent  from  Sicily  would 
come  to  his  aid  ;  the  guerrillas  held  in  check  thou- 
sands of  the  best  troops  of  France,  and  made  their 
communications  everywhere  insecure ;  the  Spanish 
armies  were  reappearing  in  the  field  ;  the  moral,  even 
the  material,  power  of  the  Spanish  rising  was  great. 
But  probably,  under  existing  conditions,  he  could 
not  oppose  more  than  one  hundred  and  sixty  thou- 
sand men,  including  even  his  Spanish  allies  in  the 
field,  to  nearly  four  hundred  thousand  of  those  of 
the  enemy:  the  seeming  disproportion  of  strength 
was  thus  enormous :  it  would  have  appalled  every 
other  commander  who  had  tried  to  cope  with  Na- 
poleon. 

I  may  glance  at  the  positions  and  the  approximate 
strength  of  the  belligerent  armies  at  this  conjuncture. 
Bessiferes,  soon  to  be  replaced  by  Dorsenne,  was 
in  command  of  the  French  army  of  the  North ; 
this  was  composed  of  50,000  or  60,000  troops ;  and, 
ever  beset  by  bands  of  guerrillas,  was  guarding  the 
communications  between  France  and  Madrid,  a  task 
of  difficulty,  that  usually  kept  it  on  this  part  of  the 
theatre  of  the  war.  Marmont  was  at  Salamanca  re- 
organising Massena's  army  ;  he  had  probably  50,000 
soldiers,  on  paper,  and  many  of  these  were  of  ex- 
cellent quality,  but  the  army  was  still  suffering  from 
the  effects  of  the  campaign  in  Portugal.  Joseph  was 
the  nominal  chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Centre,  as  it 
was  called  ;  this  was  from  20,000  to  30,000  strong ; 
it  was  spread  around  Madrid  and  in  the  valley  of  the 
upper  Tagus.  In  the  East,  Suchet  was  in  command 
in  Aragon  :  he  had  been  given  the  chief  part  of  Mac- 


Ciudad  Rodrigo  149 

donald's  forces,  which  had  been  employed  against 
the  fierce  Catalans  ;  he  had  administered  his  province 
with  justice  and  care — in  fact,  he  was  the  least  rapa- 
cious of  the  French  generals:  he  had  taken  Lerida, 
Tortosa,  and  other  strongholds  ;  he  had  a  fine  army 
of  perhaps  70,000  men,  of  whom  some  50,000  could 
appear  in  the  field  ;  he  had  been  directed  to  be- 
siege and  capture  Tarragona,  the  greatest  of  the  Cata- 
lonian  fortresses,  to  advance  southwards  to  subdue 
Valencia,  and  if  possible  to  join  hands  with  Soult. 
That  Marshal  was  in  Andalusia  at  the  head  of  an 
army  said  to  be  80,000  strong,  but  really  hardly 
more  than  60,000 ;  part  of  these  troops  was  em- 
ployed in  the  siege  of  Cadiz,  which  every  week  was 
proving  to  be  all  but  hopeless;  the  remaining  parts 
were  scattered  throughout  the  province,  keeping  the 
population  and  the  conquered  cities  down,  or  were 
in  Estremadura  observing  Badajoz,  the  only  trophy 
of  the  Campaign  of  18 10.  The  French  armies  were 
thus  spread  over  the  whole  of  Spain,  everywhere  as- 
sailed by  the  national  rising,  and  here  and  there  by 
the  reviving  Spanish  armies;  they  were  under  chiefs 
who  would  seldom  act  cordially  together ;  thousands 
of  the  soldiers  were  mere  recruits,  and  as  the  cam- 
paign at  hand  was  to  prove,  they  had  lost  much  of 
their  wonted  confidence,  and  had  learnt  what  was 
the  power  of  the  British  infantry.  On  the  opposite 
side  Wellington  probably  disposed  of  some  80,000 
men  along  the  Portuguese  frontier;  he  had,  too,  a 
considerable  reserve ;  he  held  a  central  position  be- 
tween divided  and  distant  enemies,  and  he  had  a  for- 
midable and  victorious  army,  moved  to  a  man  by 


1 50  Wellington 

his  single  will.  It  is  unnecessary  to  add  that  he  de- 
rived enormous  support  from  the  guerrillas  and  the 
national  rising,  from  the  Spanish  armies  which,  un- 
der Blake,  Ballasteros,  and  other  chiefs,  were  making 
their  presence  felt,  especially  in  the  South  and  the 
East,  and  from  the  descents  of  British  squadrons  on 
the  coasts  of  Spain,  and,  as  I  have  said,  he  hoped  to 
see  a  British  force  from  Sicily  appear  to  give  him 
aid. 

Hill  and  Beresford  had,  we  have  seen,  been  de- 
tached before  Fuentes  d'Onoro  to  lay  siege  to 
Badajoz.  Hill  had  the  covering  army  a  few  marches 
distant :  the  siege  fell  to  the  share  of  Beresford,  who 
expected  the  support  of  one  of  the  Spanish  armies. 
The  attack,  however,  had  hardly  begun,  when  Soult 
marched  from  Seville  to  the  relief  of  the  fortress  at 
the  head  of  about  24,000  good  troops :  the  Marshal 
had  his  eyes  always  fixed  on  his  late  conquest.  Well- 
ington, who,  I  have  said,  had  left  the  main  army 
for  Estremadura,  was  not  on  the  scene;  Beresford 
raised  the  siege  on  the  12th  and  13th  of  March,  and 
advanced  to  Albuera,  where  he  was  joined  by  Blake 
and  Castanos,  with  from  15,000  to  20,000  Spaniards, 
to  offer  battle  to  the  enemy  at  hand.  The  allied 
army  was  perhaps  35,000  strong;  but  the  British  in- 
fantry did  not  exceed  7000  men  ;  the  Portuguese  were 
not  more  than  8000 ;  the  French  army  was  very  su- 
perior in  really  effective  strength.  These  operations 
led  to  the  battle  of  Albuera,  in  itself  not  of  supreme 
importance,  but  perhaps  the  most  desperately  con- 

'  The  figures  I  have  above  given  are,  of  course,  largely  conjectural ; 
but  I  have  taken  pains  to  make  them  as  accurate  as  possible. 


CO 

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CM 

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t- 

< 

Badajoz  151 

tested  of  the  Peninsular  War.  The  French  Marshal 
on  the  morning  of  the  i6th  of  March,  181 1,  flung  his 
left  wing  against  Beresford's  right  and  endeavoured 
to  seize  an  eminence  which  was  the  key  of  the  whole 
position  ;  the  Spaniards  occupied  this  part  of  the 
line  ;  but  though  they  made  for  a  time  a  brave  re- 
sistance, their  ill-disciplined  masses  could  not  man- 
oeuvre ;  when  directed  to  make  a  change  of  front 
in  retreat,  they  lost  all  order,  and  fell  into  utter  con- 
fusion. The  French  were  now  masters  of  the  de- 
cisive point :  Soult  collected  his  reserves  to  make 
victory  certain,  but  Beresford  called  on  his  British 
infantry,  and  this  nobly  restored  the  conflict,  though 
pressed  by  Ifirgely  superior  numbers.  A  disaster, 
however,  soon  occurred  which  would  have  been  fatal 
to  less  stubborn  and  confident  soldiers.  Under  the 
cover  of  a  tempest  of  rain  which  darkened  the  air,  a 
large  body  of  French  cavalry  fell  suddenly  on  the 
rear  of  the  footmen  ;  two  regiments  were  well-nigh 
cut  to  pieces.  The  heroic  defenders  still  clung  to 
the  ground  ;  Beresford  had  sufficient  time  to  bring  up 
more  reserves,  especially  a  Portuguese  contingent ; 
the  battle  raged  furiousl)^  for  some  hours,  each  side 
fighting  with  unflinching  courage,  the  murderous 
British  musketry  making  havoc  of  the  dense  hostile 
columns.  Fortune,  nevertheless,  seemed  inclining  to 
Soult,  and  Beresford,  it  is  said,  was  about  to  retreat, 
when  a  final  effort  —  the  credit  was  mainly  due  to 
Hardinge,  then  a  young  colonel,  afterwards  a  great 
chief  in  India  —  turned  the  balance  in  which  victory 
had  been  trembling.  A  terrible  onslaught  of  the 
last  British  reserve  was  directed  on  the  flank  of  the 


1 5  2  Wellington 

advancing  French:  a  great  column  was  hurled  down 
the  height ;  the  Marshal  gave  up  the  fiery  trial.'  It 
has  been  said,  however,  —  and  this  was  one  of  his 
shortcomings  in  war,  —  that  had  he  boldly  fallen 
on,  on  the  following  day,  Beresford  could  not  have 
avoided  a  defeat. 

Villars  fought  Malplaquet  to  relieve  Mons ;  Soult 
fought  Albuera  to  relieve  Badajoz.  Both  generals 
retreated  after  these  battles  ;  both,  therefore,  virtu- 
ally confessed  defeat,  if  in  both  instances  victory 
was  all  but  doubtful ;  indeed,  Malplaquet  was  truly  a 
Pyrrhic  victory.  The  carnage  at  Albuera  was  pro- 
digious, about  one  in  four  of  the  troops  engaged,  a 
proportion  to  which  very  few  parallels  can  be  found. 
Soult  fell  back  a  few  marches  on  Llerena,  seeking 
an  opportunity  to  strike  again  ;  Wellington,  hav- 
ing left  Estremadura  to  fight  Fuentes  d'Onoro,  re- 
turned to  Badajoz  in  May  and  renewed  the  siege. 
The  place  was  invested  between  the  25th  and  the 
29th  ;  the  covering  army  was  commanded  by  Hill ; 
Wellington  disposed  of  perhaps  43,000  men,  but  of 
these  not  28,000  were  British  soldiers  ;  the  besieging 
force  was  some  10,000  strong.  I  shall  afterwards 
briefly  describe  Badajoz,  when  it  became  the  scene  of 


'  Napier's  description  of  this  famous  charge  is  well  known.  This 
was  Wellington's  brief  account  of  the  battle  :  "  The  Spanish  troops, 
I  understand,  behaved  admirably  .  .  .  but  they  were  quite  im- 
movable ;  and  this  is  the  great  cause  of  our  losses.  After  they  had 
lost  their  position,  .  .  .  the  British  troops  were  the  next  and 
they  were  brought  up,  and  must  always  be  brought  up  in  these 
cases :  and  they  suffered  accordingly  .  .  .  we  should  have 
gained  a  complete  victory  if  the  Spaniards  could  have  manoeuvred, 
but  unfortunately  they  cannot." — Selection,  pp.  482-483. 


Badajoz  153 

one  of  the  most  terrible  conflicts  of  which  history  has 
left  a  record ;  enough  here  to  say  that  the  fortress  rose 
from  the  southern  bank  of  the  Guadiana;  was  sur- 
rounded by  a  wall,  with  its  bastions,  and  by  external 
works,  and  was  defended  by  a  garrison  of  some  five 
thousand  men,  under  Philippon,  a  most  skilful  and 
determined  officer.  The  most  vulnerable  part  of  the 
place  was  the  ancient  castle,  near  the  river,  and  on 
the  north-eastern  front ;  but  this  was  protected  by  the 
fortified  work  of  Christoval,  Avhich  was  held  to  be 
the  principal  point  for  the  attack.  Fire  opened  on 
the  fortress  on  the  2nd  of  June,  and  was  maintained 
for  three  or  four  days;  but  the  siege  guns  of  the 
assailants  brought  up  from  Elvas  were  old  and  bad, 
and  without  proper  shot, — some  of  the  guns  were  cast 
in  the  reign  of  Philip  11., — the  trenching  and  other 
tools  were  of  inferior  quality.  Two  breaches,  how- 
ever, had  been  made  in  Christoval  by  the  6th,  but 
the  garrison  had  retrenched  these  ;  two  daring  as- 
saults were  successfully  repulsed.  Meantime  a  most 
formidable  relieving  force  was  being  assembled  to 
save  the  beleaguered  fortress.  Marmont  had  broken 
up  from  Salamanca,  had  crossed  the  Tagus,  and  was 
on  the  march  to  join  hands  with  Soult ;  Soult,  sup- 
ported by  D'Erlon,  was  on  the  way  from  Llerena;  a 
great  army  would  be  before  Badajoz  in  a  few  days. 
Wellington  raised  the  siege  on  the  12th  of  June; 
the  marshals  had  entered  Badajoz  on  the  19th. 
Philippon  and  his  brave  garrison  received  the  meed 
of  praise  they  deserved. 

The  British  General  now  took  a  strong  defensive 
position  on  the  Caya,  a  feeder  of  the  Guadiana,  about 


154  Wellington 

midway  between  Badajoz  and  Elvas,  and  made  ready- 
to  accept  battle.  Everything  seemed  to  portend 
a  great  trial  of  strength ;  Wellington  had  hardly 
more  than  42,000  men  ;  Marmont  and  Soult  dis- 
posed of  more  than  60,000.  The  chances  certainly 
were  on  the  side  of  the  marshals ;  but,  as  had 
so  often  been  the  case  before,  the  French  com- 
manders disagreed  with  each  other;  Marmont  thor- 
oughly disliked  and  distrusted  Soult,'  and,  besides, 
the  memory  of  a  series  of  defeats  hung  heavily 
on  the  minds  of  the  French  soldiery.  The  hostile 
armies  confronted  each  other  for  more  than  a  fort- 
night ;  the  marshals  drew  off  without  firing  a  shot ; 
but  it  does  not  follow,  as  French  writers  have  urged, 
that  they  must  have  gained  a  decisive  victory.  Mar- 
mont now  fell  back  into  the  valley  of  the  Tagus, 
spreading  his  army  over  a  vast  space  and  connecting 
it  with  Salamanca,  his  headquarters  ;  but  he  repaired 
the  bridge  across  the  river  at  Almaraz,  and  fortified 
this  with  skill  and  care,  in  order  to  keep  up  his  com- 
munications with  Soult.  On  his  side,  Soult,  leaving 
D'Erlon  with  a  detachment  not  far  from  Badajoz,  set 
off  for  Andalusia  to  maintain  his  hold  on  the  pro- 
vinces; he  was  occupied  for  some  time  with  the  Span- 
ish armies,  which  caused  him  a  great  deal  of  trouble 
and  loss  ;  he  even  stretched  a  hand  towards  Suchet  in 
the  East.  Wellington,  therefore,  was  unmolested  and 
free  to  act  ;  he  marched  northwards  with  the  mass  of 
his  forces.  Hill  being  left  in  Estremadura  to  observe 
Marmont;    his    object    was,  if   possible,  to    capture 


'  See  Marmont,  Mdmoires,  pp.  4,  46,  47. 


Badajoz 


I 


00 


Ciudad  Rodrigo,  taken  by  Massena  the  year  before. 
The  fortress,  he  had  been  informed,  was  without 
supplies  ;  he  was  deceived,  however,  by  a  false  report. 
He  confined  himself  to  a  blockade  of  Ciudad  ;  he 
placed  his  troops  in  cantonments  in  the  adjoining 
lands  between  the  Agueda  and  the  Coa;  they  were 
suffering  greatly  from  the  fevers  and  the  diseases  of 
the  tract  around  the  Guadiana.  Things  apparently 
did  not  look  well  for  the  British  chief ;  Fuentes  and 
Albuera  had  cost  him  dear  ;  the  siege  of  Badajoz  had 
been  twice  raised  ;  the  hostile  armies  in  Spain  were 
in  great  strength  ;  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  gov- 
ernments had  been  crossing  him  in  many  ways ; 
murmurs  against  his  "  inaction  "  were  even  heard  in 
England.  Yet  Wellington  retained  his  steadfast 
confidence  ;  he  contemplated  the  situation  with  char- 
acteristic insight ;  he  was  convinced,  from  the  posi- 
tion of  affairs  before  him,  that  he  would  not  only  be 
able  to  defend  Portugal,  but  could  carry  the  war  be- 
yond the  frontier.' 

By  this  time   it  had    become   improbable  in  the 

'  Wellington  wrote  thus  to  Dumouriez  in  July,  1811,  when  his 
prospects  did  not  appear  bright:  "  Je  crois  que  ni  Buonaparte,  ni  le 
monde,  n'ont  compte  sur  les  difficultes  a  subjuguer  la  Peninsula, 
etant  oppose  par  une  bonne  armce  en  Portugal.  It  a  fait  des  efforts 
gigantesques,  dignes  de  sa  reputation,  et  des  forces  dont  il  a  la  dis- 
position; mais  il  n'en  a  pas  fait  assez  encore;  et  je  crois  que  I'ancien 
dictum  de  Henri  Quatre  que  '  quand  on  fait  la  guerre  in  Espagne 
avec  peu  de  monde  on  est  battu,  et  avec  beaucoup  de  monde,  en 
meurt  de  faim,'  se  trouvera  verifie  de  nos  jours;  et  que  Buonaparte 
ne  pourra  jamais  nourrir,  meme  de  la  maniere  Fran9aise  moderne, 
une  armee  assez  grande  pour  faire  la  conquftte  des  Royaumes  de  la 
Peninsule,  si  les  allies  ont  seulement  une  armce  assez  forte  pour 
arreter  ses  progres." — Selection,  p.  501. 


1 56  Wellington 

extreme  that  Napoleon  would  appear  in  person  in 
Spain ;  he  was  engrossed  with  his  preparations  for 
the  war  with  Russia.  The  French  armies  in  the 
Peninsula,  though  still  maintained  at  their  full 
strength,  would  therefore  sooner  or  later  be  more 
or  less  diminished,  they  were  disseminated,  besides, 
over  a  vast  space  ;  for  the  present  they  were  most 
powerful  in  the  south  and  the  east  of  Spain.  In  these 
circumstances  Wellington  believed  that  he  might  find 
an  opportunity  to  pounce  on  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and 
Badajoz,  the  keys  of  the  Spanish  frontier  to  the 
west ;  this  would  give  him  a  favourable  position 
to  invade  Leon  and  Castile,  perhaps  to  strike  the 
enemy's  communications  between  Bayonne  and 
Madrid.  He  had  made  arrangements  to  facilitate 
an  attack  on  both  fortresses  ;  he  had  caused  a  good 
road  to  be  constructed,  which  opened  a  way  into 
Estremadura,  and  thus  brought  him  within  easy  reach 
of  Badajoz,  but  Ciudad  Rodrigo  was  his  immediate 
object ;  he  was  quietly  preparing  to  make  this 
siege.  Taught  probably  by  what  had  occurred  at 
Badajoz,  he  resolved  that  his  guns  should  be  effi- 
cient ;  he  directed  a  siege  train,  which  had  arrived 
from  England,  to  be  sent  from  Lisbon,  as  if  it 
was  meant  for  Cadiz  ;  and  then  with  admirable 
secrecy  and  skill  he  had  had  it  landed  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Douro  and  transported  to  Celorico,  not  far 
from  Ciudad,  where  it  remained  concealed  from  the 
enemy  until  the  proper  moment  had  come.  But 
in  the  meantime  the  British  commander  narrowly 
escaped  a  reverse  which  might  have  been  most  dis- 
astrous.    His  army,  not  more  than  thirty  thousand 


Badajoz  157 

strong, — many  of  his  troops  were  distant  and  smitten 
with  disease, — was  spread  along  the  Agueda,  on  both 
its  banks,  its   leading  divisions  near  Ciudad   Rod- 
rigo,  its  rearward  miles  away,  at  a  place  called  St. 
Payo;    he    had    no   expectation    that    he    could    be 
attacked  in  force.     Dorsenne,  however,  in  the  north, 
and    Marmont    along    the   Tagus,   had    learnt    that 
Ciudad    was    about    to    succumb    to    famine ;    they 
rapidly  assembled  some  sixty  thousand  men,  acting 
well  together,  unlike  most  of  their  colleagues  ;   on 
the  23rd  of  September,  181 1,  they  had  reached  the 
fortress  and  successfully  introduced  a  great  convoy 
of  supplies.     Marmont,  in  supreme  command,  did 
not   think   of   fighting  a  battle,  but  he  wished   to 
ascertain  the  positions  of  the  enemy's  forces.     On 
the  24th   his  troops,  greatly  superior  in   numbers, 
attacked  a  single   division   of  Wellington,  standing 
isolated  on  the  heights  of  El  Bodon.     The  attack 
was  repulsed,  but  the  position  was  turned  and  lost; 
Wellington  drew  his  army  together   in   retreat   on 
Guinaldo  ;  but  he  waited  for  hours  for  Crawford's 
division ;  fourteen    thousand  men  were    for  a  time 
opposed  to  enemies  who  might  have  fallen  on  with 
at  least   forty  thousand  !     "  Wellington,  your  star, 
too,  is   bright,"  Marmont   bitterly  exclaim.ed  when 
he  heard  of  the  grand  opportunity  he  had  let  slip; 
but  the  Marshal's  operations  had  been  tentative  and 
weak.' 

Wellington  was  taken  by  surprise  in  this  instance, 
an  accident  that  will  sometimes  happen  in  war ;  he 

'For  Marmont's  lame  and  impotent  apology  see  M/moires,  iv., 
67-68. 


158  Wellingto7t 

had  not  reckoned  on  the  speedy  junction  of  Dorsenne 
and  Marmont.  Meanwhile  the  French  arms  had 
made  remarkable  progress  in  the  theatre  of  the  war, 
in  Spain  in  the  east.  Suchet,  leaving  forces  be- 
hind in  Aracfon  and  Catalonia  to  maintain  a  hold  on 
the  provinces  he  had  so  well  governed,  marched 
a£iainst  Tarragona,  as  he  had  been  ordered  ;  he  was 
before  the  fortress  in  the  first  days  of  May,  181 1, 
with  an  army  of  about  twenty-four  thousand  men. 
The  place  was  one  of  very  great  importance ;  it  was 
a  point  of  refuge  for  the  Catalan  rising,  an  arsenal 
and  a  depot  of  supplies ;  it  had  the  support  of  a 
British  squadron  and  of  a  British  flotilla,  which  could 
assist  the  garrison  if  attacked.  Its  natural  and  arti- 
ficial strength  was  not  doubtful  ;  it  was  divided  into 
a  lower  town  and  an  upper  town,  each  defended  by 
a  bastioned  enceinte  ;  it  was  unassailable  on  its  sea- 
ward front,  its  northern  and  eastern  points  were  cov- 
ered by  Olivo,  a  fortified  outwork,  its  western  by  a 
deep  stream,  the  Francoli ;  it  contained  an  army  of 
eighteen  thousand  Spaniards, always  formidable  when 
fighting  behind  walls.  The  siege  was  protracted  for 
nearly  two  months,  but  French  science  and  valour 
at  last  triumphed.  Olivo  was  first  taken  after  a 
stern  resistance;  trenches  were  then  opened  beyond 
the  Francoli ;  the  lower  town  was  next  successfully 
stormed  ;  the  upper  was  carried  by  one  of  the  most 
desperate  efforts  that  were  made  in  the  whole  Penin- 
sular War;  the  besieged  were  not  far  from  equal  to 
the  besiegers  in  numbers.  Tarragona  was  given  up 
to  pillage,  as  was  the  unhappy  custom  of  those  days. 
French  writers,  who  have  taken  care  to  dwell  on  the 


Badajoz  159 

excesses  of  British  troops  in  towns  they  had  con- 
quered, must  excuse  us  if  we  remark  that  in  this  in- 
stance, too,  barbarity  and  hcentiousness  were  not  less 
manifest.  Suchet  justly  received  the  staff  of  a  mar- 
shal for  this  brilliant  exploit.  After  placing  his  army 
in  cantonments  during  the  heats  of  summer,  he 
advanced  in  September  into  the  lands  of  Valencia, 
which  Napoleon  had  marked  down  long  before  for 
conquest.  The  Marshal,  making  his  way  along  the 
coast-line,  was  stopped  before  the  walls  of  the  ancient 
Saguntum,  famous  for  the  stand  it  made  against 
Hannibal.  Blake  appeared  with  a  considerable  re- 
lieving force  ;  but  he  was  completely  defeated  and 
the  place  fell.  The  way  into  Valencia  was  now 
open  ;  Suchet  crossed  the  Guadalaviar,  and  by  the 
end  of  November  had  invested  the  capital  of  the 
kingdom  defended  by  Blake  and  a  strong  garrison. 

The  Marshal  had  not  more  than  twenty  thousand 
men  ;  this  force  was  not  sufficient  to  take  the  fort- 
ress. Napoleon,  hundreds  of  miles  away  from  the 
scene  of  events,  saw  in  Valencia  the  decisive  point  to 
be  occupied  at  the  existing  moment.  He  directed 
parts  of  the  armies  of  the  North  and  the  Centre  to 
advance  and  to  reinforce  Suchet ;  even  Marmont  was 
to  despatch  two  divisions  from  the  valley  of  the  Ta- 
gus  to  support  his  colleague.  These  orders  were 
obeyed  more  readily  than  was  usually  the  case  in 
Spain  ;  Valencia  was  surrounded  by  forces  which 
could  not  be  withstood  ;  the  place  fell  in  January, 
1 81 2,  after  a  mere  semblance  of  a  siege  ;  nearly 
twenty  thousand  Spaniards  were  made  prisoners  of 
war.     This  was  a  notable  triumph  for  the  invaders 


1 60  Wellington 


^>■ 


of  Spain ;  but  the  French  armies  had  been  moved 
from  their  positions  to  a  considerable  extent :  Mar- 
mont's  two  divisions  had  overshot  their  mark,  and 
had  actually  marched  to  Alicante,  far  south  of  Val- 
encia. This  dislocation  of  the  French  armies  gave 
Wellington  his  opportunity  to  fall  on  Ciudad  Rod- 
rigo,  though  Napoleon's  dispositions  were  correct  in 
principle  had  they  been  carried  out  rapidly  and  with 
intelligence ;  possibly  anticipating  what  the  British 
chief  might  attempt,  the  Emperor  had  directed  Mar- 
mont  to  move  from  the  valley  of  the  Tagus  into  that 
of  the  Douro,  and  thus  to  be  nearer  the  threatened 
fortress.  Wellington  before  this  time  had  struck  a 
weighty  blow,  of  good  omen  for  the  operations  at 
hand ;  Hill  had  annihilated  one  of  D'Erlon's  divisions 
at  a  place  called  Arroyo  Molihos,  in  Estremadura; 
Girard,  though  a  good  soldier,  had  been  suddenly 
taken  by  surprise.  The  British  chief,  having  brought 
up  his  siege  train  to  the  spot,  appeared  before 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  on  the  I2th  of  January,  1812; 
he  disposed  of  more  than  seventy  thousand  men  ; 
the  garrison  was  not  more  than  eighteen  hundred, 
and  was  commanded  by  an  inexperienced  officer; 
there  was  no  prospect  of  a  relieving  force  ;  this  want 
of  anything  like  adequate  means  of  defence  appears 
to  have  been  mainly  the  fault  of  Dorsenne,  at  the 
head  of  the  Imperial  army  of  the  North.  The  siege 
that  followed  may  be  briefly  passed  over,  but  in  the 


'  Napier  will  not  admit  that  Napoleon  was  in  error  in  sending 
so  large  a  force  to  Suchet  when  before  Valencia.  Thiers  and  other 
French  writers  take  an  opposite  view.  I  do  not  think  that  the  fall 
of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  can  be  largely  attributed  to  this  cause. 


Badajoz  1 6 1 

result  it  was  of  very  great  importance.  Ciudad  was 
an  old  fortress  upon  the  Agueda,  surrounded  by  the 
usual  bastions  and  walls  ;  but  it  was  protected  by 
two  convents,  which  had  been  fortified,  and  by  an 
outwork  on  rising  ground  called  the  Teson,  The 
besiegers,  who  could  spare  almost  any  loss  of  men, 
had  soon  taken  this  work  and  stormed  the  convents; 
they  easily  made  two  breaches  in  the  walls,  which 
had  been  imperfectly  repaired  since  Massena's  siege  ; 
and  though  they  encountered  a  brave  resistance,  the 
place  was  assaulted  by  overwhelming  numbers,  and 
fell  after  a  defence  of  but  ten  days.  The  only  point 
in  the  siege  that  requires  attention  is  that  the  Brit- 
ish engineers  did  not  destroy  the  counterscarp,  a  mis- 
take that  was  soon  to  cost  Wellington  dear.  In  fact, 
though  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras  were  a  model  of 
aft,  the  scientific  arms  in  the  British  service  had 
been  but  little  versed  in  the  attack  of  strong  places.' 
The  losses  of  the  assailants  at  Ciudad  were  great, 
not  less  than  nearly  one  thousand  men  ;  the  brilliant 
and  daring  Crawford  was  among  the  fallen.  Mean- 
while Marmont,  who  had  waited  for  his  divisions  in 
the  east,  was  on  his  way  from  the  valley  of  the 
Tagus  to  that  of  the  Douro,  but  the  fortress  had 
surrendered  before  he  reached  Salamanca.  The  ad- 
vance of  the  French  Marshal  had  been  slow  ;  but  had 
Ciudad  Rodrigo  possessed  a  sufficient  garrison,  it 
might  have  held  out  for  twenty  days,  and  received 
the  support  of  a  relieving  army;  the  speedy  fall 
of  the  place  must  be  mainly  ascribed  to  Dorsenne. 

'  Marlborough  noticed   this  defect  at  the  great  siege  of  Lille  in 
1708. — Coxe,  ii.,  p.  312. 


1 62  Wellin(^ton 


i> 


One  of  the  keys  of  the  Spanish  frontier  had  thus 
been  taken.  Wellington  was  properly  rewarded 
with  an  English  earldom,  and  was  made  a  duke  in 
the  peerage  of  Spain. 

A  portentous  change  was  now  being  made  in  the 
military  power  of  the  invaders  of  the  Peninsula. 
The  war  with  Alexander  had  become  imminent.  As 
Wellington  had  foreseen,  Napoleon  was  compelled 
to  make  considerable  drafts  from  his  armies  in  Spain  ; 
they  were  erelong  reduced  by  fully  sixty  thousand 
men  ;  not  more,  probably,  than  two  hundred  thou- 
sand were  actually  present  under  arms  to  maintain 
the  contest.  The  balance  of  force,  therefore,  which 
a  few  months  before  had  seemed  to  preponderate  so 
enormously  against  the  British  Chief — and  yet  was 
not  so  great  as  it  appeared  to  be,  if  we  bear  in  mind 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case — had  now  been  in  a 
great  measure  redressed  ;  even  the  Ministry  in  Eng- 
land— Lord  Liverpool  was  soon  to  be  its  head,  and 
Castlereagh  was  to  return  to  office — was  looking  for- 
ward hopefully  to  a  successful  issue.  Wellington 
now  stretched  his  hand  to  seize  the  second  key  of 
the  frontier ;  he  resolved  to  lay  siege  to  Badajoz  for 
the  third  time.  Marmont,  meanwhile,  who  after  the 
fall  of  Ciudad  was  the  most  exposed  of  the  French 
commanders,  had  done  much  to  prepare  himself 
against  attack — he  disposed  of  about  forty  thousand 
men  ;  he  had  hastily  fortified  Salamanca  with  skill ; 
it  is  to  his  credit  that  he  anticipated  Wellington's 
design  ;  he  wrote  to  his  master  that  he  ought  to  be 
strongly  reinforced,  and  to  have  the  command  of  a 
great  army,  which  would   enable  him   to  march  to 


Badajoz  1 6 


o 


the  relief  of  Badajoz.  Napoleon,  however,  tartly  re- 
plied that  the  defence  of  Badajoz  was  the  affair  of 
Soult,  who,  he  declared,  had  not  less  than  eighty 
thousand  good  soldiers ;  should  Wellington  make 
the  suggested  movement,  Marmont  was  to  fall  on  his 
comm'unications,  and  send  him  back  into  Portugal. 
These  views  were,  in  principle,  strategically  correct, 
but  they  were  founded  on  assumptions  completely 
false, — the  fatal  results  of  directing  war  from  a  dis- 
tance. Soult  had  not  at  this  moment  fifty  thousand 
men  around  the  eagles;  he  thought  that  D'Erlon 
near  Badajoz  could  hold  any  enemy  in  check ;  he 
was  engrossed  with  the  contest  in  Andalusia,  with 
the  siege  of  Cadiz  not  yet  abandoned,  with  projects 
against  British  power  in  Portugal ;  and  though  prob- 
ably he  could  have  done  more  than  he  did,  he  could 
hardly  have  accomplished  what  the  Emperor  ex- 
pected from  him.  Napoleon's  directions,  therefore, 
were  at  odds  with  the  facts;  and  Marmont  was  not 
in  sufficient  strength  to  strike  Wellington's  commu- 
nications with  effect,  and  to  turn  that  General  aside 
from  his  fixed  purpose. 

While  Marmont  had  been  protesting  in  vain,  Wel- 
lington had  steadily  completed  his  preparations.  He 
remained  in  person  near  Ciudad  as  long  as  possible, 
had  the  breaches  repaired  and  the  defences  improved 
in  order  to  conceal  his  real  purpose ;  but  he  kept  his 
eyes  bent  on  his  intended  quarry,  Badajoz.  He  had 
much  of  his  siege  train,  and  part  of  the  material  re- 
quired, brought  up  the  Tagus  to  Abrantes  from 
Lisbon  ;  all  this  was  carried  through  Alemtejo  to  El- 
vas  ;  the  enemy  was  still  uncertain  whether  he  would 


1 64  Wellington 

attack  the  fortress.  Meantime  he  broke  up  from  the 
Coa  with  the  mass  of  his  forces,  marching  along  the 
main  road  he  had  taken  care  to  construct ;  he  ap- 
peared before  Badajoz  on  the  i6th  of  March,  18 12, 
at  the  head  of  more  than  50,000  men,  of  whom 
30,000  were  his  best  British  soldiers.  The  place  was 
invested  on  the  following  day,  with  a  force  perhaps 
15,000  strong,  which,  however,  could  be  largely  aug- 
mented. Hill  was  in  command  of  the  covering  army, 
which  extended  on  both  sides  of  the  fortress,  on  the 
lookout  for  either  Marmont  or  Soult.  The  garrison 
was  almost  taken  by  surprise,  but  Philippon  had  made 
everything  ready  for  a  determined  defence;  he  nobly 
proved  himself  equal  to  a  most  arduous  task.  He  had 
scoured  the  country  around  for  supplies,  and  had 
sent  the  poorer  population  out  of  Badajoz :  he 
had  despatched  many  a  messenger  to  Soult  in  the 
hope  of  obtaining  aid  from  the  Marshal ;  he  had  left 
nothing  undone  to  strengthen  the  place  entrusted 
to  his  care.  He  had  connected  Christoval  with  the 
main  fortress  by  a  bridge  and  a  bridge  head  on  the 
Guadiana ;  this  outlying  work  could  thus  receive 
support  if  required.  He  had  increased  the  artillery 
of  the  castle,  and  had  flooded  the  approaches  by 
damming  up  a  little  stream,  the  Rivillas ;  this  pro- 
tected the  weakest  point,  the  north-eastern  front. 
He  had  also  strengthened  by  different  means  the 
forts  of  Picurina  and  Pardaleras  and  the  outlying 
work  of  St.  Roque,  external  defences  of  the  place ; 
he  had  deepened  the  fosse  around  the  enceinte  and 
spread  inundations  where  this  was  possible ;  and  he 
had  laid  mines  along  the  western  front,  the  garrison 


Badajoz  165 

being  too  weak  to  cover  every  point.  But  Philippon 
had  not  sufficient  munitions  ;  and  he  had  hardly 
more  than  5000  men  to  oppose  to  an  enemy  in  im- 
mensely superior  numbers.  D'Erlon  who,  we  have 
seen,  had  been  detached  to  observe  Badajoz  would 
have  done  well  to  support  the  garrison  with  part  of 
his  troops ;  but  he  fell  back  on  the  approach  of  Wel- 
lington, and  took  no  part  in  the  stirring  events  that 
followed. 

Ground  was  broken  on  the  i8th  of  March  before 
the  Picurina  and  St.  Roque,  which  protected  the 
eastern  front  of  the  fortress ;  a  tempest  of  shot  was 
rained  on  these  outlying  works,  and  on  the  bastions 
of  Santa  Maria  and  Trinidad  in  their  rear.  A  bold 
sally  of  the  garrison  was  repulsed  with  loss  ;  but  guns 
were  brought  to  bear  on  the  trenches  from  across 
the  river  ;  these  raked  them  with  destructive  effect. 
The  fire  of  the  Picurina  had  slackened  by  the  25th, 
in  fact,  Philippon  had  to  husband  his  powder;  a 
furious  assault  was  made  on  the  fort,  but  the  re- 
sistance was  not  less  fierce  and  resolute;  it  was  not 
until  half  of  the  defenders  had  fallen  that  the  assail- 
ants mastered  their  hard  won  prize  ;  and  they  were 
unable  to  retain  it  under  the  guns  of  the  fortress. 
St.  Roque  still  bravely  maintained  the  struggle;  but 
the  threatened  bastions  were  now  exposed  ;  yawn- 
ing breaches  were  by  degrees  made  in  Santa  Maria 
and  Trinidad,  and  the  adjoining  curtains.  The  be- 
sieged, nevertheless,  did  not  lose  heart;  they  re- 
trenched the  breaches  and  made  a  new  line  of 
defence ;  they  maintained  a  heavy  fire  from  the  ram- 
parts ;  cleared  the  fosse  which  the  enemy  did  not 


1 66  Wellington 

command,  and  as  the  counterscarp  had  not  been  even 
reached  pHed  their  dangerous  task  in  comparative 
safety.  Things  were  in  this  state  when  Wellington 
was  informed  that  Soult  was  approaching  with  a  re- 
lieving army  ;  he  resolved  not  to  be  baffled  for  the 
third  time  and  to  risk  everythirfg  in  a  general  assault 
on  Badajoz,  in  which  his  immensely  superior  forces 
might  give  him  success.  His  dispositions  for  the 
attack  were  made  for  the  night  of  the  6th  of  April ; 
a  combined  effort  was  to  be  attempted  in  all  direc- 
tions ;  the  fortress  was  to  be  surrounded  by  a  circle 
of  consuming  fire.  Picton's  division  was  to  escalade 
the  castle,  forcing  its  way  over  the  hindrances  in  its 
path.  The  division  of  Leith  was  to  make  a  feint 
against  the  Pardaleras  and  to  assault  part  of  the 
western  front,  which  had  been  mined  ;  false  attacks 
were  to  be  tried  on  other  points  ;  the  divisions  of 
Colville  and  that  lately  under  Crawford,  the  flower 
of  the  British  infantry,  were  to  storm  the  breaches, 
whatever  the  cost.  But  Philippon  had  his  prepara- 
tions made ;  hard  pressed  and  straitened  as  he  was, 
he  was  undismayed  by  enemies  in  overwhelming 
numbers;  he  called  on  his  weakened  garrison  to  hold 
out  to  the  last  man  ;  he  did  everything  that  was  pos- 
sible to  the  art  of  the  engineer.  He  was  not  suffi- 
ciently strong  to  defend  all  the  points  that  could  be 
assailed  ;  he  properly  concentrated  his  main  force  to 
cover  the  breaches  ;  he  had  here  accumulated  ex- 
traordinary means  of  resistance.  Bodies  of  sharp- 
shooters, every  man  having  three  pieces  were  ranged 
along  the  imperilled  ramparts  ;  a  formidable  stockade, 
constructed  with  the  most  ingenious  skill,  was  laid 


Badajoz  167 

along  the  front  of  the  breaches ;  the  bottom  of  the 
fosse  was  inundated  and  made  a  most  grave  obsta- 
cle;  and  a  long  line  of  what  may  b  ecalled  infernal 
machines  was  placed  at  the  foot  of  the  counterscarp 
which,  I  have  said,  had  been  left  intact.  ' 

Wellington  spared  the  garrison  the  form  of  a  sum- 
mons ;  he  knew  what  would  be  the  indignant  answer. 
The  night  of  the  6th  was  dark,  but  still;  it  was  a 
calm,  before  a  storm  raised  by  the  fury  of  man  ; 
hardly  a  sound  was  heard  in  the  trenches  or  along 
the  ramparts  save  the  voice  of  the  sentry  saying  that 
all  was  well  in  Badajoz.  Soon  after  ten  the  two  di- 
visions charged  to  master  the  breaches,  had  reached 
the  glacis,  and  were  close  to  the  place;  bundles  of 
hay  were  thrown  into  the  fosse  to  fill  it  ;  the  forlorn 
hopes  and  the  storming  parties  boldly  fell  on.  The 
columns  of  the  assailants  had  soon  rushed  forward 
"deep  and  broad,  coming  on  like  streams  of  lava"  ; 
an  appalling  spectacle  suddenly  was  seen.  The  ram- 
parts were  lit  up  with  the  blaze  of  rockets  ;  the  mus- 
ketry of  the  sharpshooters  made  frightful  havoc  ;  the 
train  of  the  deadly  engines  laid  along  the  counter- 
scarp, exploded,  flinging  out  shells  and  other  missiles  ; 
the  inundated  fosse  swallowed  up  many  victims; 
hundreds  of  brave  men  perished  before  they  at- 
tained the  breaches,  yet  still  the  assaulting  columns 

'  Wellington,  after  the  result,  complained  bitterly  of  this:  "  \ 
trust  that  future  armies  will  be  equi|)pe(l  for  sieges  with  the 
people  necessary  to  carry  them  on  as  they  ought  to  be  ;  and  that  our 
engineers  will  learn  how  to  put  their  batteries  on  the  crest  of  the 
glacis,  and  to  blow  in  the  counterscarp,  instead  of  placing  them 
where  the  wall  can  be  seen,  leaving  the  poor  officers  to  get  into 
and  cross  the  ditch  as  they  can." — Selection,  p.  594. 


1 68  Wellington 

pressed  on,  maddened,  shattered,  yet  determined  to 
do  or  to  die ;  here  they  were  met  by  fresh  and  ter- 
rific obstacles.  The  stockade  along  the  breaches 
proved  impossible  to  break  down  ;  it  presented  a 
front  of  sword-blades  fastened  into  beams,  and  of 
planks  studded  with  sharp  points  of  iron  ;  the  assail- 
ants dashed  themselves  against  it  in  vain  ;  they  were 
crushed  by  the  pressure  of  their  comrades  and  rolled 
down  into  the  fosse  below,  while  the  rattle  of  the 
musketry  from  the  ramparts  rang  steadily  out ;  the 
troubled  air  was  rent  with  the  sound  of  bursting  pro- 
jectiles ;  the  shouts  and  jeers  of  the  garrison  swelled 
loud  and  high  as  the  enemy  was  called  on  to  "  come 
and  take  Badajoz,"  yet  these  desperate  onslaughts 
were  repeated  over  and  over  again,  and  continued 
for  the  space  of  two  hours;  it  was  not  until  more 
than  two  thousand  men  had  been  slain,  the  fosse 
had  been  choked  with  the  killed  and  the  wounded, 
and  the  breaches  had  become  a  frightful  scene  of 
carnage,  echoing  with  groans,  execrations,  and  hor- 
rible sounds  of  passion,  that  a  pause  was  made  in 
the  appalling  struggle.  But  victory  meanwhile  had 
declared  for  Wellington  at  other  points  of  the  be- 
leaguered fortress.  Picton's  division  had  carried  the 
castle  after  a  brave  resistance,  though  it  has  been 
said  that  the  German  troops  who  defended  it  hardly 
did  their  duty.  The  feint  on  Pardaleras  was  not 
pressed  home;  but  though  there  was  a  panic  about 
a  mine  which,  proved,  however,  a  false  alarm,  the 
part  of  the  western  front  that  was  attacked  was 
stormed  ;  in  truth,  the  French  were  scarcely  anywhere 
in  suf^cient  force.     The  victors  now  took  the  garrison 


Badajoz  1 69 

at  the  breaches  in  reverse  and  exacted  a  fearful  and 
bloody  vengeance ;  the  assailants  had  soon  swarmed 
into  the  town.  Philippon  and  his  chief  officers  made 
their  escape  into  Christoval,  but  Badajoz  was  sur- 
rendered on  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  June.  The 
losses  of  Wellington  from  first  to  last  had  not  been 
less  than  5000  men,  out  of  an  attacking  force  of  some 
18,000;  the  losses  of  the  garrison  were  1500;  there 
never  has  been  a  more  fiercely  contested  siege.  His- 
tory drops  a  veil  on  the  hideous  excesses  that  fol- 
lowed ;  but  in  the  case  of  towns  taken  under  these 
conditions  this  was  the  evil  custom  of  war  in  that 
age. 

The  second  key  of  the  frontier  had  thus  been  taken, 
enormous  as  had  been  the  cost  of  success.     Spain 
now  lay  open  to  the  attack  of  Wellington  ;  things  had 
changed  since  he  clung  to  the  lines  before  Lisbon. 
Soult    had    meanwhile    been    approaching    Badajoz 
from  Seville,  but  his  advance  had  been  tentative  and 
slow  ;  he  appears  to  have  had  no  communication  with 
D'Erlon  ;  when  apprised  by  Philippon  of  the  fall  of 
the  fortress  he  retraced  his  steps,  and  was  around 
Llerena  for  a  few  days  ;  he  ultimately  made  his  way 
into  Andalusia.     The    Marshal's    operations   might 
have  been  more  bold, — this  was  Napoleon's  distinct 
judgment, — but  he  had  not  brought  with  him  more 
than  twenty-five  thousand  men,  a  force  not  sufficient 
to  have  compelled  the  raising  of  the  siege ;  he  was 
hampered,  besides,  by  the  fruitless  attack  on   Cadiz 
and  by  Ballasteros  and  a  large  Spanish  army;  and 
he  was  contemplating  a  great  movement  which,  with 
the   support  of  Suchct,  might    force   Wellington  to 


1 70  Wellington 

retreat  even  to  the  Portuguese  capital.  The  British 
General  seems  for  a  moment  to  have  wished  to  pursue 
and  attack  Soult,  and  he  would  have  been  much  su- 
perior in  strength  ;  but  he  was  recalled  northwards 
by  the  operations  of  Marmont.  That  Marshal,  com- 
plying with  his  master's  orders,  had  fallen  on  the 
communications  of  Wellington,  had  passed  Ciudad 
and  Almeida,  had  reached  Celorico,  and  had  spread 
consternation  as  far  as  Coimbra;  but  he  had  not 
forced  his  adversary  away  from  Badajoz,  and  before 
long  he  was  in  retreat  into  Leon.  Wellington  now 
placed  his  army  between  the  Agueda  and  the  Coa, 
and  made  preparations  for  the  invasion  of  Spain. 
He  disposed,  including  his  reserve,  of  not  far  from 
100,000  men  ;  he  could  place  in  his  first  line  some 
56,000,  of  whom  32,000  were  British  troops  ;  but  his 
24,000  Portuguese  had  been  made  excellent  soldiers; 
they  were  now  known  as  "  the  fighting-cocks  of  the 
army."  This  force  was  still  much  inferior  to  that  of 
the  enemy  as  a  whole  ;  but  the  French  armies  were  at 
immense  distances  ;  their  chiefs  notoriously  would 
not  act  in  concert ;  their  nominal  head,  Joseph,  had 
no  real  authority  ;  they  were  everywhere  harassed 
by  the  guerrillas  and  by  Spanish  armies,  beaten  in  the 
field,  but  never  subdued  ;  Wellington  had  thus  a 
reasonable  prospect  of  success,  very  different  from 
what  had  been  the  case  in  1809.  The  British  chief, 
with  characteristic  insight,  took  careful  precautions 
before  he  advanced,  to  make  the  movement  as  secure 
as  was  possible.  He  had  left  Hill  in  Estremadura 
with  some  fifteen  thousand  men  ;  that  able  lieuten- 
ant had  destroyed  the  bridge  at  Almaraz,  and  the 


Salamanca  171 

fortified  works  which  had  been  made  to  protect  it ; 
he  had  thus  severed  the  communications  between 
Marmont  and  Soult  by  the  Tagus.  Hill,  too,  had 
repaired  the  great  bridge  at  Alcantara,  and  this  had 
much  facilitated  his  junction  with  his  chief;  these 
two  operations  had  been  admirably  designed.  At 
the  same  time  Wellington  urged  the  Ministers  at 
home  to  make  frequent  descents  wath  squadrons  on 
the  coast,  in  order  to  assist  the  guerrillas  in  the  north 
and  to  occupy  the  French  army  on  the  spot ;  and  he 
earnestly  entreated  that  the  British  force,  which  had 
been  expected  from  Sicily  for  some  months,  should 
be  landed  on  the  seaboard  of  Catalonia,  to  hold 
Suchet  in  check.  This  operation,  he  hoped,  would 
indirectly  give  him  the  support  of  about  twenty 
thousand  men. 

.  The  only  army  immediately  confronting  Welling- 
ton was  that  of  Marmont,  which,  when  concentrated, 
would  be  about  forty-five  thousand  strong,  but  which 
at  this  juncture  was  much  scattered,  chiefly  between 
Salamanca  and  the  Douro.  This  army,  the  remnant 
of  that  of  Massena,  had  been  reorganised  by  its  new 
commander ;  it  was  for  the  most  part  composed  of 
excellent  troops ;  but  there  was  a  certain  admixture  of 
new  levies.  The  only  armies  that  could  be  expected 
to  reinforce  Marmont  were  that  of  the  North  under 
Caffarelli,  who  had  replaced  Dorsenne,  and  that  of 
the  Centre,  of  which  the  nominal  head  was  Joseph  ; 
these  could  hardly  be  expected  to  send  the  Marshal 
more  than  twenty  thousand  or  twenty-five  thousand 
men.  As  for  Suchet,  he  was  bound  to  Valencia  and 
was  looking  out  for  a  hostile  descent   from   Sicily  ; 


172 


Wellinoton 


ii 


Soult  practically  refused  to  leave  Andalusia,  or  to 
weaken  his  army  in  that  province,  though  Joseph 
had  ordered  him  to  send  a  detachment  to  Marmont, 
nay,  to  evacuate  Andalusia  if  necessary,  orders 
which,  had  they  been  obeyed  at  this  time,  might 
have  changed  the  fortunes  of  the  campaign  at  hand. 
Wellington  was,  therefore,  not  really  overmatched  ; 
he  broke  up  from  his  cantonments  in  the  first  days 
of  June  and  directed  his  movements  on  Salamanca, 
where  he  was  received  as  a  deliverer  by  the  exulting 
citizens,  like  nearly  all  Spaniards,  deadly  enemies  of 
the  French.  Marmont,  I  have  said,  had  fortified 
Salamanca  as  well  as  he  could,  in  order  to  make  a 
barrier  against  the  invasion  he  dreaded,  after  the 
loss  of  Almeida  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo ;  he  had  de- 
stroyed a  number  of  religious  houses  and  had  cleared 
the  town  of  buildings,  wlpch  might  be  of  use  to  the 
enemy  ;  but  he  had  made  three  large  convents  strong 
points  of  defence,  and  one  of  these,  San  Vincente, 
was  perched  on  a  cliff  overhanging  the  Tormes,  an 
affluent  of  the  Douro,  flowing  by  the  place.  Wel- 
lington was  compelled  to  lay  siege  to  the  convents, 
and  this  delayed  him  ten  or  twelve  days ;  San  Vin- 
cente was  not  captured  until  the  27th  of  June.  Dur- 
ing this  time  Marmont  had  approached  the  Tormes 
at  the  head  of  some  twenty-five  thousand  men,  who 
erelong  were  considerably  reinforced  ;  the  Marshal 
sought  an  opportunity  to  strike,  but  he  found  that  he 
had  been  on  a  bootless  errand.  In  a  short  time  he 
had  retreated  behind  the  Douro,  spreading  his  army, 
now  assembled  on  a  broad  front,  from  Toro  on  the 
Douro,  beyond  Tordesillas  and  thence  further  to  the 


<     ^ 

o 

uj  z^    . 

oO 

^  <- 

~ 

<  <4 

tn     — 1  ?j 

s 

<" 

>■ 

t/)           J 

o 

Salamanca  i  T^ 

Pisuerga,  holding  the  bridge  of  Tordesillas  upon  the 
Douro,  which  would  enable  him  to  cross  over  the 
river.  In  this  position  he  was  safe,  it  may  be  said, 
from  attack ;  he  had  drawn  near  Caffarelli  and  Joseph  ; 
he  commanded  a  very  fine  army  of  men  of  one  race. 
But  he  sent  messages  to  Caffarelli  and  Joseph  very 
properly  seeking  assistance  from  both  ;  and  both — a 
fact  that  deserves  special  notice — had  held  out  hopes 
of  support,  if  in  very  ambiguous  language. 

In  this  position  of  affairs  the  obvious  course  for 
Marmont  would  have  been  to  remain  behind  the 
Douro,  and  to  await  the  reinforcements  that  might 
be  on  the  way;  the  Marshal  knew  that  Wellington 
was  at  hand,  and  that  Wellington  had  a  superiority 
of  force.  But  though  Marmont  was  a  brilliant  sol- 
dier, an  excellent  tactician  in  the  field,  and  possessed 
of  no  ordinary  organising  skill,  he  was  a  somewhat 
vain  and  presumptuous  man  ;  the  intelligent  French 
soldiery  had  little  trust  in  him;  a  phrase  was  current 
in  their  camps  "  Marmont  fights,  but  fights  to  be 
beaten."  The  Marshal  resolved  to  leave  his  point 
of  vantage,  and  to  try  a  game  of  manoeuvres  with  the 
British  chief,  which  rnight  perhaps  compel  his  adver- 
sary to  retreat,  perhaps  offer  a  chance  of  a  successful 
battle.  On  the  15th  and  i6th  of  July  he  made  a 
feint  with  his  right  and  began  to  cross  the  Douro  at 
Toro  ;  this  movement  had  the  effect  of  turning  Wel- 
lington's left ;  that  General  had  his  army  at  Canizal 
near  a  feeder  of  the  main  river.  A  trial  of  strength  in 
this  position  would  have  been  dangerous  in  the  ex- 
treme; both  armies  would  have  stood  on  what  tac- 
ticallv  is  called  a  front  to  a  flank,  that  is,  would  have 


1 74  Wellington 

fought  on  a  line  not  covering  their  communications 
and  means  of  retreat ;  Marmont  had  no  intention  of 
running  such  a  risk.  He  countermarched,  therefore, 
rapidly  to  his  left,  crossed  the  Douro  at  Tordesillas 
and  another  point  ;  and  advanced  to  the  upper 
Guarena,  the  feeder  before  mentioned  ;  his  object 
now  being  to  turn  Wellington's  right.  A  series  of 
brilliant  movements  followed  ;  both  armies  marched 
in  parallel  lines,  over  an  open  country,  each  watch- 
ing an  opportunity  which  did  not  come  ;  but  the 
French  distinctly  outmarched  their  enemy  ;  Mar- 
mont, continually  pressing  Wellington's  right, 
reached  the  Tormes  and  crossed  the  river  at  fords 
which  Wellington  believed  were  guarded  by  a  Span- 
ish garrison  in  forts.  The  British  commander,  out- 
manoeuvred and  outflanked,  chiefly  owing  to  the 
celerity  of  the  French  movements,  now  fell  back  and 
took  a  position  on  the  heights  covering  Salamanca 
to  the  south;  he  reached  this  ground  on  the  2ist 
of  July.  The  situation  had  become  critical  for  him  ; 
for  his  line  of  retreat  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo  was  not 
firmly  held,  nay,  was  already  in  some  degree  men- 
aced, and  should  he  abandon  Salamanca  he  would 
give  up  a  prize  to  Marmont.  The  Marshal  was  fully 
alive  to  the  advantage  he  had  won  ;  he  advanced  to 
a  village  called  Calvarossa,  the  mass  of  his  army, 
however,  being  somewhat  in  the  rear ;  his  purpose 
was  to  threaten  his  adversary's  communications  with 
Ciudad  ;  to  fall  on  them  if  a  good  chance  offered, 
perhaps  to  flight  if  there  was  a  real  prospect  of  suc- 
cess. On  the  22nd  of  July  Marmont  continued  his 
movement;  he  began  to  press  on  Wellington's  line 


Salamanca  1 75 

at  least  to  approach  it  within  a  near  distance  ;  one 
of  his  divisions  seized  a  hill  called  the  Great  Ara- 
peiles,  near  an  opposite  height  of  the  same  name, 
which  was  occupied  by  a  part  of  the  allied  army. 
But  the  Marshal's  forces  were  not  completely  in 
hand  ;  there  was  a  small  interval  of  space  between 
his  centre  and  his  left,  though  this  was  hardly  of 
importance  as  yet,  and  his  troops  were  rather  en- 
tangled in  the  woodland  that  spread  along  the  ground 
he  held. 

Had  Marmont  at  this  moment  kept  to  the  vantage- 
ground  he  had  won,  and  drawn  together  his  some- 
what scattered  troops,  he  could  have  compelled 
Wellington  to  leave  Salamanca,  and  to  seek  his  line 
of  retreat  on  Ciudad  Rodrigo  ;  he  might  even  have 
harassed  the  retiring  columns.  But  he  continued  to 
edge  nearer  and  nearer  to  his  adversary's  right, 
whether  to  challenge  him  to  a  battle  is  still  uncertain  ; 
his  left,  under  Thomiferes,  gradually  extending  itself 
increased  the  gap  that  separated  it  from  the  rather 
ill-formed  centre,  and  became  isolated  at  a  distance 
from  its  supports.  This  false  movement  was  in- 
stantly perceived  by  Wellington, — his  exclamation, 
"'Moil  cJier  Alava,  Marmont  est  perdu,''  is  well 
known ;  he  seized  the  occasion  as  became  a  master 
of  tactics,  whose  dispositions  on  the  field  have  been 
seldom  equalled.  He  directed  the  leaders  of  his 
centre,  which  was  well  in  hand,  to  fall  in  full  force 
on  this  part  of  the  enemy's  line ;  at  the  same  time 
he  ordered  his  brother-in-law,  Pakenham,  to  attack 
Thomieres's  exposed  wing,  to  overwhelm  it,  and  to  se- 
cure victory.     The  effect  of  these  perfectly  conceived 


1 76  Wellington 

strokes  was   extraordinary,   sudden,   and    complete. 
The    men   of  the   alHed   centre    rushed  down   from 
the    Arapeiles    where    they    stood,   sweeping    away 
the    enemies    who    tried   to  arrest  their  onslaught ; 
"disregarding  the  storm  of  bullets  discharged  by  the 
French  artillery,  which  seemed    to  shear  away  the 
whole    surface  of   the   earth.  "     Erelong  Pakenham 
had   rolled   up  Thomieres's   divisions   in  spite  of  a 
brave  and  stern  resistance.     The  French  were  almost 
surrounded,  and  utterly    routed  ;    a   fine    charge  of 
cavalry  scattered    them    into  a  horde    of  fugitives. 
Marmont  from  the  Great  Arapeiles  beheld  the  disas- 
trous  scene ;    he   sent    messenger   after    messenger 
to  try  to  restore  the  battle  ;  but  his  efforts  would 
have  been  fruitless  in  any  event,  and  he  was  struck 
down  by  a  cannon-shot  at  a  critical  moment.     The 
result  of  the  day  was  now  not  really  doubtful ;  but 
justice  should  be  done  to  a  very    able  and  skilful 
man,  who  still  made  a  desperate  attempt  to  bid  for 
victory.     Clausel,  a   young   general  of  the  highest 
promise,  contrived  to  rally  and  strengthen  the  broken 
French  centre;  he  even  ventured  on  a  bold  counter- 
stroke,  "the  result  went  nigh  to    shake  the  whole 
battle.  "     But  victory,  under  these    conditions,  be- 
longs to  the  commander  who  has  the  last  fresh  re- 
serve ;  this  was  launched  by  Wellington  against  the 
enemy  ;  "  the  allied  host,  righting  itself  like  a  gallant 
ship  after  a  sudden  gust,  bore  onward  again  in  blood 
and  gloom,"  and  drove  the  French  army  in  defeat 
from  the  field.     Nevertheless  Clausel  admirably  cov- 
ered the  retreat ;  with  his  colleagues  he  often  stemmed 
the  advancing  tide  of  his  foes  ;  but  had  not  the  fords 


Salamanca  1 7  7 

on  the  Tormes  been  left  open,  against  Wellington's 
positive  orders,  the  beaten  host  must  have  been  all 
but  destroyed.' 

Besides  eleven  guns  and  two  eagles,  the  French 
lost  at  Salamanca  6000  men  killed  and  wounded, 
7000  prisoners  were  moreover  taken,  not  more  than 
20,000  men  held  together  for  some  days  ;  the  victory, 
in  a  word,  was  complete  and  decisive.  The  loss  of 
the  Allies  was  upwards  of  5ooomen,  for  the  defeated 
army  made  a  fine  defence ;  but  Wellington  was 
master  of  the  situation  for  a  time.  Clausel  conducted 
his  retreat  with  conspicuous  skill ;  his  rearward  divi- 
sions were  once  or  twice  smitten,  but  he  made  nearly 
forty  miles  in  less  than  twenty  hours ;  he  rightly  di- 
rected his  movement  on  Aravelo,  not  on  Tordesillas 
as  the  British  General  thought  would  be  the  case ; 
he  wished  to  draw  near  Madrid  and  King  Joseph. 
The  pursuit  of  Wellington,  as  was  his  wont,  was 
slow  ;  in  fact,  as  the  historian  of  the  Peninsular  War 
has  written,  "  the  vigorous  following  of  a  beaten 
enemy  was  never  a  prominent  characteristic  of  the 
British    chief"*'';    but    Wellington    did    his    young 


'  Wellington  has  thus  briefly  described  the  main  features  of  the 
battle  of  Salamanca  :  "  Marmont  ought  to  have  given  me  a  pont  d'or 
and  he  would  have  made  a  handsome  operation  of  it.  But  instead  of 
that,  after  manoeuvring  all  the  morning  in  the  usual  French  style, 
nobody  knew  for  what  object,  he  at  last  pressed  before  my  right  in 
such  a  manner,  at  the  same  time  witliout  engaging,  that  he  would 
have  either  carried  our  Arapeiles,  or  he  would  have  confined  us  entirely 
to  our  position.  This  was  not  to  be  endured,  and  we  fell  u])on  him, 
turning  his  left  flank,  and  1  never  saw  an  army  receive  such  a  beat- 
ing."— Selection,  p.  615. 

"^  Napier,  Peninsular  War,  iii.,  67;  edition  published  by  Routlcdge. 


iy8  Wellington 

opponent  justice;  he  has  expressed  high  admiration  of 
the  operations  of  Clausel.  Marmont  from  his  couch 
of  pain  must  have  felt  bitter  anguish  at  the  intelH- 
gence  that  soon  reached  his  successor ;  CaffarelH 
sent  a  reinforcement  to  the  defeated  army  ;  Joseph 
had  actually  marched  out  of  Madrid  at  the  head  of 
more  than  fourteen  thousand  men  in  order  to  sup- 
port Marmont  upon  the  Douro.  The  King  might 
have  joined  Clausel  at  Aravelo,  and  thus  made  a 
good  stand  against  Wellington  ;  but  he  was  appalled 
by  the  result  of  the  late  battle  ;  he  fell  back  behind 
the  Guadarrama  and  returned  to  his  capital.  The 
allied  army  continued  to  dog  Clausel's  footsteps  ; 
but  the  French  commander  made  good  his  way  to 
Burgos,  where,  though  he  had  been  wounded  at 
Salamanca,  he  rallied  and  reorganised  his  army  with 
indefatigable  care.  Leaving  a  considerable  detach- 
ment to  observe  Clausel,  Wellington  now  turned 
against  Joseph,  but  his  movements  once  more  were 
not  rapid  ;  the  King  was  given  time  to  fly  from  Mad- 
rid, with  his  mock  Court  and  a  train  of  many  thou- 
sand followers.  The  British  General  entered  the 
capital  of  Spain  on  the  12th  of  August,  181 2  ;  he  was 
greeted  with  enthusiastic  acclaim  ;  the  moral  results 
of  his  appearance  were  no  doubt  immense.  But  it 
has  truly  been  remarked  that  he  might  have  done 
more  than  he  did  had  he  been  a  chief  of  the  type 
of  Turenne  or  Napoleon.  It  was  probably  in  his 
power,  had  he  struck  quickly  home,  to  have  annihil- 
ated Clausel  and  his  shattered  forces  ;  and  he  ought 
to  have  been  able  to  have  caught  and  routed  Joseph 
before  the  fugitive  had  made  his  escape  from  Madrid 


Salamanca  1 79 

But  strategy,  in  its  grandest  aspects,  was  never  one 
of  the  strong  points  of  Wellington  ;  this  is  manifest 
in  several  passages  of  his  career. 

Wellington  was  raised  a  step  in  the  British  Peer- 
age for  Salamanca,  and  was  made  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  Spanish  armies,  honours  nobly  deserved 
and  justly  won.  He  remained  in  Madrid  a  few 
days  only ;  he  seems  rather  to  have  offended  jealous 
Spanish  pride  ;  his  stay  was  chiefly  remarkable  for 
the  exasperation  shown  by  the  citizens  to  the  hand- 
ful of  politicians  who  had  adhered  to  Joseph.  Ere- 
long Clausel  had  again  appeared  in  the  field,  having 
rallied  his  army  with  characteristic  resource ;  he  was 
in  command  of  some  30,000  men  ;  he  threatened 
the  detachment  left  behind  to  hold  him  in  check  ; 
this  was  from  15,000  to  18,000  strong.  Wellington 
broke  up  from  Madrid  on  the  1st  of  September; 
with  his  Portuguese,  he  had  perhaps  35,000  men,  for 
his  army  had  suffered  much  from  disease ;  he  was 
ultimately  joined  by  some  11,000  Spaniards.  The 
Allies  had  a  great  superiority  of  force,  when  the 
isolated  detachment  had  come  into  line;  the  British 
General  endeavoured  to  bring  Clausel  to  bay  ;  but  his 
enemy  retarded  his  advance  with  consummate  skill, 
defending  position  after  position  not  without  suc- 
cess': he  finally  made  good  his  way  to  Burgos,  whence 
he  effected  his  junction  with  the  French  army  of  the 
North.  Wellington  was  before  Burgos  on  the  8th 
and   9th   of  September,  he  was  on  the  line  of  the 

'  Wellington  gave  this  honourable  testimony  to  Clausel  :  "  He 
held  every  position  till  turned  and  then  drew  off  in  splendid  order." 
— Sir  II.  Maxwell,  History,  i.,  290, 


1 80  Wellington 

communications  of  the  French  with  Madrid ;  he 
may  have  believed  that  he  could  easily  reduce  the 
place  and  then  strike  a  blow  with  effect,  but  his  real 
purpose  has  hardly  been  made  known.  He  had  sate 
down  before  Burgos  by  the  loth,  but  his  calculations 
were  wholly  frustrated  ;  the  siege  is  a  very  remark- 
able instance  of  what  the  value  of  a  weak  fortress 
may  be  in  war  ;  how  it  may  baf^e  an  enemy,  nay, 
bring  him  into  grave  danger.  Burgos  was  an  ancient 
fortification  of  little  strength  ;  but  it  was  protected 
by  entrenchments  within  the  wall  ;  it  was  cov- 
ered on  the  northern  front  by  a  hornwork ;  it  had 
a  very  able  commandant,  Dubreton,  and  a  brave 
garrison  of  some  2000  men.  The  hornwork  was 
stormed  on  the  19th,  but  Wellington  had  no  siege 
artillery ;  his  guns  were  comparatively  few  and  weak  ; 
he  had  to  resort  to  mines  to  destroy  the  defences. 
Four  assaults  were  made  against  narrow  breaches; 
Dubreton  and  his  men  still  clung  to  the  entrench- 
ments they  had  admirably  held.  But  meanwhile 
a  formidable  tempest  of  war  had  been  gathering 
against  the  British  commander.  Massena  had  been 
sent  to  the  southern  borders  of  France  ;  but  the 
veteran  refused  to  take  the  field  ;  Clausel  had  been 
disabled  by  a  festering  wound  ;  Souham,  rather  an 
elderly  man,  was  placed  at  the  head  of  Marmont's  late 
army,  which  had  been  reinforced  to  40,000  men  by 
the  addition  of  a  levy  of  conscripts.  Caffarelli,  too, 
was  at  hand  with  10,000  or  12,000  men  ;  their  united 
forces  were  much  superior  to  those  of  Wellington, 
in  the  quality  of  the  troops,  nay,  perhaps  in  numbers. 
The  British  General  raised  the  siege  on  the  21st  of 


Burgos  1 8 1 

October ;  he  had  lost  fully  2000  men ;  he  had  cer- 
tainly delayed  too  long  around  the  fortress. 

While  Wellington  had  been  laying  siege  to  Burgos, 
great  events  had  occurred  in  other  parts  of  Spain. 
Joseph    had    reached  Valencia  on  the    1st  of  Sep- 
tember, and  with  his  motley  following  had  been  well 
received    by    Suchet,    who  —  created    by   Napoleon 
Duke    of    Albufera — had,   as    usual,    governed    his 
province  well,  and  had  even  been  able  to  collect  its 
revenue.      The    Marshal,  however,  had   to  provide 
against  the  expedition  which  had  disembarked  from 
Sicily,  and  which,  though  of  less  force  than  had  been 
expected,  was  nevertheless  sufficient  to  keep  him  on 
the  spot.     Joseph  sent  peremptory  orders  to  Soult  to 
quit  Andalusia  and  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Centre 
w^'th  his  own.       Soult  obeyed,  but  with  a  bad  grace, 
after  despatching  a  protest  to  the  Emperor,  which 
did    not    improve    his    relations    with    the     King. 
The  Marshal,  I  have  said,  had  for  some  time  been 
projecting    operations  which  in    his   opinion    would 
compel  Wellington  to  return  into  Portugal ;  he  aimed 
at  making  Andalusia  a  great  military  base ;  whence 
being  reinforced  to  large  extent,  he  might  be  able  to 
turn  the  Lines,  and  to  advance  on  Lisbon.     Even 
after  Salamanca  he  insisted  that  this  was  the  true 
strategic  course  ;    the  Army  of   the  Centre  should 
unite  with  his  own  ;  this  would  give  a  new,  perhaps 
a  fortunate  turn  to  the  war  ;  Andalusia  in  any  event, 
should  not  be  abandoned.      But  he  was  forced  to 
forego  these  ambitious  hopes,  and  to  evacuate  the 
province  which  he  had  occupied  to  little  purpose, 
and  which  the  invaders  ought  never  to  have  entered 


1 82  Wcllinzton 


'<^' 


while  Wellington  had  his  army  in  Portugal.  Soult, 
of  course,  withdrew  from  Cadiz,  besieged  in  vain  for 
months,  the  forces  which  the  siege  had  greatly  re- 
duced ;  he  gathered  his  outlyin^  detachments  to- 
gether ;  he  set  off  for  Seville  with  a  heavy  heart, 
carrying  away  the  spoil  of  a  devastated  land.' 
He  was  harassed  by  Ballasteros  and  a  Spanish 
army,  while  his  lieutenant,  D'Erlon,  was  pursued  by 
Hill,  but  he  reached  the  borders  of  Murcia  in  Sep- 
tember, and  was  in  Valencia  by  the  first  days  of 
October,  not  far  from  the  historic  field  of  Almanza. 
His  junction  with  the  King  had  now  been  effected  ; 
the  united  French  armies,  not  reckoning  that  of 
Suchet,  were  not  far  from  60,000  strong ;  it  was 
agreed,  after  some  hot  discussion,  to  march  to  and  re- 
gain the  Spanish  capital,  which  Wellington,  it  was 
known,  had  left.  Joseph  re-entered  Madrid  on  the  2nd 
day  of  November;  Hill,  who  after  pursuing  D'Erlon, 
had  held  a  position  on  the  upper  Tagus,  with  a  com- 
posite army  of  some  25,000  men,  having  retreated 
through  the  Guadarrama  to  join  his  chief.  Wel- 
lington, by  this  time  falling  back  from  Burgos,  was 
now  gravely  threatened  by  two  armies,  that  of  Sou- 
ham  and  that  of  Joseph  and  Soult ;  each  of  these 
was  probably  a  match  for  his  own,  if  for  the  present 
they   were   far   apart;   such   had  been  the  result  of 

'  Soult  had  taken  away  with  him  a  number  of  important  pic- 
tures, among  others  the  magnificent  Dona  di  Gloria  of  Murillo, 
and  placed  these  in  his  mansion  in  Paris.  Many  years  after- 
wards the  Marsha]  showed  the  collection  to  Lord  Cowley,  nephew 
of  Wellington,  and  remarked  that  "no  doubt  the  Duke  had  a 
gallery  of  the  same  kind."  The  reply  was  excellent:  "  Non,  M, 
le  Marechal ;  il  vous  a  suivi." 


VISCOUNT  ROWLAND  HILL. 
(From  the  painting  by  H.  W    Tickursgill,  K.A.) 


Burgos  183 

maintaining  a  fruitless  siege.  French  writers,  who 
have  contended  that  in  this  position  of  affairs,  the 
British  General,  like  Napoleon  in  the  campaign  of 
Italy,  could  have  fallen  on  and  defeated  his  divided 
enemies,  appear  to  be  altogether  in  error. 

During  these  events  Wellington  in  retreat  from 
Burgos  was  followed  by  Souham  with  some  40,000 
men,  Caffarelli  having  gone  back  with  the  Army  of 
the  North.  The  operations  of  Souham  were  cautious; 
some  engagements  of  no  importance  took  place  ;  but 
the  British  soldiery,  as  so  often  has  been  the  case, 
when  falling  back  a  long  distance  before  an  enemy, 
began  to  show  symptoms  of  insubordination  and 
want  of  discipline.  Meanwhile  Joseph  had  marched 
out  of  Madrid  in  order  to  effect  his  junction  with 
Souham, —  a  rapid  and  well-conceived  movement; 
he  was  accompanied  by  Soult  and  his  Chief- of - 
Staff  Jourdan  ;  the  combined  armies,  about  90,000 
strong,  were  on  the  upper  Douro  by  the  8th  of 
November,  advancing  in  full  pursuit  of  Wellington. 
The  British  chief  had  crossed  the  Douro  some  days 
before  ;  he  was  joined  by  Hill,  on  the  Tormes,  on 
the  7th  of  November ;  he  had  reached  the  scenes  of 
his  late  victory  ;  he  was  now  at  the  head  of  more 
than  60,000  men,  a  number,  however,  of  these  being 
Spanish  levies.  Wellington  placed  himself  on  a  very 
extended  line,  from  Alva,  on  the  upper  Tormes,  on 
his  right  to  Calvarossa  occupied  by  Marmont  on  the 
2 1st  of  July,  and  thence  to  a  point  called  San  Chris- 
toval  on  his  left ;  the  distance  was  nearly  fifteen 
miles.  He  was  ready,  it  has  been  said,  to  accept 
battle,  to  restore,  as  had  been  the  case  at  Busaco, 


1 84  IVellington 

the  confidence  of  an  army  that  had  been  shaken  ;  but 
this  appears  to  be,  at  the  very  least,  uncertain.  On 
the  14th  of  November  the  enemy  had  crossed  the 
Tormes,  and  was  even  menacing  Wellington's  line 
of  retreat ;  an  important  council  of  war  was  held ; 
Jourdan's  voice  was  for  fighting  a  great  battle,  at 
least  for  attacking  Plill,  who  was  drawing  back  from 
Alba;  the  odds  would  certainly  have  been  largely  in 
favour  of  the  French.  But  the  memory  of  Sala- 
manca disturbed  Soult,  seldom  ready  to  seize  the 
occasion  and  to  strike  home;  he  insisted  that  an  at- 
tempt should  be  made  to  outflank  Wellington,  and 
to  cut  him  off  from  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  in  his  retreat, 
very  much  as  had  been  the  object  of  Marmont  before  ; 
Joseph  yielded  to  counsels  that  were  perhaps  unfor- 
tunate. The  movement  of  the  French  was  circuitous 
and  slow  ;  it  has  been  compared  to  the  hovering  of  a 
wily  kite ;  Wellington,  skilfully  drawing  his  army 
together,  reached  Ciudad  Rodrigo  hardly  molested. 
He  had  lost  in  the  retreat  nearly  nine  thousand  men  ; 
he  vented  his  displeasure  in  an  address  to  his  troops, 
severely  condemning  their  conduct  since  they  had 
left  Burgos.  Many  soldiers,  even  officers,  had  be- 
haved ill ;  but  this  indiscriminate  censure  was  hardly 
deserved ;  it  was  characteristic  of  a  stern  and  ob- 
durate nature  which  deemed  military  licence  an 
unpardonable  crime. 

To  superficial  observers  the  retreat  from  Burgos 
seemed  to  mark  a  turn  in  the  tide  of  the  war  against 
Wellington.  He  had,  after  entering  the  capital  of 
Spain  in  triumph,  and  striking  the  line  of  the  com- 
munications of  the  French,  been  compelled  to  fall 


Bttrgos  185 

back  an  immense  distance ;  on  the  Tormes  he  had 
been  exposed  to  no  doubtful  peril ;  his  army  had 
been  partly  demoralised  and  much  weakened  ;  he 
had  been  forced  back  almost  to  the  Portuguese  fron- 
tier. And  his  strategy  after  Salamanca  does  not 
comrtnend  itself  to  an  impartial  student  of  the  mili- 
tary art.  He  ought  not  to  have  allowed  the  defeated 
army  of  Marmont  to  recover  itself,  and  become 
formidable  again,  in  order  merely  to  appear  in  Mad- 
rid ;  this  was  sacrificing  the  primary  to  the  sec- 
ondary end.  He  might,  perhaps,  at  this  juncture 
have  routed  Joseph  ;  he  ought  not  to  have  delayed 
before  Burgos  for  weeks,  and  to  have  risked  the  issue 
of  the  campaign  for  an  insignificant  object. 

These  mistakes,  and  certainly  they  were  mistakes, 
enabled  the  French  armies,  scattered  over  Spain,  to 
gather  against  him  in  greatly  superior  strength  ;  they 
obliged  him  to  make  a  dangerous  retrograde  move- 
ment ;  he  ought  to  have  been  defeated  near  Sala- 
manca but  for  the  hesitations  of  Soult.  But  if  we 
examine  the  operations  of  Wellington  as  a  whole, 
from  Fuentes  d'Onoro  to  the  close  of  18 12,  they  bear 
witness  to  his  great  and  characteristic  merit  in  war. 
He  was,  no  doubt,  taken  by  surprise  at  El  Boden  ;  it 
was  fortunate  when  he  stood  on  the  Caya  that  Mar- 
mont and  Soult  would  not  agree  to  attach  him.  But 
when,  in  the  summer  of  181 1,  the  position  of  affairs 
seemed  of  evil  omen,  he  maintained  his  undaunted 
and  wise  confidence  ;  in  the  dissemination  of  the  hos- 
tile armies,  in  the  disputes  of  their  chiefs,  in  the 
preparations  of  the  contest  with  Russia,  he  beheld  the 
hopeful  promise  of  final  success.     He  made  admirable 


1 86  Wellingtoft 

arrangements  for  two  great  sieges;  he  seized  the 
occasion  with  energy  and  skill ;  he  captured  Ciu- 
dad  Rodrigo  and  Badajoz  under  the  beard,  so  to 
speak,  of  the  enemy.  When  the  keys  of  Spain  had 
thus  passed  into  his  hands,  he  conducted  the  inva- 
sion that  followed  with  fine  judgment,  at  least  at 
first;  and  though  he  was  outmanoeuvred  by  Mar- 
mont,  his  tactics  at  Salamanca  were  a  masterpiece  in 
the  field.  And  the  results  of  his  achievements  had 
been  very  great ;  he  had,  with  forces  sometimes 
much  inferior  in  strength,  destroyed  the  renown  and 
confidence  of  the  French  armies  ;  he  had  made  the 
invaders  leave  Andalusia,  never  to  return  ;  he  had 
practically  upset  the  tottering  throne  of  Joseph. 
The  catastrophe  which  befell  Napoleon  in  the  north, 
and  which  shook  his  power  on  the  Continent  to  its 
base,  was  to  open  a  new  career  to  Wellington  in 
Spain  ;  he  was  erelong  to  overwhelm  the  enemies  in 
his  path,  to  strike  them  down  in  a  decisive  battle, 
and  to  carry  the  war  into  France  itself,  while  the  per- 
ishing  Empire  was  crashing  down  in  ruins. 


CHAPTER    VII 

VITORIA 

The  invasion  of  Russia  in  1S12— The  Retreat  from  Moscow— Great 
rising  in  Prussia  after  the  disasters  of  the  French— The  Czar 
continues  the  war— Efforts  of  Napoleon  to  restore  his  military 
power— Lutzen  and  Bautzen — Negotiations— Policy  of  Melter- 
nich— The  armistice  of  Pleisnitz — Events  in  Spain  largely  influ- 
ence the  conduct  of  the  Allies— Position  of  the  French  armies 
after  the  retreat  from  Burgos — They  are  considerably  reduced 
-^Directions  of  Napoleon  for  the  Campaign  of  1813  i"  Spain — 
They  reach  Joseph  late  and  are  imperfectly  carried  out— Dis- 
semination of  the  French  armies — Wellington  disposes  of  a  great 
military  force — His  plan  for  the  Campaign  of  1813 — He  turns 
the  position  of  the  French  on  the  Esla  and  the  Douro — Joseph 
is  surprised  and  compelled  to  fall  back — Confused  and  ill-man- 
aged retreat  of  the  French  armies  from  Valladolid  to  Vitoria — 
Battle  of  Vitoria — Complete  defeat  of  Joseph — Immense  results 
of  the  victory. 

AFTER  Salamanca  and  the  conquest  of  Mad- 
drid,  the  retreat  from  Burgos  caused  much 
discontent  in  England  ;  murmurs  were  loudly 
heard  that  the  Peninsular  War  could  never  come  to 
an  end.  The  nation,  too,  had  been  engaged  in  a 
contest  with  the  United  States,  which  markedly  in- 
jured its  renown  on  the  seas,  unchallenged  since 
the  great  day  of  Trafalgar ;  the  Continental  System 

187 


1 88  Wellington 

had  continued  to  produce  its  disastrous  effects, 
in  bankruptcies,  disorders,  and  the  depreciation 
of  a  paper  currency.  These  events,  however, 
important  as  they  were,  were  thrown  into  the 
shade  by  the  awful  catastrophe  of  the  French  in- 
vasion of  Russia  in  1812.  Napoleon  had  steadily 
carried  out  the  policy,  in  military  as  well  as  in 
civil  affairs,  of  striking  down  the  great  Power  of 
the  North,  to  which  he  had  for  months  turned  his 
mighty  energies.  Concealing  the  movement  by  all 
kinds  of  feints,  he  had  drawn  together  the  armed 
strength  of  the  West,  supported  by  enormous  re- 
serves, to  assail  and  subdue  the  Czar  in  the  East ;  he 
had  directed  this  from  the  Rhine  and  the  Danube  to 
the  Vistula;  in  the  spring  of  1812  it  was  ready  to 
march  to  the  Niemen,  drawing  with  it  a  huge  ma- 
terial of  war;  the  world  had  never  yet  beheld  such  a 
display  of  a  conqueror's  power.  Austria  and  Prus- 
sia, with  secret  reluctance,  but  with  apparent  con- 
sent, had  furnished  contingents  to  the  gigantic  host ; 
France,  Germany,  and  Italy  had  sent  their  youth  to 
join  in  the  great  crusade.  The  Emperor  left  Paris  in 
proud  confidence,  disregarding  the  entreaties  of  more 
than  one  wise  counsellor;  the  alarm,  nay,  the  dis- 
affection showing  itself  from  the  Seine  to  the  Rhine, 
and  the  Spanish  ulcer,  malignant  and  growing.  At 
Dresden  the  Continent  bowed  before  its  lord  ;  kings, 
princes,  and  potentates  lavished  their  homage ;  flat- 
tery described  the  enterprise  as  a  triumphal  march 
for  the  summer.  Four  hundred  thousand  men, 
sustained  by  two  hundred  thousand  in  the  rear, 
crossed  the  Niemen  in  the  last  days  of  June;  but 


Vitoria  1 89 

this  immense  host  was  composed  of  many  races  and 
tongues ;  the  forces  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  foes  at 
heart,  formed  the  extremes  of  the  wings.  The  ad- 
vance of  the  Grand  Army — a  time-honoured  name — 
was  impeded  by  many  and  grave  obstacles,  and  its 
losses  were  great  from  the  first  moment ;  but  Napo- 
leon's earlier  operations  were  admirably  designed, 
and  for  some  weeks  were  of  the  highest  promise. 
The  main  army  of  Alexander  was  placed  in  im- 
minent danger,  owing  to  the  unwise  advice  of  a 
pedantic  theorist ;  and  though  his  secondary  army 
made  its  escape,  chiefly  through  the  neglect  of 
the  young  King  of  Westphalia,  both  were  com- 
pelled, widely  divided  as  yet,  to  retreat.  Napoleon 
pursued,  but  the  pursuit  was  checked  by  the  im- 
pediments inherent  to  such  an  enterprise  ;  Barclay 
and  Bagration  ultimately  combined  their  forces ;  a 
bloody  battle  was  fought  at  Smolensk,  the  portal,  as 
its  name  was,  of  old  Muscovy ;  the  two  Russian 
commanders,  imitating  Wellington  at  last,  fell  back 
over  an  immense  space,  destroying  the  means  of 
subsistence  in  a  devastated  and  poor  country.  The 
Emperor  advanced  from  Smolensk  with  the  best 
part  of  his  forces,  about  160,000  strong,  throwing 
out,  however,  powerful  armies  on  both  sides  of  the 
line  of  his  march,  in  order  to  secure  his  communica- 
tions and  his  flanks  ;  Barclay  and  Bagration  were  re- 
placed by  Kutusoff ;  the  terrible  conflict  at  Borodino 
followed,  not  decisive,  but  one  of  appalling  carnage; 
the  Russian  army  continued  its  retreat.  Napoleon 
entered  Moscow  on  the  14th  of  September— the  ex- 
treme Hmit  of  the  march  of  the  Tricolour;  he  had 


1 90  Wellington 

lost  fully  fifty  thousand  men  since  he  had  broken  up 
from  Smolensk. 

The  conflagration  of  Moscow,  whatever  the  cause, 
might  have  warned  the  Emperor  that  with  his  di- 
minished forces  he  was  isolated  in  the  midst  of  a  still 
unconquered  country,  and  was  already  in  a  position 
that  might  become  most  critical.  But  Napoleon 
cherished  the  hope  that  the  Czar  would  treat ;  he 
was  deceived  by  his  wily  foe,  Kutusoff ;  he  lingered 
five  weeks  in  the  ruin  of  the  half-effaced  city  ;  boast- 
ing that  a  march  on  St.  Petersburg  was  within  his 
power  ;  ignorant  of  what  was  in  the  womb  of  the 
immediate  future.  On  the  19th  of  October  the 
memorable  retreat  began  ;  it  is  not  probable  that 
had  Moscow  remained  intact  it  could  have  been 
used  as  quarter  for  the  invaders  through  the  winter, 
"  whence  they  would  have  emerged  like  a  ship  from 
the  ice  of  the  North."  The  Emperor's  intention  was 
to  make  his  way  to  Kalouga  and  to  establish  himself 
in  a  country  unravaged  and  with  a  milder  climate; 
but  he  was  repulsed  by  his  adversary  at  Malo  laro- 
slavetz.  The  Grand  Army,  laden  with  the  spoils  of 
Moscow,  and  already,  too,  like  an  undisciplined 
horde,  though  still  perhaps  ninety  thousand  strong, 
was  forced  to  retreat  through  the  devastated  region 
in  which  it  had  advanced.  Things  looked  compara- 
tively well  for  a  few  days ;  but  an  Arctic  winter, 
with  its  ice  and  its  snows,  fell  suddenly  on  the  rapidly 
dwindling  host ;  supplies  were  not  to  be  found  on 
the  wasted  line  of  march ;  the  Russians,  though 
timidly,  hung  on  the  enemy's  flanks;  when  Smo- 
lensk was   reached    some    forty  thousand    starving 


Vitoria  191 

fugitives,  demoralised,  and  breaking  even  from  their 
chief,  were  all  that  remained  of  the  legions  which 
had  proved  at  Borodino  what  they  were.  Napoleon 
had  hoped  to  find  a  safe  haven  at  Smolensk  ;  but 
two  large  hostile  armies,  bearing  back  the  lieuten- 
ants, who  were  to  make  the  advance  on  Moscow 
secure,  were  menacing  his  rear  on  either  side  ;  it  had 
become  necessary  to  continue  the  appalling  retreat. 
The  army,  only  slightly  restored — the  soldiery  had 
recklessly  pillaged  the  magazines — abandoned  Smo- 
lensk between  the  14th  and  the  i6th  of  November, 
but  it  had  separated  into  somewhat  distant  masses, 
perhaps  in  order  to  procure  food  ;  Kutusoff,  who  had 
become  bolder,  attacked  it  with  effect  ;  Ney,  who 
covered  the  retreat  with  wonderful  courage  and 
energy,  was  nearly  cut  off,  and  with  difficulty  made 
his  escape.  The  scenes  on  the  march  from  Smolensk 
w^ere  even  more  terrible  than  those  which  had  been 
witnessed  before;  the  army  was  quickly  reduced  to 
less  than  twenty-five  thousand  men  ;  as  it  drew  near 
the  Beresina  the  Emperor  learned  that  his  retreat 
was  barred  by  the  two  armies,  which  had  been  con- 
verging to  close  on  his  rear.  Napoleon  had  not  been 
equal  to  himself  since  he  had  left  Moscow ;  but  two 
of  his  marshals  had  joined  him  at  this  crisis,  with  rein- 
forcements of  considerable  strength  ;  he  effected  the 
passage  of  the  river  with  considerable  skill,  losing, 
however,  many  thousands  of  disbanded  men  ;  he 
carried  across  perhaps  40,000  troops  who  held  to- 
gether. He  left  the  wrecks  of  his  army  at  Smor- 
gone,  conduct  of  at  least  a  questionable  kind,  and 
gave  the  command   to  Murat,  a    bad    choice;    the 


192  Wellington 

retreat  went  on  as  before  to  Wilna ;  but  it  was  in 
vain  that  additions  were  made  to  the  perishing  host  ; 
Murat  lost  his  head  and  had  only  one  idea,  flight. 
About  the  middle  of  December  some  20,000  spec- 
tres crossed  the  Niemen  in  little  knots  and  bands; 
these  were  the  remains  of  the  400,000  men  who  had 
formed  the  first  line  of  the  Grand  Army  ;  and  the 
reserve  of  200,000  had  cruelly  suffered.  The  catas- 
trophe was  like  that  which  befell  the  Assyrian  tyrant ; 
it  is  doubtful  if  80,000  of  the  600,000  men  were  ever 
seen  under  the  eagles  again. 

This  unparalleled  disaster  was  quickly  to  prove 
how  precarious  was  the  structure  of  Napoleon's  Em- 
pire. Schwartzenberg,  the  leader  of  the  Austrian 
contingent,  had  allowed  one  of  the  hostile  armies 
that  had  reached  the  Beresina  to  pass ;  he  had  soon 
brought  back  his  forces,  almost  unscathed,  to  the 
Vistula.  York,  a  general  of  the  Prussian  contingent, 
abandoned  Macdonald  with  his  soldiers  to  a  man  ; 
he  was  welcomed  as  a  hero  by  the  whole  Prussian 
nation.  Germany,  from  the  Niemen  to  the  Elbe, 
rose  up  in  patriotic  passion ;  the  King  of  Prussia, 
hesitating  and  alarmed  for  a  time,  was  swept  into  a 
mighty  movement  to  avenge  the  humiliations  and 
the  wrongs  of  years  ;  Alexander,  against  KutusofT's 
entreaties,  crossed  the  Vistula  and  proclaimed  him- 
self the  deliverer  of  an  enthralled  continent.  The 
survivors  of  the  Grand  Army,  perhaps  forty  thousand 
strong,  and  now  under  the  command  of  Eugene 
Beauharnais,  were  borne  back  by  the  universal  rising 
to  the  Elbe  ;  they  were  islanded  in  a  flood  of  enemies 
on  all  sides;  the  French  garrisons  shut  up  in   the 


Vitoria  193 


Prussian  fortresses  were  the  only  other  signs  of  the 
domination  of  France  in  that  kingdom.  The  Em- 
peror, however,  though  wrathful  and  troubled  at  the 
sight  of  a  catastrophe  surpassing  his  worst  fears,  and 
disturbed  by  the  position  of  affairs  at  home,  had  no 
thought  even  of  negotiating  with  his  foes  ;  he  was 
only  intent  on  finding  resources  to  continue  the  war. 
He  had  expected  when  he  had  left  his  army,  to 
have  two  hundred  thousand  men  on  the  Niemen ; 
he  had  now  not  more  than  a  fifth  part  of  that  force 
on  the  Elbe.  His  throne,  too,  had  been  menaced 
by  an  obscure  plotter,  whose  efforts,  though  fruitless, 
had  startled  Paris ;  and  it  had  been  remarked  that 
Paris  had  no  real  faith  in  his  dynasty.  Yet  at  this 
crisis  he  appealed,  and  with  prodigious  effect,  to 
the  pride  and  the  martial  spirit  of  France,  bent  on 
maintaining  the  supremacy  on  the  Continent  which 
she  still  possessed.  Napoleon's  efforts  were  gigantic, 
and  his  marvellous  power  of  organisation  was  dis- 
played to  the  utmost ;  but  he  was  earnestly  seconded 
by  the  will  of  a  united  people,  as  strongly  expressed 
perhaps  as  in  1792-93.  Discontent  and  murmuring 
for  the  present  ceased  ;  the  Emperor  called  out  the 
conscripts  of  18 13  and  even  of  18 14;  the  French 
youth  gathered  in  thousands  around  the  eagles.  At 
the  same  time  he  restored  the  artillery  he  had  lost ; 
he  worked  hard  to  form  again  a  mighty  force  of 
cavalry ;  he  recalled  the  best  of  his  officers  and 
troops  from  Spain  to  strengthen  and  improve  the 
newly  raised  levies.  In  less  than  three  months  he 
had  200,000  men  in  line  ;  and  these  were  ultimately 
increased  to  more  than    500,000.     But   though   an 


'3 


STEEL  V/ORKS  CLUB  LIBRARY, 

JOLIET.  ILL 


1 94  Wellington 

extraordinary  creation  of  genius  and  power,  the  new 
Grand  Army  was  very  different  from  that  which  had 
crossed  the  Niemen  the  year  before,  so  far  as  this 
was  composed  of  French  elements.  Its  infantry  was 
largely  a  multitude  of  boys ;  its  cavalry  was  compar- 
atively scanty  and  raw:  its  artillery,  if  imposing,  was 
ill-organised  ;  it  was  in  every  sense  a  very  imperfect 
instrument  of  war. 

Napoleon  took  the  field  in  the  end  of  April,  1813  ; 
he  was  soon  joined  by  the  troops  of  Eugene  Beau- 
harnais,  the  remains  of  the  immense  host  that  had 
been  assembled  to  invade  Russia.  The  united  Prus- 
sian and  Russian  armies  had  meanwhile  advanced 
into  the  plains  of  Saxony,  in  order  to  encourage  the 
mighty  rising  already  stirring  nearly  all  Germany; 
this  was  a  dangerous  movement  in  a  military  sense ; 
it  exposed  them  to  their  great  enemy  when  far  from 
their  base.  The  hostile  forces  encountered  each  other 
on  the  historic  field  of  Lutzen ;  the  French  levies 
fought  with  the  valour  of  the  race ;  the  Allies  were 
compelled  to  retreat.  Napoleon  now  entered  Dres- 
den in  triumph,  though  his  want  of  cavalry  had 
made  his  late  success  fruitless;  another  and  a  much 
greater  battle  took  place  at  Bautzen,  on  the  verge  of 
Bohemia,  along  the  heads  of  the  Spree ;  it  was  inde- 
cisive, but  his  enemies  were  again  worsted.  Things 
now  looked  badly  for  the  cause  of  the  Allies  ;  had  the 
Emperor  boldly  followed  up  his  victory  he  might 
have  put  down  the  German  movement  for  a  time, 
nay,  have  stood  out  again  the  lord  of  the  Continent. 
But  events  were  to  take  an  extraordinary  turn  ;  the 
great  believer   in    the   power   of  the  sword  was  to 


Vitoria  195 

try  to  make  assurance  doubly  sure,  and  to  find 
his  calculations  completely  baffled  ;  the  way  was  to 
be  prepared  for  his  ultimate  overthrow.  Napoleon 
seems  to  have  been  convinced  for  some  months  that 
his  marriage  had  made  Austria  a  firm  ally,  to  be 
reckoned  upon  in  any  case;  when  he  felt  himself 
strong  enough  to  enter  the  lists  in  Germany  he  invited 
Austria  to  join  him  in  attacking  Prussia,  and  offered 
her  the  tempting  bribe  of  Silesia,  torn  from  her  by 
Frederick  the  Great  half  a  century  before.  The  af- 
fairs of  Austria  were  now  in  the  hands  of  the  far- 
sighted  and  calm-minded  Metternich  ;  in  the  state  of 
things  created  by  the  events  of  18 12  he  saw  a  pros- 
pect of  restoring,  to  some  extent,  the  power  his  coun- 
try had  lost  in  a  series  of  wars,  and  of  relieving  Ger- 
many, too,  from  the  unnatural  supremacy  of  France. 
He  therefore  eluded  the  offer  of  the  bribe  ;  and  gradu- 
ally with  consummate  skill,  he  assumed  the  attitude 
of  a  mediator  between  the  belligerent  powers,  while  he 
made  military  preparations  to  carry  out  his  policy, 
and  to  throw  the  sword  of  his  master  into  the  bal- 
ance. His  sympathies  certainly  were  with  the  Allies, 
and  probably  he  foresaw  that  Austria  would  be  drawn 
into  a  conflict  with  Napoleon  in  the  long  run  ;  but  it 
is  fair  to  add  that  the  peace  he  wished  to  establish 
would  have  left  Napoleon  by  far  the  chief  part  of  his 
Empire.  The  conduct  of  Metternich,  dictated  by 
profound  statecraft,  and  savouring,  no  doubt,  in  some 
degree,  of  guile,  exasperated,  nay,  incensed  Napoleon; 
he  resolved  to  avenge  himself  on  Austria  for  what 
he  called  her  gross  breach  of  faith  ;  he  even  offered 
to  treat  with  the  Czar,  in  order  to   turn  his   arms 


1 96  Wellingtoit 

against  her.  The  Allies,  however,  held  together ; 
Metternich  inclined  more  and  more  to  their  side ; 
Napoleon,  suspecting  part  at  least  of  the  truth, 
determined  to  defy  even  their  united  forces,  and 
to  contend,  if  necessary,  against  embattled  Europe. 
To  accomplish  this  it  was  essential  to  increase  his 
military  power ;  he  believed  that  he  would  gain  more 
by  time  than  any  coalition  could  ;  he  signed  an  ar- 
mistice at  Pleisnitz  in  June,  1813;  this  has  been 
called  the  greatest  mistake  of  his  life.  Nevertheless 
his  position  was  so  commanding  that  all  was  hesita- 
tion and  doubt  for  some  weeks ;  Metternich  and  no- 
tably his  master  were  slow  in  making  up  their  minds. 
Events  in  the  distant  theatre  of  the  war  in  Spain  did 
much  to  decide  their  halting  purpose ;  I  pass  on  to 
direct  attention  to  them. 

The  situation  in  the  Peninsula  appeared  to  be  not 
hopeless  for  the  invaders  after  the  retreat  from  Bur- 
gos. Salamanca  had  been  a  terrible  defeat ;  the 
flight  from  Madrid  had  been  a  disaster  for  Joseph  ; 
Andalusia  had  been  permanently  lost.  But  Welling- 
ton had  been  forced  back  to  the  verge  of  Portugal ; 
and  though  his  resources  for  war  were  being  largely 
increased,  he  had  narrowly  escaped  very  grave  dan- 
gers. The  French  armies,  at  the  close  of  181 2,  were 
extended  upon  an  immense  front,  from  Valencia, 
on  the  south-east,  to  the  Biscayan  seaboard  ;  they 
still  numbered  much  more  than  two  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  men  on  paper.  But  Napoleon,  after 
the  late  catastrophe,  was  obliged,  we  have  seen, 
greatly  to  reduce  these  forces  when  he  was  reorgan- 
ising the  shattered  power  of  France  ;  he  drew  nearly 


Vitoria  1 9  7 

30,000  men  from  Spain  ;  these,  with  their  officers, 
were  the  flower  of  his  troops  in  that  kingdom.  In 
the  military  operations  of  1813  the  French  were  prob- 
ably not  more  than  180,000  strong,  perhaps  not 
150,000  in  arms  around  the  eagles.  This  force,  as 
before,  was  divided  into  five  armies,  that  of  Suchet, 
in  Valencia  and  the  provinces  in  the  east ;  that  of 
the  north,  under  the  command  of  Clausel,  pro- 
tecting the  communications  between  Madrid  and 
Bayonne  ;  that  of  the  Centre,  now  in  the  hands 
of  D'Erlon,  spread  for  the  most  part  around  the 
capital ;  that  of  Soult,  who  had  been  replaced  by 
Gazan — the  Marshal  had  been  recalled  from  Spain 
— disseminated  in  the  valley  of  the  upper  Tagus, 
and,  finally,  that  of  Marmont,  still  called  the  Army 
of  Portugal,  on  the  Tormes  and  in  the  valley  of 
the  upper  Douro,  with  Reille,  a  capable  officer,  at 
its  head.  The  first  four  armies,  however,  were  be- 
set by  enemies  in  almost  every  direction,  and  it  was 
a  weighty  task  for  the  Army  of  Portugal  to  match 
Wellington  on  the  borders  of  Leon.  The  expedition 
from  Sicily  kept  Suchet  near  the  coast ;  Aragon  and 
Catalonia  swarmed  with  guerrillas.  The  rising  in  the 
north,  conducted  by  Mina  and  other  skilful  chiefs, 
had  become  more  formidable  than  ever  since  the 
attack  on  Burgos  ;  it  resembled,  it  was  said,  the  war 
in  La  Vendee  ;  Clausel  was  not  sufficiently  strong  to 
put  it  down  anywhere.  As  for  the  army  of  D'Erlon 
and  that  of  Gazan,  they  were  threatened  by  two  or 
three  Spanish  armies,  not  powerful  indeed,  but  still 
a  danger,  and  requiring  to  be  held  in  check  and  ob- 
served.    For   the   moment,   however,  the   invaders 


i  9§  Wellingioli 

were  in  comparative  safety,  at  least  until  Wellington 
should  appear,  in  force,  on  the  scene. 

In  this  position  of  affairs,  Napoleon  gave  his  di- 
rections for  the  operations  of  the  French  armies 
in  Spain,  as  usual,  at  a  great  distance,  that  is,  from 
Paris.  His  real  policy  at  this  conjuncture  was  to 
endeavour  to  treat  with  England,  and  to  restore  Fer- 
dinand to  his  ancestral  throne,  taking,  however,  the 
provinces  north  of  the  Ebro  as  an  indemnity  for 
France,  and  perhaps  offering  Ferdinand  the  crown 
of  Portugal  in  exchange.  With  these  objects  in 
view  it  was  of  supreme  importance  to  him  to  have  a 
powerful  force  in  Biscay,  Navarre,  and  the  adjoining 
lands,  and  to  keep  his  communications  with  France 
secure;  he  did  not  wish  to  leave  Joseph  at  Madrid  ; 
he  was  at  heart  ready  to  abandon  nearly  all  Spain, 
could  Wellington  be  held  in  check  on  the  Portuguese 
frontier.  The  Emperor  accordingly,  in  the  first 
days  of  1813,  ordered  that  a  great  change  should  at 
once  be  made  in  the  positions  of  the  invaders  in 
Spain,  Suchet  alone  being  left  as  before  in  the  east. 
Joseph  was  to  assemble  the  Army  of  the  Centre 
around  Valladolid,  on  the  line  of  the  communications 
with  France ;  he  was  to  have  only  a  few  thousand 
men  in  the  capital.  The  chief  part  of  the  Army  of 
Portugal  was  to  fall  back  from  the  country  it  now 
occupied,  and  to  join  hands  with  the  army  of 
Clausel ;  these  united  forces  were  to  crush  the  insur- 
rection in  the  north  ;  should  this  be  accomplished 
speedily,  as  was  to  be  expected,  Reille  ought  to 
have  time  enough  to  return  to  the  upper  Douro. 
Simultaneously  the  army  of  Gazan  was   to    march 


Vitoria  1 99 

from  the  upper  Tagus  to  the  upper  Douro,  and 
to  hold  Wellington  back  on  that  line  ;  it  was  to  main- 
tain an  offensive  attitude,  especially  if  reinforced 
by  the  Army  of  Portugal.'  These  directions  were 
right  enough  in  principle,  in  order  to  give  effect  to 
Napoleon's  views  ;  but  issued  as  they  were  far  from 
the  theatre  of  the  war,  they  reached  Joseph  several 
weeks  late,  and  when  they  reached  him  they  were 
very  ill  obeyed.  The  King  moved  to  Valladolid, 
but  too  slowly  ;  he  left  half  of  the  Army  of  the 
Centre  behind  at  Segovia ;  he  placed  a  whole  divi- 
sion of  Gazan's  army  in  Madrid  :  evidently  he  could 
not  endure  the  thought  of  quitting  the  capital.  At 
the  same  time  more  than  three-fourths  of  the  Army 
of  Portugal  were  detached  to  the  assistance  of  Clausel; 
a  mere  fraction  only  remained  on  the  upper  Douro, 
Reille  and  Clausel  were  kept  employed  for  weeks  in 
coping  with  the  insurrection  in  the  north  ;  and  even 
in  this  they  were  far  from  successful.  As  for  the 
army  of  Gazan,  it  reached  the  upper  Douro,  but  in 
greatly  diminished  force  ;  and  it  had  hardly  any  sup- 
port from  the  remnants  of  the  Army  of  Portugal. 
When  the  season  for  military  operations  had  come 
the  French  armies,  scattered  and  largely  directed 
northwards,  were  thus  dangerously  exposed  in  the 
highest  degree,  should  they  be  attacked  by  Welling- 
ton in  force  from  the  western  verge  of  Leon. 

The  British  commander,  during  these  events,  had 
been  maturing  his  deep-laid  designs  ;  after  the  ruin 
that    had    befallen   the  French  in    Russia,  and   the 


'  For  Napoleon's  instructions,  see  Corr.,  pp.  433-491,  and  especially 
pp.  506-507. 


200  Wellin^toji 


2>' 


faulty  disposition  of  their  armies  in  Spain,  he  had 
good  hopes  of  decisive  success  in  the  campaign  at 
hand.  The  national  mind  of  England  had  been 
profoundly  stirred  by  the  catastrophe  of  1812  and 
the  German  rising ;  the  fall  of  Napoleon  seemed  im- 
minent ;  the  men  of  the  militia  flocked  to  the  army 
in  thousands  ;  Parliament  was  eager  to  do  anything 
to  further  the  contest  in  Spain.  As  commander-in- 
chief,  too,  of  the  Spanish  armies  Wellington  had  ob- 
tained additional  elements  of  military  strength  ;  he 
had  repaired  to  Cadiz  to  meet  the  Cortes  ;  that 
Assembly  had  pledged  itself  to  second  his  efforts. 
In  the  spring  of  1813  he  disposed  of  considerably 
more  than  200,000  men  ;  half  of  this  force  was  com- 
posed of  Spanish  troops,  for  the  most  part  in  the 
eastern  provinces  ;  the  other  half  comprised  his  Brit- 
ish and  Portuguese  army,  from  70,000  to  80,000  fight- 
ing men,  in  the  highest  state  of  efficiency  for  war, 
and  besides  some  30,000  Spaniards,  better  soldiers 
than  most  of  the  levies  of  their  race.  Wellington 
had  more  than  100,000  men  in  his  hands  ;  he  had 
left  nothing  undone  to  make  them  ready  to  take 
the  field  and  to  march  rapidly  over  long  distances ; 
and  he  had  the  support  of  the  bands  of  the  omnipre- 
sent guerrillas,  of  British  squadrons  commanding  the 
northern  seaboard,  and  of  the  Sicilian  expedition  on 
the  coast  at  the  east.  He  was  now  distinctly  su- 
perior to  the  enemy  in  force  ;  the  plan  of  his  in- 
tended operations  was  grand  yet  simple.  He  would 
fall  on  the  French  armies  in  his  front,  which  certainly 
would  not  be  as  strong  as  his  own  ;  he  would  turn 
their   positions    upon   the   Douro  ;    he   would  force 


LORD  LYNEDOCH. 
(After  the  painting  by  Sir  Thomas  Lawrence.) 


Vitoria  201 

them  to  retreat  before  they  could  unite  ;  he  would 
threaten  their  communications,  perhaps  seize  them, 
continually  outflanking  them  on  his  left,  and  having, 
if  possible,  brought  them  to  bay,  he  would,  if  success- 
ful, drive  them  across  the  Pyrenees.  This  fine  con- 
ception was  thoroughly  carried  out,  if  one  or  two 
shortcomings  perhaps  appear  ;  the  possession  of  the 
northern  seaboard,  of  which  he  was  assured,  would 
obviously  facilitate  the  great  outflanking  move- 
ment. 

Wellington  had  his  preparations  made  in  the  last 
days  of  April ;  his  operations  had  begun  by  the 
middle  of  May.  He  marched  with  some  90,000 
men  ;  his  left  wing,  about  40,000  strong,  under 
Graham,  a  lieutenant,  who  had  distinguished  him- 
self at  Salamanca  and  on  other  fields,  had  advanced 
through  the  difficult  country  of  the  Trasos  Montes; 
his  task  was  to  cross  the  Esla,  in  the  first  instance, 
and  to  join  the  main  army  on  the  upper  Douro. 
Wellington's  centre  and  right  wing  numbered  some 
50,000  m.en  ;  his  object  was  to  effect  the  passage  of 
the  upper  Douro,  turning  the  defences  of  the  French 
on  the  river,  and  attacking  the  enemy  should  he  re- 
sist ;  the  British  chief,  besides,  disposed  of  a  motley 
force  of  guerrillas  and  of  Spanish  troops  and  levies, 
perhaps  20,000  or  30,000  strong,  which,  moving  along 
the  northern  coast,  was  to  co-operate,  if  required, 
in  the  outflanking  movement,  Wellington  left  his 
headquarters  in  the  third  week  of  May  ;  "  Farewell, 
Portugal,"  it  is  said  he  exclaimed,  so  confident  was 
he  of  decisive  success  in  Spain.  By  the  26th  of  May 
he  was  at  Salamanca  with  his  centre ;   Hill,  with  the 


202  Wellingto7t 

right  wing,  was  at  Alba,  upon  the  Tormes  ;  a  French 
division  fell  back  after  a  mere  show  of  resistance; 
the  chief  part  of  the  army  was  thus  approaching  the 
Douro.  But  Graham,  at  the  head  of  the  left  wing, 
had  been  delayed  by  accidents  ;  he  was  not  over  the 
Esla  until  the  1st  of  June  ;  Wellington  had  been 
compelled  to  pause  for  some  days,  and  had  even 
thought  it  necessary  to  see  Graham.  Such  are  the 
difificulties  of  widely  divided  movements,  as  a.  rule 
not  to  be  commended  in  war,  but  perfectly  to  be 
justified  in  the  present  instance.  The  British  com- 
mander crossed  the  Douro  on  the  3rd  of  June  ;  had 
Graham  joined  him,  as  had  been  arranged,  in  the  last 
days  of  May,  the  weak  forces  of  the  French  upon 
the  Douro  would  have  been  completely  surprised 
and  in  part  destroyed,  nay,  Joseph  might  have  been 
involved  in  an  immense  disaster. '  But  the  success 
already  obtained  had  been  great,  the  line  of  the 
upper  Douro  had  been  seized  ;  the  positions  which 
the  enemy  held  on  the  river,  and  which  had  been 
fortified  at  different  points,  had  been  turned  or  forced 
almost  without  a  shot  being  fired  ;  the  detachment 
of  the  Army  of  Portugal  and  the  army  of  Gazan, 
weakened  as  it  had  been,  had  no  choice  but  to  retreat 
before  greatly  superior  forces  ;  writers  seem  to  be  in 
error  who  have  maintained  that  the  French  could 
have  made  a  stand  on  the  Douro.  Wellington  made 
a  halt  at  Toro  on  the  river  for  two  days ;  we  per- 
haps see  here  again  his  characteristic  slowness  in 
making  the  most  of  probable  success  ;  he  might,  it 

'Napier  is  emphatic  on  this  point.     ^&q  History  of  the  Peninsular 
War,  iii.,  194,  Routledge  Edition. 


Vitoria  203 

has  been  said,  have  come  up  with  and  routed  the 
enemy.'  His  army,  however,  had  marched  a  great 
distance,  and  it  was  necessary  to  have  it  well 
in  hand;  it  has  been  justly  remarked  that  "  it  was 
prudent  to  gather  well  to  a  head  first,  and  the 
general  combinations  had  been  so  profoundly  made 
that  the  evil  day  for  the  French  was  only  de- 
ferred." - 

Meanwhile  Joseph,  possibly  given  a  brief  respite 
had  been  endeavouring  to  retrieve  his  mistakes,  and 
to  concentrate  his  forces  around  Valladolid.  The 
division  left  at  Madrid  rejoined  the  army  of  Gazan  ; 
the  Army  of  the  Centre  was  assembled  at  Valladolid  ; 
the  Army  of  Portugal,  partly  reinforced,  fell  back  in 
order  to  draw  near  its  supports.  In  the  first  days  of 
June  the  three  armies  were  around  Valladolid,  or 
near  that  city ;  the  army  of  Gazan  beyond  Tor- 
desillas ;  the  Army  of  the  Centre  at  Valladolid; 
the  Army  of  Portugal,  that  is,  only  a  part  of  it, 
between  Medina  Rio  Seco  and  Palencia  north- 
wards. Joseph  had  now  more  than  50,000  men  in 
hand ;  but  the  greater  part  of  the  Army  of  Portugal 
and  the  whole  army  of  Clausel  were  far  away  in  the 
north  ;  in  fact,  Clausel  had  reached  Pampeluna  and 
the  coast,  making  efforts  to  crush  the  guerrilla  rising  ; 
from  40,000  to  50,000  men  were  thus  at  a  great  dis- 
tance from  the  main  army;  Wellington  was  ap- 
proaching in  irresistible  force;  Joseph  is  not  to  be 
blamed  for  deciding  to  retreat.  But  here  two  capital 
mistakes  were  made,  most  discreditable  to  Jourdan, 

'  Napier,  History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  iii.,  194. 
«  Ibid. 


204  Wellington 

the  chief  of  Joseph's  staff,  who  at  this  conjuncture 
showed  a  want  of  capacity  unworthy  of  the  former  vic- 
tor of  Fleurus.  The  impedimenta  of  the  French  were 
enormous:  siege  guns,  the  material  of  the  garrison  of 
Madrid,  all  that  belonged  to  a  fugitive  but  once 
brilliant  Court,  and  hundreds  of  non-combatant  men 
and  women  ;  these  incumbrances  should  at  once  have 
been  sent  forward  ;  they  were  allowed  to  follow  in 
the  track  of  the  retiring  army.  Again,  there  were 
numerous  positions  on  the  line  of  march,  for  the  most 
part  at  the  heads  of  the  Douro,  which  could  have 
been  made  excellent  points  of  defence ;  it  was  of  su- 
preme importance  to  occupy  these  and  to  retard  the 
advance  of  the  enemy  as  much  as  possible,  especially 
as  time  would  thus  be  afforded  to  the  largest  part  of 
the  Army  of  Portugal  and  to  the  forces  under  Clausel 
to  join  Joseph ;  a  real  general  could  certainly  have 
taken  advantage  of  these,  perhaps  even  have  found 
an  opportunity  to  strike  with  effect.  But  no  opera- 
tions of  this  kind  were  thought  of;  the  only  idea  was 
to  fall  back  on  Burgos,  on  the  line  of  the  communi- 
cations with  France ;  this  was  pusillanimous,  nay, 
contemptible  strategy. 

The  French  armies,  now  forming  a  united  mass, 
reached  Burgos  on  the  9th  and  the  loth  of  June; 
Joseph  had  sent  messages  to  Clausel  and  Reille  to 
come  into  line  with  him  as  quickly  as  possible ;  this 
was  apparently  all  that  occupied  the  troubled  mind 
of  the  King.  Wellington  pursued,  but  rather  cau- 
tiously, as  was  his  wont ;  he  had  expected  that  the 
enemy  would  make  a  stand  on  the  Carrion  and  the 
Pisuerga,  affluents  of  the  upper  Douro ;  he  had  pre- 


Vitoria  205 

pared  himself  for  a  trial  of  strength.  But  no  use  was 
made  of  these  and  other  positions  ;  slight  demonstra- 
tions of  resistance  were,  indeed,  attempted  ;  but  these 
were  fruitless  displays  and  came  to  nothing.  Reille 
and  a  part  of  the  Army  of  Portugal  had  now  joined 
the  King;  but  a  part  was  still  at  a  distance  under 
Foy,  and  Clausel  was  onl}^  adv^ancing  through  Na- 
varre;  from  25,000  to  30,000  men  were  thus  still  far 
away  from  the  principal  army,  Joseph  evacuated 
Burgos  on  the  13th,  but  he  was  now  at  the  head  of 
more  than  60,000  good  troops  elated  by  the  news  of 
Lutzen  and  Bautzen  ;  it  is  pitiable  to  reflect  that  he 
simply  continued  to  retreat,  dragging  with  him  an 
immense  and  dangerous  burden,  and  not  venturing 
to  defend  a  single  point  of  vantage.  The  King,  too, 
and  Jourdan  marched  in  a  wrong  direction:  they  fol- 
lowed the  main  line  of  the  communications  between 
Madrid  and  Bayonne ;  this  exposed  them  to  attack 
from  Wellington's  left,  and  especially  to  the  great 
outflanking  movement  which  formed  part  of  his  origi- 
nal design  and  which  might  be  extended  even  from 
the  coast.  And,  at  this  crisis,  a  real  commander 
might  possibly  have  baffled  the  British  General,  cer- 
tainly have  secured  a  large  reinforcement  to  the  re- 
treating army.  Clausel  was,  reaching  Logrono,  on 
Joseph's  right;  he  commanded  about  fifteen  thou- 
sand men  ;  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  the  King 
marching  to  join  him  ;  and  perhaps  Foy,  too,  might 
have  been  brought  into  line.  But  the  French  leaders 
pursued  their  untoward  course,  passively  clinging  to 
their  communications  and  making  their  way  along 
the  main  roads  to  the  heads  of  the  Ebro,     This  was 


2o6  Wellincrton 


i> 


playing  into  the  hands  of  Wellington ;  continuing 
steadily  the  outflanking  movement,  and  pressing  the 
enemy's  right  as  he  fell  back,  he  rapidly  swung  round 
his  left  wing,  and  advancing  with  the  mass  of  his. 
army,  he  forced  his  adversaries  into  Vitoria  and  the 
adjoining  country  where,  being  not  far  from  the  foot 
of  the  Pyrenees,  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  avoid 
battle.  This  grand  movement  had  been  seconded 
by  movements  from  the  seaboard,  on  which  the 
British  General  had  always  reckoned. 

By  the  evening  of  the  19th  of  June  the  three 
bodies  of  which  the  King's  army  was  composed 
were  assembled  around  Vitoria  and  the  adjoining 
lands;  they  were  huddled  together  in  ill-united 
masses,  disordered  after  the  discreditable  retreat. 
The  town  rises  from  a  small  plain  encompassed  by 
hills,  which  afford  favourable  positions  for  defence, 
the  Zadorra,  a  feeder  of  the  Ebro,  runs  before  its 
front ;  the  main  road  to  Bayonne  and  another 
road  to  Pampeluna,  through  the  Pyrenees,  formed 
avenues  for  retreat.  The  French  army  was  about 
sixty  thousand  strong,  and  as  Clause!  and  Foy  were 
near  at  hand  Joseph  might  accept  a  battle  with 
some  chances  of  success, — at  least  might  make  the 
British  General  pay  dear  for  a  victory.  But  the 
miserable  arrangements  which  from  first  to  last  were 
made  by  the  French  commanders  in  this  campaign 
were  continued  up  to  the  latest  moment.  The  ac- 
cumulation of  impedimenta  which,  in  the  event  of  a 
reverse,  would  entangle  and  encumber  a  retiring 
army,  were  collected,  for  the  most  part,  in  and 
near  Vii:oria ;  a  fraction  only  was  sent  forward   and 


Vitoria  207 

away  ;  and  this  required  an  escort  of  two  thousand 
or  three  thousand  men,  to  this  extent  weakening 
the  principal  force.  It  was  imperative  to  summon 
Clausel  and  Foy  to  the  field,  and  possibly  they 
might  have  accomplished  this  had  the  orders  been 
transmitted  by  armed  bodies  of  men ;  but  the 
task  was  committed  to  guides  and  peasants,  who 
ought  never  to  have  been  entrusted  with  such  a  mis- 
sion. Above  all  it  was,  of  course,  essential  to  recon- 
noitre the  ground  and  to  place  the  army  upon  good 
positions ;  the  whole  of  the  20th  might  have  been 
employed  for  this  purpose,  but  nothing  of  the  kind 
was  done  or  even  attempted.  No  doubt  Jourdan 
was  ill  and  could  not  mount  a  horse  ;  but  there  were 
excellent  officers  in  the  French  army  ;  that  they 
neglected  this  duty  it  is  to  be  greatly  feared  was  due 
to  their  characteristic  disputes  and  jealousies.  As 
the  result,  the  morning  of  the  21st  of  June  found 
the  French  army  dispersed  and  scattered,  in  a  word, 
unprepared  to  encounter  a  well-directed  attack. 
The  right  wing,  about  half  of  the  Army  of  Portugal, 
under  Reille,  was,  so  to  speak,  in  the  air  ;  it  was  be- 
yond the  Zadorra  and  held  two  of  its  bridges.  The 
centre  and  left,  led  by  D'Erlon  and  Gazan,  were  at 
a  distance  of  six  or  seven  miles  from  Reille,  and 
were  separated  by  the  Zadorra  from  that  General; 
and  of  the  seven  bridges  on  the  river,  not  one  was 
broken,  a  mistake  exceedingly  difficult  to  explain. 
The  position  of  the  French  army,  in  fact,  was  such 
that  defeat  at  one  point  would  lead  to  defeat  in 
all. 

Joseph  and  his  chief  of  the  staff  had  hoped  that  they 


2o8  Wellington 

would  be  given  the  21st  of  June  to  place  their  army 
in  a  position  to  fight,  and  to  get  ready  for  the  battle 
now  manifestly  at  hand.  They  reckoned,  however, 
without  their  host  ;  Wellington  was  upon  them  on 
the  morning  of  that  day,  a  day  of  disgrace  for  the 
French  commanders-in-chief,  but  not  for  their  brave, 
if  unfortunate,  troops.  The  British  General  disposed 
of  some  80,000  men,  20,000  of  these  perhaps  being, 
however,  Spaniards  ;  little  more  than  60,000  were 
actually  engaged.  The  French  must  have  been 
57,000  or  58,000  strong,  all  good  soldiers  of  a  single 
race  ;  had  they  been  directed  with  ordinary  fore- 
thought and  care,  they  might  possibly  have  kept  Wel- 
lington at  bay,  certainly  have  rallied  Clausel  and  Foy 
and  made  good  their  retreat.  But  everything  went 
wrong  with  them  on  this  fatal  occasion  :  what  ought 
to  have  been  at  least  a  hard-fought  battle  ended  in  a 
complete  and  shameful  disaster.  The  attack  began 
by  a  movement  of  the  Spaniards  against  the  French 
left;  the  assailants  fell  on  their  enemy  advancing 
through  the  defiles  of  Puebla,  but  Gazan  success- 
fully maintained  his  ground,  though  he  is  said  to 
have  been  wanting  in  energy  and  resource.  Ere- 
long, however,  Hill,  crossing  the  Zadorra  on  intact 
bridges,  came  to  the  aid  of  the  Spaniards  with  a  con- 
siderable force,  and  gradually  bore  back  the  divi- 
sions of  Gazan  ;  and  Wellington,  in  command  of  the 
British  centre,  having  also  easily  got  over  the  river, 
attacked  D'Erlon  with  largely  superior  numbers. 
The  two  French  generals  endeavoured  to  make  a 
stand  on  an  eminence,  which  gave  them  a  point  of 
vantage,  but  they  were  slowly  driven  back  towards 


Vitoria  209 

Vitoria,  though  their  troops  fought  with  the  most 
determined  courage.  Reille,  meanwhile,  had  been 
fiercely  assailed  by  Graham  ;  but  he  defended  his 
position  with  resolution  and  skill ;  the  bridges  he 
held  were  taken  and  retaken  ;  the  fis^ht  ra^ed  lone 
and  furiously,  without  any  marked  effect.  But  the 
defeat  of  Gazan  and  D'Erlon  compelled  Reille  to 
retreat  ;  he  was  necessarily  involved  in  the  fate  of 
his  colleagues,  and,  isolated  as  he  was,  was  exposed 
to  a  crushing  disaster  ;  he  drew  his  brave  soldiers 
across  the  Zadorra,  and  kept  the  road  to  Pampeluna 
open,  a  movement  that  may  have  saved  the  French 
army  from  complete  destruction.  The  Army  of 
Portugal  and  its  chief  retrieved  the  honour  of  France 
on  this  calamitous  day. 

While  Reille  had  been  playing  this  distinguished 
part,  the  rest  of  the  French  army  was  being  forced 
back  through  the  passes  leading  into  the  plain  of 
Vitoria.  The  defence  was  for  a  time  stubborn ; 
positions  were  held  to  the  last  moment ;  clouds  of 
skirmishers  were  thrown  out  to  cover  the  retreat ; 
the  fire  of  the  artillery  was  well  sustained  and  in- 
tense. But  Gazan  and  D'Erlon  were  overmatched  ; 
nothing  could  withstand  the  irresistible  liritish  on- 
set ;  Wellington  advanced  upon  a  flood  tide  of  vic- 
tory. The  last  stand  was  made  on  heights  in  front 
of  Vitoria  ;  these  were  carried  after  a  brave  resist- 
ance ;  the  allied  troops  had  soon  taken  possession  of 
the  town,  driving  before  them  enemies  now  com- 
pletely beaten.  A  terrible  spectacle  then  was  seen, 
a  warning  to  military  chiefs  who  neglect  their  duty. 
The  immense  incumbrances  of  the  defeated  army 
14 


2 1  o  Wellincrton 

spread  all  round  ;  guns,  trains,  material  of  war  of 
every  kind  retarded  the  flight  of  the  disordered 
masses ;  the  French  were  meshed,  so  to  speak,  in 
toils  of  their  own  making.  Panic  fell  on  the  host 
already  breaking  up  ;  the  terrified  artillerymen  aban- 
doned their  pieces,  the  infantry  and  cavalry,  mingled 
together,  sped  onwards  in  precipitate  rout.  The 
spoil  taken  by  the  victors  was  prodigious  ;  out  of 
one  hundred  and  fifty  guns  the  French  carried  off 
but  two;  the  treasure-chest  of  Joseph  and  the  plun- 
der of  a  devastated  kingdom  were  speedily  captured. 
Jourdan  lost  his  staff,  and  the  King  his  papers. 
Vitoria  and  the  surrounding  plain  was  covered  with 
swarms  of  non-combatants,  fine  ladies  and  gentle- 
men, camp-followers,  and  a  multitude  of  the  de- 
graded of  their  sex.  The  great  road  to  Bayonne 
had  been  seized  by  Wellington  ;  Joseph,  with  the 
remains  of  his  army,  was  very  fortunate  in  escaping 
along  the  road  to  Pampeluna,  from  whence  he  got 
through  the  Pyrenees  passes.  Meanwhile,  Foy  and 
Clausel  had  not  joined  the  King,  and  for  some  time 
were  in  the  gravest  danger.  Foy,  however,  suc- 
ceeded in  crossing  the  frontier  ;  Clausel  was  nearly 
caught  by  the  enemy  in  pursuit,  but  ultimately  made 
good  his  way  into  France  through  the  pass  of  Jaca, 
having  thought  of  marching  on  Saragossa  and  rally- 
ing Suchet.  The  French  armies,  which  a  few  weeks 
before  had  been  assembled  around  Madrid, and  which, 
had  they  been  rationally  led,  would  have  tasked 
Wellington's  powers  to  the  utmost,  had  been  driven 
out  of  Spain  in  dishonourable  rout.  Of  Vitoria,  in- 
deed, Napier  has  truly  written  :  "  Never  was  an  army 


Vitoria  2 1 1 

more  hardly  used  by  a  commander,  and  never  was  a 
victory  more  complete."  ' 

Napoleon  was  not  unnaturally  incensed  at  the  ruin 
which  had  befallen  his  arms  in  Spain,  and  at  the  fla- 
grant misconduct  which  had  led  to  Vitoria.  "  It  is 
time  to  have  done  with  imbeciles,"  he  angrily  wrote  ; 
he  deprived  Joseph  of  his  command,  and  made  him  a 
prisoner  in  all  but  the  name  ;  he  sent  off  Soult,  "  the 
only  military  head  in  Spain,"  to  try  to  repair  disas- 
ters beyond  remedy.  The  Peninsula  had  now  been 
set  free  from  its  French  invaders,  except  where 
Suchet  was  isolated  in  the  east,  and  a  few  garrisons 
held  fortresses  on  the  verge  of  the  Pyrenees.  The 
mighty  efforts  which  the  Emperor  had  made  to 
achieve  what  he  thought  would  be  an  easy  conquest 
had  failed  after  a  struggle  of  five  years  ;  the  armies 
which  had  entered  Lisbon,  Madrid,  and  Seville  had 
been  defeated  and  at  last  disgraced  ;  Salamanca  and 
Vitoria  had  followed  Baylen  ;  the  power  of  the  Em- 
pire had  been  sapped  and  its  renown  marred  ;  the 
Peninsula  had  been  well-nigh  as  fatal  as  Russia. 
This  succession  of  reverses  had  been  partly  due  to 
the  energy  of  the  ubiquitous  Spanish  rising,  even  to 
the  efforts  of  the  Spanish  armies  in  the  field  ;  it  was 
largely  due  to  the  faulty  operations  of  the  French, 
and  to  the  jealousy  and  the  disputes  of  their  chiefs, 
nay,  to  the  mistakes  made  by  Napoleon  himself,  in 
attempting  to  direct  war  from  a  distance,  conduct  cer- 
tain to  lead  to  defeat  and  disaster,  which  strategic 
genius  can  in  no  sense  justify.  But  beyond  question 
a  principal   cause  had    been   the  capacity   and  the 

^  History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  iii.,  206,  Routledge  Edition. 


2 1 2  Wellington 

profound  insight  of  the  British  commander,  who  had 
from  the  first  seen  how  the  invaders  of  the  Peninsula 
could  be  withstood  with  success,  and  had  marked  the 
vulnerable  heel  of  the  Imperial  Achilles;  who,  un- 
dismayed by  the  colossal  forces  of  the  Lord  of  the 
Continent,  had  resolutely  stood  on  the  verge  of  Por- 
tugal, and  had  stemmed  the  torrent  of  French  con- 
quest ;  who  had  gradually  formed  an  invincible 
army,  composed  though  it  was  of  different  races ; 
who  in  military  and  civil  affairs  had  shown  the  great- 
est wisdom ;  who  with  admirable  perseverance  and 
skill  had  defeated  his  adversaries  over  and  over 
again;  and  who,  finally,  had  in  a  magnificent  passage 
of  war  driven  an  army  hardly  inferior  in  real  strength 
to  his  own  from  the  frontier  of  Portugal  across  the 
Pyrenees.  Turning  to  the  special  events  of  1813  in 
Spain,  their  most  striking  feature  is  the  weakness 
and  want  of  judgment  seen  in  the  conduct  of  the 
leaders  of  the  French  army  ;  we  are  here  reminded 
of  the  Soubises  and  Cleymonts  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War.  No  doubt  Napoleon  may  have  been  in  fault 
in  his  direction  of  the  Army  of  Portugal,  in  the  first 
instance,  though  this  is  by  no  means  certain  ;  but 
this  cannot  excuse  the  miserable  retreat  to  Vitoria, 
and  the  enormous  mistakes  made  before  the  battle. 
Yet  these  considerations  do  not  in  the  slightest  de- 
gree lessen  the  admiration  that  is  justly  due  to  the 
grand  plan  of  operations  formed  by  Wellington,  and 
carried  out  to  the  end  with  complete  success.  If 
once  or  twice  he  possibly  might  have  done  more,  if  he 
was  characteristically  cautious  rather  than  daring,  the 
preparations  he  made  for  the  campaign,  his  march  to 


Vitoria  2 1 1 


o 


the  Esla  and  the  Douro,  and  the  movements  by 
which  he  forced  his  enemy  to  fight  at  Vitoria,  and 
struck  him  down  in  a  decisive  battle,  rank  high 
among  the  fine  operations  of  war. 

Vitoria  and  the  expulsion  of  the  invaders  from 
Spain  confirmed  the  Allies  in  a  purpose  still  not  per- 
haps fixed  ;  the  weight  of  Wellington  in  the  balance 
of  Fortune  was  great.  The  interview  between  Napo- 
leon and  Metternich,  in  which  the  terms  of  Austria 
were  treated  with  scorn,  had  been  held  before  the  in- 
telligence had  arrived  of  the  ruin  in  the  Peninsula  of 
the  Emperor's  power ;  but  Austria  had  soon  openly 
thrown  in  her  lot  with  Prussia  and  the  Czar  ;  the  Co- 
alition thenceforward  had  probably  resolved  on  war ; 
it  would  hardly  have  made  the  peace  which  had  been 
offered  before.  The  Congress  of  Prague  was  a  mere 
phantom.  The  Allies  made  preparations  on  a  gigan- 
tic scale  ;  they  had  nearly  700,000  men  under  arms ; 
the  League  was  more  formidable  than  any  which 
France  had  encountered  from  the  days  of  Louis 
XIV.  to  the  existing  time.  The  vassals,  too,  of  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  though  they  sent  their 
contingents  to  their  still-dreaded  lord,  knew  that 
their  own  subjects  were  rising  against  him ;  new 
and  strange  enemies  were  crossing  Napoleon's  path  : 
Moreau  and  Bernadotte  had  appeared  in  the  allied 
camp ;  Murat,  infirm  of  purpose,  was  thinking,  per- 
haps, of  treason.  And  not  only  the  material,  but 
the  moral  forces,  which  tell  with  such  potent  effect  in 
war,  were  being  thrown  into  the  scale  against  France 
and  the  Emperor.  The  resolve  of  great  races,  held 
down  but  not  subdued,  to  throw  ofT  the  detested 


214  Wellington 

yoke  of  a  conqueror,  the  intense  desire  to  avenge  the 
wrongs  of  years,  now  stirring  all  the  Teutonic  peo- 
ples, sustained  the  cause  of  the  League  in  Europe. 
On  the  opposite  side  was  a  great  military  genius, 
indeed,  and  the  pride  and  the  energy  of  a  famous  na- 
tion, but  of  a  nation  tired  of  despotic  rule  and  well- 
nigh  exhausted.  The  ultimate  result  of  such  a  con- 
flict could  be  hardly  doubtful ;  but  Napoleon  cared 
little  for  these  things ;  he  had  greatly  increased  and 
strengthened  his  immature  army;  he  was  at  the  head 
of  half  a  million  of  men;  he  held  the  fortresses  of 
Germany  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Vistula.  Astride  on 
the  Elbe  from  the  Bohemian  hills  to  Hamburg,  as 
in  former  years  he  had  been  astride  on  the  Adige, 
he  was  confident  that  he  could  defy  his  enemies.  A 
gleam  of  victory  was  to  shine  on  his  arms  ;  but  the 
contest  of  1813  was  to  end  at  Leipzig. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

FROM  THE  PYRENEES  TO  THE  GARONNE 

Wellington  made  a  Field  Marshal  and  Duque  di  Vitoria — Soult  reor- 
ganises the  French  array — Battles  of  the  Pyrenees — Siege  of 
San  Sebastian — Fall  of  the  place — The  Campaign  of  1813  in 
Germany — Complete  defeat  of  Napoleon  at  Leipzig — The  French 
armies  driven  across  the  Rhine — Wellington  crosses  the  Bidas- 
soa — Soult  fortifies  his  lines  on  the  Nivelle — The  lines  forced — 
Soult  had  previously  called  on  Suchet  to  support  him  — Soult  at 
Bayonne — His  formidable  position — Wellington  crosses  the  Nive 
— Danger  of  this  operation — The  allied  army  divided  on  the 
river — Soult  concentrates  his  forces  and  attacks  it — Indecisive 
battles  of  the  loth  and  13th  of  December — Hostilities  in  the 
field  resumed  in  February,  1814 — Difficulties  of  Soult  and  Wel- 
lington— Wellington  attacks  Soult — Passage  of  the  Adour — 
Battle  of  Orthes — Retreat  of  Soult  to  Toulouse — Rising  against 
Napoleon  at  Bordeaux — Pursuit  of  Wellington — Fall  of  Napo- 
leon— Battle  of  Toulouse — End  of  the  War. 

FOR  his  triumph  at  Vitoria  WeUington  re- 
ceived the  staff  of  a  Field  Marshal  of  Eng- 
land, an  honour  that  had  been  in  abeyance 
for  nearly  half  a  century.  The  Spanish  Govern- 
ment, too,  made  him  Duque  di  Vitoria;  the  re- 
nown of  his  achievements  had  become  so  great 
that  it  was  seriously  proposed  to  place  him  at  the 
head  of  the  allied  armies  about  to    contend  with 

215 


2  1 6  IVcllino-ton 

Napoleon  on  the  Elbe.  He  had  driven  Joseph  in 
rout  out  of  Spain ;  it  has  been  said  that  he  might 
have  crossed  the  Pyrenees  and  destroyed  the  shat- 
tered wrecks  of  the  French  armies  before  they  could 
be  ready  again  to  appear  in  the  field.  This  view, 
however,  is  no  doubt  erroneous,  even  if,  as  a  rule,  he 
was  slow  in  following  up  success.  The  allied  army 
had  lost  more  than  5000  men  at  Vitoria ;  in  fact,  the 
loss  of  the  enemy  in  killed  and  wounded  had  not 
been  much  greater  ;  and  the  country  swarmed  with 
thousands  of  disbanded  troops,  gorged  with  the  plun- 
der strewn  over  the  scene  of  the  battle,  and  rioting  in 
all  kinds  of  excess.  Wellington  complained  of  this 
conduct  in  indignant  language,  exaggerated,  perhaps, 
as  after  the  retreat  from  Burgos'  ;  but  time  was  re- 
quired to  restore  discipline  ;  the  army  was  hardly 
able  to  move.  Besides,  he  could  not,  at  this  junc- 
ture, have  loosed  his  hold  on  Spain  and  begun  what 
would  have  been  a  premature  invasion  of  France. 
The  fortress  of  San  Sebastian  on  the  coast,  where  the 
frontiers  of  France  and  Spain  approach  each  other 
from  the  west,  was  still  held  by  a  French  garrison ; 
it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  reduce  this  before  the 
Bidassoa,  the  river  on  the  border,  could  be  passed. 
The  fortress,  too,  of  Pampeluna,  in  Navarre,  was  still 
in  the  hands  of  the  enemy ;  it  was  connected  with 

'  Selection,  p.  706  :  "I  am  quite  convinced  that  we  have  now 
out  of  our  ranks  double  the  amount  of  our  loss  in  battle,  and  that  we 
have  lost  more  men  in  the  pursuit  than  the  enemy  have.  .  .  .  This 
is  the  consequence  of  the  state  of  discipline  of  the  British  Army." 
Wellington  doubtless  was  too  severe;  but  a  British  army  has  perhaps 
always  shown  a  tendency  to  get  out  of  hand,  whether  in  victory  or 
in  defeat. 


v/^ 


'It  ■' 


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■^■^1 

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t^\: 


■"^X 
■/i-^ 


From  the  Pyre7iees  to  the  Garonne      2 1 7 

San  Sebastian  by  a    main    road  along  the  Spanish 
vtrg&  of  the  Pyrenees  ;  this  could  not  be  left  as  a 
menace  on   Wellington's  flank,  should  he  attempt 
to  force  the  Pyrenean  barrier.    But  the  principal  ob- 
stacle to  the  suggested  movement  was  the  presence 
of  Suchet  in  the  eastern  provinces  of  Spain,  dispos- 
ing of  a  well-organised  and  still  powerful  army.    The 
Marshal,  no  doubt,  had  been  held  in  check  by  the 
expedition  which   had   landed  from   Sicily  and  by 
the  guerrillas  in  Aragon  and  Catalonia  ;  but  Murray, 
the  ofificer  who  had  failed  on  the  Douro,  had  been 
forced  to  raise  the  siege  of  Tarragona,  and  was  un- 
able to  leave  the  line  of  the  coast ;  his  operations  had 
been  of  little  use  to  the  British  arms.     At  this  very 
time  Suchet  might,  not  improbably,  have  marched 
on  Saragossa,  nay,  have  attacked  Wellington ' ;    in 
any  case,  as  long  as  he  remained  in  the  east  of  Spain 
he  gravely  threatened  Wellington's  right  flank  and 
rear.   This  circumstance  alone  forbade  a  march  across 
the  Pyrenees  ;   the  British  General  clearly  perceived 
this,  and  continued  to  fear  what  Suchet  might  do, 
though   the   Marshal,  in  the  events  that   followed, 
never  ventured  to  make  an  offensive  movement. 

Meantime,  Soult,  invested  with  plenary  powers, — 
"Lieutenant-General  of  the  Emperor"  was  his  im- 
posing title, — had  been  reorganising  and  restoring 
the  French  armies,  which  had  fled  through  the  Pyr- 
enees after  Vitoria.  He  had  been  joined  by  Clauscl 
and  Foy  ;  he  had  obtained  a  small  reinforcement  of 

'  Napier  disliked  Suchet,  for  he  would  not  co-operate  with  Napier's 
friend,  Soult.  But  the  historian  is  right,  here. — History  of  the  Pen- 
insular fVar,  iii.,  230. 


2 1 8  Wellington 

conscripts  ;  he  had  replaced  from  Bayonne  the  artil- 
lery lost  in  the  battle  ;  he  disposed  erelong  of  nearly 
78,000  men  ;  he  had  united  his  forces  into  a  single 
army  under  three  subordinates,  D'Erlon,  Reille,  and 
Clausel.  In  about  a  month  he  was  ready  to  take  the 
field  ;  he  was  to  engage  in  a  protracted  contest  with 
Wellington,  of  which  the  issue  was  long  doubtful, 
and  in  which,  though  he  was  at  last  worsted,  he  gave 
proof  of  no  ordinary  powers.  A  few  words  must  be 
said  as  regards  this  eminent  soldier.  Soult  had  a 
true  eye  to  the  great  combinations  of  war  ;  as  a 
strategist  he  was  far-seeing  and  profound  ;  without 
the  inspiration  of  Napoleon,  he  was  one  of  the  best 
of  the  master's  disciples.  He  had  also  much  te- 
nacity and  firmness  of  purpose  ;  he  could  stubbornly 
play  to  the  last  a  losing  game  in  war ;  he  could  pre- 
pare and  array  an  army  with  remarkable  skill.  But 
he  did  not  possess  the  divine  gift  of  genius  ;  as  a 
tactician  in  battle  he  does  not  rank  high  ;  as  a  com- 
mander we  see  two  distinct  faults  in  him  :  in  action 
he  was  often  backward  and  remiss  ;  he  was  apt  to  fail 
in  carrying  out  effectively  well-conceived  designs. 
Napoleon  and  Wellington  concurred  in  their  estimate 
of  Soult :  "  he  was  excellent  in  council,"  the  Em- 
peror said,  "but  in  execution  feeble"';  "he  knew 
how  to  place  his  troops  in  the  field,"  was  his  adver- 
sary's remark,  "  but  he  did  not  know  how  to  make 
the  best  use  of  them."  The  career  of  the  Marshal  in 
Spain  had  not  been  brilliant ;  it  had  been  marked  by 
his  characteristic  faults  ;  but  he  had  distinguished 
himself  on  many  fields  of  fame ;  his  struggle  with 

'  Gourgaud,  ii.,  424. 


SIR  GEORGE  MURRAY. 
(After  the  painting  by  H.  \V .  Pickersgill.) 


From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne      2 1 9 

Wellington  was  to  add  to  his  renown  as  a  warrior, 
though  he  had  not  the  tactical  genius  of  the  British 
commander,  nor  yet  his  admirable  insight  and  readi- 
ness in  the  actual  shock  of  battle.  It  must,  how- 
ever, be  said,  in  justice  to  Soult,  that  his  antagonist 
was  usually  superior  in  force,  and  commanded  an 
army  excelling  in  every  quality  that  makes  a  truly 
formidable  instrument  of  war.  The  British  soldiery 
— and  the  Portuguese  were  now  nearly  their  equals — 
always  terrible  in  a  trial  of  strength  for  their  murder- 
ous fire  and  their  undaunted  steadiness — this  was 
the  reason  that  the  column  could  not  stand  before 
the  line — had  by  this  time  got  rid  of  most  of  the  en- 
cumbrances of  the  past  ;  they  were  not  inferior  to 
their  foes  in  manoeuvring  skill '  ;  they  had  a  great 
leader  and  excellent  lesser  chiefs ;  above  all,  a  series 
of  victories  had  given  them  that  moral  power,  worth, 
it  has  been  truly  said,  "  three  times  more  than  mere 
physical  force."  "  The  Peninsular  army,"  in  Wel- 
lington's language,  "could  now  go  anywhere  and  do 
anything " ;  for  its  size  it  was  unquestionably  the 
best  of  European  armies.  The  French  soldiery,  on 
the  other  hand,  if  brave  as  their  race,  and  with  its 
aptitude  for  war,  were  depressed  by  the  memories  of 
incessant  defeats ;  they  were  at  heart  afraid  of  their 
enemies,  and  spellbound  by  them  ;  they  could  still 
fight  well,  but  seldom  could  make  a  resolute  stand  ; 
they  had  become  to  a  certain  extent  demoralised, 
and  this  was  especially  the  case  with  their  oflficers. 


'  '*  L'armte  anglais -portugaise,"  Napoleon  has  remarked  {Com., 
x::xii.,  369),  "  etait  devenue  aussi  manoeuvriere  que  I'armee  fran- 
yaise. " 


2  20  WeLLinsion 


Vb' 


They  were,  in  a  word,  no  longer  the  men  of  Jena  and 
Austerhtz,  nay,  of  Busaco  and  Fuentes  d'Onoro. 
It  should  be  added  that  the  army  of  Soult  con- 
tained bad  foreign  elements  in  its  ranks,  and  was, 
by  degrees,  crowded  with  comparatively  worthless 
conscripts. 

Having  made  a  spirited  and  stirring  address  to  his 
troops,  in  which  their  late  chiefs  were  severely  con- 
demned, Soult  resolved  to  assume  a  daring  offensive. 
His  position  gave  him  a  great  strategic  advantage. 
The  French  army  extended  along  the  northern 
verge  of  the  Pyrenees ;  it  had  the  command  of  good 
lateral  roads,  connecting  the  passes  into  the  range 
and  facilitating  movements  in  that  direction  ;  it  held 
the  fortress  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  which  screened 
its  operations  to  a  certain  extent.  The  army  of 
Wellington,  on  the  other  hand,  though  it  controlled 
the  main  road  from  San  Sebastian  to  Pampeluna, 
had  very  inferior  lateral  roads,  spreading,  as  it  was, 
on  the  southern  edge  of  the  mountains  ;  this  made 
the  communication  between  its  separate  parts  dif- 
ficult, and  exposed  these  to  a  concentrated  attack 
in  force.'  Wellington,  moreover,  though  superior 
to  Soult  in  numbers — he  was  at  the  head  of  perhaps 
100,000  men — had  blockaded  Pampeluna,  at  one  ex- 
tremity of  his  line,  and  was  laying  siege,  on  the  other, 
to  San  Sebastian ;  the  double  operation,  which  he 
acknowledged  was  a  mistake, — he  may  have  under- 
rated the  organising  power  of  his  foe, — engaged  a 
very  considerable  part  of  his  army  ;  and  his  right 
wing  was  certainly  too  weak,  and  lay  open  to  a  bold 

'  See  Selection,  p.  720. 


Fyo))i  Ike  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne      221 

and  resolute  stroke.  Soult  availed  himself  with  re- 
markable skill  of  the  favourable  situation  this  pre- 
sented to  him.  Leaving  only  small  detachments  in 
his  rear,  he  massed  together  the  forces  of  Reille  and 
Clausel,  from  35,000  to  40,000  strong,  and  moving 
rapidly  through  the  famous  pass  of  Roncesvalles, 
he  advanced  against  Wellington's  feeble  right,  while 
D'Erlon,  at  the  head  of  nearly  20,000  men,  pushed 
onward  through  the  pass  of  Maya  against  the  allied 
centre.  All  went  auspiciously  with  the  Marshal  at 
first;  on  the  25th  of  July  he  bore  back  with  30,000 
men  the  brigades  opposed  to  him  not  10,000  strong; 
D'Erlon  thrust  aside  or  defeated  part  of  the  forces  of 
Hill,  inflicting  a  loss  that  was  severely  felt.  But  at 
this  point  the  shortcomings  of  Soult  were  seen ;  he 
halted  on  the  26th  and  made  no  use  of  his  success ; 
he  almost  halted  again  on  the  27th,  awaiting,  prob- 
ably, the  approach  of  D'Erlon,  whose  movements 
had  been  unaccountably  slow.'  These  hesitations 
gave  Wellington  just  sufficient  time  to  reinforce  his 
gravely  imperilled  wing,  though  he  remained  consid- 
erably inferior  in  force  ;  he  was  attacked  on  the  28th 
by  his  adversary  at  Sorauren,  almost  within  sight  of 
Pampeluna;  but  the  advantage  gained  by  the  Mar- 
shal had  been  well-nigh  lost.  The  French  fell  on 
with  determined  valour,  but  they  had  to  assail  and 
carry  a  strong  position  ;  the  result  was  what  had 

'  I  cannot  credit  the  statement  of  Napier  that  Soult's  inaction  on 
the  27th  was  caused  by  his  having  heard  shouts  announcing  the  pre- 
sence of  Wellington.  In  a  conversation  at  St.  Helena,  related  by 
Gourgaud,  Napoleon  declared  that  "  Soult  ought  to  have  over- 
whelmed Wellington  on  the  25th."  This  criticism  is  exaggerated, 
but  has  some  truth  in  it. ^Gourgaud,  ii.,  416. 


2  2  2  Wellington 


■i> 


been  seen  at  Busaco ;  after  hours  of  "  bludgeon 
work,"  as  was  Wellington's  phrase,  the  army  of 
Soult,  practically  beaten,  gave  up  the  contest. 

On  the  29th  of  July  not  a  shot  was  fired  ;  the  hos- 
tile armies  maintained  the  ground  they  held,  but 
Wellington's  right  had  been  much  strengthened  ; 
D'Erlon,  with  eighteen  thousand  men,  had  at  last 
come  into  line  with  his  chief.  Soult  had  still  a  su- 
periority of  force ;  but  he  had  learned  a  lesson  from 
the  battle  of  the  28th,  which  his  lieutenants  had 
urged  him  not  to  fight  ;  he  did  not  venture  upon 
another  engagement ;  he  formed  a  new  combination 
worthy  of  a  very  able  strategist.  Hill,  defeated  on 
the  25th,  was  drawing  near  Wellington  ;  but  he  was 
isolated  and  still  along  way  off;  Soult  resolved  to 
fall  on  him,  and  to  sweep  him  out  of  his  path,  while 
Wellington,  still  at  Sorauren,  was  to  be  held  in 
check.  Should  Hill  be  overwhelmed,  as  there  was 
reason  to  expect,  the  Marshal  might  destroy  some  of 
his  enemies  along  the  hills  and,  above  all,  might  be 
able  to  reach  the  main  road  from  Pampeluna  to  San 
Sebastian,  to  advance  by  it  and  to  raise  the  siege  of 
that  fortress.  Taking,  therefore,  D'Erlon  and  some 
of  his  own  troops  with  him,  and  leaving  Reille  and 
Clausel  with  the  mass  of  the  army,  before  Welling- 
ton, Soult  attacked  Hill  on  the  30th  with  very  su- 
perior forces ;  he  succeeded  in  turning  the  British 
General's  left,  and  all  but  reached  his  great  object, 
the  main  road,  which  might  become  an  avenue  to 
no  ordinary  success.  But  Hill  made  a  tenacious  de- 
fence, disputing  every  inch  of  the  ground  ;  he  fell 
back  to  another  position ;  the  progress  of  the  Mar- 


From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garo7ine      223 

shal  was  thus  arrested  ;  meanwhile  Wellington  had 
struck  a  terrible  stroke,  which  at  once  frustrated  all 
his  opponent's  projects.  Relying  on  his  tactical 
power  and  on  the  ascendency  his  troops  had  gained, 
the  British  chief  attacked  Reille  and  Clausel  on  the 
30th ;  he  endeavoured  to  turn  both  their  flanks, 
and  at  the  same  time  he  assailed  their  front  ;  a  point 
of  vantage  was  won  on  the  extreme  French  right ; 
this  was  the  prelude  to  complete  success.  In  this 
second  battle  of  Sorauren,  as  it  has  been  called, 
Soult's  men  did  not  give  proof  of  their  wonted  cour- 
age ;  they  felt  the  effects  of  the  reverse  of  two 
days  before ;  they  gave  way  along  the  whole  line  ; 
the  division  of  Foy  was  cut  off  from  the  beaten 
army.  This  sudden  disaster  placed  the  Marshal  in 
the  gravest  danger  ;  he  was  exposed  to  a  twofold 
attack  by  Wellington  and  Hill ;  but  he  ably  extri- 
cated himself,  if  with  enormous  loss.  Rallying  his 
shattered  divisions  as  best  he  could,  he  threaded  the 
pass  of  Dona  Maria  on  his  right,  and  thence  he 
made  good  his  retreat  to  the  frontier,  having  only 
once  attempted  to  run  the  risk  of  a  stand.  He  had 
certainly  been  hardly  treated  by  Fortune  ;  he  had 
no  reason  to  suppose  that  his  lieutenants  would  be 
easily  beaten  ;  they  were  in  considerable  force  and 
held  a  strong  position.  But  Soult's  operations  from 
first  to  last  revealed  his  merits  and  defects  in  war; 
he  could  plan  well,  but  in  carrying  out  his  plans  was 
not  good  ;  this  was  most  perilous  when  in  the  pre- 
sence of  such  a  man  as  Wellington.  D'Erlon,  too, 
was  greatly  to  blame  for  his  delays;  had  he  pushed 
forward  on  the  26th  and  the  27th,  the  issue  of  the 


224  Welli7igton 

conflict  might  have  been  very  different.  As  regards 
the  British  commander,  he  made  a  strategic  mistake 
in  attacking  two  fortresses  at  the  same  time,  and  in 
leaving  his  right  well-nigh  uncovered  ;  it  was  well  he 
had  not  Napoleon  before  him  ;  as  it  was,  his  position 
was  made  difficult  in  the  extreme.  But  his  counter- 
stroke  on  the  30th  was  in  his  best  manner,  if  un- 
doubtedly he  owed  much  to  his  invincible  troops. 
The  losses  of  Soult  in  this  interesting  passage  of 
arms  was  from  twelve  thousand  to  thirteen  thou- 
sand men,  those  of  Wellington  less  than  eight 
thousand,  and  victory  had  once  more  abandoned  the 
eagles. 

After  the  battles  of  the  Pyrenees,  as  they  have 
been  named,  Soult  took  a  strong  position  in  front  of 
Bayonne,  holding  the  range  of  hills  along  the  Ni- 
velle,  a  stream  parallel  to  the  Nive  and  the  Adour, 
but  keeping  possession  of  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port. 
His  adversary,  taught  by  recent  experience,  en- 
trenched the  passes  leading  into  the  mountain  range 
and  placed  his  army  in  a  better  situation  for  defence; 
there  were  no  operations  in  the  field  for  some  weeks. 
The  British  commander  now  turned  to  the  siege  of 
San  Sebastian,  which  had  been  for  some  time  an  ob- 
ject of  attack ;  as  has  been  said,  it  was  essential  to 
master  the  place  before  the  borders  of  France  could 
be  crossed.  San  Sebastian  was  not  a  great  strong- 
hold in  itself,  but  its  position  and  the  peculiarities 
of  the  ground  made  it  very  difficult  to  besiege  and 
reduce ;  and  it  was  defended  by  an  able  command- 
ant and  a  devoted  garrison.  The  fortress  stands  on 
an  isthmus  projecting  into  the  Bay  of  Biscay  ;  it  is 


Fro)ii  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne.      225 

covered  to  the  north  by  a  river  called  the  Urumcea, 
and  to  the  south  by  a  creek,  an  inlet  of  the  Bay  ;  on 
the  west  it  is  commanded  by  a  steep  hill,  crowned 
at  this  time  by  an  old  castle  ;  the  only  easy  approach 
to  it  is  by  a  rising  ground  from  the  east.  The  for- 
tifications were  not  imposing  ,•  but  they  comprised  a 
succession  of  outer  and  inner  works  which  formed  a 
kind  of  fourfold  barrier ;  the  hill  and  the  castle  were 
points  of  vantage ;  an  enemy  advancing  to  assault 
the  place  would  be  dangerously  exposed  to  the  gar- 
rison's efforts.  Two  of  the  outworks  were  carried  on 
the  17th  of  July;  but  an  assault  on  the  breaches 
which  had  been  made  on  the  northern  front  was 
successfully  repulsed  on  the  25th,  the  day  when 
Soult  forced  the  Pyrenean  passes.  The  siege  was 
now  suspended  for  more  than  three  weeks,  for  a 
sufficient  battering  train  had  not  arrived  from  Eng- 
land ;  Graham,  who  commanded  the  besieging  force, 
though  at  the  head  of  ten  thousand  men,  not  to 
refer  to  a  covering  army,  was  compelled  to  remain 
well-nigh  wholly  inactive.  This  respite  gave  the  de- 
fenders— they  were  less  than  three  thousand  strong 
— an  opportunity  turned  to  the  best  advantage  by 
their  skilful  chief,  Rey ;  some  reinforcements  came 
in  from  the  Bay,  not  intercepted  by  the  British 
cruisers ;  the  breaches  were  re-trenched  and  made 
difficult  to  force ;  batteries  were  constructed  at  dif- 
ferent points  ;  works,  where  injured,  were  carefully 
repaired  ;  a  great  mine  was  laid  along  the  spaces, 
where  the  besiegers,  it  was  foreseen,  would  make 
the  assault ;  San  Sebastian,  in  a  word,  was  immensely 
strengthened.     The  battering  train  had  reached  its 

IS 


2  26  WellinQio7i 


'i> 


destination  on  the  19th  of  August ;  for  twelve  days 
a  tempest  of  shot  and  shell,  directed  from  sand-hills, 
called  the  Chofres,  beyond  the  Urumcea,  ravaged  the 
place  with  its  stern  work  of  destruction.  But  the 
defences  of  San  Sebastian  were  by  no  means  ruined  ; 
redoubts,  a  hornwork,  and  batteries  remained  in- 
tact ;  a  general  assault  was  ordered  for  the  31st  ;  but 
the  storming  columns  advanced  between  the  river 
and  the  walls,  exposing  their  flank  to  the  fire  of  the 
enemy.  They  were  struck  down  in  hundreds  before 
the  breaches  were  attained  :  had  not  the  great  mine 
been  exploded  at  the  wrong  moment  the  assault,  it 
is  believed,  would  have  failed.  The  stormers,  how- 
ever, were  supported  by  a  body  of  Portuguese,  who 
crossed  the  Urumcea  at  the  very  nick  of  time ;  the 
breaches  were  at  last  carried,  after  a  desperate 
struggle  ;  the  result  was  partly  due  to  a  mere  acci- 
dent. The  castle  on  the  hill  held  out  for  some  days; 
it  was  surrendered  on  the  9th  of  September  ;  San 
Sebastian  had  been  defended  for  nearly  ten  weeks. 
As  in  the  case  of  other  assaulted  places  in  that  age, 
the  excesses  of  the  victors  were,  unhappily,  great. 

Soult  made  an  effort  to  relieve  San  Sebastian  ;  he 
crossed  the  Bidassoa,  but  not  in  force  ;  the  attempt 
was  tentative,  and  came  to  nothing.  The  belliger- 
ent armies  returned  to  their  former  positions  along 
either  side  of  the  Pyrenees  to  the  west  ;  no  import- 
ant movements  were  made  for  a  month.  Here  Wel- 
lington's inaction  has  again  been  censured  ;  but 
sound  military  reasons  explain  his  conduct.  He  had 
to  form  a  new  base  before  he  invaded  France,  and  to 
procure  supplies  on  the  seaboard  of  Biscay  ;  his  ad- 


From  the  Pyrejiees  to  the  Garomie      227 

vance  from  Portugal  had  been  unexpectedly  rapid  ; 
he  was  in  need  of  requirements  of  all  kinds  for  his 
troops.     Besides,   faction   at   Lisbon   had  raised  its 
head    against    him ;  the    Spanish    Government   had 
been  incensed  by  exaggerated  reports  as  to  the  ex- 
cesses of  his  men  ;  it  indulged  in  angry  and  noisy 
threats ;    it    was    weakened    by    intestine    discord. 
Moreover,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  issue  of 
the  contest  in  Germany  was  still  doubtful ;  Napoleon 
held  his  commanding  position  on  the  Elbe.     Wel- 
lington well  knew  what  the  great  warrior  was ;    he 
had  little  faith  in  the  operations  of  his  foes.     Should 
the  Emperor  win  a  decisive  battle  on  the  plains  of 
Saxony,  he  would  be  able  to  reinforce  his  Spanish 
armies  ;  he  retained  many  of  the  fortresses  in  the 
East;  Soult    and    Suchet,   if    largely    strengthened, 
niight  make  it  go  hard  with  the  British  commander. 
And  even  if  no  great  additions  were  made  to  their 
forces,  the  position  of  Suchet  in  the  east  of  Spain 
was  a  dangerous  menace,  and   Pampeluna  had  not 
yet  fallen.     Lord  William  Bentinck  had  superseded 
Murray  ;  but  his  operations  and  those  of  the  Spanish 
armies  in  Aragon  and  Catalonia,  were  of  little  use, 
he   had  been    defeated  at  Ordal,  beyond  the  lower 
Ebro.     Suchet  was  superior  in  real  strength  in  the 
eastern   provinces  ;  he  had  advanced  into  Catalonia 
towards  the  frontier,  leaving  garrisons  in  several  fort- 
resses  in  his   rear;  if  he  was  now  far  distant  from 
Wellington's  flank,  it  was  possible  for  him  to  join 
hands   with  Soult, — this   very   movement  we    shall 
see    was    proposed ;   the   united    forces    of    the  two 
marshals  would,  in  that  event,  be  formidable  in  the 


2  28  Wellington 

extreme.  Wellington,  therefore,  wished  to  dispose 
of  Suchct  before  venturing  into  France  :  he  even 
contemplated  operations  against  the  Marshal ;  from 
a  military  point  of  view  he  was  fully  justified. 

While  Wellington  and  Soult  were  thus  watching 
each  other,  ruin  was  befalling  Napoleon  and  his 
arms  in  Germany.  When  the  Emperor  rejected  the 
terms  of  the  Allies,  which  would  have  left  him  with 
hardly  diminished  power,  he  was  confident  that  he 
would  overwhelm  his  enemies,  and  be  once  more  the 
undisputed  Lord  of  the  Continent.  But  he  had 
wholly  underrated  the  strength  of  the  material  and 
moral  forces  arrayed  against  him  :  he  disposed,  no 
doubt,  of  half  a  million  of  men ;  but  his  army  was 
filled  with  rude  levies  and  discontented  foreigners; 
the  Allies  had  700,000  men  in  their  ranks ;  the  Prus- 
sian army  was  150,000  strong,  not  40,000,  as  he  had 
supposed;  all  Germany  from  the  Niemen  to  the  Rhine 
was  burning  to  rush  to  arms,  and  to  avenge  itself  on 
its  French  oppressors.  And  if  his  position  on  the 
Elbe  was  imposing,  it  was  weaker  than  his  position 
on  the  Adige  in  1796-7;  the  long  line  of  the  great 
river  could  be  more  easily  turned,  his  communica- 
tions with  France  were  insecure,  regard  being  had  to 
the  German  rising.  Napoleon,  too,  from  his  centre 
on  the  Elbe,  had  thrown  out  secondary  armies  in 
many  directions,  in  order  partly  to  strike  down 
Prussia,  which  he  rightly  judged  was  his  bitterest 
enemy,  and  partly  to  stretch  a  hand  to  the  large  gar- 
risons he  still  had  on  the  Oder  and  the  Vistula  :  this 
greatly  weakened  his  principal  army  and  exposed 
his  lieutenants  to  dangerous  attack.     He  had,  in  a 


From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne      229 

word,  aimed  at  and  grasped  too  much  :  scientific  and 
grand  as  his  strategy  was,  it  had  made  the  situation 
critical  for  him  :  had  he  fallen  back  to  the  Rhine  in 
1813  he  could  have  successfully  defied  the  Coalition's 
efforts.  Genius  in  war,  nevertheless,  for  a  time  tri- 
umphed :  the  Emperor  won  a  great  battle  at  Dres- 
den ;  and  but  for  the  disaster  of  Vandamme  at 
Culm,  the  trembling  scales  of  fortune  might  have  in- 
clined towards  France.  But  the  Allies,  acting  on  a 
preconcerted  plan,  the  credit  of  which  belongs  to 
Moreau,  and  avoiding  the  strokes  of  the  adversary 
they  feared,  fell  on  his  secondary  armies  one  after 
the  other :  Macdonald  was  defeated  on  the  Katz- 
bach  ;  Oudinot  met  the  same  fate  within  sio-ht  of 
Berlin  ;  Ney  was  routed  with  terrible  effect  at  Den- 
newitz  ;  the  losses  of  the  Emperor  were  enormous ; 
he  was  compelled  to  change  the  plan  of  his  cam- 
paign. He  marched  down  the  Elbe  hoping  to  seize 
Berlin,  and  to  crush  Prussia  in  a  decisive  trial  of 
strength  ;  but  Bliicher  had  successfully  crossed  the 
river  ;  Schwartzenberg  was  on  the  march  to  join 
Bliicher  ;  Bavaria  suddenly  declared  for  the  Allies  ; 
Jerome's  kingdom  of  Westphalia  disappeared ; 
Napoleon  had  no  other  choice  but  to  abandon  his 
design.  He  retreated  on  Leipzig,  where  the  greatly 
superior  forces  of  the  League  of  Europe  were  clos- 
ing around  him  ;  a  great  battle  of  two  days  followed  : 
on  the  first  the  advantage  remained  with  the  French  ; 
on  the  second  they  were  distinctly  worsted,  partly 
owing  to  the  defection  of  the  Saxon  contingent. 
The  defeated  army  was  now  driven  out  of  Leipzig  ; 
the  destruction  of  a  bridge  on  the  Elster  caused  the 


230  Wellington 

loss  of  many  thousands  of  men  ;  the  retreat  was 
marked  by  scenes  of  horror  and  despair,  like  those 
which  had  attended  the  retreat  from  Moscow.^  A 
gleam  shone  on  the  Emperor's  arms,  as  his  fugitive 
host  toiled  onwards  to  the  Main  :  the  Bavarian, 
Wrede,  was  defeated  at  Hanau,  but  this  was  the 
flicker  of  the  expiring  lamp.  The  Grand  Army  which 
a  few  weeks  before  had  seemed  to  defy  attack  on 
the  Elbe  had  been  destroyed  as  a  military  force  ;  a 
mere  wreck  only  sought  refuge  behind  the  Rhine : 
the  French  garrisons  in  Germany  had  been  lost  to 
their  country. 

At  the  instance  of  the  Allies  and  of  the  British 
Ministry,  Wellington  had  entered  France  a  few  days 
before  Leipzig.  His  military  object  was  to  seize 
Fuentarabia,  as  a  base  of  supplies  ;  he  was  still  not 
inclined  to  invade  the  country,  in  face  of  the  diffi- 
culties to  which  he  remained  exposed.  His  opera- 
tions were  successful  and  brilliant  :  he  deceived  his 
adversary  as  to  the  true  point  of  attack,  as  he  had 
deceived  him  before  upon  the  Douro  ;  he  crossed  the 
Bidassoa  by  fords  near  its  mouth,  and  drove  back 
Soult's  right  with  largely  superior  numbers.  Nearly 
at  the  same  time  he  carried  a  height  called  the  Great 
Rhune,  just  outside  the  main  positions  of  the  French  ; 
the  resistance  was  for  some  hours  stern,  but  the 
British  General  turned  the  mountain  by  the  left,  and 
had  erelong  compelled  the  enemy  to  retreat.  But 
as  yet  he  had  only  reached  the  edge  of  the  ground 
of  vantage  held  by  Soult,  a  range  of  eminences, 
we  have  seen,  along  the  Nivelle,  before  the  import- 
ant fortress  of  Bayonne.     The  Marshal  had  fortified 


From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne 


231 


this  position  with  skill  and  care  ;  it  bristled  with  re- 
doubts and  entrenchments  ;  a  double  series  of  lines 
protected   the  heights  ;  these  have  been  compared 
to  the  famous  lines  of  Torres  Vedras.     But  there 
was  an  essential  distinction  between  the  two  cases: 
Soult's  lines  were  hastily  constructed  in  face  of  the 
enemy  ;    he    commanded    a    brave,   but  a    defeated 
army  ;  and  Wellington,  unlike  Massena,  was  victori- 
ous and  had  a  superiority  of  force.      The  Marshal 
endeavoured    to    find    other    means   to   defend    the 
menaced    territory   of    France,    nay,    to    place    his 
antagonist  in  real  straits;    he  formed  a  combination 
worthy  of  his  strategic  powers.     Suchet  was  in  Cata- 
lonia  and    could   dispose  of   thirty   thousand  men, 
veteran  soldiers  of  an  excellent  quality ;  Soult  en- 
treated him  to  cross  the  frontier,  to  advance  through 
Roussillon,  and    to    join    hands    with    him    around 
Tarbfes  and  Pau  ;  the   united    armies,   fully   ninety 
thousand  strong,  would  then  break  intoSpain  through 
the  pass  of  Jaca,  and  fall  on  the  flank  and  rear  of 
Wellington  ;  should  they  defeat  the  British  chief  in 
a  great  battle,  they  would  perhaps  drive  him  back 
as  far  as  the  Douro.     It  was  a  fine  project,  and  it 
proves  how  Wellington  was  right  in   being   appre- 
hensive as  to  the  position  of  Suchet,  though  it  may 
be  doubted   if  the  two  French  armies  could  have 
made  good  their  way,  with  their  artillery,  through  the 
narrow  pass  of  Jaca,  especially  as  the  winter  was  at 
hand.     But  as  Suchet  would  not  operate  by  himself 
against  Wellington,   he   now   refused   to  accede    to 
Soult's  counsels ;  a  real  opportunity  may  have  been 
lost ;  the  French  commanders,  as  so  often  had  been 


232  Wellington 

the  case  before,  did  not  agree  with  each  other  and 
would  not  act  in  concert.' 

Pampeluna  had  fallen  on  the  31st  of  October;  a 
danger  on  Wellington's  right  flank  had  thus  been 
removed.  Leipzig  had,  by  this  time,  closed  the  cam- 
paign in  Germany  ;  the  British  chief  was  again  urged 
to  invade  France.  For  the  reasons,  however,  already 
given,  he  was  still  indisposed  to  an  operation  of  this 
kind  ;  the  weather,  too,  had  been  exceedingly  bad, 
and  the  Spaniards  in  his  camp  had  hardly  any  sup- 
plies. He  resolved,  in  the  first  days  of  November, 
to  storm  Soult's  fortified  lines;  the  result,  if  partly 
due  to  other  not  unimportant  causes,  was  a  fine 
example  of  his  admirable  coup  d'wil,  and  of  his  re- 
markable tactical  power,  but  also  of  his  adversary's 
defects  on  a  field  of  battle.  The  lines  to  be  assailed 
extended  on  a  front  from  Ainhoue  on  the  French 
left  to  the  right  on  the  sea;  they  formed,  we  have 
seen,  a  strong  twofold  barrier ;  they  were  held  by 
D'Erlon,  Clausel,  and  Reille,  with  probably  50,000 
men.  But  Foy  stood,  on  the  far  left,  with  a  large 
detachment,  intended  to  threaten  an  offensive  move- 
ment ;  in  the  events  that  followed  he  was  almost  out 
of  the  conflict.  Wellington's  army  was  divided  into 
three  main  bodies.  Hill  on  the  right,  Beresford  hold- 
ing the  centre — that  General  had  been  called  up  from 
Portugal;   Sir  John   Hope  was  in  command  on  the 

'  Soult,  before  this  time,  had  urged  Suchet  to  attack  or  to  threaten 
Wellington's  right  flank.  The  plan  of  a  combined  operation  is 
fully  explained  in  Napier's  Pcninsnla7-  War,  iii.,  310-314.  Napier, 
however,  is  always  on  the  side  of  Soult  when  he  refers  to  another 
French  colleague.  Good  judges  have  thought  Soult's  plan  very 
hazardous,  nay,  impracticable. 


From  tJic  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne     233 

left;  it  numbered  some  74,000  men.  Soult,  reckon- 
ing Foy,  had  perhaps  60,000.  The  attack  began 
on  the  loth  of  November ;  a  hill,  called  the  Lesser 
Rhune,  and  the  intervening  space  to  the  bridge  of 
Amotz,  upon  the  Nivelle,  formed  the  vulnerable 
point  in  the  Marshal's  lines ;  Wellington  perceived 
this  with  characteristic  insight ;  Hill  and  Beresford 
were  directed  to  master  the  point ;  their  combined 
forces,  more  than  40,000  strong,  bore  back  and  de- 
feated D'Erlon,  who  had  not  more  than  15,000  men. 
Clausel  made  an  obstinate  defence  at  the  centre, 
but  the  weakest  part  of  his  front  was  held  by  a  bri- 
gade only  ;  this  was  attacked  by  at  least  8000  men  ; 
he  was  erelong  driven  from  the  positions  he  held. 
Meanwhile  Foy  had  been  kept  in  check  by  a  small 
body  of  men,  and  Reille,  on  Soult's  right,  with 
25,000  troops,  was  paralysed  by  Hope  with  a  very 
inferior  force.  The  masterly  dispositions  of  the 
British  chief  had  thus  brought  overwhelming  num- 
bers against  the  French  left  and  centre ;  the  lines 
were  carried  along  this  space ;  the  first  line  of  the 
defence  was  untenable  and  was  soon  abandoned. 
Soult,  on  the  contrary,  had  arrayed  his  army  badly  ; 
Foy,  practically,  was  kept  out  of  the  battle ;  Reille 
was  unable  to  turn  his  divisions  to  account ;  the 
Marshal  made  no  real  attempt  to  improve  his  posi- 
tion. On  the  second  line  of  the  defence  little  resist- 
ance was  made;  the  twofold  obstacle  was  carried 
with  comparatively  little  loss.  The  issue  was  mainly 
due  to  the  ability  and  the  resource  of  Wellington. 
It  is  fair,  nevertheless,  to  Soult  to  remark  that  his 
soldiery  were  disheartened  by  the  rout  of  Leipzig, 


234  Wellington 

and  did  not  make  the  stand  that  might  have  been 
expected  from  them.' 

Notwithstanding  the  delays  which  had  been  laid 
to  his  charge,  the  British  General  had  invaded  France 
many  months  before  the  Allies.  Soult  was  much 
disconcerted  by  the  carrying  of  his  lines  ;  he  appears 
to  have  believed  that  they  were  impregnable ;  but 
he  was  a  tenacious  and  determined  soldier;  he  fell 
back  on  the  fortress  of  Bayonne,  and  entrenched 
himself  again  in  a  strong  position.  Bayonne  was 
only  a  place  of  the  third  order,  but  its  situation 
makes  it  a  point  of  vantage  for  defence  if  a  com- 
mander knows  how  to  turn  the  adjoining  ground 
to  account.  It  is  placed  on  the  confluence  of  the 
Adour  and  the  Nive,  both  large  rivers,  especially  in 
the  floods  of  winter;  the  tract  around  it  is  divided 
by  the  Nive,  which  separates  it  into  two  parts;  the 
lands  in  its  front  are  scarcely  practicable  for  troops 
in  a  rainy  season.  Having  strengthened  his  position 
by  inundations  and  field  works,  Soult  arrayed  his 
army  before  Bayonne,  extending  it  on  both  sides  of 
the  Nive ;  D'Erlon  was  on  the  left,  with  Foy  on  the 
extreme  left;  Clausel  held  the  centre,  Reille  the 
right.  The  Marshal  had  still  nearly  60,000  men,  but 
some  of  these  were  Germans,  and  there  were  a  num- 
ber of  conscripts.  Wellington  placed  his  army  nearly 
in  front  of  Soult,  but  occupied  only  one  side  of  the 

'  Napier's  comments  on  this  battle,  History  of  the  Peninsular 
War,  iii.,  340,  341,  are  very  discriminating  and  just.  He  clearly 
points  out  how  Wellington  brought  largely  superior  forces  to  the  de- 
cisive points,  and  how  Soult  failed  to  defend  them.  "  Against  such 
a  thunderbolt  of  war,"  he  remarks,  "there  was  no  defence  in  the 
French  ranks." 


From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne     235 

Nive;  Hill  was  on  the  right,  Beresford  in  the  centre, 
Hope  on  the  left;  the  troops  were  confined  to  the 
space  between  the  Nive  and  the  coast,  and  held  a 
somewhat  narrow  and  contracted  front.  The  army, 
however,  nearly  100,000  strong,  was  very  superior  to 
that  of  the  enemy.  The  British  General  would  have 
quickly  fallen  on  Soult  but  for  unexpected  difificul- 
ties  that  crossed  his  purpose.  The  Spaniards  in  his 
camp,  having  entered  France,  gave  a/ree  rein  to  ex- 
cesses of  all  kinds.  Wellington  had  no  choice  but  to 
make  severe  examples  ;  he  actually  sent  the  great 
body  of  these  troops  across  the  frontier,  retaining 
only  one  or  two  divisions,  and  necessarily  weakening 
to  some  extent  his  forces.  He  also  dreaded  a  rising 
of  the  population  around  him  ;  he  rightly  described 
it  as  a  martial  race.  He  issued  a  proclamation, 
pledging  himself  to  respect  persons  and  property, 
and  to  pay  for  supplies;  and  this  had  an  admirable 
effect  on  the  neighbouring  peasantry,  who,  as  a  rule, 
did  not  stir  from  their  homes.  These  wise  arrange- 
ments, characteristic  of  a  chief  intolerant  of  license 
and  stern  in  discipline,  but  essentially  humane,  like 
most  British  ofificers,  and  having  their  ingrained  re- 
spect for  order  and  law,  contributed  largely  to  his 
ultimate  success  ;  but  some  time  passed  before  they 
were  complete.  It  should  be  added  that  the  low- 
lands in  front  of  Bayonne  were  turned  into  swamps 
by  incessant  rains  ;  this  circumstance  alone  retarded 
the  intended  attack. 

By  the  first  week  of  December  Wellington  had 
his  arrangements  made  ;  he  resolved  to  cross  to  the 
side   of  the    Nive  he   had   not  yet    occupied.     His 


236  Wellington 

object  was  to  hem  in  Soult  in  Bayonne  ;  to  intercept 
the  supplies  of  his  enemy,  and  especially  to  cut  him 
off  from  St.  Jean  Pied  de  Port,  and  to  separate  him 
from  the  Pyrenean  passes.  But  the  attempt  was  to 
be  made  in  the  face  of  an  able  chief,  in  possession  of 
a  fortress  and  a  central  position,  which  gave  him 
shorter  lines  on  the  whole  scene  of  action  :  even  if 
successful  it  would  make  two  parts  of  the  allied 
army,  with  a  broad  river,  not  easy  to  cross,  between 
them.  The  movement  began  on  the  9th  of  Decem- 
ber: Hope  made  a  demonstration  against  Soult's 
right,  and  held  Reille,  though  superior  in  force,  in 
check  :  meantime,  Beresford  and  Hill,  meeting  but 
little  resistance,  crossed  the  Nive  at  the  two  points 
of  Ustaritz  and  Cambo,  and  established  themselves, 
in  force,  in  the  positions  they  had  won.  The  Mar- 
shal had,  in  fact,  been  surprised  by  a  bold,  rapid, 
and  well-conceived  attack  ;  his  adversary  had  seized 
the  northern  bank  of  the  Nive :  so  far,  he  had  com- 
pletely gained  his  object.  But  Wellington's  army 
was  now  divided  on  a  wide  stream  ;  the  operation, 
skilfully  carried  out  as  it  was,  was  in  the  abstract,  at 
least,  a  strategic  mistake,  to  be  justified  only  by  the 
ascendency  his  troops  had  attained  ;  Soult  seized  the 
opportunity  presented  to  him.  Availing  himself  of 
the  screen  which  his  entrenchments  and  Bayonne 
gave  him,  and  holding  the  chord  of  the  arc  on  which 
his  enemy  stood,  the  French  chief  assembled  his 
whole  army  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Nive:  he 
concentrated  nearly  sixty  thousand  against  thirty 
thousand  men  :  he  attacked  Wellington  on  the  loth 
of  December.     The  British  General,  as  in  July,  was 


Frovi  the  Py7'enees  to  the  Garonne     237 

in  no  doubtful  peril  ;  had  Soult  fallen  in  full  strength 
on  the  allied  centre,  he  would  have  found  only  a 
single  division  in  his  path  :  he  must  have  gained, 
possibly,  a  signal  victory.  But  the  Marshal,  from 
some  unknown  reason,  sent  Reille  with  all  his  forces 
against  Hope,  that  is,  against  the  left  of  his  foe, — 
a  badly  conceived,  almost  an  eccentric  movement, — 
and  Reille,  after  a  fierce  struggle  at  a  place  called 
Barrouilet,  was  repulsed.  Meanwhile  the  division  in 
the  centre  had  held  its  ground,  though  attacked  by 
Clausel  with  superior  numbers  :  but  it  could  hardly 
have  maintained  its  position  with  success,  had  not 
Soult  unexpectedly  given  up  the  attack.  Welling- 
ton, from  the  opposite  side  of  the  Nive,  had  ferried 
large  detachments  across  the  river ;  these,  though 
still  distant,  threatened  Soult's  left  flank  :  Clausel 
was  directed  by  his  superior  to  retreat  from  the 
heights  of  Bussussary,  which  he  had  nearly  won. 
Once  more  the  faults  of  the  French  commander 
appeared  ;  a  demonstration,  for  it  was  little  more, 
made  him  abandon  a  prospect  of  real  success  :  be- 
sides, he  had  not  chosen  the  true  point  of  attack, 
and  had  not  overwhelmed  his  enemy's  centre ; 
Reille,  too,  had  been  moved  in  the  wrong  direction. 
The  French  army  fell  back  on  Bayonne:  the  fine 
project  of  its  chief  had,  in  its  execution,  failed. 

Two  German  regiments,  after  this  hard-fought 
combat,  followed  the  example  of  the  Saxons  at  Leip- 
zig, and  went  over  to  Wellington's  camp.  But  the 
French  commander  was  not  dismayed  :  he  knew  the 
advantage  of  his  central  position  :  he  resolved  to 
seize  another  opportunity  to  attack.     On  the   nth 


238  Wellington 

and  1 2th  of  December  skirmishes  only  took  place; 
but  on  the  night  of  the  12th  a  flood  in  the  Nive 
swept  away  abridge  by  which  the  Allies  had  crossed  ; 
Hill  remained  isolated  on  the  northern  bank ;  he 
had  not  more  than  14,000  men  in  hand.  Soult 
had  been  defiling  his  army  through  Bayonne ; 
on  the  13th  he  fell,  with  35,000  men,  on  Hill:  the 
odds  were  immensely  in  the  Marshal's  favour,  if 
not  so  decisive  as  might  be  supposed.  The  ad- 
vance of  the  French  was  upon  a  narrow  front, 
and  by  roads  made  almost  impassable  ;  Soult  was 
unable  to  bring  more  than  20,000  men  into  ac- 
tion. The  assailants,  nevertheless,  had  much  the 
better  of  the  fight  for  some  hours :  their  artil- 
lery played  from  a  height  with  deadly  effect ;  Hill's 
centre  at  St.  Pierre  was  very  nearl}'  broken  :  two 
English  colonels,  afterwards  disgraced,  abandoned 
their  positions  and  drew  their  men  out  of  fire.  Vic- 
tory seemed  at  last  in  the  Marshal's  grasp  :  he  pushed 
forward  part  of  his  reserve ;  he  prepared  himself 
for  a  final  effort ;  in  this  instance  he  tried  to  strike 
hard,  and  home.  But  three  regiments,  two  British, 
one  Portuguese,  continued  to  make  a  fierce  resist- 
ance :  a  sudden  panic  fell  on  the  advancing  enemy, 
caused,  it  has  been  said,  by  a  mistaken  order  to  re- 
treat ;  at  the  very  crisis  of  the  fight  Soult's  columns 
came  to  a  stand,'  and  failed  to  make  use  of  the  ad- 
vantage they  had  gained.     Hill  was  gradually  rein- 


^'^z.Y^t.x'%  History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  iii.,  354,  significantly 
remarks  :  "  Yet  the  battle  seemed  hopeless,  for  Ashworth  was  badly 
wounded,  his  line  was  shattered  to  atoms  and  Barnes,  who  had  not 
quitted  the  field  for  his  former  hurt,  was  shot  through  the  body." 


From  the  Pyre7iees  to  tJic  Garonne      239 

forced  to  a  certain  extent  :  and  ultimately  Soult 
gave  up  the  contest.  But  Hill  for  a  time  was  in  the 
greatest  danger';  it  was  conspicuously  made  appar- 
ent, how  hazardous  it  is  to  have  an  army  divided 
upon  a  wide  river,  in  front  of  a  concentrated  enemy, 
especially  if  he  commands  a  fortress. 

Soult  retreated  into  Bayonne  after  this  indecisive 
battle;  he  did  not  venture  to  make  another  attack; 
he  devoted  some  time  to  restoring  his  weakened 
army  and  to  strengthening  his  position  around  the 
fortress.  Wellington  remained  in  possession  of  both 
banks  of  the  Nive;  he  continued  to  carry  out  his 
purpose,  that  is,  to  keep  his  adversary  within  Bay- 
onne, to  isolate  him,  to  cut  off  his  supplies,  and  to 
separate  him  from  Spain,  and  even  from  the  plains 
of  Gascony.  The  Marshal  eluded  these  operations 
with  skill  and  resource ;  he  left  a  considerable  garri- 
son in  Bayonne,  but  he  succeeded  in  maintaining  his 
communications  with  the  adjoining  country,  and  he 
held  his  army  in  readiness  to  march  to  the  upper 
Garonne,  where  he  still  hoped  to  join  hands  with 
Suchet,  who  was  about  to  abandon  Catalonia  and  to 
cross  the  frontier.  Hostilities,  however,  were  nearly 
suspended  for  about  two  months;  a  winter  of  ex- 
treme severity  prevented  operations  in  the  field,  and 
the  movements  of  the  British  chief  had  rightly  been 
made  to  depend  on  the  general  invasion  of  France 

'  Napier,  History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  iii.,  355,  points  this  out. 
"  The  Allies  could  not,  unsuccoured,  have  sustained  a  fresh  assault." 
Soult,  except  perhaps  at  Orthes,  was  never  so  near  victory  as  on  this 
occasion  :  of  his  operations  as  a  whole  Napier  says,  iii.,  356,  "  Tlie 
French  general's  plan  was  conceived  with  genius,  but  the  execution 
offers  a  great  contrast  to  the  conception." 


240  Wellington 

by  the  League  of  Europe.  Meanwhile  the  Empire 
of  Napoleon  was  menaced  on  every  side  with  ruin  ; 
Murat  had  abandoned  his  benefactor  and  joined  the 
Allies;  Holland  and  even  Belgium  were  in  revolt;  the 
hosts  of  the  Coalition  were  upon  the  Rhine  ;  France, 
exhausted  by  her  efforts  in  18 13,  seemed  utterly  un- 
able to  prolong  the  war;  a  movement  against  her 
ruler  had  begun  ;  discontent  agitated  the  terrified 
bodies  of  the  State.  The  situation  appeared  des- 
perate, but  the  great  master  of  war  did  not  give  up 
hope  ;  he  left  nothing  undone  to  restore  his  shat- 
tered military  power,  and  though  he  listened,  per- 
haps sincerely,  to  overtures  for  peace,  he  prepared 
to  contend  for  Italy  and  the  France  of  the  natural 
boundaries.  These  events  profoundly  affected  the 
position  of  Soult ;  the  Marshal  was  being  cast  on  a 
stormy  sea  of  troubles  ;  large  drafts  from  his  best 
troops  were  made  by  the  Emperor;  his  army  was 
reduced  to  some  40,000  men  ;  increasing  numbers 
of  these  were  mere  conscripts.  But  this  was  not 
all,  or  nearly  all ;  his  soldiery,  accustomed  to  li- 
cence in  Spain,  preyed  on  the  country  and  stirred 
up  the  population  against  them  ;  he  was  short  of 
requirements  necessary  to  take  the  field ;  parts  of 
the  south  of  France  were  breaking  away  from  the 
Empire;  a  rising  in  behalf  of  the  fallen  Bourbons 
was  being  planned  at  Bordeaux.  But  the  diffi- 
culties, too,  of  Wellington  were  great,  even  at  a 
conjuncture  when  the  war  seemed  coming  to  an 
end.  The  admirable  arrangements  he  had  made 
to  preserve  discipline  and  to  defray  all  the  charges 
of  his  army  had,  no  doubt,  kept  the  French  peas- 


From  the  Pyj^cnces  to  the  Garonne      241 

antry  quiet ;  they  were,  indeed,  better  disposed 
to  his  troops  than  to  those  of  their  own  country- 
men. But  his  Spanish  auxiliaries  were  still  given 
to  excesses — a  large  number  of  these  had  been  re- 
called ;  the  Regency,  as  it  was  named,  of  Portugal 
continued  to  refuse  him  the  aid  he  required ;  the 
Spanish  Cortes  had  not  ceased  to  be  angry  and  jeal- 
ous. A  most  important  incident,  besides,  had  oc- 
curred, which  the  British  commander  regarded  with 
just  apprehensions.  Napoleon  had  made  a  treaty 
with  his  captive,  Ferdinand  ;  had  acknowledged  him 
as  king,  and  had  sent  him  back  into  Spain.  Wel- 
lington feared  that  the  Cortes  might  confirm  this 
compact,  and  actually  wrote  to  the  Government 
at  home  that  a  war  with  Spain  was  by  no  means 
impossible. 

This  danger,  however,  was  soon  dispelled ;  the 
Cortes  refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with  Fer- 
dinand, and  Wellington's  position  was  in  other  re- 
spects improved.  The  campaign  opened  in  the 
middle  of  February,  18 14,  the  frost  having  con- 
gealed the  roads  and  made  operations  practicable 
in  a  difficult  country.  The  British  chief  was  still  at 
the  head  of  about  100,000  men  ;  but  of  these  25,000 
perhaps  were  Spaniards,  a  part  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Pyrenees ;  exclusive  of  the  garrison  of  Bayonne, 
which  seems  to  have  been  rather  too  large — this  at 
least  was  the  judgment  of  Napoleon.  Soult,  we 
have  seen,  was  not  more  than  40,000  strong,  and 
thousands  of  his  troops  were  rude  levies.  The  in- 
tention of  Wellington  was  to  attack  Soult,  whose 
army  extended  from  the  eastern  verge  of  Bayonne, 
16 


242  Wellington 

along  the  Bidouze,  an  affluent  of  the  Adour,  and 
also  along  the  Gave  of  Oleron,  the  local  name  of  a 
mountain  torrent ;  and  at  the  same  time  to  cross  the 
Adour  at  its  mouth,  to  invest  it,  and,  if  possible,  to 
reduce  Bayonne.  Both  operations  were  attended 
with  success,  if  this  was  not  as  complete  as  Wel- 
lington could  have  wished.  Soult's  lieutenants  were 
driven  from  their  positions  to  the  Gave  of  Pau,  a 
stream  parallel  to  the  Gave  of  Oleron  ;  St.  Jean 
Pied  de  Port  was  besieged  by  a  Spanish  division. 
The  Marshal  was  finally  cut  off  from  the  Pyrenean 
passes  and  forced  farther  into  the  interior  of  France  ; 
his  army,  however,  had  suffered  little  loss;  he  made 
ready  for  another  trial  of  strength  before  under- 
taking his  march  to  the  Garonne,  which  he  had 
had  in  contemplation  for  sometime.  Meanwhile  the 
allied  army  had  effected  the  passage  of  the  Adour ; 
the  operation  was  conducted  with  daring  and  skill ; 
a  bridge  of  boats  was  thrown  across  the  river  ;  a  flo- 
tilla seconded  the  crossing  from  the  sea ;  a  kind  of 
causeway  was  made  of  small  coasting  vessels.  The 
garrison  offered  but  little  resistance  ;  the  French,  it 
has  been  said,  were  terrified  by  the  British  rockets,  a 
missile  as  yet  little  known  in  the  warfare  of  that  age. 
The  fortress  was  now  besieged  by  Hope,  but  it  held 
out  until  the  close  of  the  war;  the  siege,  too,  occu- 
pied a  large  part  of  Wellington's  forces ;  in  fact,  he 
failed  here  toattain  his  object;  he  had  hoped  to  master 
Bayonne,  to  penetrate  into  France,  and  to  find  a 
better  theatre  on  which  to  contend  with  his  enemy. 

Meanwhile  Soult,  falling  back  behind   the  Gave 
of  Pau,  had  assembled  some  forty  thousand  men, — 


From  the  Pyreiiees  to  the  Garonne     243 

seven  thousand  of  these,  however,  were  conscripts, — 
in  a  formidable  position,  round  the  little  town  of 
Orthes.  His  right,  under  Reille,  was  protected  by 
marshy  ground  and  held  the  hamlet  of  St.  Boes  and 
the  adjoining  heights,  sloping  down  towards  the  vil- 
lage of  Baights  ;  his  centre,  commanded  by  D'Erlon, 
was  covered  by  an  eminence, — the  Marshal  took 
his  stand  on  this  in  the  battle  that  followed, — by  a 
ravine  and  by  a  swampy  flat ;  his  left,  with  Clausel 
at  its  head,  held  Orthes  and  its  fine  bridge,  the 
only  one  on  the  Gave  that  had  been  left  un- 
broken. Both  the  flanks  and  the  front  of  Soult 
were  thus  extremely  strong  and  very  difficult  to 
reach  and  attack ;  he  was  behind  a  river,  be- 
sides, which  the  enemy  must  cross.  Welling- 
ton had  approached  the  position  by  the  25th  of 
February ;  having  reconnoitred  the  ground  with 
care,  he  made  preparations  rather,  as  he  believed,  to 
dislodge  his  adversary  from  his  points  of  vantage 
than  to  fight  a  strongly  contested  pitched  battle. 
The  British  General  was  not  quite  forty  thousand 
strong  :  making  every  allowance  for  detachments  and 
the  siege  of  Bayonne,  it  appears  strange  that  he  had 
not  assembled  a  more  powerful  force  against  his  able 
opponent.  His  right,  under  Hill,  was  before  Or- 
thes and  Clausel ;  his  centre  and  left  under  Picton 
and  Beresford,  confronted  D'Erlon  and  Reille,  and 
Soult's  centre  and  right.  At  daybreak  on  the  27th 
Picton  and  Beresford  crossed  the  Gave  ;  the  Marshal, 
it  is  said,  thought  of  attacking  them  when  in  the  act 
of  passing  ;  but  he  preferred  to  maintain  his  attitude 
of  defence,  and  to  accept  a  battle,  which  gave  him 


244  Wellmgton 

good  hope  of  success.  Hill  remained  on  the  other 
side  of  the  river,  and  there  was  a  wide  space  between 
his  two  colleagues  ;  Wellington's  army  was  thus  not 
favourably  placed  to  fall  on  an  enemy  in  a  position 
of  remarkable  strength.  The  advanced  posts  of  the 
French  were  soon  driven  in  ;  but  the  battle  raged 
furiously  for  at  least  three  hours  around  the  village 
of  St.  Boes  and  its  heights;  the  troops  of  the  defence 
had  long  a  distinct  advantage.  The  men  of  Beres- 
ford  and  Picton,  still  rather  far  apart,  endeavoured 
in  vain  to  turn  the  enemy's  right,  and  to  force  his 
centre  ;  they  were  repulsed  over  and  over  again,  as 
they  struggled  through  the  obstacles  in  their  way, 
and  sought  to  close  with  the  skilfully  posted  French  ; 
they  were  ravaged  by  a  destructive  fire  of  guns  and 
of  musketry.  Soult,  it  is  said,  as  he  beheld  what 
seemed  a  certain  defeat,  smote  his  thigh  and  ex- 
claimed, "  I  have  him  at  last  "  ;  he  marshalled  his  re- 
serves to  make  victory  complete.  But  Wellington 
had  watched  the  battle  from  a  hill  on  his  side  ;  his 
tactical  inspiration  turned  the  scales  of  fortune. 
Perceiving  that  St.  Boes  and  the  height  could  not  be 
carried,  he  contrived  by  a  movement  of  characteristic 
skill,  to  turn  this  part  of  the  position  to  the  left ; 
the  result  was  before  long  developed :  safety,  nay, 
success,  was  admirably  plucked  from  danger.  The 
French  army  gave  way  by  degrees :  its  commander 
had  no  choice  but  to  retreat.  Meanwhile  Hill  had 
effected  the  passage  of  the  Gave  ;  Clausel  fell  back 
to  join  his  discomfited  chief.  The  retreat  was  con- 
ducted in  good  order ;  but  thousands  of  conscripts 
disbanded  and  threw  away  their  arms. 


From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne     245 

Soult  had  ably  fought  a  defensive  battle ;  he  had 
only  just  missed  a  real  victory ;  but  probably  he 
should  have  fallen  on  his  antagonist  when  crossing 
the  Gave :  here,  again,  we  see  his  shortcomings  in  the 
field.  On  the  other  hand,  Wellington's  strategy  can 
hardly  be  admired  ;  but  his  genius  in'  tactics  shone 
out  finely  ;  his  movement  to  turn  the  hill  at  St.  Boes 
was  a  master  stroke.'  The  Marshal  had  lost  four 
thousand  men  at  Orthes  ;  besides,  perhaps,  half  of  his 
boyish  conscripts  ;  but  he  rose  superior  to  fortune, 
however  adverse  ;  he  made  ready  to  march  to  the 
Garonne,  where  he  still  hoped  to  be  joined  by  Suchet. 
The  retrograde  movement  was  across  the  heads 
of  the  streams  which  descend  from  the  Pyrenees, 
through  a  difficult  and  intricate  country  ;  it  was 
effected  with  admirable  skill  and  resource  ;  it  was  in 
no  sense  a  mere  passive  retreat.  Soult  made  a  stand 
at  Tarbes  on  the  upper  Adour,  and  successfully  held 
his  adversary  at  bay  :  more  than  once  he  assumed  a 
daring  offensive  ;  meanwhile  he  reorganised  his  de- 
feated troops,  restored  their  confidence  in  some  de- 
gree, endeavoured  to  stir  up  a  partisan  warfare,  and 
obtained  reinforcements,  though  for  the  most  part 
conscripts.  And  these  fine  operations  were  carried 
out  at  a  time  when  the  Empire  was  crashing  down 
in  ruin,  and  when  a  large  part  of  the  south  of 
France  was  declaring  against  it ;  this  retreat  of  Soult, 
in  fact,  may  be  fitly  compared  to  the  remarkable 
retreat  of  Chanzy  to  Lcmans,  a  striking  episode 
in  the  great  war  of   1870.     Wellington  followed  the 

■  Napier,  History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  iii.,  419,  has  very  clearly 
described  the  characteristics  of  the  contending  generals  at  Orthes. 


246  IVellingtou 

Marshal  cautiously  and  at  a  distance  ;  he  was  appre- 
hensive of  the  strength  of  Suchet,  who,  he  assumed, 
would  come  into  line  with  Soult ;  his  army  was  being 
reduced  by  large  detachments  to  guard  his  length- 
ened communications  and  his  rear  ;  and  he  sent  off 
Beresford,  with  twelve  thousand  men,  to  Bordeaux, 
where  the  Due  D'Angouleme  and  many  leading  citi- 
zens had  organised  a  rising  against  Napoleon,  and 
had  raised  the  white  flag  of  the  House  of  Bourbon. 
It  may  be  doubted  if  this  was  a  wise  step  in  a  mere 
military  sense  ;  but  it  was  of  the  first  importance  to 
second  a  movement,  which  was  extending  itself 
throughout  Gascony  :  it  should  be  added  that  Wel- 
lington gave  proof  of  his  characteristic  prudence;  he 
refused  to  recognise  the  Bourbons  without  the  con- 
sent of  his  Government,  though  he  did  not  conceal 
his  sympathies  with  them.  All  this  made  his  opera- 
tions slow,  as  was  often  the  case  with  him  when  fol- 
lowing a  retiring  enemy,  and  he  found  it  necessary 
to  call  up  large  reinforcements  to  his  army  as  it  ad- 
vanced eastwards.  Meanwhile  Soult  had  reached 
Toulouse,  the  chief  town  of  Languedoc,  in  the  last 
days  of  March  ;  he  had  gained  a  considerable  start 
on  his  enemy  ;  he  had  reached  his  position  on  the 
Garonne.' 

During  the  course  of  these  events  in  the  south  of 
France,  Napoleon's  Empire  was  toppling  down  in 
ruin.  By  the  first  days  of  January,  1814,  the  armies 
of  the  embattled  Continent  had  crossed  the  Rhine  : 


'  For  an  excellent  criticism  of  these  operations  of  Wellington  and 
Soult,  see  Napier's  Peninsular  War,  iii.,  435-436.  The  historian 
blames  the  slowness  of  Wellington's  pursuit. 


I 


From  the  Pyre7iees  to  the  Garonne      247 

they  extended  on  a  great  arc  from  the  confluence  of 
the  Moselle  to  the  verge  of  Switzerland.  The  rapid- 
ity of  the  invasion  had  surprised  the  Emperor;  he 
had  not  had  time  to  restore  his  forces  ;  France,  ex- 
hausted and  discontented,  gave  him  little  support : 
he  had  not  more  than  80,000  or  100,000  beaten 
troops  to  oppose  to  300,000  of  the  Allies.  After  La 
Rothiere  his  position  appeared  desperate;  this  would 
have  been  the  case  had  his  adversaries  followed  the 
principles  of  war.  But  Bliicher  and  Schwartzenberg, 
the  chiefs  of  the  hosts  of  the  League,  men  of  differ- 
ent natures  and  not  disposed  to  agree,  divided  their 
armies  on  the  Marne  and  the  Seine ;  Napoleon 
struck  in  between  them,  with  marvellous  power  and 
skill,  opposing  a  single  front  of  defence  to  a  double 
front  of  attack,  he  defeated  them  over  and  over 
again  ;  Vauchamps,  Montmirail,  and  Montereau  re- 
called the  exploits  of  1796-7.  The  Allies  actually 
sued  for  an  armistice ;  had  the  Emperor  at  this 
juncture  been  satisfied  with  contending  only  for  the 
France  of  the  Rhine,  the  struggle  perhaps  would 
have  turned  in  his  favour.  But  he  was  still  bent  on 
retaining  a  great  part  of  his  Empire,  especially  Bel- 
gium and  the  prize  of  Antwerp  ;  he  did  not  concen- 
trate all  his  forces  and  recall  Eugene  Beauharnais 
from  across  the  Alps  :  this,  in  a  military  sense,  was  a 
real  fault  in  his  magnificent  operations  in  1814.  Nev- 
ertheless his  genius  shone  grandly  out  for  a  time  ; 
Bliicher  advanced  rashly  again,  as  he  had  advanced 
before  ;  he  was  nearly  caught  and  destroyed  at 
Soissons ;  but  the  old  Prussian  chief  would  not 
acknowledge   defeat ;     Napoleon    met    a    reverse   at 


248  Wellington 

Laon,  followed  by  another  at  Arcis  sur  Aube,  when 
he  turned  to  manceuvre  against  Schvvartzenberg. 
Still,  notwithstanding  this  partial  success,  the  Allies, 
despite  their  overwhelming  numbers,  had  really  not 
accomplished  much ;  they  had  been  outgeneralled 
in  every  respect ;  Wellington,  with  a  relatively  small 
army,  had  been  of  more  weight  in  the  scales  of  for- 
tune. The  British  General  has,  in  fact,  maintained 
that  their  mighty  enemy  might  have  tired  them  out 
had  he  continued  to  operate  as  before  ' :  but  the 
Emperor  adopted  a  different  course,  grand  in  con- 
ception, but  in  the  result  fatal.  He  fell  back  to- 
wards the  Rhine  in  order  to  rally  his  garrisons  in 
Lorraine,  to  call  up  Eugene  from  Italy  and  Augereau 
from  Lyons ;  with  their  united  forces — and  they 
would  be  very  great — he  intended  to  strike  the  com- 
munications and  the  rear  of  his  foes,  to  defeat  them, 
and  to  drive  them  out  of  France.  This  movement, 
however,  uncovered  Paris  ;  opinion  in  the  capital  was 
turning  against  the  war ;  the  Allies  marched  on 
and  seized  the  seat  of  the  Empire  ;  the  effect  was 
decisive   and    complete.     After   a   short    resistance 

'  These  comments  of  Wellington  on  Napoleon's  operations  in 
1814  are  very  interesting,  especially  as  Waterloo  was  soon  to  be 
fought.  They  are  in  the  Greville  Me»ioirs,  i.,  73,  ed,  1888. 
"  Bonaparte's  last- campaign,  before  the  capture  of  Paris,  was  very 
brilliant,  probably  the  ablest  of  all  his  performances.  .  .  .  Had 
he  possessed  greater  patience  he  would  have  succeeded  in  compellinr; 
the  Allies  to  retreat.  .  .  .  The  march  upon  Paris  entirely  dis- 
concerted him  and  finished  the  war.  The  Allies  could  not  have 
maintained  themselves  much  longer,  and  had  he  continued  to  keep 
his  force  concentrated  and  to  carry  it  as  occasion  required  against 
one  or  the  other  of  the  two  armies  ...  he  must  eventually  have 
forced  them  to  retreat. " 


From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garojmc     249 

Paris  opened  her  gates  :  the  Monarchy  of  the  Bour- 
bons was  proclaimed  restored :  Napoleon,  aban- 
doned by  his  companions  in  arms,  but  still  idolised 
by  his  devoted  soldiery,  signed  his  abdication  on 
the  6th  of  April,  1814. 

Meanwhile  Wellington  and  Soult  had  been  gird- 
ing up  their  loins  for  a  trial  of  strength  around 
Toulouse.  The  Marshal  had  given  orders  to  place 
the  city  in  a  state  of  defence,  before  he  had  ap- 
proached its  walls  ;  his  orders  had  been  carefully 
obeyed.  Suchet  was  still  in  Roussillon  when  his 
colleague  reached  Toulouse ;  his  army  had  been 
reduced  to  12,000  men  ;  he  continued  to  turn  a  deaf 
ear  to  Soult 's  counsels.  That  chief  was  thus  prac- 
tically left  to  his  own  resources  ;  his  arrangements 
were  made  with  conspicuous  ability  and  skill.  He  had 
still  about  38,000  men,  for  he  had  been,  we  have  said, 
reinforced  on  his  march  :  his  first  care  was  to  secure 
his  communications  with  the  adjoining  country, — 
he  hoped  against  hope  to  join  Suchet ;  his  next 
was  to  take  a  formidable  position  for  a  defensive 
battle.  Toulouse  gave  him  most  favourable  oppor- 
tunities for  this:  he  turned  them  to  the  very  best 
advantage.  The  city  is  divided  by  the  Garonne,  a 
deep  and  broad  river :  on  its  southern  bank  the 
suburb  of  St.  Cyprien  stands  ;  this,  surrounded  by 
a  loop  of  the  Garonne,  could  be  made  well-nigh  im- 
pregnable to  attack.  The  canal  of  Languedoc  cov- 
ers the  place  on  the  northern  bank — not  to  speak 
of  its  ancient  enceinte ;  outside  rises  the  eminence 
of  Mont  Rave,  crowned  by  a  tableland  able  to  con- 
tain an  army ;  beyond,  the  Ers,  an  affluent  of  the 


250  Wellington 

Garonne,  flows  ;  an  enemy  would  have  to  cross  this 
should  he  attack  Mont  Rave,  the  Ers  being  at 
hand,  and  directly  in  his  rear.  Soult  chose  his 
ground  with  remarkable  skill ;  his  object  was  to  com- 
pel the  British  chief  to  attack  him  on  the  tableland 
of  Mont  Rave ;  in  that  case  he  would  have  to  make 
a  long  flank  march  exposed  to  the  onset  of  the 
French  columns,  and  with  a  river  behind  him,  im- 
perilling his  retreat.  The  Marshal  placed  Reille  and 
his  troops  in  St.  Cyprien,  which  had  been  made  a 
post  of  very  great  strength  ;  he  had  a  small  detach- 
ment outside  the  city  to  observe  the  line  of  his  re- 
treat, in  the  event  of  a  reverse.  But  D'Erlon  and 
Clausel  had  the  mass  of  their  forces  accumulated 
along  Mont  Rave  and  thetableland,  the  point,  Soult 
correctly  judged,  that  his  adversary  would  be  obliged 
to  attack.  Wellington  did  not  refuse  a  just  meed  of 
praise  to  his  very  able  foe  :  "  In  the  whole  of  my 
experience,"  he  wrote  many  years  afterwards,  "  I 
never  saw  an  army  so  strongly  posted  as  that  of  the 
French  at  the  battle  of  Toulouse."  ' 

The  start  gained  upon  Wellington  by  his  oppo- 
nent had  enabled  the  Marshal,  not  only  to  choose 
his  position,  but  to  strengthen  Mont  Rave  and  the 
tableland  with  redoubts  and  field  works.  The  Brit- 
ish General  was  now  in  command  of  52,000  men, 
9COO,  however,  being  Spaniards  ;  he  resolved  to  at- 
tack Soult  and  to  drive  him  out  of  Toulouse.  On  the 
28th  of  March  he  tried  to  cross  the  Garonne  above 
the  city ;  but  the  river  was  in  flood  and  the  materi- 
als for  a  bridge  too  scanty  ;    he  was  obliged  to  cross 

'Sir  H.   Maxwell,  Life   of    IVcllingtott,    i.,    371. 


From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne     251 

lower  down  at  a  place  called  Grenade.  The  bridge 
was  destroyed  by  the  force  of  the  current ;  Beres- 
ford  was  isolated,  without  support,  for  two  whole 
days ;  Soult  has  been  severely  blamed  for  not  at- 
tacking him  when  in  these  straits ;  but  Grenade  is 
fifteen  miles  from  Toulouse;  it  is  difificult  to  say 
that  an  opportunity  was  missed.  Wellington  had 
his  dispositions  made  by  the  9th  of  April ;  Hill  was 
to  threaten,  and,  if  there  was  a  chance,  to  attack  St. 
Cyprien ;  Picton,  on  the  left,  was  to  assist  Hill;  the 
main  attack,  directed  by  Wellington  himself,  with 
Beresford  and  the  Spaniards,  was  to  be  on  Mont 
Rave  and  the  tableland.  The  assailants,  therefore, 
were  extended  along  a  broad  arc,  of  which  the  de- 
fenders held  the  chord,  an  advantage  in  itself  of  no 
little  importance ;  and  the  British  General,  as  his  ad- 
versary had  foreseen,  had  been  compelled  to  make 
his  principal  effort  under  conditions  in  the  highest 
degree  adverse. 

The  battle  began  at  an  early  hour  on  the  loth  ;  for 
a  long  time  victory  inclined  to  the  French  ;  they 
might  have  won  it  had  they  had  a  more  daring  com- 
mander. Picton  made  a  rash  movement  which  cost 
him  dear;  Hill's  attempt  to  storm  St.  Cyprien  com- 
.pletely  failed  ;  Reille  was  able  to  detach  largely  to 
the  assistance  of  his  chief.  Meanwhile  Freyre  and 
his  Spaniards,  and  Beresford  with  his  British  troops, 
liad  crossed  the  Ers  by  the  one  bridge  that  had  been 
left  intact,  and  had  begun  making  their  perilous 
flank  march,  through  miry,  broken,  and  difificult 
ground,  against  Mont  Rave  and  the  tableland,  ex- 
posed  at  all  points  to  the   destructive  fire  of  the 


I 


252  Wellington 

enemy.  The  Spaniards  were  unable  to  stand  the 
ordeal ;  their  ranks  gave  way  and  became  a  horde  of 
fugitives ;  Beresford's  soldiery,  though  they  toiled 
steadily  on,  were  stricken  down  in  hundreds  by  the 
French  guns  and  musketry.  As  the  formidable  posi- 
tion of  Soult  was  reached,  the  assailants  were  not 
more  than  10,000  strong,  blown,  too,  and  exhausted 
by  their  most  trying  march.  Soult  might  have  fallen 
on  them  with  nearly  20,000  fresh  troops,  strongly 
supported,  and  from  a  point  of  vantage.  But  the 
Marshal's  defects  in  battle  were  once  more  made 
manifest;  "he  did  not  employ  half  the  force  he 
might  have  employed  "  ;  he  attacked  Beresford  with 
a  single  division  only  ;  this  was  fairly  repulsed  after 
a  brief  struggle.  The  assailants  now  redoubled  their 
efforts ;  nothing  could  withstand  the  British  in- 
fantry's onset ;  the  Spaniards  rallied  at  the  spirit- 
stirring  sight ;  the  French  were  by  degrees  driven 
back ;  Mont  Rave  and  the  tableland  were  won. 
Soulf  retreated,  but  only  a  short  distance  ;  he  made 
ready  to  fight  the  next  day  ;  his  forces  were  much 
less  than  those  of  his  enemy.  The  battle,  however, 
if  indecisive,  was  a  defeat  for  the  French  ;  they  had 
been  forced  away  from  a  position  of  extraordinary 
strength  by  assailants  fighting  with  all  the  odds 
against  them  for  hours.  Once  again  Soult,  admira- 
ble in  conception,  had  been  weak  in  execution ;  but 
the  result  was  largely  due  to  the  endurance  and 
the  valour  of  Beresford's  men.  "  I  could  have  done 
anything  with  that  army,"  was  a  remark  made  by 
its  chief. 

Soult   retreated    from    Toulouse,  still    entreating 


From  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Garonne      253 

Suchet  to  come  into  line  with  him  at  Carcassonne. 
The  war,  however,  had  now  reached  its  end ;  the 
Marshal,  it  has  been  said,  fought  his  last  great  battle 
in  the  confidence  of  assured  success,  and  knowing 
that  peace  had  already  been  made.  This  is  an  un- 
just, nay,  a  shameful  charge  ;  it  is  confuted  by  a 
simple  comparison  of  dates.  Napoleon's  abdication 
was  not  ratified  until  the  i  ith  of  April ;  the  engage- 
ment took  place  upon  the  loth ;  Soult  could  not 
have  heard  that  hostilities  had  ceased. 

The  Peninsular  War,  in  a  strict  sense,  closed  with 
Vitoria  and  the  expulsion  of  the  invaders  from 
Spain.  I  have  endeavoured  to  describe  the  great 
qualities  of  Wellington  in  that  remarkable  contest, 
to  do  justice  to  his  antagonists,  and  to  indicate  the 
characteristics  of  the  belligerent  armies.  I  shall  not 
repeat  what  I  have  already  written.  The  war  along 
the  Pyrenees  and  in  the  south  of  France  resolves 
itself  into  a  duel  between  Soult  and  Wellington  ;  it 
has  peculiar  interest  for  a  student  of  the  art.  The 
Marshal  was  a  strategist  of  no  mean  excellence ; 
some  of  his  combinations  were  exceedingly  fine;  he 
outgeneralled  his  adversary  more  than  once ;  he  had 
great  tenacity  and  firmness  of  purpose.  But  he  was 
not  equal  to  himself  in  the  shock  of  battle ;  his 
hand,  so  to  speak,  could  not  second  his  brain';  he 
allowed  victory  to  slip  from  his  grasp  ;  he  had  not 

'  Napier  is  very  partial  to  Soult,  but  these  remarks  on  the  Mar- 
shal's strategy  before  he  fought  at  Toulouse  are  true  {History  of 
the  Peninsular  War,  iii.,  460):  "  Soult's  combinations  were  now 
crowned  with  success.  He  had,  by  means  of  his  fortresses,  his  bat- 
tles, the  sudden  change  of  his  hne  of  operations  after  Orthes,  his 
rapid  retreat  from  Tarbes,  and  his  clear  judgment  in  fixing  upon 


2  54  Wellington 

the  gifts  of  Conde  or  of  Frederick  in  the  field.  In 
this  contest  Wellington  made  strategic  mistakes :  in 
fact,  strategy  was  not  his  strong  point  in  war ;  but 
he  was  infinitely  superior  to  his  opponent  in  tactical 
power ;  he  directed  an  army  on  the  ground  much 
better ;  in  a  word,  he  was  a  much  greater  com- 
mander.' It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  on  the  qualities 
of  the  contending  armies.  In  1813  and  1814  the 
British  soldiery — and  the  Portuguese  were  hardly 
inferior — trained  for  years  under  a  great  chief  and 
flushed  with  repeated  success,  had  acquired  a  com- 
plete ascendency  over  their  disheartened  foes,  exhib- 
ited on  almost  every  occasion.  The  main  historical 
interest  of  this  passage  of  arms  is  that  it  gives  us  a 
measure  of  what  Wellington  achieved  in  the  final 
struggle  between  Napoleon  and  Europe.  He  kept 
Soult,  and  even  Suchet,  confined  to  a  theatre  of  war 
outside  the  great  theatre  on  the  Marne  and  the 
Seine;  had  these  Marshals  been  able  to  join  their 
master,  the  Allies  could  never  have  reached  Paris ; 
they  would  probably  have  been  driven  beyond  the 
Rhine. 


Toulouse  as  his  next  point  of  resistance,  reduced  the  strength  of  his 
adversary  to  an  equality  with  his  own.     He  had  gained  seventeen 
days  for  preparation,  had  brought  the  Allies  to  deliver  battle  on 
ground  naturally  adapted  for  defence,  and  well  fortified,  where  one-  I 
third  of  their  force  was  separated  by  a  great  river  from  the  rest." 

'Napier  {History  of  the  Peninsular  War,  iii.,  419),  comparing 
Wellington  with  Soult,  remarks  :  "  Wellington  possessed  in  a  high 
degree  that  daring  promptness  of  action,  that  faculty  of  inspiration, 
.  .  .  with  which  Napoleon  was  endowed  beyond  all  mankind. 
It  is  this  which  especially  constitutes  military  genius." 


SPAIN 
PORTUGAL        f^-J- 

ij     To  tlliish';it«  the  Venmsiilai-  War 


n 


(j~V.PuJjijjTtis  Son.'i. 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA — QUATRE    BRAS — 

WATERLOO 

Wellington  made  a  Duke  in  1S14 — He  is  sent  as  Ambassador  to 
France — His  position  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna — Napoleon's 
escape  from  Elba — He  regains  the  throne — Conduct  of  the 
Allies — The  Hundred  Days — Weakness  of  the  Emperor's  Gov- 
ernment—  His  military  preparations — The  allied  plan  of  cam- 
paign— Wellington  proposes  to  invade  France — Napoleon's  plan 
of  campaign — Concentration  of  the  French  army  on  the  Belgian 
.  frontier — The  operations  of  June  15,  1815 — Napoleon  fails  to 
attain  fully  his  objects,  but  gains  a  distinct  advantage — Blucher 
hastily  advances  to  encounter  Napoleon  with  only  part  of  his 
forces — Delays  of  Wellington — The  battle  of  Ligny — The 
D'Erlon  incident — Blucher  is  defeated,  but  not  destroyed — The 
Battle  of  Quatre  Bras — Misconduct  of  Ney  on  the  l6th  of  June 
— Tactics  of  Wellington — Napoleon  and  the  French  army  on 
the  17th  of  June — Immense  opportunity  given  the  Emperor — 
Grouchy  is  detached  with  a  restraining  wing — The  night  of  the 
lylhof  June — Operations  of  the  i8th  of  June — The  battle  of 
Waterloo — Fine  defence  of  Wellington — Rout  of  the  French 
army — Grouchy  the  real  cause  of  the  disaster. 

WELL  deserved  honours  were  showered   on 
Wellington  when  he  sheathed  his  victori- 
ous   sword  in    18 14.      He   was    raised    to 
the  highest  rank  in  the  Peerage,  and,  as  in  the  case 
of  Marlborough,  was  made  a  Duke  ;    he  was  led  in 

255 


256  Wellington 

state  into  the  House  of  Commons,  and  received 
its  thanks,  which  he  acknowledged  in  brief,  but  dig- 
nified words  ;  half  a  million  was  voted  as  a  reward 
for  his  services ;  he  was  the  most  striking  figure  at 
a  solemn  thanksgiving  at  St.  Paul's  ;  peerages  were 
bestowed  on  three  of  his  best  companions  in  arms. 
The  troubled  state  of  the  Continent  erelong  required 
his  presence  on  the  scene  of  events,  in  differents 
countries.  He  endeavoured  to  compose  disputes  be- 
tween the  Spanish  Cortes  and  Ferdinand,  who,  hav- 
ing regained  the  throne,  was  reviving  absolutism  and 
the  abuses  of  the  past  ;  his  remonstrances  and  even 
threats  prevailed  for  the  moment.  A  more  difificult 
mission  was  then  entrusted  to  him  ;  he  was  sent 
as  the  envoy  of  England  to  France,  where  Louis 
XVni.,  restored  by  the  right  of  conquest,  was  al- 
ready wearing  an  uneasy  crown.  With  character- 
istic insight  he  was  not  slow  in  perceiving  the 
mistakes  and  the  vices  of  the  Bourbon  regime  ;  his 
Correspondence  abounds  in  dry  comments  on  these, 
especially  on  the  weakness  of  an  ill-united  Govern- 
ment—"they  are  ministers,"  he  bitterly  said, — 
"  not  a  ministry"  ;  he  predicted  before  many  months 
had  passed  that  the  existing  order  of  things  could 
not  endure  in  France.  His  position  in  Paris,  how- 
ever, became  dangerous  :  he  stood,  indeed,  well  with 
the  King,  and  the  noblesse  of  the  Court;  but  the 
disbanded  soldiery  and  the  populace  looked  askance 
at  him  ;  his  life  was  exposed  to  the  plots  of  assassins; 
Lord  Liverpool  insisted  upon  his  recall  to  England. 
Before  this  time,  it  may  be  observed,  he  had  turned 
his  attention  to  the  defence  of  the  Netherlands  ;  he 


The  Congress  of  Vie7ina  257 

had  surveyed  the  fortresses  on  the  Belgian  frontier; 
he  had  marked  out  "  the  entrance  of  the  Forest  of 
Soignies  "  as  a  favourable  position  for  a  great  defen- 
sive battle,  an  augury  of  what  was  to  be  seen  at 
Waterloo.  Wellington  replaced  Castlereagh  during 
the  later  scenes  of  the  memorable  Assembly  which 
met  at  Vienna  to  dispose  of  the  spoils  of  Napoleon's 
Empire,  and  to  remodel  the  map  of  a  transformed' 
Continent.  But  though  his  Correspondence  clearly 
shows  that  he  had  opinions  of  his  own  on  the  mo- 
mentous questions  which  were  agitating  the  Euro- 
pean world,  he  confined  himself  to  carrying  out  the 
policy  of  his  chief ;  he  made  little  or  no  mark  on 
vv^hat  took  place  at  Vienna,  at  least  until  the  very 
last  moment.  His  sympathies  were,  on  the  whole, 
with  a  settlement  of  the  Continent  which  curbed  the 
ambition  of  France  ;  but  he  approved  of  the  pro- 
posed alliance  between  Austria,  England,  and  France, 
to  check  the  pretensions  of  Prussia  and  the  Czar. 
Like  all  the  soldiers  and  statesmen  of  the  Coalition, 
he  had  no  inkling  beforehand  of  the  portentous 
events  which  were  about  to  convulse  the  world 
again  and  to  lead  to  the  conflict  of  which  the  end 
was  Waterloo. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna  was  about  to  dissolve 
when  it  received  the  intelligence  of  Napoleon's  es- 
cape from  Elba.  This  is  not  the  place  to  examine 
the  reasons  that  led  the  fallen  Emperor  to  attempt 
to  recover  his  throne  in  defiance  of  Europe,  still 
armed  against  him.  That  he  broke  faith  with  the 
Allies  is  true,  and  probably  he  would  have  made  his 
wonderful  venture  in  any  event  :  but  the  Bourbons 

17 


258  Wellmgton 

and  the  Allies  had  broken  faith  with  him  :  History 
justly  condemns  a  great  deal  of  their  conduct.  We 
may  accept  Wellington's  statement  that  St.  Helena 
had  not  been  chosen  as  a  place  for  his  banishment  ; 
but  his  forcible  deportation  had  been  discussed  at 
Vienna ;  Marie  Louise  and  his  son  had  been  taken 
from  him,  by  shameful  intrigues  that  cannot  bear 
the  light  ;  funds  promised  him  by  treaty  were 
wrongfully  withheld  ;  plotters,  known  to  Talleyrand, 
seemed  to  have  aimed  at  his  life.  His  march  from 
Grenoble  to  Paris  was  a  triumphal  progress ;  it 
proved  how  an  immense  majority  of  the  French 
people  detested  and  despised  the  rule  of  the  Bour- 
bons ;  the  Royal  authority  disappeared  on  his  way; 
his  advance  was  that  of  a  mighty  influence  that 
nothing  could  resist.  He  was  at  theTuileries  on  the 
20th  of  March,  181 5  ;  within  four  weeks  he  had  put 
petty  risings  down,  without  shedding,  it  may  be 
said,  a  drop  of  blood  ;  he  had  accomplished  a  Revo- 
lution to  which  no  parallel  can  be  found  ;  he  was 
acknowledged  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Mediter-' 
ranean  as  the  Sovereign  of  France.  When  he  first 
landed  on  the  shores  of  Provence  even  his  old  com- 
panions in  arms  denounced  him  as  an  adventurer 
engaged  in  a  mad  enterprise  ;  this,  too,  was  Welling- 
ton's decided  view ;  "  The  King  of  France,"  he 
wrote,  *'  will  destroy  him  without  difificulty,  and  in 
a  short  time."  As  to  the  leading  personages  at 
Vienna,  they  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  what  they  were 
told  for  some  days  ;  in  the  phrase  of  the  Corsican 
Pozzo  di  Borgo,  Napoleon  "  was  a  bandit  soon  to  be 
strung  up  on  a  tree."     But  when    it  had    become 


The  Congress  of  Vientta  259 

too  evident  that  the  great  body  of  the  French  nation, 
and  that  the  army,  to  a  man,  had  ralHed  around 
him,  they  adopted  measures  without  example  in 
the  annals  of  the  diplomatic  world.  Napoleon  was 
proclaimed  the  outlaw  of  Europe  ;  it  is  idle  to  attempt 
to  qualify  the  phrase  ;  the  overtures  he  made  for 
peace  received  no  answer  ;  war,  deadly  and  universal, 
was  declared  against  him.  This  frantic  violence  no 
doubt  may  be  partly  excused,  if  we  bear  in  mind 
what  had  been  the  Emperor's  career  ;  but  it  was 
mainly  due  to  the  animosities  and  the  fears  of  a 
League  apprehensive  of  having  to  disgorge  what  it 
had  gained  ;  it  is  significant  that  even  such  a  man  as 
Wellington  fully  concurred  in  what  was  being  done 
at  Vienna.  He  even  signed  a  treaty  which  pledged 
England  to  join  in  the  crusade  against  the  ruler  of 
France  before  he  had  obtained  the  consent  of  the 
Ministry. 

The  brief  and  tragical  period  of  the  Hundred 
Days  was  meanwhile  running  its  momentous  course. 
The  Second  Empire  of  Napoleon,  from  the  nature 
of  the  case,  could  not  be  the  absolute  and  uncon- 
trolled despotism  of  the  First.  France  had  wel- 
comed him  with  general  acclaim  as  her  chief,  but 
the  prospect  of  a  tremendous  struggle  with  Europe 
made  large  parts  of  the  nation  fall  away  from 
him,  and  separated  it  into  discordant  factions.  The 
Royalists  lifted  again  their  heads;  the  great  Liberal 
middle  class,  though  it  had  thrown  off  the  Bour- 
bons, began  to  regard  the  Emperor  with  distrust; 
the  mass  of  the  peasantry  had  hailed  him  aj  a  Deliv- 
erer, but  it  dreaded  the  conscription  and  the  return 


26o  Wellington 

of  years  of  fatal  war.  The  stern  unanimity  of  Rome 
when  she  confronted  Hannibal  at  a  crisis  of  her 
fortunes  was  not  seen  ;  the  Assembly  of  the  Cham- 
bers and  the  "  Acte  additionnel,"  concessions  to  the 
prevailing  ideas  of  the  hour,  showed  how  France 
was  a  house  divided  against  itself,  and  impaired  the 
authority  of  the  Head  of  the  State.  Disappoint- 
ment, too,  had  followed  illusions;  Napoleon,  in  his 
advance  to  the  capital,  had  appealed  to  revolution- 
ary passions  and  hopes,  but  he  had  no  real  intention 
of  satisfying  these ;  he  would  not  be,  he  exclaimed, 
"the  king  of  a  Jacquerie";  besides,  for  many  and 
obvious  reasons,  his  new-made  Government  was  un- 
stable and  essentially  weak.  He  was  thrown,  in  a 
word,  on  a  sea  of  troubles,  in  which  the  vessel  of 
the  State  could  hardly  be  steered  ;  nevertheless,  his 
genius  of  organisation  and  his  administrative  powers 
were  never,  perhaps,  more  grandly  displayed.  He 
was  too  clear-sighted  not  to  perceive,  from  the  first, 
that  the  League  of  Europe  was  bent  on  war  to  the 
death,  though  he  endeavoured  for  some  weeks  to 
obtain  peace,  and  he  offered  to  accept  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Continent  made  at  Vienna,  But  when 
it  became  manifest  that  these  attempts  were  hope- 
less, he  addressed  himself  to  the  herculean  task  of 
contending  against  a  world  in  arms.  His  efforts  to 
recreate  the  military  power  of  France,  and  to  place 
the  nation  in  a  position  of  defence,  were,  consider- 
ing the  circumstances  of  the  time,  astonishing.  The 
army,  which  on  his  return  from  Elba  could  not 
send  50,000  soldiers  in  the  field,  was  raised  by  him, 
■\vithin  two  months,  into  an  active  army,  nearly  200,- 


The  Congress  of  Vicniia  261 

000  strong,  by  the  middle  of  June,  181 5,  and  into  an 
auxiliary  army  of  greater  numbers;  by  the  autumn 
the  armed  strength  of  the  Empire  would  have  ap- 
proached the  enormous  total  of  800,000  men.  At 
the  same  time,  he  contrived  to  find  the  means  to 
arm,  to  equip,  and  to  supply  these  masses,  to  a  very 
considerable  extent  at  least.  He  had  begun  to  for- 
tify Paris  and  Lyons  ;  he  restored  the  organisation 
of  his  field  army,  distributing  it  into  its  old  divi- 
sions, and  giving  it  again  its  revered  eagles.  Napo- 
leon, no  doubt,  had,  at  this  crisis,  vast  elements  of 
military  force  in  his  hands,  in  thousands  of  dis- 
banded soldiers  and  their  trained  officers ;  and  the 
nation,  exasperated  by  the  threats  of  its  enemies,  at 
last  seconded  his  exertions  with  patriotic  ardour, 
and  shook  off  the  apathy  and  the  weakness  of  the 
year  before.  But  what  Napoleon  accomplished  was 
not  the  less  wonderful ;  it  even  surpassed  his  achieve- 
ments of  1 81 3.' 

While  the  great  warrior  was  making  these  gigan- 
tic efforts,  the  Allies  were  preparing  to  overwhelm 
their  enemy.  Their  forces  were  being  assembled 
from  all  parts  of  Europe  ;  700,000  men  were  con- 
centrated, in  June,  18 15,  to  carry  the  war  from  the 
Scheldt,  the  Elbe,  and  the  Po,  to  the  Seine.  Well- 
ington, the  only  one  of  the  chiefs  of  the  League  who 
had  not  felt  the  terrible  hand  of  Napoleon,  had 
wished  to  invade  France  in  April  with  300,000  men  ; 


'  It  is  impossible,  in  a  mere  sketch  like  this,  to  describe  Napo- 
leon's preparations  for  war  in  1815.  An  admirable  and  exhaus- 
tive account  will  be  found  in  the  "  i8/j"  of  H.  Houssaye,  ii., 
1-83. 


2b  2-  Wellington 

his  colleagues  resolved  to  follow  the  general  plan  of 
their  operations  in  1814.  Four  great  armies,  ad- 
vancing from  Belgium,  from  the  Rhine,  from  the 
Var,  and  forming  a  huge  semicircle  of  attack,  were 
to  bear  down  all  resistance  and  to  converge  on  Paris, 
They  could  not  be  arrested  by  partial  defeats ;  they 
would  stifle  the  disturber  of  the  world  in  the  capi- 
tal, and  speedily  bring  the  contest  to  a  triumphant 
close.  The  situation,  as  it  was  thus  presented,  of- 
fered two  plans  of  campaign  to  Napoleon.  The  en- 
emies could  not  reach  Paris  until  the  end  of  July, 
and  then  with  not  more  than  450,000  men,  for  150,- 
000  would  be  required  to  mask  the  fortresses  on 
their  way ;  they  could  not  reach  Lyons  until  about 
the  same  time,  and  they  would  not  be  more  than 
70,000  strong.  In  the  first  case,  they  would  have  to 
deal  with  Napoleon,  at  the  head  of  at  least  200,000 
men,  in  possession  of  both  banks  of  the  Marne  and 
the  Seine,  and  supported  by  a  fortified  city  with  a 
powerful  garrison  ;  in  the  second,  they  would  be  op- 
posed to  Suchet,  who,  with  30,000  men  and  the  re- 
sources of  the  second  town  of  France,  ought  to  be 
quite  able  to  hold  them  in  check.  This  scheme  of 
operation  had  real  promise  ;  if  we  bear  in  mind  what 
the  Emperor  achieved  in  his  wonderful  struggle  of 
18 14,  it  afforded  reasonable  hopes  of  ultimate  suc- 
cess. But  the  plan  exposed  France  to  a  second  in- 
vasion, and  this  the  nation  would  not  endure ;  it 
was  certain  to  quicken  the  intrigues  of  faction,  to 
strengthen  the  Bourbon  cause,  and  to  play  into  the 
hands  of  the  League.  The  second  plan  was,  no 
doubt,  more  hazardous;  but  it  was  in  accord  with 


The  Congress  of  Viemia  263 

the  true  principle  of  the  art  of  war  ;  it  gave  scope  to 
Napoleon's  strategic  genius. 

The  forces  of  the  Coalition  formed  a  huge  front 
of  invasion,  extending  from  the  North  Sea  to  the 
Mediterranean  ;  at  the  edge  of  this  lay  the  armies 
of  Bliicher  and  Wellington,  spreading  over  Belgium 
and  near  the  borders  of  France.  The  northern  col- 
umn of  the  enemies,  as  it  might  be  called,  was  thus 
widely  separated  from  its  supports ;  it  was  possible 
suddenly  to  spring  on  this,  and,  when  isolated,  to 
defeat  it  in  detail ;  it  would  then  be  practicable  to 
turn  against  the  eastern  and  southern  columns,  and 
to  confront  them,  with  many  chances  of  success. 
Napoleon  resolved  to  adopt  this  plan,  in  principle 
the  same  as  that  which  led  to  Marengo  and  Ulm. 
The  position  of  the  hostile  armies  in  Belgium  was 
most  favourable,  it  should  be  added,  to  his  auda- 
cious venture.  They  were  disseminated  on  a  great 
space  of  country  ;  their  concentration  would  neces- 
sarily take  time  ;  the  headquarters  of  their  chiefs 
were  far  apart ;  they  were  dangerously  exposed  to 
an  ably  directed  attack.' 

The  united  armies  of  Bliicher  and  Wellington 
were  about  220,000  men.  Napoleon  had  hoped  to 
fall  on  them  with  150,000;  a  sudden  rising  in  La 
Vendee,  however,  deprived  him  of  from   15,000  to 


'  These  operations  have  been  admired  by  all  commentators.  Well- 
ington said  to  Greville  {Memoirs,  i.,  40):  "Bonaparte's  march 
upon  Belgium  was  the  finest  thing  ever  done."  Napoleon  (Ci?/;/- 
f/ient.,  v.,  198)  has  remarked:  "II  trouva  ainsi  dans  les  secrets 
de  I'art  des  moyens  supplementaires,  qui  lui  tinrent  lieu  de  100,000 
hommes,  qui  lui  manquaient  ;  ce  plan  fut  con9u  et  execute  avec 
audace  et  sagesse." 


264  Wellington 

20,000  good  troops ;  he  was  only  able  to  assemble 
128,000,  including  3500  non-combatants;  this  largely 
lessened  the  chances  of  an  advantageous  issue.  His 
object  was  to  strike  the  allied  centre  at  the  points 
where  its  inner  flanks  met,  and  where  it  would 
naturally  be  most  weak ;  to  force  it,  and  to  com- 
pel his  antagonists  to  separate,  and  to  diverge 
from  each  other,  giving  him  an  opportunity  to  at- 
tack them  when  apart.  The  Emperor's  first  opera- 
tions were  as  admirably  designed  and  conducted 
as  any  in  his  extraordinary  career.  Four  corps 
d'armee,  their  movement  skilfully  masked,  were 
marched  along  the  edge  of  the  Belgian  frontier  to 
the  point  of  junction  of  the  army  as  a  whole;  a 
fifth  corps  advanced  from  the  Aisne  ;  the  Imperial 
Guard  was  pushed  forward  from  Paris ;  on  the  night 
of  the  14th  of  June,  1815,  124,000  fighting  men 
were  assembled  within  a  few  miles  of  Charleroy 
under  the  beard,  so  to  speak,  of  a  hardly  suspecting 
enemy,  and  directly  before  a  great  main  road  lead- 
ing from  Charleroy  to  the  chief  town  of  Belgium, 
and  traversing  the  allied  centre,  the  object  of  at- 
tack. Operations  began  in  the  early  morning  of  the 
15th.'  The  purpose  of  the  Emperor  for  this  day  was 
to  catch  and  destroy  the  corps  of  Zieten,  one  of 
the  four  which  composed  the  army  of  Bliicher,  and 
which  lay  near  the  Sambre  on  either  side  of  Char- 
leroy ;  to  hold,  as  far  as  possible,  the  main  road  in 
force,  and  to  seize  the  two  strategic  points  of  Quatre 
Bras  and  Sombreffe,  on  the  line  of  the  communica- 

'  For  the  objects  of  Napoleon  on  the  15th  of  June,  see  the  authori- 
ties collected  in  my  Campaign  of  iSij,  pp.  76,  77. 


Quatre  Bras  265 

tion  of  the  hostile  armies,  the  occupation  of  these 
manifestly  being  of  the  very  first  importance. 

The  project  was  one  of  the  finest  ever  conceived 
in  war,  but  the  accomplishment  of  it  was  far  from 
perfect.  Napoleon  expected  to  have  crossed  the 
Sambre,  and  to  have  been  master  of  Charleroy  by 
noon ;  in  that  event  Zieten  could  have  hardly  es- 
caped ;  the  main  road  would  have  been  occupied  for 
miles ;  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe  would  have  been 
in  the  hands  of  the  French  by  the  afternoon.  But 
hesitations  and  delays  occurred,  partly  owing  to  ac- 
cidents common  in  war,  largely  to  the  timidity  and 
indecision  of  commanders,  who,  terrified  at  the  pros- 
pect of  a  contest  with  Europe,  did  not  second  as 
they  ought  to  have  done  their  great  chief.  D'Erlon, 
on  the  left,  a  laggard,  we  have  seen  in  Spain,  was 
very  late  in  reaching  the  Sambre,  and  did  not  ad- 
vance on  the  15th  as  far  as  was  expected  from  him. 
Vandamme,  in  the  centre,  was  retarded  by  a  mis- 
chance. The  march  of  the  chief  part  of  the  army 
was  checked  for  some  hours.  Gerard,  too,  on  the 
right,  had  not  assembled  his  whole  corps  by  day- 
break ;  the  shameful  desertion  of  the  vile  traitor 
Bourmont  impeded,  to  some  extent,  his  advance. 
Charleroy  was  thus  not  attained  until  the  afternoon  ; 
even  by  nightfall  a  fourth  part  of  the  French  army 
still  lay  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Sambre.  The 
corps  of  Zieten,  accordingly,  escaped  with  but  little 
loss;  one  of  the  objects  of  Napoleon  had  not  been 
realised.  The  invaders,  however,  had  possession  of 
the  main  road  for  some  distance  beyond  Charle- 
roy, and  Quatre  Bras  and  Sombreffe  might,  without 


266  Wellington 

difficulty,  have  been  seized.  But  Ney,  who  had  only 
received  the  command  of  the  left  of  the  army  at  the 
last  moment,  would  not  employ  a  sufficient  force  to 
take  Quatre  Bras ;  the  point  was  successfully  held 
by  the  enemy,  through  a  mere  chance.  A  dispute 
between  Grouchy  and  Vandamme,  in  Napoleon's  ab- 
sence, prevented  the  occupation  of  Sombreffe. 

Napoleon  had  already  gained  a  great  strategic  ad- 
vantage, if  his  operations  on  the  15th  had  been  in- 
complete. He  had  occupied  the  main  road  and 
gathered  near  the  enemy's  centre,  as  he  had  cal- 
culated, the  weakest  part  of  their  line;  he  was  within 
easy  reach  of  Quatre  Bras  and  SombrefYe ;  he  might 
hope  to  divide  his  adversaries,  and  to  beat  them  in 
detail.  The  dispositions  of  Bliicher  and  Wellington 
were  singularly  favourable  to  this  daring  offensive 
movement.  The  Prussian  chief  had  learned  that  the 
French  army  was  near  the  frontier  on  the  14th  of 
June  ;  he  directed  his  forces  to  concentrate  on  Som- 
breffe ;  but  only  three  of  his  corps  could  be  at  that 
place  on  the  i6th,  the  corps  of  Bulow  being  far  away 
around  Liege.  Bliicher  was  thus  exposing  himself 
to  the  strokes  of  Napoleon  with  no  more  than  a  part 
of  a  not  united  army  ;  and  he  had  no  certainty  of 
support  from  Wellington,  whose  headquarters  at 
Brussels  were  far  from  his  own  at  Namur.  The  con- 
duct of  the  British  commander  gave  signal  proof 
that  he  did  not  excel  in  strategy,  especially  when  he 
had  to  cope  with  the  greatest  of  strategists.  He  had 
been  informed,  as  early  as  the  loth,  that  an  attack 
on  his  positions  was,  perhaps,  imminent  ;  but  he  left 
his   army  as  dispersed   as  it  had    been    before  ;  he 


Qitatre  Bras  267 

would  not  believe  that  the  allied  centre  would  be 
assailed  ;  he  left  the  mass  of  his  forces  far  on  his 
right,  thinking  that  this  was  his  most  vulnerable 
point,  an  assumption  very  difficult  to  understand. 
He  remained  motionless  until  the  15th  ;  by  the  after- 
noon of  that  day,  perhaps  at  an  earlier  hour,  he  was 
apprised  that  the  allied  centre  was  being  threatened; 
but  practically  he  did  nothing  to  ward  off  this 
attack.  Towards  nightfall  he  assembled  his  army  ; 
his  right  was  moved  in  the  direction  of  his  left ;  his 
reserve  was  made  ready  to  march  from  Brussels;  but 
not  a  regiment  was  sent  to  the  main  road,  which  was 
already  partly  held  by  Napoleon  and  would  bring 
the  enemy  in  full  force  on  the  allied  centre.  A  wide 
gap  thus  divided  him  from  his  Prussian  colleague ; 
but  happily  one  of  his  subordinates,  perceiving  this, 
rnoved  a  single  small  division  to  Quatre  Bras,  which 
closed  the  gap  to  a  certain  extent, — the  distance 
was  not  less  than  fourteen  miles, — and  so  far  might 
retard  the  advance  of  the  Emperor,  Late  in  the 
night  Wellington  gave  orders  that  a  large  part  of 
his  army  should  march  towards  Quatre  Bras ;  but 
these  dispositions  were  hours  too  late;  no  great  force 
could  reach  Quatre  Bras  on  the  i6th;  the  one  weak 
division  which  held  that  point  could  not  possibly  re- 
sist a  powerful  attack.' 

'  For  the  dispositions  of  Blucher  and  Wellington  on  the  15th  of 
June,  acknowledged  by  all  commentators  to  have  been  very  faulty, 
see  the  admirable  chai)ter  of  Mr.  Ropes,  The  Campaign  of  Waterloo, 
pp.  70-115.  I  may  refer  to  my  own  Campaign  of  /S/j,  pp.  88-102, 
and  the  authorities  there  cited.  The  operations  of  the  day  on  both 
sides  are  excellently  narrated  by  H.  Houssaye,  "  iSij"  ii.,  109- 
149. 


6TEEL  WORKS  CLUB  LIBRARY, 

JOI.IFT.  TT! 


268  Wcllinoiou 


<j> 


We  may  glance  at  the  positions  of  the  belligerent 
armies  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th  of  June.  Ney, 
in  command  of  the  French  left,  was  at  Frasnes,  a 
little  village  near  Quatre  Bras,  but  with  a  few  hun- 
dred men  only;  the  other  divisions  of  his  army, 
under  Reille  and  D'Erlon,  extended  backwards  to 
Gosselies  and  Jumet,a  distance,  at  the  farthest  point, 
of  eleven  miles.  Grouchy,  who  had  received  the 
command  of  the  French  right,  was,  with  part  of  his 
army,  near  Fleurus,  that  is  only  a  short  way  from 
Sombreffe  ;  Napoleon,  with  part  of  the  centre,  was 
around  Charleroy  ;  Lobau,  Kellermann,  and  Milhaud 
were  about  to  cross  the  Sambre,  in  all,  about  17,000 
strong  ;  Gerard,  now  under  Grouchy,  had  half  of  his 
corps  still  south  of  the  river.  On  the  other  side  of 
the  field  of  manoeuvre,  Bliicher  was  approaching 
Sombreffe,  but  with  only  three-fourths  of  his  army; 
Wellington  was  moving  on  Quatre  Bras,  but  with  a 
force  comparatively  small.  In  these  circumstances 
the  Emperor  has  been  charged  with  undue  delays  ; 
he  ought  to  have  advanced  against  Bliicher  at  once  ; 
in  that  event  he  could  have  annihilated  the  corps  of 
Zieten,  not  yet  supported  by  the  corps  of  Pirch  and 
Thielmann,  and  isolated  between  Fleurus  and  Som- 
breffe.' If  not  wholly  without  foundation,  this  criti- 
cism is  far  fetched  '';   Napoleon  was  bound  to  assem- 

'  The  authorities  on  this  subject  will  be  found  cited  in  my  Cam- 
paign of  jSij,  p.  104. 

'^  Napoleon  returned  to  Charleroy  on  the  night  of  the  15th  of  June; 
he  was  already  suffering  from  the  physical  decline  which  affected 
him  in  1815.  According  to  Gourgaud,  Al^moires,  i.,  502,  the  Em- 
peror said  he  ought  to  have  slept  at  Fleurus  ;  this  may  indicate 
that  he  thought  he  should  have  fallen  on  Zieten  early  on  the  i6th. 


Quatre  Bras  269 

ble  his  army  north  of  the  Sambre  before  encounter- 
ing enemies  nearly  double  in  numbers;  anything 
like  a  premature  movement  might  have  been  dis- 
astrous. The  Emperor,  too,  from  the  point  of  view 
he  took, — and  this  conformed  to  true  strategic  prin- 
ciples,— did  not  expect  that  his  adversaries  would 
meet  him  in  force  on  the  i6th ;  close  as  he  now  was 
to  the  allied  centre,  he  did  not  suppose  that  Bliicher 
and  Wellington  would  attempt  to  approach  each 
other  at  Sombreffe  and  Quatre  Bras  with  only  a  part 
of  their  armies  ;  he  assumed  that  they  would  fall 
back,  as  would  have  been  their  most  prudent  course. 
It  is  plain  from  his  despatches  and  those  of  Soult — 
the  Marshal  had  been  made  chief  of  the  French 
Staff,  an  unfortunate  choice — that  he  did  not  think 
he  would  be  seriously  engaged  on  this  day ;  he  be- 
lieved that  he  would  reach  Brussels  on  the  17th; 
there  was  no  necessity,  therefore,  to  hasten  the  ad- 
vance of  his  army.'  These  anticipations  were,  no 
doubt,  false  in  the  event  ;  but  what  really  deserves 
notice  is,  that  Napoleon's  dispositions  for  the  i6th 
were  masterly,  and  ought  to  have  secured  him  de- 
cisive success.  Ney  was  ordered  to  march  with  his 
army  to  and  beyond  Quatre  Bras, — a  single  division 
was  being  detached, — and  to  send  another  division 
to  a  point  called  Marbais,  where  it  would  be  on  the 
flank  and  rear  of  the  Prussians,  should  Bliicher  be 
moving  upon  Sombreffe.  Ney  would  thus  hold 
Wellington  in  check  and  probably  beat  him,  for  the 
Marshal  would  dispose  of  more  than   40,000  men  ; 

'  All  these  considerations  are  admirably  explained  by   II.  Hous- 
saye,  "  t8/_5,"  ii.,  131-134. 


2  7o  Wellington 

and  he  would  be  admirably  placed  to  fall  on  Bliicher, 
should  Bliicher  attempt  to  give  Napoleon  battle. 
At  the  same  time  Grouchy  and  the  main  army  of  the 
Emperor  were  to  march  to  Sombreffe,  and  even  as 
far  as  Gembloux,  and  to  attack  Bliicher  should  the 
opportunity  arise. 

Had  Ney  carried  out  his  orders  as  he  might  have 
done,  the  army  of  Bliicher  would  have  been  de- 
stroyed ;  Wellington  could  hardly  have  averted  a 
severe  defeat ;  the  campaign  in  Belgium  would  prob- 
ably have  come  to  an  end.  But  the  Marshal  "  was 
not  the  same  man,"  in  Napoleon's  phrase;  his  de- 
fection from  the  Bourbons  preyed  on  his  mind  ;  he 
was  distrusted  by  his  master  and  by  the  army  ;  he 
was  fighting  with  a  halter  around  his  neck.  It  is 
impossible  to  account  otherwise  for  the  timidity, 
followed  by  recklessness,  of  which  the  ill-fated  chief 
gave  such  decisive  proof  in  the  conflict  of  1815.  He 
had  been  directed,  on  the  15th  of  June,  to  seize 
Quatre  Bras ;  he  had  failed  to  do  this  through  his 
own  fault  ;  but  the  directions  of  Napoleon  remained 
unchanged.  Ney,  therefore,  ought  to  have  had  his 
army  ready  to  advance  by  the  early  morning  of  the 
i6th ;  but  he  allowed  Reille  and  D'Erlon  to  be 
motionless  for  hours.  He  received  the  Emperor's 
orders  for  the  i6th  in  the  forenoon  ;  yet  he  did  very 
little  to  conform  to  them  ;  he  indeed  summoned 
Reille  to  Quatre  Bras,  but  very  late  :  he  did  not  send 
a  message  to  D'Erlon  for  a  considerable  time.  No 
doubt  Reille  hesitated  and  paused,  which  he  should 
not  have  done  ;  but  Napoleon  was  indignant  at  the 
Marshal's   conduct ;   he  peremptorily   ordered    him 


Qiiatre  Bras  271 

again  to  advance  to  Ouatre  Bras,  and  to  drive  off  any 
enemies  he  might  find  in  his  path.  This  second  order 
was  rather  late  ;  but  it  might  have  been  carried  into 
effect,  with  consequences  of  the  most  momentous 
kind,  had  Ney  been  the  daring  and  energetic  warrior 
of  old.  The  result  of  this  inaction,  nay,  of  disregard 
of  positive  commands,  Avas  unfortunate  for  the  Em- 
peror in  the  very  highest  degree  ;  it  frustrated  to  a 
great  extent  his  consummate  strategy.  It  was  not 
until  two  in  the  afternoon  of  the  i6th  that  Ney  was 
within  reach  of  Ouatre  Bras  ;  he  had  as  yet  only 
some  ii,0CK)  men  in  hand;  he  was  confronted  by  the 
single  division,  nearly  8000  strong,  which  had  been 
sent  to  Quatre  Bras  the  night  before  ;  this  sufificed 
for  the  moment  to  arrest  the  Marshal's  advance. 
His  false  operations  had  saved  the  allies  from  dis- 
aster :  and  yet  even  this  was  not  the  measure  of  his 
errors  on  the  i6th.' 

Meanwhile  Napoleon  and  the  greater  part  of  the 
main  French  army  had  reached  Fleurus  by  noon  on 
the  i6th,  a  short  distance  from  Bliicher's  point  of 
assembly,  Sombreffe.  But  half  of  Gerard's  corps 
had  not  yet  come  into  line  and  Lobau  was  only 
breaking  up  from  Charleroy,  that  is,  was  still  seven 
or  eight  miles  away.  The  Emperor  reconnoitred 
the    ground  from  the  roof  of  a  mill ;  he  seems  at 

'  The  misconduct  of  Ney  in  the  first  part  of  the  i6th  of  June  has 
been  admirably  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Ropes,  Campaign  of  Waterloo, 
pp.  176-18S.  I  can  only  quote  one  sentence  :  "  The  whole  manage- 
ment of  Marshal  Ney  shows  distrust  of  the  Emperor's  judgment,  un- 
willingness to  take  the  most  obvious  steps,  finally  disobedience  of 
orders."  See  also  H.  Houssaye,  "  i8/j"  ii.,  185-192,  and  my 
Campaign  of  1813,  pp.  109-110. 


272  WcUingion 

first  to  have  only  descried  the  corps  of  Zieten  ,  but 
he  soon  recognised  that  a  real  army  was  at  hand  ; 
Pirch  and  Thielmann  were  advancing  in  force.  His 
forecast  for  the  day  had  thus  turned  out  false  ;  he 
could  not  reach  Sombreffe,  and  still  less  Gembloux, 
without  fighting  a  great  battle  ;  this  had  been  rather 
unexpectedly  offered  by  Bliicher,  Napoleon  in- 
stantly seized  the  occasion  ;  Gerard  had  reached  the 
scene  of  action  a  little  after  one  ;  Lobau  was  ordered 
to  quicken  his  march  ;  the  Emperor  resolved,  when 
ready,  to  attack.  Bliicher  had  now  arrayed  his  three 
corps  on  the  ground :  they  formed  a  most  danger- 
ously extended  front,  from  Wagnelee  on  the  extreme 
right,  to  the  centre,  Ligny,  and  thence  to  Sombreffe, 
and  to  Tougreienes  and  Balatre  on  the  extreme  left; 
for  Bliicher  sought  to  join  hands  with  Wellington, 
and  to  guard  his  communications  with  Namur;  and 
though  his  position  was  in  parts  very  strong,  it  was 
vulnerable  at  some  points,  and  was  much  too  widely 
held.  But  this  was  not  all,  or  even  nearly  all ;  the 
Prussian  army  would  be  on  the  rear  of  Ney,  should 
the  Marshal,  as  was  to  be  assumed,  be  in  possession 
of  Quatre  Bras  ;  it  would  be  almost  under  the  guns 
of  the  division  to  be  detached  to  Marbais ;  it  was 
open  to  attack  in  front,  flank,  and  rear  ;  it  might  be 
nearly  surrounded  and  destroyed.  Napoleon  felt 
assured  of  a  decisive  triumph  at  hand  ;  he  said '  to 
Gerard,  in  whom  he  placed  great  trust  :  "  The  cam- 
paign may  be  brought  to  a  close  in  three  hours.  If 
Ney  executes  his  orders  properly  not  a  gun  of  the 
Prussian  army  will  escape  :  it  is  entrapped  in  a  fatal 

'Napoleon,  Comment.,  v.,  pp.  140-141. 


Oitatre  Bras  273 

position."  From  another  point  of  view  Wellington 
augured  very  ill  of  the  fortunes  of  his  colleague  in 
the  battle  at  hand.  The  British  General  had  has- 
tened from  Quatre  Bras  to  meet  Bliicher ;  he  pro- 
mised to  assist  him  if  this  was  in  his  power;  but  it 
is  not  true,  as  German  writers  have  alleged,  that 
Bliicher  was  about  to  fight  with  the  certainty  of  his 
allj^'s  support ;  his  own  correspondence  proves  the 
exact  contrary.  With  his  fine  tactical  insight,  Wel- 
lington had  perceived  a  bad  mistake  in  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  Prussian  army ;  the  reserves,  arrayed  on 
high  uplands,  were  most  wrongly  exposed.  He  re- 
monstrated in  vain  with  the  stubborn  old  chief ;  as 
he  rode  from  the  field  he  drily  said  to  his  staff  :  "  If 
they  fight  here  they  will  be  damnably  mauled." 

The  battle  of  Ligny  began  at  about  three  in  the 
afternoon.  The  Prussian  army  was  some  87,000 
strong;  the  French,  including  the  corps  of  Lobau, 
some  78,000 ;  but  the  French  had  a  superiority  in 
cavalry  and  guns.  The  plan  of  Napoleon's  attack 
was  perfectly  designed  ' ;  Vandamme,  supported  by 
a  division  of  Reille,  detached  for  some  time,  was  to 
fall  on  Bliicher's  right,  which  was  greatly  exposed  ; 
Gerard,  with  the  chief  part  of  his  corps,  was  to  storm 
Ligny ;  Grouchy  was  to  hold  Bliicher's  far-extended 
left  in  check.  These  attacks  might  be  expected  to 
break  the  enemy's  front,  badly  placed  on  the  ground, 
and  stretching  much  too  far;  but  they  were  to  be 
combined  with  the  decisive  onslaught,  to  be  exe- 
cuted by  Ney,  on   Bliicher's  flank  and    rear.     This 

'  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena  triumphantly  demolished  the  petty  criti- 
cisms made  on  this  project  {Comment.,  vi.,  146-147). 

18 


2  74  Wellington 

last  was  to  be  the  mortal  stroke ;  had  it  been  struck 
there  would  have  been  an  end  of  the  Prussian  army. 
Napoleon  spared  no  pains  to  make  its  delivery  as- 
sured ;  at  two  he  had  sent  off  a  message  to  Ney 
directing  him  to  attack  "  a  Prussian  corps  "  on  his 
right ;  at  a  quarter  after  three  he  despatched  an- 
other message,  telling  the  Marshal  "  to  envelop  the 
flank  and  the  rear  of  the  Prussian  army."  '  Soon 
after  this  he  was  informed  by  Lobau  that  Ney  was 
fighting  a  battle  with  Wellington  ;  the  roar  of  can- 
non at  Quatre  Bras  was,  indeed,  proof  of  this.  The 
Emperor  accordingly  summoned  D'Erlon  to  his  own 
field — D'Erlon  was  still  at  a  distance  from  Quatre 
Bras,  in  the  rear — ordering  that  general  to  march 
on  "  St.  Amand,  near  Ligny "  ;  that  is,  to  strike 
Bliicher's  flank  with  his  corps,  20,000  strong.  A  staff 
ofificer  was  the  bearer  of  this  order ;  a  duplicate  was 
sent  to  Ney  by  a  second  staff  officer.'' 

The  conflict  at  Ligny  raged  for  two  or  three 
hours,  without  leading  to  decisive  results,  though 
the  Prussian  army  was,  on  the  whole,  worsted. 
Vandamme  mastered  St.  Amand,  and  drew  near 
Wagnel^e,  on  Bliicher's  extreme  right ;  the  veteran 

'  The  expression  "  Prussian  corps  "  instead  of  "  army,"  has  puz- 
zled commentators.  The  word  was  probably  a  mistake  of  Soult, 
a  bad  chief  of  the  staff  in  the  campaign. 

^  The  D'Erlon  incident,  as  it  has  been  called,  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  much  controversy,  for  it  had  a  most  important  bearing  on  the 
results  of  the  campaign.  I  have  never  doubted  that  Napoleon  gave 
the  order  as  above  mentioned.  See  my  Great  Coimnanders  of  Mod- 
ern Times,  p.  329,  and  Disputed  Passages  of  the  Campaign  of  1813 
{English  Historical  Review,  January,  1895,  p.  68).  \\.  Houssaye 
has  set  the  question  at  rest  {"iSij,"  ii.,  162-163) ;  but  I  do  not  think 
the  text  of  Napoleon's  order  is  genuine  {ibid.,  ii.,  201). 


Qiiatre  Bras  275 

warrior  was  all  but  turned  and  outflanked.  Gerard 
attacked  Ligny,  which  had  been  partly  fortified ; 
the  position  was  one  of  considerable  strength;  it 
was  taken  and  retaken  after  furious  efforts;  no 
quarter  was  asked  for  or  given  by  troops  animated 
by  savage  national  hatred.  Meanwhile  Grouchy 
successfully  engaged  Thielmann,  and  was  able  to 
paralyse  a  superior  force  by  demonstrations  which 
held  his  enemy  fast  to  the  spot.  The  fight  was 
desperately  contested  along  three-fourths  of  the 
line,  but  the  losses  of  the  Prussians  were  much 
greater  than  those  of  the  French ;  as  Wellington 
had  foreseen,  their  reserves  were  cruelly  stricken  ' ; 
and  Bliicher  was  compelled  to  employ  a  consid- 
erable part  of  his  reserve  against  an  army  much 
more  skilfully  arrayed  on  the  field.  It  was  now 
about  half-past  five  o'clock.  Vandamme  sent  a 
report  to  Napoleon  that  a  large  hostile  column 
was  advancing  against  his  flank  and  rear  towards 
Fleurus,  and  that  he  would  be  driven  from  his  po- 
sition if  he  was  not  reinforced.  The  Emperor  de- 
spatched an  aide-de-camp  to  find  out  how  the  matter 
stood  ;  this  officer  returned,  in  rather  more  than  an 
hour,  announcing  that  the  apparition  was  that  of  the 
corps  of  D'Erlon,  which,  we  have  seen,  had  been 
summoned  to  the  field  of  Ligny.  Erelong  the  great 
mass  of  this  force  was  seen  to  disappear.  This  most 
untoward  accident  saved  Bliicher.  Had  D'Erlon 
marched  to  St.  Amand,  as  he  had  been  directed, 
the  Prussian  army  must  have  been  overwhelmed. 
It  is  now  tolerably  certain  how  this  did  not  happen. 

'  Napoleon  also  noticed  tliis.     CotnmenC,  v.,  144. 


2  76  Wellington 

D'Erlon  received  the  order  sent  by  the  staff  officer  ; 
he  turned  aside  from  the  roads  to  Quatre  Bras  to- 
wards Ligny  ;  but  the  order  was  not  sufificiently  pre- 
cise.' He  marched  on  Fleurus,  not  on  St.  Amand ; 
that  is,  he  seemed  to  be  threatening  the  French,  not 
the  Prussian  army.  Napoleon,  trusting  to  the  mes- 
sage from  Vandamme,  appears  to  have  accepted  a 
mistake  as  a  fact  ;  but  it  remains  a  mystery  why 
he  did  not  bring  up  D'Erlon  to  the  field,  when  the 
aide-de-camp  had  ascertained  that  D'Erlon  was  at 
hand.  Many  surmises  have  been  made  to  account 
for  this ;  but  it  seems  most  probable  that  the  Em- 
peror, losing  his  presence  of  mind  in  the  confusion 
of  a  great  battle,  unaccountably  missed  the  occa- 
sion. All  that  is  certain  is,  that  the  message  to 
D'Erlon  was  badly  worded,  and  that  Napoleon's  ac- 
count of  this  incident  is  very  obscure  ;  he  seems  to 
have  felt  that  a  great  mistake  had  been  made.' 

The  march  of  D'Erlon,  announced  to  be  that  of  an 
enemy,  had  caused  great  disorder  in  Vandamme's 
columns  ;  they  lost  much  of  the  vantage  ground  they 
had  gained.     By  this  time  Bliicher  had  learned  that 

'  This  was  another  instance  of  the  negligence  of  Soult,  as  chief  of 
the  French  staff,  repeatedly  seen  in  the  campaign.  Soult  was  natur- 
ally indolent,  and  had  little  or  no  experience  of  this  most  important 
office. 

*  Napoleon's  narrative  of  the  D'Erlon  incident  will  be  found  in 
Cotnt/ieni.,  v.,  142.  In  Gourgaud's  Memoires,  i.,  174,  the  Em- 
peror is  made  to  say:  "  Le  mouvement  D'Erlon  m'a  fait  bien 
du  tort  ;  on  croyait  autour  de  moi  cjue  c'  etait  I'ennemi."  In  my 
Great  Cotnmanders  and  Disputed  Passages  I  have  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  a  mistake  was  made  by  Napoleon,  and  this  is  the  view 
of  H.  Houssaye  ("iS/j,"  ii.,  203;  see  also  my  Campaign  of  181  j, 
p.  145)- 


Quatrc  Bras  277 

he  could  expect  no  help  from  Wellington,  engaged 
for  hours  with  Ney  at  Ouatre  Bras ;  but  the  old 
chief  thought  his  opportunity  had  come.  He  made 
a  desperate  onslaught  on  Vandamme,  collecting  all 
the  available  troops  at  hand  ;  his  object  was  to  out- 
flank the  French  left,  perhaps  to  drive  it  into  the 
defiles  of  the  Sambre.  The  attack,  supported  by  a 
great  part  of  the  Marshal's  reserve,  was  formidable, 
and  not  far  from  successful ;  Napoleon  was  obliged 
to  send  part  of  the  Imperial  Guard  to  the  aid  of 
Vandamme  :  this  reinforcement  brought  the  attack 
to  a  stand.  The  Emperor  now  made  ready  for  a 
decisive  counter-stroke  ;  he  could  no  longer  hope  to 
annihilate  Bliicher ;  but  he  had  the  means  at  hand 
of  winning  the  battle.  The  Imperial  Guard  and  the 
horsemen  of  Milhaud,  sustained  by  the  divisions  of 
Gerard,  were  launched  against  the  Prussian  centre  at 
Ligny ;  this  was  now  held  by  a  small  force  only,  for 
the  Prussian  reserves  had  been  wasted  and  greatly 
weakened,  and  large  detachments  had  been  made  to 
join  in  the  attack  on  Vandamme.  The  result,  in 
the  expressive  language  of  Soult,  was  "  like  a  trans- 
formation scene  at  a  theatre."  Ligny  was  carried, 
after  a  short  resistance  ;  the  Prussian  army  was  rent 
asunder;  Bliicher  was  unhorsed  in  a  cavalry  melee; 
he  owed  his  life  to  a  devoted  aide-de-camp.  The 
exulting  French  had  soon  taken  possession  of  the 
ground  held  by  their  defeated  enemies;  but  these 
fought  fiercely  to  the  last  moment,  and  fell  back  a 
short  distance  only.  The  Emperor,  in  a  word,  had 
gained  a  victory  ;  but  this  was  not  the  complete  and 
absolute  triumph  which  unquestionably  would  have 


2/3  Wellington 

been  seen  had  D'Erlon  fallen  on  Bliicher's  flank  or 
rear;  in  that  event,  Soult  wrote,  without  exagger- 
ating the  facts,  that  "  30,000  Prussians  would  have 
been  made  prisoners."  The  losses  of  the  French 
were  about  11,000  men  ;  those  of  the  enemy  18,000 
killed  and  wounded  ;  and  from  8000  to  12,000  flying 
troops  disbanded.' 

Meanwhile  Quatre  Bras  had  been  the  scene  of  a 
combat,  fierce  and  well  contested,  but  unlike  Ligny. 
It  was  a  little  after  two  on  the  i6th  of  June,  when  Ney 
began  his  attack  on  this  important  point,  which  he 
ought  to  have  occupied  and  passed  many  hours  be- 
fore. Perponcher,  the  general  who  had  so  happily 
sent  his  division  to  Quatre  Bras  on  the  1 5th,  had  with 
his  chief,  the  young  Prince  of  Orange,  made  their 
preparations  to  resist  the  enemy.  The  ground  tra- 
versed by  the  great  main  road  from  Charleroy  to 
Brussels,  but  protected  by  woodland  and  two  or  three 
large  farms,  was  favourable  to  the  defensive  as  a 
whole,  and  Perponcher  and  the  Prince  had  skilfully 
arrayed  their  men  ;  but  these  were  unable  to  with- 
stand the  onset  of  the  French  ;  by  three  Quatre  Bras 
was  almost  in  the  grasp  of  Ney.  The  Marshal, 
nevertheless,  had  been  held  in  check  for  an  hour, 
and  this  had  been  a  godsend  for  the  Allies ;  Per- 
poncher's  division  may  have  been  a  forlorn  hope, 
but  it  had  been  a  forlorn  hope  of  the  very 
greatest    value.      About    half-past    three,    Welling- 

'  The  account  of  the  battle  of  Ligny,  by  Clausewitz,  is  very  able 
and  brilliant,  but  very  disingenuous.  The  historian  conceals  the 
truth  as  to  v?hat  must  have  been  the  result  had  D'Erlon  fallen  on 
Blucher  ;  see,  too,  the  admirable  remarks  of  Mr.  Ropes,  The  Cam- 
paign of  Waterloo,  pp.  163-175. 


Ouatvc  Bras  279 

ton,  returning  from  Ligny,  had  most  fortunately 
reached  Ouatre  Bras ;  Picton's  division  and  other 
detachments  had  reached  the  field  by  this  time;  but 
Ney  had  been  joined  by  the  mass  of  Reille's  corps : 
he  disposed  of  from  18,000  to  19,000  men,  and  was 
very  superior  in  cavalry  and  guns ;  the  situation 
had  become  "  most  critical  "  for  the  British  com- 
mander. Wellington,  however,  an  eye-witness  has 
said,  was  "  as  cool  as  ice " ;  his  dispositions  for 
the  defence  were,  as  always,  excellent.  Picton 
and  his  soldiers  successfully  held  their  ground 
on  the  left  ;  but  the  Dutch,  Belgian,  and  Ger- 
man auxiliaries,  who  formed  a  large  part  of  the 
Duke's  army,  were  distinctly  beaten  at  the  cen- 
tre and  on  the  right ;  and  though  Wellington  was 
again  reinforced,  the  tide  of  battle  was  still  turn- 
ing against  him  ;  he  must  have  been  overwhelmed 
had  Ney  concentrated  his  forces,  as  he  might  have 
done,  by  the  early  afternoon  of  the  i6th  at  latest. 
It  was  now  about  half-past  five  o'clock ;  the  Mar- 
shal had  just  received  the  message  sent  by  Napoleon 
at  a  quarter  after  three,  directing  him  to  "  envelope 
Bliicher's  flank  and  rear"  ;  how  he  had  failed  to  sec- 
ond his  great  master's  designs  !  Ney  could  not  now 
hope  to  do  the  Emperor's  bidding;  he  was  held  in 
check  at  Quatre  Bras  by  Wellington  ;  D'Erlon  and 
his  corps  were  far  from  the  scene ;  only  a  part  of 
Kellermann's  cavalry,  which  had  been  placed  in  his 
hands,  was  on  the  spot.  Ney  acted  with  precipitate 
haste  ;  he  launched  a  single  brigade  of  Kellermann 
against  the  enemy,  a  useless  and  ill-conceived  effort; 
the   steel-clad   horsemen   made  a  very  fine   charge  ; 


28o  Wellington 

but  their  onset  was  fruitless,  and  they  were  erelong 
repulsed. 

During  this  episode  in  the  conflict,  or  about  that 
time,  a  superior  officer,  sent  off  by  D'Erlon,  had  in- 
formed the  Marshal  that  his  chief  had  been  sum- 
moned to  join  Napoleon.  Ney  flamed  out  into 
indignant  wrath  ;  he  forgot  that  D'Erlon  had  re- 
ceived the  Emperor's  orders,  and  that  D'Erlon  was 
too  far  off  to  be  of  any  use  at  Quatre  Bras  ;  he  per- 
emptorily enjoined  his  lieutenant  to  come  to  his  aid. 
D'Erlon  very  injudiciously  obeyed  this  command  ; 
clearly  he  ought  to  have  done  what  Napoleon  had 
told  him  to  do  ;  he  could  have  made  Ligny  a  decisive 
victory  for  France  ;  he  was  too  late  to  reach  the 
Marshal  in  time.  Despite  the  angry  protests  of  his 
own  soldiery,  he  drew  off  three-fourths  of  his  corps 
from  where  it  stood,  and  marched  towards  Quatre 
Bras  ;  he  left  a  single  division  to  observe  the  Prus- 
sians, a  bad  half-measure  that  effected  nothing. 
Twenty  thousand  excellent  troops,  therefore,  who 
could  have  crushed  Bliicher  had  they  fallen  on  his 
flank,  in  conformity  with  Napoleon's  orders,  or  who 
would  have  struck  Wellington  down,  had  they  been 
brought  up  by  Ney  to  Quatre  Bras  in  time,  were 
idly  moved  to  and  fro  between  two  battlefields,  and 
did  not  fire  a  shot  on  the  i6th  of  June;  Napoleon 
probably  made  a  mistake  ;  but  the  blame  must  lie 
mainly  on  Ney,  and  in  part  on  D'Erlon.  The  Mar- 
shall meanwhile  had  continued  to  fight  at  Quatre 
Bras ;  the  staff  officer  who  had  carried  the  despatch 
in  duplicate,  directing  D'Erlon  to  march  on  St. 
Amand,  had  entreated  Ney  in  vain  to  countermand 


Quatre  Bras  28 1 

his  order  :  he  had  persisted  in  recalling  his  subordinate 
to  his  side.  The  evening  by  this  time  had  far 
advanced  ;  considerable  reinforcements  flowed  into 
Wellington,  who  had  conducted  the  defence  v/ith 
characteristic  skill  :  Ney  was  compelled  to  retreat 
to  Frasnes ;  the  losses  of  the  French  were  about 
4300  men  ;  those  of  the  allies  rather  a  larfjer  num- 
ber.  As  we  look  back  at  the  operations  of  the  day, 
Ney,  it  may  be  admitted,  did  one  good  service  ;  he 
prevented  Wellington  from  stretching  a  hand  to 
Bliicher.  But  if  we  recollect  that  he  was  at  the 
head  of  an  army  of  more  than  40,000  men,  and  how 
great  his  opportunities  were,  his  conduct  must  be  in 
no  doubtful  sense  censured.  Had  he  assembled  his 
forces  in  sufificient  time,  he  ought  to  have  been  able 
to  overthrow  Wellington,  and  to  detach  a  force  that 
would  have  destroyed  Bliicher :  nay,  had  he  not  im- 
properly recalled  D'Erlon,  disobeying  flagrantly  his 
master's  orders,  Ligny  would  have  been  a  second 
Jena  for  Prussia.  Napoleon  has  written,  without 
exaggerating  the  truth,  that  he  would  have  "crushed 
his  enemies  on  the  i6th,  had  Ney  done  his  duty  on 
the  left."  In  that  event  Waterloo  would  not  have 
been  fought  ,  superior  strategy  would  have  pro- 
duced its  natural  results.' 

The  operations  of  the  French  on  the  i6th  of 
June  had  been  "incomplete,"  as  had  been  the 
case  on  the  15th.     It  is  simply  ignoring  plain    facts 

'  For  an  admirable  resume  of  what  Ney  might  have  accomplished 
on  the  i6th  of  June,  see  Napoleon,  Commeiil.,  v.,  199,  200.  Consult 
also  the  judicious  remarks  of  Mr.  Ropes,  The  Campaign  of  Water  bo, 
pp.  186,  187. 


282  Weill  HO- ton 


^> 


to  deny  that,  had  the  Emperor's  arrangements  been 
properly  carried  out,  Bliicher  would  have  been 
crushed  on  the  field  of  Ligny,  and  that  Wellington 
would  have  been  severely  beaten  ;  a  magnificent  con- 
ception of  war  would  have  been  realised.  But  if 
these  decisive  results  had  not  been  obtained,  the 
strategic  advantage  gained  by  Napoleon,  from  the 
outset  of  the  campaign,  had  been  largely  increased  ; 
and  the  prospect  before  him  was  of  the  most  splen- 
did promise.  He  was  master  of  the  main  road  from 
Charleroy  to  Brussels,  up  to  the  line  of  the  communi- 
cation of  his  foes ;  he  had  broken  in  the  weak  allied 
centre:  Wellington  would  have  to  leave  Quatre 
Bras,  as  Bliicher  had  been  driven  from  Sombreffe. 
The  hostile  armies  would  be  compelled  to  retreat 
into  an  intricate  country  of  woodland  and  marsh, 
where  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  effect  their  junc- 
ture, and  where  this  could  be  made  impossible,  they 
could  probably  be  kept  separated  and  defeated  in 
detail.  But  this  was  only  a  part  of  the  results  ;  it 
was  in  the  power  of  Napoleon  to  achieve  a  signal 
triumph  for  France  on  the  17th  of  June.  The  Prus- 
sian army  had  been  badly  worsted,  and  its  chief  dis- 
abled :  it  could  not  fight  a  battle  for  many  hours, 
and  was  in  retreat ;  Wellington  could  not  assemble 
45,000  men  at  Quatre  Bras,  and  was  far  from  his 
colleague  "in  the  air";  Napoleon  was  at  the  head 
of  more  than  100,000  men  ;  and  of  these  60,000  were 
fine  fresh  troops.  In  these  circumstances,  the  Em- 
peror had  the  choice  of  three  courses  ;  all  were  in 
the  very  highest  degree  auspicious.'  He  might 
'  All  commentators  are  now  agreed  as  to  what  Napoleon  might 


Oiiatre  Bras  2"^ 


o 


send  only  a  few  thousand  men  to  observe  Bliicher, 
and  might  fall  on  Wellington,  a  short  way  off  at 
Quatre  Bras,  with  his  own  army  and  that  of  Ney  ;  a 
disaster  must  have  befallen  the  British  commander. 
Or,  leaving  a  small  detachment  to  observe  Welling- 
ton, he  might  pursue  Bliicher,  with  the  mass  of  his 
forces;  in  that  event  nothing  could  have  saved 
Bliicher.  Or,  finally,  in  conformity  with  more 
scientific  strategy,  and  with  grand  examples  set  by 
Turenne  and  himself.  Napoleon  might  attack  Welling- 
ton with  from  70,000  to  80,000  men,  an  army  that 
ought  to  make  victory  certain ;  at  the  same  time  he 
might  send  some  30,000  against  Bliicher ;  the  Prus- 
sian army,  we  must  bear  in  mind,  had  not  been  de- 
stroyed, and  it  might  be  reinforced  by  the  whole 
corps  of  Bulow.  In  any  of  these  cases,  it  seemed 
hardly  possible  but  that  decisive  success  would  be 
obtained. 

The  events  of  the  17th  of  June,  however,  turned 
out  otherwise  ;  it  is  essential  to  examine  how  this 
happened.  To  secure  the  splendid  results  he  might 
have  secured,  Napoleon  should  have  been  equal  to 
himself,   and  should   have  shown   his  characteristic 

have  achieved  on  the  17th  of  June.  Reference  may  be  made  to  the 
authorities  cited  in  my  Campaign  of  181^,  p.  i  56;  and  see  Ropes's  Cam- 
paign of  Waterloo,  pp.  197-200,  an  excellent  resume.  Of  the  three 
alternative  operations  Soult,  who  knew  what  British  soldiers  were,  pre- 
ferred the  first ;  he  wished  every  available  man  to  be  directed  against 
Wellington.  II.  Houssaye,  " /^/J,"  ii.,  240.  According  to  Gour- 
gaud,  M^ttwires,  i.,  197,  Napoleon  accepted  this  view  after  Waterloo. 
Clausewitz  has  written  that  the  second  alternative  would  have  been 
the  best,  but  this  is  more  than  doubtful.  The  third  alternative  was 
the  most  correct  in  pure  strategy  ;  it  was  adopted  by  Napoleon,  but 
loo  late  ;  and  the  execution  of  it  was  utterly  mismanaged. 


284  Wellington 

energy  and  resource,  usually  seen  in  following  up 
victory.  He  ought  to  have  had  reports  from  his 
lieutenants  at  Ligny  and  Quatre  Bras  as  to  the  state 
of  his  army  before  retiring  to  rest ;  he  ought  to 
have  had  his  troops  ready  to  march  against  Bliicher 
or  Wellington  by  the  early  morning  of  the  17th; 
this  was  only  what  was  to  be  expected  of  him.  Un- 
fortunately, at  this  juncture  he  lost  many  hours;  he 
was  in  a  state  of  inaction  for  a  not  inconsiderable 
time  ;  this  is  acknowledged  by  his  friendly  as  well  as 
his  hostile  critics.  He  went  back  to  Fleurus  after 
the  defeat  of  Blucher,  completely  exhausted  by  the 
work  of  two  days  ;  and  though  he  gave  general  di- 
rections for  the  pursuit  of  the  Prussians,  he  saw  no 
one  until  six  or  seven  in  the  morning  of  the  17th. 
This  conduct  was  so  utterly  different  from  the  ex- 
traordinary activity  of  other  campaigns  that  there 
must  have  been  a  real  cause  for  it ;  this,  I  believe, 
was  the  state  of  Napoleon's  health,  which  had  been 
in  decline  for  many  months,  especially  since  his  re- 
turn from  Elba.  Not  that  his  genius  did  not  often 
shine  out  in  full  force,  or  that  he  was  not  still  ca- 
pable of  great  exertion  ;  but  he  was  subject  to  two 
distressing  ailments  and  to  a  kind  of  lethargy  which 
occasionally  made  him  good  for  nothing."  There  is 
cogent  proof  that  this  was  the  case  with  him  on  the 
night  of  the  i6th ' ;  this  accounts,  and  can  alone  ac- 
count, for  his  seeming  remissness.  Meanwhile,  the 
Prussians  after  Ligny  were   not  even  observed  ;    it 


'For  the  state  of  Napoleon's  health  in  181 5  see  the  authorities 
in  my  Campaign  of  j8ij,  pp.  164-166. 

*  Dorsey  Gardner,  Quaf)-e  Bras,  Ligny,  and  JVaterloo. 


Quatrc  Bras  285 

was  assumed  that  they  were  utterly  routed  ;  care- 
lessness and  negligence  ran  riot  in  the  camp  of  the 
victors ;  worse  than  all,  Ney  and  Soult  did  not  com- 
municate with  each  other,  as  was  their  obvious  duty. 
The  Achilles  of  war,  whatever  the  cause,  was  thus 
slumbering  in  his  tent ;  his  whole  army  and  its 
chiefs  were  reposing  in  thoughtless  confidence.  It 
is  unnecessary  to  say  how  dangerous  this  was  in  the 
presence  of  two  such  men  as  Blucher  and  Welling- 
ton ;  the  first  always  indomitable  in  adverse  fortune, 
the  second  prompt,  skilful,  and  daring,  when  his  ad- 
versary was  before  him. 

A  letter  from  Soult  to  Ney — dictated,  no  doubt, 
by  the  Emperor  between  seven  and  eight  in  the 
morning — was  the  first  sign  of  life  shown  by  the 
French  army  on  the  17th  of  June.  This  important 
despatch  announced  that  "  the  Prussian  army  was 
routed  "  ;  it  added,  among  many  other  things,  that 
the  French  army  was  to  make  a  halt  for  the  day ; 
unquestionably  it  had  suffered  a  great  deal.'  Mean- 
while the  Emperor  had  sent  two  of  his  cavalry  chiefs 
after  Blucher ;  he  reached  the  field  of  Ligny  be- 
tween nine  and  ten ;  he  was  received  with  enthusi- 
astic acclaim  by  his  troops ;  but  he  was  obliged  to 
await  for  a  time  the  report  of  his  horsemen.  These 
informed  him  that  the  Prussians  were  falling  back 
towards  Namur  and  Liege,  that  is,  on  the  line  of 
their  communications  with  the  Rhine  ;  but  that  a 
large  body  of  the  enemy  had  assembled  around 
Gembloux,  that    is,  near    a   village    some    eighteen 

'  '  This  despatch  will  be  found  in  La  Tour  d'Auvcryne,  WaUr- 
loo,  pp.  211-213,     It  is,  1  think,  conclusive  as  to  tht  D'Erlon  incident. 


286  Wellington 

miles  from  Brussels,  but  almost  parallel  with  Quatre 
Bras;  this  would  show  that  Bliicher  may  have  di- 
vided his  forces,  but  that  he  was,  perhaps,  thinking 
of  drawing  near  Wellington.  The  lame  and  impo- 
tent conclusion  of  a  halt  was  abandoned  ;  Napoleon 
instantly  resolved  to  attack  Wellington,  taking  with 
him  every  man  he  could  spare  from  Ligny  ;  a  mes- 
sage was  sent  to  Ney  to  join  in  the  attack.  At  the 
same  time,  that  is,  before  noon.  Grouchy  was  to  be 
detached,  with  a  considerable  restraining  wing,  to 
pursue  Bliicher  and  to  hold  him  in  check,  and,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  to  keep  him  away  from  Welling- 
ton. These  operations  were  in  accordance  with  true 
strategy,  especially  having  regard  to  the  probable 
strength  of  Bliicher  ;  but  they  were  undertaken  late  ; 
precious  hours  had  been  lost ;  success,  which  ought 
to  have  been  made  certain,  had  been  rendered  doubt- 
ful ;  nay,  there  were  chances  that  Fortune  might  be- 
come adverse.  The  orders  given  to  Grouchy  were 
of  supreme  importance  ;  they  have  been  angrily  dis- 
cussed, but  their  import  is  plain.  In  an  interview 
with  the  Marshal,  the  Emperor  told  him  that  his 
mission  was  to  reach  and  to  attack  Bliicher ;  that  he 
was  to  communicate  with  headquarters  by  the  road 
from  Namur  to  Quatre  Bras ;  the  Emperor  all  but 
certainly  added  that  Grouchy  was  to  hold  a  position 
intermediate  between  the  Prussian  army  and  his 
own,  which,  if  possible,  was  to  attack  Wellington  in 
front  of  the  forest  of  Soignies.  In  a  despatch  sent 
a  little  later  Napoleon  ordered  Grouchy  "  to  march 
to   Gembloux  with  the  mass  of   his  forces"';   he 


'  The  orders  given  to  Grouchy  on  the  17th  of  June  have  been  the 


Qiuxtre  Bras  287 

added  significantly  that  Wellington  and  Bliicher 
might  be  trying  to  unite,  and  to  endeavour  to  fight 
another  battle.' 

The  French  army  was  now  divided  into  two 
groups;  the  first,  some  72,000  strong,  with  the  Em- 
peror at  its  head,  was  to  attack  Wellington  ;  the  sec- 
ond, not  quite  34,000  men,  under  Grouchy,  was  to 
pursue  Bliicher.  Napoleon  reached  Quatre  Bras  at 
about  two  in  the  afternoon;  Ney  had  not  stirred  from 
his  camp  at  Frasnes ;  his  master  was  incensed  that 
he  had  made  no  movement ;  he  had  again  set  posi- 
tive orders  at  nought.  But  Napoleon  and  Ney 
could  not,  for  many  hours,  have  made  any  real  im- 
pression on  Wellington's  army.  The  Duke — here 
different  from  his  great  antagonist  — had  been  in  the 
saddle  from  the  early  dawn  of  the  17th;  he  had  been 
informed  of  the  defeat  of  Ligny,  and  of  the  line  of 
the  Prussian  army's  retreat ;  he  resolved  to  fall 
back  on  a  parallel  line  ;  but  told  the  aide-de-camp, 
sent  by  the  chief  of  Bliicher's  staff,  that  he  would 
accept  battle  at  Waterloo,  on  the  i8th  of  June,  if 
he  had  the  support  of  one  or  two  Prussian  corps 
(Tarin^e.  Wellington's  retreat  was  begun  at  ten  in 
the  morning;  it  was  admirably  conducted,  and  with 
perfect  steadiness  ;  the  Emperor  was  a  great  deal 
too  late.     A  body  of  British  cavalry,  however,  had 

subject  of  endless  controversy  by  commentators.  See  H.  Iloussaye, 
"  181J,"  ii.,  225  ;  Thiers,  vi.,  470  ;  my  own  Campaign  of  iSij,  pp. 
168-170.  ] ommi,  Pr/cis  de  la  Catnfagnedei8i^,Y>Y>-  ^S8<  189,  has 
no  doubt  as  to  Napoleon's  meaning. 

'  As  to  this  most  important  order  reference  may  be  made  to  the 
admirable  remarks  of  Mr.  Ropes,  The  Campaign  of  Waterloo,  pp. 
209-211. 


288  Wellington 

screened  the  movement,  and  still  continued  at  Quatre 
Bras ;  Napoleon  pushed  his  own  cavalry  forward, 
and  vehemently  directed  the  pursuit  in  person.  But 
only  insignificant  skirmishes  took  place  ;  the  pur- 
suit, in  fact,  was  to  no  purpose  ;  and,  besides,  a  tem- 
pest of  rain  which  flooded  the  country  had  made 
military  operations  well-nigh  useless.  By  seven  in  the 
evening  the  French  squadrons  had  reached  the  up- 
lands of  La  Belle  Alliance,  in  front  of  the  position 
chosen  by  Wellington ;  Napoleon  ordered  a  charge 
to  be  made ;  the  thunder  of  many  batteries  made 
him  aware  that  he  had  a  considerable  army  before 
him  ;  in  fact,  Wellington  had  assembled  the  greatest 
part  of  his  forces.  "  What  would  I  have  given," 
the  Emperor  exclaimed,  "  to  have  had  the  power  of 
Joshua,  and  to  have  stayed  the  march  of  the  sun  !  " ' 
But  the  march  of  the  sun  had  not  been  turned  to 
account  in  the  morning  ;  a  great  opportunity  had 
passed  away. 

Meanwhile  Grouchy,  with  nearly  34,000  men,  had 
been  on  the  march  to  pursue  Bliicher.  His  move- 
ments, however,  had  been  extremely  slow  ;  his  mas- 
ter had  advanced  not  far  from  twenty  miles  on  the 
17th  ;  he  had  not  advanced  more  than  nine  or  ten  ; 
it  deserves  special  notice  that  part  of  his  cavalry  had 
come  up  with  the  corps  of  Thielmann,  falling  back 
from  Ligny,  and  yet  did  not  hang  on  its  retreat,  un- 
pardonable negligence,  which  may  have  had  great 
results.  Grouchy  had  his  army  around  Gembloux  by 
nine  on  the  night  of  the  17th,  some  of  his  squadrons 
being  at  Sauvenifere,  northwards;  during  the   night 

'  Comment.,  v.,  200. 


IVatei'ho  289 

he  received  several  reports  to  the  effect  that  Bliicher 
all  but  certainly  was  at  Wavre,  a  town  some  fifteen 
miles  from  Gembloux,  and  about  ten  or  eleven  from 
Waterloo,  on  a  line  parallel  to  Wellington's  army. 
We  have  reached,  perhaps,  the  most  important  pas- 
sage of  the  campaign,  for  it  led  to  the  memorable 
events  that  followed.  Grouchy  wrote  twice  to  the 
Emperor,  between  ten  at  night  and  three  in  the  morn- 
ing, that  he  was  on  the  track  of  the  Prussian  army, 
and  that  Bliicher  had  assembled  it  around  Wavre ;  he 
added  that  should  this  prove  to  be  the  case,  he 
would  follow  Bliicher  and  march  on  Wavre,  "  in 
order  to  keep  him  apart  from  Wellington"  ' ;  sig- 
nificant words,  which  show  that  he  understood  his 
mission,  and  knew  what  his  restraining  wing  was  to 
do  ;  had  he  intelligently  carried  out  this  purpose, 
Waterloo  would  have  been  a  French,  not  an  allied 
victory.  While  Napoleon  was  thus  before  Waterloo 
and  Grouchy  was  at  Gembloux,  even  now  backward, 
the  Prussian  army,  beaten  as  it  had  been  at  Ligny, 
had  effected  its  retreat  in  complete  safety.  As  we 
have  seen,  it  had  not  even  been  observed  by  its 
enemy  ;  Zieten  and  Pirch  marched  northwards  by 
Tilly  and  Sauveniere  ;  Thielmann,  though  reached  by 
the  French  horsemen,  was  not  molested;  Bulow,  with 
29,000  fresh  troops,  joined  the  main  army  by  Wal- 
hain  and  Corry.  The  whole  army,  still  some  90,000 
strong,  and  with  from  270  to  280  guns,  had  assembled 


'  These  despatches  will  be  found  in  La  Tour  d'Auvergne,  IVater- 
loo,  pp.  230,  231,  and  318.  Grouchy  shamefully  garbled  the  first 
afterwards,  to  excuse  his  own  conduct.  His  works  on  the  campaign 
are  a  tissue  of  falsehoods. 


19 


290  Wellington 

round  Wavre  on  the  night  of  the  17th,  on  both 
banks  of  the  stream  of  the  Dyle,  its  divisions,  how- 
ever, being  rather  far  apart  ;  that  is,  it  held  posi- 
tions parallel  to  the  field  of  Waterloo  ;  but  it  was  at 
a  considerable  distance  from  the  British  commander. 
This  movement  was  directed  by  Gneisenau,  the  chief 
of  Bliicher's  stafT ;  it  has  been  extolled  by  the  wor- 
shippers of  success ;  but  it  was  really  a  very  imper- 
fect half-measure.  Bliicher  was  now  separated  from 
Wellington  by  a  long  march,  through  a  most  difificult 
and  broken  country;  he  was  not  near  his  colleague 
as  he  had  been  at  Sombreffe  ;  Grouchy  had  been  de- 
tached to  prevent  their  junction  ;  had  he  been  a  true 
soldier  he  would  have  made  this  impossible.' 

We  turn  to  Napoleon  on  the  night  of  the  17th  of 
June.  The  great  warrior  showed  no  signs  of  the 
lethargy  which  had  disabled  him  the  night  before: 
he  carefully  observed  his  own  position,  and  that  of 
the  enemy,  lit  up  by  a  succession  of  bivouac  fires. 
His  chief  thought  was  how  to  bring  Wellington  to 
bay  :  he  was  afraid  that  this  would  be  almost  im- 
possible, for  rain  had  continued  to  fall  in  torrents  ; 
but  he  had  resolved  to  risk  a  night  attack  should  the 
British  General  decamp.  He  had  been  informed 
that  a  Prussian  column  was  not  far  from  Wavre;  but 
he  gave  little  attention  to  this  report ;  he  believed 
that  Bliicher,  severely  stricken  at  Ligny,  would  not 
venture  to  march  on  Waterloo;  in  any  case,  Grouchy 
would  hold  him  in  check,  and  this  was  to  be  ex- 
pected from  Grouchy's  letters.     At  the  same  time 

'  See,  on  this  subject,  the  conclusive  observations  of  Napoleon,  Co7n- 
vient.,  v.,  205. 


Waterloo  291 

he  did  not  neglect  Grouchy;  it  may  be  affirmed  that 
he  ordered  the  Marshal  to  send  a  detachment,  on  the 
i8th,  to  the  main  French  army,  falling  on  the  flank 
or  the  rear  of  Wellington  ;  this  would  be  the  coun- 
terpart of  the  movement  that  ought  to  have  been 
made  by  Neyon  the  i6th.'  Passing  on  to  the  Allies 
Wellington  had  made  up  his  mind  to  encounter 
Napoleon  on  the  i8th.  Bliicher,  though  still  suffer- 
ing from  the  shock  of  his  fall,  had  nobly  written  that 
he  would  join  his  colleague  with  his  whole  army. 
Should  Wellington  and  Bliicher  once  unite,  they 
would  be  largely  superior  to  Napoleon  in  numbers  ; 
but  were  there  reasonable  grounds  for  supposing  that 
they  could  effect  their  junction  in  time  to  baffle  the 
attack  of  the  Imperial  army  ?  Bliicher  would  have  to 
make  a  long  and  hazardous  march  from  Wavre  ;  was  it 
npt  certain,  having  regard  to  the  Emperor's  strategy, 
illustrated  in  many  splendid  campaigns,  that  there 
would  be  a  restraining  wing  on  his  way  to  stop  him  ? 
It  should  be  observed,  too,  that  the  allied  chiefs 
thought  that  Napoleon  had  100,000  men  before 
Waterloo,  and  that  Grouchy  was  far  away  with 
15,000  only  ;  but  Wellington  had  only  assembled 
70,000, — bad  auxiliaries  to  a  large  extent, — what 
would  be  his  chances  in  the  battle  at  hand,  should 
the  French  attack  in  the  early  forenoon,  as  would 
have  happerted  but  for  a  mere  accident?  The  allied 
dispositions    for    the    18th   were,    therefore,  faulty ; 

'  As  regards  this  order,  which  was  exactly  in  Napoleon's  manner, 
see  Comment.,  v.,  154,  155,  and  the  authorities  cited  in  my  Cam- 
paign 0/  iSij,  pp.  igo-236.  I  am  convinced  the  order  was  given  ; 
but  it  never  reached  Grouchy. 


292  Wellington 

Napoleon  has  proved  with  irresistible  logic  *  that  his 
adversaries  should  not  have  run  the  risk  of  fighting 
a  great  battle  before  Waterloo  ;  both  should  have 
fallen  back  and  joined  hands  near  Brussels.  This 
whole  strategy  was  essentially  false ;  it  may  com- 
mend itself  to  the  courtiers  of  success  ;  it  cannot 
blind  the  real  student  of  war. 

Napoleon's  army  was  nearly  72,000  strong,  in- 
cluding 15,000  cavalry  and  240 guns.  The  Emperor 
had  intended  to  attack  at  nine  in  the  forenoon;  but  a 
large  part  of  his  troops  was  still  in  the  rear  ;  he  had 
no  notion  of  making  an  attack  piecemeal.  The  at- 
tack, however,  might  have  begun  at  about  ten  ^ ;  but 
the  state  of  the  ground,  sodden  with  incessant  rain, 
made  the  manoeuvring  of  cannon  and  horsemen 
very  difficult ;  at  the  instance  of  Drouot,  one  of  his 
best  officers,  Napoleon  postponed  his  onset  for  a 
time.  Opinions  have  differed  whether  this  was  not 
a  grave  mistake ;  the  delay  was  an  advantage  in 
a  certain  sense,  but  it  favoured  a  Prussian  march 
from  Wavre ;  all  that  can  be  said,  with  certainty,  is 
that,  on  the  i8th  of  June,  the  sun  in  its  course 
fought  against  Napoleon  ;  Wellington  must  have 
been  defeated  had  the  attack  been  made  at  about 
ten,  on  reasonably  solid  ground.  Wellington's  army, 
we  have  seen,  was  composed  of  about  70,000  men. 


'  For  Napoleon's  conclusive  reasoning  on  this  subject  reference 
may  be  made  to  Comment.,  v.,  210-211.  The  passage  is  unan- 
swerable and  avoided  by  English  and  German  critics.  See  also  my 
Campaign  of  181J,  pp.  193-194. 

"  The  order  for  the  attack  at  nine  is  in  La  Tour  d'Auvergne, 
Waterloo,  p.  251.     Charras  most  improperly  suppressed  it. 


Jlalerloo  293 

comprising  13,500  cavalry  and  159  guns';  but  it 
was  crowded  with  very  inferior  levies;  it  did  not 
contain  50,000  really  good  troops ;  it  was  not  nearly 
so  powerful  as  the  army.it  opposed;  all  the  more 
reason  that  its  chief  should  not  have  accepted  battle. 
The  Duke  had  made  his  arrangements  for  the  de- 
fence at  an  early  hour;  with  one  great  exception 
they  were,  on  the  whole,  masterly  ;  they  fully  re- 
vealed the  consummate  tactician.  Ever  apprehen- 
sive for  his  right,  he  left  17,000  men  near  Hal  and 
had  thus  greatly  weakened  his  main  army ;  unques- 
tionably this  was  a  strategic  error'' ;■  even  in  the 
dispositions  he  made  at  Waterloo  his  right  was,  per- 
haps, too  strongly  occupied.  But,  as  a  rule,  the 
choice  of  this  position  had  been  admirably  made, 
and  the  means  he  adopted  to  hold  it  were,  in  the 
highest  degree,  excellent.  The  front  of  his  main 
battle  was  covered  by  a  crossroad,  leading  from 
Ohain  to  Braine  le  Leud,  and  forming  in  itself  a  very 
strong  obstacle  ;  the  slopes  before  it  gave  free  play 
to  the  fire  of  artillery.  Before  the  position  stood 
a  kind  of  succession  of  outworks  ;  the  chateau  of 
Hougoumont,  with  its  walled  enclosures;  the  large 
farm  of  La  Haye  Sainte  with  its  buildings,  and  the 
little  hamlets  of  Papelotte  and  La  Haye  ;  these  were 
calculated  to  break  the  first  fury  of  the   enemy's 

'  I  have  taken  the  figures  as  to  the  numbers  of  Napoleon's  and 
Wellington's  forces  from  Charras,  who  has  studied  the  subject  with 
great  care.  The  English  estimate  for  Wellington,  rather  more  than 
67,000  men,  omits  commissioned  and  non-commissioned  officers  and 
bandsmen. 

'■'  All  commentators  are  agreed  as  to  this.  See  especially  Charras, 
ii..  72-73- 


294  Wellington 

attack.  But  the  most  distinctive  feature  of  the  posi- 
tion was  this :  the  reserves  were  kept  behind  the  ridge 
of  Mont  St.  Jean,  screened  to  a  great  extent  from  the 
fire  of  the  French  guns  ;  this  was  exactly  the  oppo- 
site of  what  had  been  seen  at  Ligny.  Wellington 
knew  what  his  antagonist  had  done  with  this  arm, 
and  had  provided  most  skilfully  against  its  effects. 
The  ground,  too,  gave  facilities  for  counter-attacks 
always  essential  in  the  case  of  a  well- designed 
defence. 

While  Napoleon  and  Wellington  were  thus  con- 
fronting each  other,  we  may  glance  at  the  operations 
of  Grouchy,  the  evil  genius  of  France  on  the  great 
day  of  Waterloo.  He  had  learned  on  the  night  of 
the  17th  that  Bliicher  was  at  Wavre,  that  is,  ten  or 
eleven  miles  from  his  colleague  ;  he  knew  that  his 
mission  was  to  interpose  between  Bliicher  and  Wel- 
lington: he  has  acknowledged  this  in  his  own  des- 
patches. To  effect  this  object  was  by  no  means 
difficult ;  he  should  cross  the  Dyle  by  the  bridges  of 
Moustier  and  Ottignies,  about  nine  or  ten  miles  from 
Gembloux ;  this  movement  would  place  him  on  the 
western  bank  of  the  Dyle  and  could  be  accomplished 
before  noon,'  if  reasonable  activity  were  employed  ; 
the  restraining  wing  would  thus  be  near  Wavre,  and 
on  the  flank  of  Bliicher,  were  the  old  Prussian  chief 
drawing  near  Wellington,  and  would  be  in  direct 
communication  with  the  main  French  army;  Napo- 
leon's orders  would  have  been  carried  out  in  their 
true  spirit.     Had  this  been  done.  Grouchy  would 

'This  is  admitted   even    by  Charras,  a  libeller  of   Napoleon,  ii., 
115- 


Wat  e  7' loo  295 

probably  have  defeated  a  part  of  the  Prussian  army 
and  certainly  would  have  prevented  it  reaching 
Waterloo ;  France  would  not  have  had  to  mourn  for 
a  frightful  disaster.'  Unhappily  the  Marshal,  a  mere 
cavalry  chief,  adopted  an  exactly  opposite  course ; 
he  advanced  along  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Dyle, 
making  for  Wavre,  but  not  interfering  with  Bliicher' ; 
his  march,  too,  was  extremely  slow  ;  he  was  really 
playing  into  the  enemy's  hands.  Meanwhile  Bliicher, 
not  molested  or  disturbed,  was  moving  on  Waterloo 
to  join  his  colleague.  The  movement,  however,  was 
too  late,  and  was  retarded  by  accidents  that  need 
not  have  happened.  Gneisenau  distrusted  and  dis- 
liked Wellington  ;  he  charged  him  with  misconduct 
on  the  15th  of  June  ;  he  disapproved  of  an  advance 
on  Waterloo  until  he  was  assured  that  Wellington 
was  determined  to  make  a  stand.  He  was  ignorant, 
too,  of  the  whereabouts  of  Grouchy  ;  he  thought 
that  the  Marshal  had  a  small  force  only  ;  had  he 
known  that  Grouchy  had  nearly  34,000  men  he  prob- 
ably would  not  have  sanctioned  the  march  from 
Wavre ;  and  he  was  the  mentor  of  his  aged  chief. 
The  Prussian  army,  however,  was  at  last  on  the 
march  ;  but  it  was  greatly  and  very  unnecessarily 
delayed.     Bulowwas  moved  first,  because  his  troops 


'  For  what  Grouchy  should  have  done  and  what  he  could  have  ac- 
complished in  that  event,  see  the  authorities  collected  in  my  Campaign 
of  181J,  p.  326.  Charras  is  the  only  writer  who  takes  a  contrary 
view.  I  am  the  only  English  writer  who  has  seriously  gone  into 
the  subject. — Campaign  of  i S 1 5 ,  pp.  314-328. 

*  Grouchy  had  never  had  an  independent  command.  Pasquier, 
Mdmaires,  iii.,  232,  relates  that  Soult  and  other  generals  warned 
Napoleon  not  to  give  him  one. 


296  Wellington 

had  not  fought  at  Ligny  ;  but  Bulow  was  on  the 
eastern  bank  of  the  Dyle,  that  is,  farther  than  any 
of  his  colleagues  from  Wellington's  lines ;  Pirch 
marched  next,  and  was  followed  by  Zieten  ;  but 
these  generals  were  slow  and  timid ;  they  had  not 
forgotten  the  defeat  of  the  i6th  ;  Thielmann  was 
left  behind  to  defend  Wavre.  The  Prussian  army 
was  thus  divided  into  masses  far  apart  and  exposing 
their  flanks  for  miles  to  their  foes  ;  had  Grouchy 
fallen  on  these,  as  he  might  have  done,  he  could 
have  stricken  Bulow,  at  least,  with  effect ;  and  he 
could  have  kept  Bliicher  far  away  from  Welling- 
ton. 

The  French  army  had  taken  its  ground  at  about 
eleven  on  the  i8th  ;  the  masses  of  infantry  and 
cavalry  on  a  front  of  rather  more  than  two  miles, 
on  either  side  of  the  great  main  road  from  Charleroy 
to  Brussels,  presented  a  most  imposing  spectacle. 
Wellington's  army,  on  a  more  extended  front,  had 
only  its  foremost  line  displayed :  the  reserves  were 
carefully  withheld  from  view ;  it  stood  motionless 
and  silent,  while  the  enthusiastic  shouts  of  its  enemy 
rang  out  up  to  the  ridge  of  Mont  St.  Jean.  The 
plan  of  Napoleon's  attack  was  grandly  designed, ' 
but,  as  we  shall  see,  it  was  more  than  once  changed  ; 
and  it  was  badly  carried  out  on  this  eventful  day. 
The  centre  of  Wellington  at  La  Haye  Sainte  was  to 
be  stormed  ;  this  would  open  to  Napoleon  the  way 
to  Brussels  ;  at  the  same  time  Wellington's  left  was 
to  be  turned  and  forced  ;  this  was  the  weakest  part 

'  Compare  Jomini,  Precis  de  la  Campagne  de  i8ij,  p.  ig8  ;  Char- 
ras,  ii.,  88. 


Wale  r  loo  297 

of  the  British  chief's  position.  The  attack  began  at 
about  half-past  eleven  ;  the  soldiery  of  Roille  ad- 
vanced against  Hougoumont  ;  the  movement  was 
intended  to  be  only  a  feint,  to  withdraw  the  attention 
of  the  enemy  from  the  decisive  onslaught.  But 
owing  to  the  passionate  ardour  of  the  French  chiefs 
and  their  men — conspicuously  seen  throughout  the 
day,  for  the  victory  at  Ligny  had  turned  their 
heads — the  feint  was  turned  into  a  real  attack ; 
no  marked  impression  was  made  on  Hougoumont ; 
the  Duke  reinforced  the  defenders  from  time  to 
time;  the  assailants  perished  in  hundreds,  and  were 
held  completely  in  check.  At  about  one  the  Em- 
peror's grand  attack  opened ;  the  fire  of  a  great 
battery  of  eighty  guns,  so  directed  as  partly  to  rake 
the  enemy,  searched  the  centre  and  the  left  of  the 
Allies ;  Wellington's  front  was  in  some  degree 
shaken  ;  the  Belgian  auxiliaries,  too  much  exposed, 
gave  way.  The  corps  of  D'Erlon,  eager  to  avenge 
the  i6th,  and  a  division  of  Reille  were  pushed  for- 
ward ;  the  French  soldiery  swarmed  around  La  Haye 
Sainte ;  they  reached  the  crest  of  the  Duke's  po- 
sition ;  the  battle  seemed  to  be  almost  won.  But 
three  of  D'  Erlon's  divisions  had  been  arrayed  in 
dense  and  clumsily  formed  columns';  they  had  not, 
besides,  the  support  of  cavalry  ;  the  superiority  of 
the  line  over  the  column  was  seen,  as  so  often  had 
been  the  case  in  the  Peninsular  War.  D'  Erlon's 
men  were  furiously  charged  by  Picton  and  by  British 
and  Scotch  infantry ;  the  staggering  masses  were 
forced  back  by  degrees ;  their  defeat  was  completed 

'  See  Ropes's  Campaign  of  Waterloo,  p.  305,  and  Charras,  ii.,  25. 


298  VVeliingto7i 

by  a  magnificent  charge  of  horsemen.  At  the  same 
time  Reille's  division  was  driven  from  La  Haye 
Sainte  ;  and  a  body  of  cuirassiers,  sent  by  Napoleon 
to  the  spot,  was  beaten  by  another  body  of  British 
cavahy.  D'  Erlon's  fourth  division  was  also  com- 
pelled to  retreat ;  the  first  great  effort  of  the  Em- 
peror had  failed.  But  Wellington,  too,  had  cruelly 
suffered  ;  Picton  and  hundreds  of  his  best  troops 
had  fallen  ;  his  cavalry,  carried  too  far  in  their 
triumph,  had  been  half  cut  to  pieces ;  his  inferior 
auxiliaries  had  shown  signs  of  flinching;  the  vulner- 
able points  in  his  position  had  been  searched  and 
discovered. 

A  short  time  before  the  great  attack  of  D'  Erlon, 
Napoleon  had  cast  his  eyes  over  the  whole  scene  of 
action  ;  he  saw  what  appeared  to  be  a  kind  of  cloud 
three  or  four  miles  away  on  his  right.  His  practised 
sight  perceived  that  this  was  a  body  of  troops. 
Soult  expressed  an  opinion  that  this  was  a  detach- 
ment from  Grouchy — significant  words  of  extreme 
importance  ;  the  truth  was  in  a  short  time  as- 
certained. A  Prussian  officer  had  been  made  pris- 
oner ;  he  reported  to  the  Emperor  that  the  appar- 
ition was  a  part  of  the  corps  of  Bulow,  stationed 
around  the  hamlet  of  St.  Lambert  ;  that  Bulow  was 
on  his  way  to  join  Wellington  ;  and  that  no  tidings 
had  been  heard  of  Grouchy,  who,  it  was  assumed, 
was  moving  towards  the  main  French  army.  This 
intelligence,  of  course,  was  extremely  grave  ;  Na- 
poleon despatched  Lobau  with  ten  thousand  men 
to  observe  Bulow,  and  to  hold  him  in  check  ;  he 
was  to  take  position  between  St.  Lambert  and  the 


Waterloo  299 

Emperor's  right  flank.  It  appears  certain,  however, 
that,  at  this  moment,  Napoleon  had  Httle  or  no  fear 
for  himself ;  he  was  rather  apprehensive  that  Bulow 
might  intercept  Grouchy,  supposed  to  be  on  the 
march  to  the  French  lines  at  Plancenoit.  He  cer- 
tainly expected  Grouchy  to  be  not  far  off,  if  the 
Marshal  was  not  keeping  Bliicher  away  from  Wel- 
lington ;  this  would  be  in  conformity  with  his  own 
orders ;  and  all  but  certainly  he  had  directed 
Grouchy,  on  the  night  of  the  17th,  to  send  a  detach- 
ment to  his  aid.  Besides,  Napoleon  had,  on  the 
morning  of  the  i8th,  despatched  a  body  of  horse- 
men and  a  special  messenger,  towards  the  bridges  of 
Moustier  and  Ottignies,  in  the  assurance  that  Grou- 
chy was  crossing  the  Dyle  at  these  points  ;  he  told 
the  special  messenger  that  the  Marshal  was  already 
at  hand.  Nor  is  there  anything  in  an  ambiguous  des- 
patch from  Soult  to  make  an  impartial  critic  reject 
this  inference.  In  reply  to  the  letter  from  Grouchy, 
written  at  three  in  the  morning  of  the  i8th,  Soult 
said  that  his  master  approved  "  of  the  march  on 
Wavre  "  ;  but  he  ordered  the  Marshal  to  "  manoeuvre 
in  our  direction  "  ;  and  he  positively  commanded 
him  to  advance  to  the  battlefield  of  Waterloo. 
The  meaning,  badly  expressed  as  it  was,  was 
obviously  that  Grouchy  was  to  move  on  Wavre,  but 
by  the  western  bank  of  the  Dyle,  so  as  to  keep 
Bliicher  apart  from  Wellington  ;  in  any  case  he  was 
to  make  his  way  to  the  Emperor.  Soult  added  in  a 
postscript  written  after  the  prisoner's  report,  that 
Bulow  was  threatening  Napoleon's  right  flank,  and 
that  Grouchy  was  "  to  attack  and  crush  Bulow,"  a 


300  Wellington 

clear    proof    that   Grouchy,    it   was    believed,   was 
near.' 

The  attack  of  D'Erlon  had  been  repulsed  at  about 
three;  before  that  time  Napoleon  had  received  in- 
telligence from  Grouchy  of  the  most  ominous  kind. 
The  Marshal  wrote  from  Walhain,  a  village  some 
eight  miles  from  Wavre  :  he  was  advancing  by  the 
eastern  bank  of  the  Dyle,  that  is,  far  away  from  the 
Imperial  army ;  he  did  not  exactly  know  what  had 
become  of  Bliicher.  Napoleon,  therefore,  could  ex- 
pect no  support  from  Grouchy ;  he  would  have  to 
meet  the  attack  of  Bulow  on  his  right  flank  ;  he 
would  have  to  continue  the  great  fight  with  Welling- 
ton. He  immediately  changed  the  plan  of  his  battle: 
he  could  not  now  hope  to  turn  the  Duke's  left,  for 
this  would  imperil  his  own  right;  he  ordered  Ney, 
who  had  the  chief  charge  of  all  the  attacks,  to  storm 
La  Haye  Sainte  at  any  cost,  that  is,  to  effect  a  lodg- 
ment in  the  enemy's  centre,  but  to  maintain  him- 
self in  that  point  of  vantage  until  he,  the  Emperor, 
should  dispose  of  Bulow.*  Under  the  cover  of  an  in- 
tense cannonade,  which  greatly  ravaged  Wellington's 
troops,  Ney  succeeded  in  mastering  La  Haye  Sainte,^ 
but,  as  had  been  the  case  on  the  i6th,  he  again  dis- 


'  I  have  endeavoured  to  reconcile  the  very  conflicting  evidence  and 
judgments  on  this  most  important  passage  of  the  battle  of  Waterloo. 
The  authorities  will  be  found  collected  in  my  Campaign  of  iSi^,  pp. 
232,  236,  and  see  the  text. 

^  Gourgaud's  Campagne  de  181^.     Jerome's  M/moires,  vii.,  22. 

^  As  to  the  capture  of  La  Haye  Sainte,  see  the  authorities  collected 
in  my  Campaign  of  i8t^,  p.  256.  It  is  very  important,  if  possible, 
to  fix  the  time,  but  the  evidence  is  conflicting.  From  the  course  of 
the  battle  I  believe  it  was  four  or  half-past  four. 


Waterloo  301 

obeyed  his  orders.  The  Marshal  thought  he  per- 
ceived signs  of  retreat  on  the  part  of  the  enemy ; 
no  doubt  many  of  the  weak  auxiliaries  were  in  full 
flight ;  in  a  reckless  moment  he  launched  some  5000 
horsemen,  despite  the  entreaties  of  their  own  chiefs, 
against  Wellington's  right  centre,  still  quite  un- 
broken. The  onset  of  these  brave  troops  was  very 
fine  ;  but  it  was  not  supported  by  infantry  or  guns  ; 
the  Duke  was  fully  prepared  to  resist  the  attack ;  it 
failed  against  the  British  and  German  Legionary 
squares.  Meanwhile  Napoleon  had  been  fiercely 
engaged  with  Bulow  ;  Bliicher,  fearing  for  the  re- 
sults of  the  day,'  fell  on  Lobau  with  29,000  men. 
Napoleon  was  obliged  to  detach  the  Young  Guard 
against  the  advancing  enemy,  already  menacing  his 
right  and  even  his  rear  at  Plancenoit.  This  attack 
was  for  the  moment  beaten  back  ;  the  Emperor  has- 
tened to  the  main  field  of  battle,  and  was  indignant 
at  seeing  what  Ney  had  done.  "  The  madman  ! "  he 
exclaimed,  "he  is  ruining  France  for  the  second 
time" ;  but  he  decided  that  Ney's  movement  must 
now  be  sustained.*  He  allowed  the  Marshal  to  en- 
gage nearly  his  whole  cavalry;  but  he  asserted, 
to  the  last  hour  of  his  life,  that  he  directed  a  con- 
siderable reserve  to  be  kept  intact.^     The  charges  of 

'  See  the  Prussian  official  account  of  Waterloo,  Campaign  of  jSj^, 
p.  265. 

"^  As  to  Ney's  premature  and  most  unwise  cavalry  attacks,  see  the 
authorities  in  my  Campaign  of  j8iJ,  pp.  258-259.  They  were  un- 
questionably made  against  Napoleon's  orders. 

^  See  Comment.,  v.,  177;  vi.,  150,  and  11.  Houssaye,  " /cP/j,"  ii., 
364.  As  to  keeping  a  reserve  intact,  see  the  above  and  Gourgaud, 
M ^moires.  Passim. 


302  ^  Wellington 

these  masses  of  horsemen,  from  ii,ooo  to  12,000 
strong,  were  magnificent  and  repeatedly  pressed 
home  ;  but  again  they  were  very  ill  supported  ';  the 
Duke  strengthened  his  right  centre  with  character- 
istic skill ;  the  proud  squadrons  were  again  beaten 
off  by  squares,  which  a  brave  enemy  has  written 
seemed  rooted  "  in  the  earth"  ;  but  thousands  of  the 
auxiliaries  were  fugitives  along  the  main  road  to 
Brussels.  During  this  time  Bulow  had  again  fallen 
on  Napoleon's  right;  the  Emperor  sent  a  part  of  the 
Old  Guard  to  withstand  the  attack  ;  this  effort  was 
for  the  present  successful ;  the  Prussian  columns 
recoiled,  and  even  disappeared.  But  the  attacks 
made  by  Ney  had  once  more  failed  ;  the  flag  of 
England  still  waved  along  the  ridge  of  Mont  St. 
Jean,  though  Wellington's  centre  at  La  Haye  Sainte 
was  in  the  gravest  peril." 

It  was  now  about  seven  in  the  evening  ;  the  result 
of  the  battle  still  hung  in  suspense.  Napoleon  had 
hopes  that  he  could  yet  gain  a  victory,  but  he  must 
have  felt  for  hours  that  this  could  be  only  a  victory 
in  name.  The  attack  of  Bulow  seemed  to  be  spent; 
the  cannon  of  Grouchy  were  heard  at  Wavre  ;  the 
Marshal  surely  could  keep  Blvicher  back  ;  the  centre 
of  Wellington  had  been  well-nigh  broken  ;  fugitives 
were  choking  the  great  main  road  in  thousands. 
The  Emperor  resolved  to  make  a  last  effort  with  the 
Imperial  Guard  ;  but  he  could  not  dispose  of  more 
than  half  of  that   noble   force ;  the  other  half  was 


'  See  on  this  point  the  judicious  remarks  of  Mr.  Ropes,  The  Cain^ 
paign  of  Waterloo,  pp.  272,  273. 

^Shaw  Kennedy,  an  eye-witness.  Battle  of  Waterloo,  p.  124. 


IVater/oo  303 

protecting  his  right  flank  from  the  Prussians.  But 
Wellington  had  a  better  prospect  of  success ;  his 
British  and  German  Legionar},-  soldiers  had  held 
their  ground  ;  he  had  a  considerable  reserve  con- 
cealed from  his  enemy  ;  above  all,  he  knew  that 
Zieten  and  Pirch  were  at  hand  to  support  Bulow. 
Six  battalions  of  the  Guard  were  told  off  for  the  final 
attack  ;  these  were  placed  under  the  command  of 
Ney,  but  they  were  directed  against  the  Duke's 
right  centre,  his  strongest  point,  not  against  his 
gravely  endangered  centre  ;  four  battalions  were  to 
second  the  movement ;  these  were  to  be  led  by 
Napoleon  in  person.  The  Guard  did  all  that  brave 
men  could  do ;  they  even  gained  some  trifling  suc- 
cess ;  but  they  had  not  much  infantry  and  no  cavalry 
on  their  flanks  ;  they  were  overwhelmed  by  Welling- 
ton's admirably  husbanded  reserve  and  part  of  his 
fire  and  line.  The  whole  French  army  suddenly 
gave  way  ;  the  Duke,  seeing  that  the  battle  had  been 
won,  advanced  his  shattered  army  a  few  hundred 
yards  ;  La  Haye  Sainte  was  retaken  ;  fresh  British 
cavalry  was  let  loose  on  the  blood-stained  field. 
Just  at  this  moment  Zieten  appeared  on  the  scene; 
from  10,000  to  12,000  Prussians  broke  the  extreme 
right  of  Napoleon  ;  Pirch  seconded  Bulow  in  another 
attack;  fully  35,000  Prussians  fell  on  Napoleon's 
right  flank  and  rear.  An  appalling  spectacle  of  ruin 
was  seen  ;  the  beaten  army  broke  up  in  multitud- 
inous rout ;  the  four  battalions  of  the  Guard,  which 
had  not  been  engaged,  perished  almost  to  a  man, 
but  refused  to  surrender.  The  fugitive  host,  now  a 
mere  chaos,  relentlessly  pursued  by  the  triumphant 


304  Welliiigton 

Prussians,  made  its  way  to  Charleroy  and  crossed  the 
Sambre ;  as  an  effective  force  it  was  practically  de- 
stroyed. The  losses  of  the  victors  were  about  23,000 
men,  those  of  the  vanquished  upwards  of  40,000. 

Wellington  proved  himself  to  be,  in  the  highest 
sense,  a  great  master  of  tactics  on  the  field  of  Water- 
loo. With  trifling  exceptions  he  arrayed  his  army 
on  the  fine  position  of  his  choice  with  conspicuous 
skill,  especially  in  concealing  his  reserves ;  he  con- 
ducted the  battle  with  admirable  activity  and  re- 
source ;  he  was  the  soul  of  a  magnificent  defence. 
But  his  chief  excellences  were  his  stern  constancy 
and  invincible  endurance  in  a  most  fiery  trial,  and 
here  no  general  of  the  Coalition  can  be  compared  to 
him ;  the  Archduke  Charles,  we  may  affirm,  would 
have  retreated  after  the  fall  of  La  Haye  Sainte. 
Justice,  too,  should  be  done  to  the  British  troops. 
Napoleon  had  had  little  experience  of  them  ;  after 
Waterloo  he  recognised  their  sterling  worth  ;  a 
prouder  testimonial  has  never  been  given  to  sol- 
diers.* The  tactics  of  the  French  in  the  battle  were 
faulty  :  the  attack  of  Hougoumont  was  a  reckless 
waste  of  life ;  Ney  disobeyed  the  Emperor's  orders, 
and  "  massacred  his  cavalry,"  as  his  master  wrote  ; 
the  Imperial  Guard  was  wrongly  directed  ;  the  three 
arms  failed  to  support  each  other  over  and  over 
again  throughout  the  day.  Napoleon  was,  of  course, 
in  a  sense,  responsible  for  all  this  ;  he  gave  little 
proof  of   the   energy  of   his   antagonist ;  this   may 

'  "  Les  Ffanjais,  quoique  si  inferieurs  en  nombre,  auraient  rem- 
porte  la  victoire,  et  ce  ne  fut  que  la  bravoure  obstinee  et  indomptable 
des  troupes  anglaises  seules  qui  les  empecha." 


Waterloo  305 

have  been  partly  owing  to  the  state  of  his  health  ; 
he   was   dozing    for    a   time    during  the    attack   on 
Hougoumont.      But  we  must  recollect,  that  in  the 
later  part  of  the  i8th,  he  was  fighting  two  battles 
and  could  not  direct  the  operations  as  a  whole,  and 
his    lieutenants    must    bear  the  chief  share  of   the 
blame  ;  he  invariably  left  a  great  deal  to  them,  espe- 
cially when  they  had  been  engaged  in  action.     Never- 
theless, in  spite  of  the  great  qualities  displayed  by 
Wellington,  and  the  steadfastness  and  valour  of  part 
of  his  army,  and  in  spite  of  the  tactical  mistakes  of 
the  French,  Napoleon  would  have  won  the  battle  of 
Waterloo,  had  he  been   able  to   employ  his  whole 
forces  against  the  Duke,  but  his  victory,  I  believe, 
could    not  have    been  decisive."      The  allied    army 
was  very  inferior  in  strength  to  its  enemy  :   it  had 
fairly  defeated  the  attack  of  D'Erlon  ;  but  it  could 
not  have  withstood  a  combined  effort  made  not  only 
^    by  the  Emperor's  first  line,  but  by  Lobau,  the  Im- 
perial Guard,  and  the  powerful  French  cavalry.    The 
intervention  of  Bulow  prevented  this  ;  Zieten  and 
Pirch  turned  a  defeat  into  an  appalling  rout.     But 
Grouchy  ought  to  have  made  these  results  impos- 
sible ;  he  is  mainly  responsible  for  what  occurred  at 
Waterloo.     I  have  already  indicated  what  the  Mar- 
shal ought  to  have  done  :  had  he  crossed  the  Dyle 
on  the  forenoon  of  the  i8th,  and  made  his  way  on 
the  western  bank,  France  would  have  been  spared  an 
immense  disaster,  very  probably  would  have  secured 
a  victory;  nay,  had  he  not  rejected  the  counsels  of 

'  See  the  admirable  remarks  of  Mr.  Ropes,  Campaign  of  Water- 
loo, p.  327. 


3o6  WeUingtoii 

Gerard,  who,  when  the  thunder  of  Waterloo  was 
heard  at  Walhain,  entreated  his  chief  to  hasten  to 
the  field,  he  would  have  at  least  averted  the  catas- 
trophe that  took  place.  But  he  persisted  in  march- 
ing on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Dyle,  thus  permitting 
Bliicher  to  join  Wellington,  and  not  even  lending  a 
hand  to  his  master;  he  reached  Wavre  only  to  find 
Bliicher  gone  ;  he  merely  fought  an  indecisive  com- 
bat with  Thielmann.  Grouchy  stands  before  the  bar 
of  impartial  history  as  the  true  author  of  the  fright- 
ful ruin  of  Waterloo.' 

A  well-informed  survey  of  Wellington's  career 
proves  that,  like  Frederick,  he  did  not  excel  in 
strategy.  This  was  strikingly  apparent  in  1815, 
when  the  greatest  of  strategists  met  hint  in  the  field. 
He  was  outmanoeuvred  at  the  outset  of  the  cam- 
paign ;  he  ought  to  have  been  defeated  on  the  i6th 
of  June ;  he  was  in  the  gravest  peril  on  the  17th  ;  he 
risked  too  much  in  making  a  stand  at  Waterloo  ; 
he  ought  not  to  have  weakened  his  army  by  leaving 
a  large  detachment  at  Hal.  Yet  he  should  not  be 
judged  as  a  strategist  by  his  conduct  in  181 5  ;  his 
veteran  colleague  forced  his  hand,  especially  by  his 
advance  to  Sombreffe:  had  he  been  the  commander 
of  the  two  allied  armies,  he  would  probably  have 
united  them  at  Waterloo  on  the  17th  of  June  ;  and 
Napoleon  would  have  been  defeated  had  he  at- 
tacked. His  real  merit  in  this  passage  of  arms 
was  that  of  a  consummate  leader  of  men  in  battle  ; 

'  I  have  already  noticed  the  best  authorities  on  the  operations  of 
Grouchy.  I  would  especially  refer  the  reader  to  Ropes,  The  Cam- 
paigtt  of  Waterloo,  pp.  245-288,  and  to  H.  Houssaye,  ''iSi^" 
ii.,  485-494. 


Waterloo  307 

this  largely  atones  for  undoubted  strategic  errors. 
Justice,  too,  is  due  to  his  aged  ally  ;  Blucher  made 
many  and  grave  mistakes  ;  but  no  other  general  of 
that  age,  not  Wellington  himself,  would  have  so 
heroically  risen  superior  to  defeat,  and  would  have 
made  the  most  hazardous  march  from  Wavre  to 
Waterloo.  With  respect  to  Napoleon,  the  plan  of 
his  campaign  was  one  of  the  finest  ever  thought  out 
in  war,  and  it  was  over  and  over  again  well-nigh  suc- 
cessful, though  his  enemies  were  not  far  from  two- 
fold in  numbers.  No  doubt  the  Emperor  made  a 
few  mistakes;  but  in  his  operations  in  1815  the  extra- 
vagance of  the  Peninsular  War  and  of  1812  and  1813 
does  not  appear  ;  the  grandeur  of  the  conception, 
and  the  scientific  method  characteristic  of  the  first 
master  of  modern  war,  are  manifest  in  their  full  com- 
pleteness. Yet  Napoleon  met  his  ruin  at  Waterloo: 
nor  is  it  difficult  to  ascertain  the  causes.  Two  or 
three  times  victory  was  within  his  grasp  ;  but  the 
lieutenants  in  whom  he  trusted  failed  him  ;  Ney  and 
Grouchy  were  instruments  that  broke  in  his  hands  ; 
he  was  unequal  to  himself  on  the  night  of  the  16th ; 
his  army,  too,  was  not  sufficiently  strong:  due 
allowance  could  not  be  made  for  mischances.  The 
French  army,  besides,  if  it  gave  proof  of  heroic 
valour,  on  many  occasions  was  an  ill-organised  and 
ill-disciplined  army  ;  the  soldiery  had  little  trust  in 
their  chiefs  ;  the  chiefs  themselves  were  to  a  great 
extent  demoralised.  Nevertheless  the  splendour  of 
Napoleon's  genius  in  war  shines  out  conspicuousl\' 
in  the  campaign  ;  nor  has  his  renown,  as  he  foretold 
would  be  the  case,  suffered. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE     ARMY      OF      OCCUPATION — ENTRANCE       INTO 
POLITICAL   LIFE 


Wellington  and  Bliicher  invade  France — Intrigues  of  Fouche  to 
effect  the  restoration  of  Louis  XVIII. — Napoleon  practically 
deposed  by  the  Chambers — Duplicity  of  Fouche — He  paralyses 
the  defence  of  Paris — Envoys  sent  to  Wellington  and  Blticher — 
Hazardous  advance  of  Bliicher — Wisdom  and  moderation  of 
Wellington — The  capitulation  of  Paris — Great  position  of  Wel- 
lington— He  saves  France  from  dismemberment,  and  does  her 
other  services — He  commands  the  Army  of  Occupation — He 
enters  political  life  in  1818,  and  is  made  Master  of  the  Ordnance 
and  Commander-in-Chief — The  period  from  1818  to  1827 — 
Conduct  of  Wellington — His  attitude  to  the  Irish  Catholic  and 
other  questions — His  dispute  with  Canning. 

WELLINGTON  and  Blucher  at  once  invaded 
France,  the  victory  of  Waterloo  had  been 
so  complete,  though  the  other  armies  of 
the  Coalition  were  still  distant.  The  British  Gen- 
eral called  in  the  detachment,  which  he  had  left  at 
Hal,  and  advanced  by  the  fortresses  of  the  Somme  ; 
the  Prussian  Marshal,  pressing  more  boldly  forward, 
marched  along  the  western  bank  of  theOise,  leaving 
the  corps  of  Pirch  behind  to  conduct  sieges.  The 
object  of  the  two  chiefs  was  to  make  for  Paris,  and 

308 


The  Army  of  Occiipatioji  309 

to  cut  off  the  now  isolated  force  of  Grouchy,  which 
had  effected  its  retreat  from  Wavre  to  Givet,  and 
was  trying  to  reach  the  capital  by  the  Aisne  ;  the 
movement  of  its  commander,  if  unduly  extolled, 
was  intelligent,  energetic,  and  rapid,  very  different 
from  his  movements  on  the  17th  and  i8th  of  June. 
Meanwhile  a  revolution  had  broken  out  in  the  seat 
of  power  in  France  which  had  brought  the  Hundred 
Days  to  a  close,  and  was  attended  with  portentous 
results.  Napoleon,  at  the  instance  of  his  chief  offi- 
cers, who  had  too  truly  told  him  that  he  had  no 
army  in  his  hands,  had  hastened  to  Paris  to  make  an 
effort  to  obtain  means  to  continue  the  war,  and 
to  defend  the  nation  against  an  invasion  now  threat- 
ening its  very  existence  as  a  State.  He  rightly  said 
to  his  Council  that  the  only  chance  of  safety  lay 
in  the  patriotic  union  of  all  Frenchmen,  under  the 
sovereign  they  had  welcomed  a  few  months  before  ; 
and  he  wished  to  have  a  dictatorship,  which  would 
have  given  him  unfettered  power  for  a  time.  But 
France  was  enervated,  divided,  appalled  by  the  late 
disaster;  the  Chambers,  which  he  had  just  convened, 
regarded  the  Emperor  with  profound  distrust,  and 
were  inspired  by  the  revolutionary  liberalism  of  the 
day  :  and  at  this  crisis,  they  fell  under  the  influ- 
ence of  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  unscrupulous  in- 
triguers of  that  age.  Fouche  had  long  been  one  of 
Napoleon's  ministers ;  but  he  was  convinced  that  his 
second  reign  could  not  last :  he  had  plotted  traitor- 
ously against  him  during  the  Hundred  Days  ;  after 
Waterloo  he  saw  that  a  Bourbon  restoration  was 
at  hand,  and  he  aspired  to  be  one  of  its  principal 


WelliiiQion 


&>' 


leaders.  Under  his  guidance  and  that  of  Lafayette, 
an  ideologist  of  1789,  the  Chambers  turned  a  deaf 
ear  to  Napoleon's  requests  ;  they  practically  deposed 
him  by  a  sudden  coup  d'  dtat ;  they  extorted  an 
abdication,  nominally  in  favour  of  his  son,  which,  he 
bitterly  exclaimed,  was  a  sorry  delusion. 

In  a  few  days  a  kind  of  provisional  government  of 
France  was  set  up ;  Fouche  contrived  artfully  to  be 
made  its  head  ;  the  one  chance,  and  it  was  an  almost 
hopeless  chance,  of  resisting  the  armed  League  of  Eu- 
rope disappeared.  Napoleon  was  relegated  to  hardly 
veiled  captivity :  he  was  abandoned  as  he  had  been 
in  1814  ;  ere  long  he  was  on  his  way  to  St.  Helena, 
the  last  scene  of  a  strange,  eventful  history,  unparal- 
leled in  the  annals  of  mankind.  The  Provisional 
Government  was  largely  composed  of  regicides ;  the 
Chambers  were  distinctly  opposed  to  the  Bourbons. 
They  despatched  envoys  to  Bliicher  and  Wellington 
who,  in  the  first  instance,  curtly  refused  the  over- 
tures that  were  made  for  an  armistice  ;  they  issued 
proclamations  calling  on  Frenchmen  to  rise  up  in 
arms,  and  to  repeat  the  national  efforts  of  1792-94; 
as  if  the  circumstances  were  not  wholly  different, 
and  as  if  the  shadow  of  a  government  sitting  in 
Paris  could  be  a  second  convention  reviving  the 
Reign  of  Terror.  But  Fouche  judged  the  position 
of  affairs  correctly;  he  knew  the  Assembly,  and  the 
men  he  had  to  deal  with  ;  he  allowed  noisy  patriot- 
ism to  vent  itself  in  clamour,  indeed  seemed  to  pro- 
mote it  in  different  ways;  but  with  great  tact  and 
adroitness,  and  with  duplicity  skilfully  concealed, 
he  took  care  to  paralyse  every  attempt  to  resist  the 


NAPOLEON  BY  A  DYINQ  CAMP  FIRE. 
(From  a  drawing  by  Ch.irlct.) 


The  Army  of  Ocaipation  3 1  i 

invaders,  and  steadily  plotted  to  restore  Louis 
XVIII.  to  the  throne  ;  his  real  object  was,  in  1815, 
to  play  the  part  played  by  Talleyrand  the  year 
before.  He  refused  to  give  arms  to  the  population 
of  Paris,  already  beginning  to  menace  traitors ;  the 
old  Jacobin  terrified  the  Chambers  with  reports  of  a 
Jacobin  rising  ;  he  did  nothing  to  strengthen  the  for- 
tified works  begun  around  the  capital.  He  placed 
Massena  at  the  head  of  the  National  Guard  of 
Paris,  thus  giving  this  force  the  sanction  of  an  illus- 
trious name  ;  but  Massena  was  no  friend  of  the 
fallen  Emperor ;  he  had  no  thought  but  that  of  an 
inglorious  repose,  and  of  preserving  the  wealth  he 
had  amassed  by  rapine;  the  National  Guard,  com- 
posed of  the  timid  bourgeoisie,  was  soon  persuaded 
that  its  real  and  only  mission  was  to  maintain  order. 
At  the  same  time  the  astute  and  base  intriguer  con- 
vened a  great  council  of  marshals  and  generals,  to 
whom  he  put  questions  as  to  the  capacity  of  Paris  to 
withstand  an  attack,  and  as  to  the  favourable  chances 
of  a  great  national  defence  ;  such  a  council  prover- 
bially never  fights;  and  though  Davout,  Napoleon's 
late  Minister  of  War,  showed  hesitation  and  made 
some  ambiguous  protests,  the  council  reported  in 
the  negative  to  both  questions,  and  by  implication 
declared  for  the  restoration  of  the  King.  Mean- 
while Fouch^  had  continued  to  send  negotiators  to 
the  allied  camp, — one,  Vitrolles,  a  notorious  parti- 
san of  the  Bourbons,  who  had  tried  to  raise  armed 
levies  against  Napoleon  in  the  South  and  was  now 
released  from  Vincennes  to  do  Fouch^'s  bidding. 
Bliichcr  and  Wellington  still  rejected  an  armistice. 


3 1  2  VVellingtou 

though  some  of  Bliicher's  officers  dropped  pacific 
hints ;  the  British  commander,  with  characteristic 
wisdom,  perceived  that  it  might  be  possible  to  treat 
on  conditions  that  would  bring  the  war  to  an  end. 
Louis  XVIII.  had  joined  his  victorious  army;  his 
authority  with  the  King  was  immense  ;  he  saw,  and 
rightly  saw,  that  the  only  hope  for  France  was  to 
restore  the  Bourbon  dynasty  to  the  throne,  though 
he  declared  that  there  was  no  wish  to  force  on  the 
nation  a  government  against  its  will.  He  indicated 
his  thoughts  to  Fouche's  envoys :  these  fell  in  with 
the  arch-intriguer's  views  ;  but  he  also  laid  down  the 
conditions  which,  in  a  military  sense,  must  be  com- 
plied with,  before  he  could  sheathe  his  sword. 

It  was  strange  that  one  of  the  greatest  and  one 
of  the  worst  men  of  that  time  had  accidentally 
agreed,  though  from  different  motives,  in  giving 
effect  to  the  same  policy  at  this  grave  conjuncture. 
Events  singularly  concurred  to  favour  the  object  at 
which  Wellington  and  Fouche  aimed.  Blucher  had 
pressed  forward  far  in  advance  of  his  colleague : 
their  two  armies  had  been  many  leagues  apart ; 
Napoleon,  from  his  retreat  at  Malmaison,  had  in 
vain  implored  the  Provisional  Government  to  allow 
him  to  fall  on  the  divided  enemies ;  he  might  have 
gained  a  passing  triumph,  but  it  could  have  come  to 
nothing;  at  all  events  Fouche  had  ideas  of  a  very 
different  kind.  But  nothing  could  stop  the  im- 
petuous veteran;  he  marched  on  to  Paris  and 
crossed  the  Seine,  to  the  southern  bank,  where  the 
defences  of  the  capital  were  quite  unfinished;  he 
gave  out  that  he  would  shoot  Napoleon,  should  he 


The  Ar))iy  of  Occupation  3 1 


v) 


have  the  chance;  he  threatened  the  Jacobin  Cham- 
bers and  the  infidel  city.  This  sent  a  thrill  of  indig- 
nation through  the  mass  of  the  citizens,  and  even 
stirred  the  Chambers  to  wrath;  they  had  the  means 
of  making  the  old  Marshal  feel  their  vengeance. 
Grouchy  had  reached  Paris  with  most  of  his  forces  ; 
the  remains  of  the  Waterloo  army  had  been  brought 
together  and  numbered  perhaps  twenty  thousand 
men;  large  bodies  of  troops  had  been  drawn  from 
depots;  volunteers  had  been  suddenly  enrolled;  in 
short  the  capital  was  a  very  formidable  object  to  at- 
tack. And  though  Wellington  had  ere  long  come 
into  line  with  his  ally,  he  only  held  the  northern 
bank  of  the  Seine  ;  their  armies  were  not  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty  thousand  strong,  and  were  dis- 
persed over  an  immense  space  ;  their  enemies  stood 
between  them  with  ninety  thousand  men,  supported 
by  a  kind  of  great  entrenched  camp  ;  the  Prussians 
had  been  routed  in  a  bloody  combat ;  there  was  real 
danger  of  a  conflict  that  might  have  the  worst  re- 
sults. The  wisdom,  the  moderation,  the  statesman- 
like sense  of  Wellington  were  now  conspicuously 
seen,  and,  happily  for  the  estate  of  man,  triumphed. 
He  warned  his  colleague  that  the  fate  of  Napoleon 
did  not  depend  on  generals  in  the  field,  but  on  their 
masters  ;  he  quietly  deprecated  acts  of  violence  and 
revenge ;  he  even  informed  Bliicher  that  it  was  by 
no  means  certain  that  their  united  efforts  would 
make  Paris  fall ;  at  all  events  it  was  common  pru- 
dence to  wait  for  the  support  of  the  other  allied 
armies.  The  passionate  veteran  yielded  to  these 
sagacious  counsels;   he  felt  the  superior  influence  of 


3 1 4  Wellington 

a  calm  but  overmastering  mind.  In  a  very  short 
time  the  conditions  of  WelHngton  were  agreed  to ; 
the  French  armies  were  to  retire  behind  the  Loire : 
the  AlHes  were  to  occupy  Paris,  but  the  National 
Guard  was  to  act  as  the  police  of  the  city.  It  was 
understood  that  Louis  XVIII.  was  to  be  restored; 
the  King,  in  fact,  entered  the  capital  three  weeks 
after  Waterloo,  Fouche,  of  course,  gladly  accepted 
these  terms ;  he  had  played  a  hazardous  game,  and 
had  won  the  stake ;  but  his  life  had  been  in  no 
doubtful  peril ;  he  had  been  loudly  denounced  as  a 
false-hearted  traitor. 

The  position  of  Wellington,  at  this  juncture,  was 
one  of  almost  unexampled  grandeur ;  he  certainly 
was  the  foremost  man  in  Europe.  He  was  compara- 
tively unknown,  during  the  Peninsular  War,  though 
his  operations  had  been  watched  and  studied  ;  he 
did  not  march  to  Paris  in  1814;  even  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  he  held  a  secondary  place.  But  he 
had  forestalled  the  Coalition  in  1715  ;  he  had  struck 
down  Napoleon  in  a  decisive  battle  ;  the  glory  of 
this  was  mainly  and  rightly  ascribed  to  him.  He 
had  also  practically  restored  the  Bourbons,  and  had 
saved  France  from  perhaps  an  internecine  struggle  ; 
the  Allies  and  Louis  XVIII.  owed  everything  to 
him.  This  was  the  splendid  climax  of  his  renowned 
career;  no  English  subject,  not  Marlborough  him- 
self, has  ever  stood  so  high  in  the  councils  of 
Europe.  During  the  three  years  that  followed,  he 
gave  signal  proof,  in  a  situation  glorious  indeed  but 
diflficult,  and  which  taxed  his  great  powers  to  the 
utmost,  of  the  far-seeing  wisdom,  the  well-balanced 


The  Arviy  of  OcciipalioiL  /  315 

V  .-- 
judgment,  the  moderation  and  the  profound  sa- 
gacity which  were  the  distinctive  features  of  his 
character  on  its  intellectual  side,  but  also  of  his 
sterling  integrity  and  strong  sense  of  duty,  the  most 
striking,  perhaps,  of  his  moral  qualities ;  it  was  well 
for  the  world  that  it  possessed  such  a  man.  The 
most  important  of  his  achievements,  at  this  time, 
was  that  he  prevented  the  dismemberment  of  France, 
and  thus  averted  revolution  for  many  years,  and 
secured  for  the  Continent  a  season  of  comparative 
repose.  Every  member  of  the  Coalition  in  1815 
was  eager  for  vengeance  on  a  people  which,  since 
1 79 1,  had  disturbed  and  threatened  the  civilised 
world,  and  had  carrried  its  victorious  arms  from 
Madrid  to  Moscow  ;  ambition  and  prudence  seemed 
alike  to  require  that  the  territory  of  France  should 
be  largely  diminished.  Austria  demanded  the  resti- 
tution of  Alsace  and  Lorraine ;  Prussia  declared 
that  the  Continent  would  not  be  safe  until  France 
had  been  cut  up  into  separate  kingdoms ;  the  sover- 
eign of  Belgium  and  Holland,  just  made  one  state, 
insisted  on  having  a  new  barrier,  which  would  in- 
clude the  fortresses  of  Burgundian  Artois :  even 
Lord  Liverpool,  a  timid  and  pacific  statesman, 
thought  that  France  should  be  reduced  nearly 
within  her  limits  before  the  Peace  of  Westphalia. 
Wellington  steadily  rejected  these  dangerous  coun- 
sels; in  a  masterly  correspondence  he  pointed  out 
that  peace  was  the  great  need  of  the  Continent,  and 
that  this  would  be  impossible  were  whole  provinces 
torn  from  France  ;  he  laid  stress  also  on  the  injust- 
ice of  a  policy   of  this   kind  ;    and   he   significantly 


Wellington 

added  that  France  still  possessed  more  elements 
of  military  power  than  any  state  in  Europe.  His 
arguments  were  attended  with  success:  no  doubt 
other  and  potent  reasons  concurred  :  but  it  was 
chiefly  due  to  the  victor  of  Waterloo  that  France 
was  not  dismembered  in  i8i5,a  result  very  different 
from  what  was  seen  in  1870-71. 

This,  however,  was  not  the  only  service  done  by 
Wellington  to  France  in  this  eventful  period.  He 
prevented  Bliicher  from  destroying  the  bridge  on  the 
Seine,  which  commemorates  the  Prussian  disaster  of 
Jena.  With  Castlereagh  and,  in  a  lesser  degree, 
with  Nesselrode,  he  succeeded  in  cutting  down  the 
enormous  charges  made  by  the  Coalition  for  its  opera- 
tions in  181 5,  when  seven  hundred  thousand  armed 
men  were  quartered  on  provinces  of  France.  Another 
circumstance  did  him  peculiar  honour  ;  his  capacity 
in  civil  affairs  had  been  recognised  ;  he  was  placed  at 
the  head  of  a  commission  appointed  to  adjust  the 
compensation  due  to  the  allied  Powers  for  their 
losses  caused  by  the  Revolutionary  wars  and  those 
of  Napoleon.  He  acquitted  himself  of  an  Her- 
culean task,  involving  inquiries  difficult  alike  and 
delicate,  with  characteristic  industry  and  tact  ;  he  re- 
duced the  compensation  to  a  moderate  sum ;  he 
negotiated  a  loan  to  enable  France  to  discharge  it. 
The  great  qualities  he  had  shown  in  council,  not  less 
than  his  renown  in  the  field,  induced  the  Allies  to 
give  him  the  command  of  the  Army  of  Occupation, 
as  it  was  called,  which,  composed  of  not  less  than 
150,000  men,  of  different  nationalities  and  tongues, 
Was  charged  with  keeping  the  Revolution  down  in 


The  Army  of  Occupation  317 

France,  and  with  propping  up  the  throne  of  Louis 
XVIII.  In  this  high  office  he  won  the  respect  of 
his  subordinates,  in  every  service,  including  our 
own  ;  he  maintained  order  and  enforced  discipline; 
but  he  was  remarkably  considerate  and  humane  in 
the  exercise  of  his  immense  authority.  It  is  un- 
necessary to  say  that  he  refused  the  pay  and  emolu- 
ments offered  him  by  foreign  Powers  ;  his  ideas  on 
this  subject  were  strict  and  severe,  and  were  formed 
on  the  noblest  standards  of  duty  ;  here  he  presents 
a  striking  contrast  to  Marlborough,  unhappily  not 
superior  to  evil  corruption.  France,  it  might  have 
been  thought,  would  have  felt  what  she  owed  to 
Wellington,  and  now  that  the  animosities  of  the  day 
are  dead  her  best  historians  have  honourably  avowed 
her  debt.  But  he  was  unpopular  with  all  classes 
from  1815  to  1818;  the  reasons  are  not  difficult  to 
seek.  The  King  and  the  Court  were  under  obliga- 
tions too  great  to  have  a  really  friendly  feeling  for 
him  ;  his  antagonists  in  the  field  were  sore  and  angry; 
indeed,  he  treated  them  more  than  once  with  a  kind 
of  dry  discourtesy.  Allowance,  too,  must  be  made 
for  the  wounded  pride  and  susceptibilities  of  a  great 
nation,  which  rightly  saw  in  Wellington  one  of  its 
chief  conquerors  ;  Waterloo  was  a  humiliation  not  to 
be  soon  forgotten.  Plots  were  again  formed  against 
the  life  of  the  Duke;  whatever  excuses  may  be 
made  for  it,  Napoleon's  legacy  to  Cantillon  was  an 
unworthy  act,  even  though  it  was  done  in  the  agony 
of  death.  Wellington's  conduct  to  Ney  has  been 
severely  censured :  perhaps  he  ought  to  have  laid 
stress  on   the  capitulation    of  Paris,  the   only  real 


3 1 8  Wellington 

defence  for  the  ill-fated  Marshal.  But,  technically, 
Ney's  guilt  could  not  be  questioned,  and  justice  was 
more  akin  to  mercy  in  the  nature  of  the  great  Eng- 
lishman, a  personality  essentially  stern  and  hard,  and 
seldom  swayed  by  emotions  of  any  kind. 

The  Army  of  Occupation  was  disbanded  in  i8i8  ; 
Wellington  returned  to  England  to  receive  new 
honours,  and  to  "hold  a  high  place  in  the  national 
councils.  His  great  military  reputation,  the  remark- 
able powers  he  had  shown  in  the  administration  of 
civil  affairs  in  India,  in  Portugal,  in  Spain,  and  in 
France,  marked  him  out  for  distinction  in  the  service 
of  the  State;  the  men  in  power  were  only  too  glad  to 
secure  such  an  ally.  He  entered  the  Cabinet  of  Lord 
Liverpool,  and,  as  Master  of  the  Ordnance  and  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, was  in  ofifice  until  1827.  During 
this  period  England  passed  through  immense  changes 
in  government,  in  administration,  in  public  opinion, 
and  in  the  conditions  of  public  life ;  these  present 
two  marked  and  very  striking  phases.  When  Wel- 
lington joined  the  Ministry,  Toryism  of  a  peculiar 
kind  was  in  the  ascendent  in  our  foreign  and  domes- 
tic policy  ;  there  was  no  immediate  prospect  that  its 
long  reign  was  coming  to  an  end.  The  Tories  had 
brought  the  great  war  to  a  triumphant  close  ;tTie" 
Whigs  were  discredited  for  their  French  sympathies. 
Tory  statesmen,  too,  had  had  a  part  in  effecting  the 
settlement  of  the  Continent  made  at  Vienna  ;  and  if 
they  gave  no  countenance  to  the  Holy  Alliance,  and 
to  Alexander's  fantastic  dreams,  they  had  been  asso- 
ciated with  Metternich  and  other  pillars  of  absolute 
monarchies.     In  affairs  at  home  hardly  any  reforms 


Entrance  into  Political  Life  3 1 9 

had  been  made,  for  the  national  mind  had  been  en- 
grossed by  the  war ;  the  aristocracy  of  the  land  was 
supreme,  and  it  was  an  exclusive  and   illiberal  aris- 
tocracy of  class  ;  the  House  of  Commons  did  not  re- 
present the  nation  ;  enormous  abuses  were  allowed 
to  flourish  ;  legislation  was  far  behind  the  require- 
ments of  the  age  ;  the  criminal  law  was  a  disgrace  to 
a  civilised  State;  taxation  was  oppressive  and  unjust  ; 
the  life  of  the  ruling  classes  was  selfish  and  frivolous  ; 
it  had  its  image  in  the  "  First  Gentleman  of  Europe," 
as  George  IV.  was  called  with   unconscious  irony. 
At  the  same  time  vast  and  important  interests  had 
grown  up  within  a  recent  period,  and  yet  were  of  no 
account  in  the  State  ;  Birmingham  and  Manchester 
sent  no  members  to  Westminster  ;  our  colossal  manu- 
factures had  been  established,  and  with  these  the 
factory   system ;    a   teeming  population    had    come 
into  being,  and  this  was  often  in  extreme  poverty. 
Things  however,  went   on    tolerably  well  until  the 
close  of  the  war  turned  the  attention  of  thinkers  to 
this  position  of  affairs,  and,  above  all,  until  a  sudden 
and  great  fall  of  prices,  reducing  whole   classes  to 
sheer  want,  provoked  general  and    widespread  dis- 
content.    But  the  Tory  Government  had  not  under- 
stood the  signs  of  the  times  :  they  applied  coercion 
when  they  should  have  found  remedies  ;  they  mis- 
took disorganisation  for  sedition  ;  they  had  recourse 
for  years  to  measures  of  harsh  severity  to  put  down 
the  rebellious  spirit,  as  they  called  it,  of  evil-minded 
demagogues.      The   results   were    seen    in    suspen- 
sions of  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act,  in  Peterloo  riots,  in 
Cato  Street    conspiracies,  in    criminal    prosecutions 


320  Wellington 

which  disgraced  their  authors,  and  in  the  continu- 
ance of  heavy  and  unfair  taxation.  The  trial  of 
Queen  Caroline  clearly  brought  out  how  fiercely 
popular  feeling  ran  against  the  aristocracy  and  the 
monarch  on  the  throne.  England  and  Scotland,  in 
fact,  were  in  a  critical  state  ;  many  believed  a  revolu- 
tion to  be  at  hand. 

The  second  phase  of  this  period  marks  the  begin- 
ning of  a  more  auspicious  era  in  the  affairs  of  Great 
Britain.  Not,  indeed,  that  the  changes  of  supreme 
importance  which  took  place  in  the  next  generation 
had  as  yet  been  more  than  partly  foreshadowed. 
England  had  not  associated  herself  with  Liberalism 
in  foreign  politics,  nor  had  she  made  a  close  alliance 
with  the  France  of  Louis  Philippe.  The  House  of 
Commons  remained  unreformed  ;  it  was  still  the  as- 
sembly of  an  oligarchy,  and  of  a  privileged  class. 
The  landed  aristocracy  as  yet  was  dominant  in  the 
State ;  the  interests  of  manufacture  and  commerce 
were  comparatively  without  their  legitimate  influ- 
ence, the  institutions  of  the  country  still  rested  on 
too  narrow  a  basis.  Trade,  too,  was  subject  to  most 
injurious  restraints ;  the  mass  of  the  population  was 
largely  sunk  in  poverty ;  the  tone  of  society  in  high 
places  was  hardly  improved.  But  a  better,  a  more 
enlightened,  a  more  philanthropic  spirit  was  animat- 
ing the  minds  of  most  of  our  statesmen,  and  this  had 
a  powerful  effect  on  the  national  life.  Canning  did 
not  exactly  break  with  Castlereagh's  foreign  policy  ; 
but,  as  Metternich  clearly  perceived,  he  gradually 
transformed  it  in  a  liberal  sense,  as  was  seen  when 
his  mantle  fell  on  Palmerston.     The  Whigs  slowly 


Entra7ice  into  Political  Life  321 

regained  their  authority  in  the  State  ;  their  leaders 
raised  the  cry  of  parliamentary  reform  erelong  to 
swell  into  a  national  demand  ;  they  exposed  the 
abuses  of  nomination  and  rotten  boroughs,  and  de- 
nounced the  corruption  and  scandals  too  often  seen 
in  the  administration  of  affairs.  The  Ministry,  too, 
became  greatly  improved ;  mediocrities  were  re- 
placed by  men  hke  Peel  and  Huskisson  ;  these  per- 
ceived and  to  some  extent  carried  out  reforms 
absolutely  essential  to  the  national  welfare,  espe- 
cially in  relaxing  the  fetters  on  trade,  and  thus 
indirectly  bettering  the  condition  of  the  humbler 
classes  ;  in  mitigating  the  atrocity  of  the  criminal 
law  ;  in  making  justice  more  humane  and  popular. 
The  distress  besides,  universal  and  acute,  which  had 
followed  the  collapse  of  the  war  prices,  was  dimin- 
ished in  a  great  measure  by  degrees  ;  there  were  no 
doubtful  signs  of  growing  material  progress.  And 
with  this  improvement  the  hatreds  and  discords  of 
class,  which  had  separated  by  a  wide  gulf  the  rich 
from  the  poor,  became  much  less  than  they  had 
lately  been,  though  too  many  signs  of  this  great 
social  evil  remained.  If  the  England  and  Scotland 
of  1826-27  were  very  different  from  the  England  and 
Sotland  of  the  present  day,  they  were  not  the  dis- 
contented England  and  Scotland  of  1816-20. 

The  changes  of  this  period  were  also  distinctly 
apparent  in  what  Macaulay  has  aptly  called  "the 
withered  and  distorted  limb  of  the  Empire."  The 
state  of  Ireland  in  181 8  and  up  to  1821  had,  on 
the  whole,  not  improved  since  the  Union  ;  in  many 
respects  it   had  become  worse.     Five-sixths  of  the 


322  Wellington 

people  were  as  disaffected  as  ever  ;  they  had  the 
French  syr  .pathies  of   1798;  it   was  impossible  to 
govern    t'    m    without    repressive    measures.     Pro- 
testant        ^ndency  was  supreme  in   the  Church,  in 
the  St         in   the  Land  ;  its  evils  had  been  aggra- 
vated he  Toryism  of  the  time,  and  by  the  favour 
shown        the  Orange  societies,  the  embodiment  of 
the  extreme  domination  of  race  and  sect.     The  ad- 
ministration of  the  Castle  was  not   only  exclusively 
Protestant, — it    was   harsh,   narrow-minded,   severe, 
bisoted  ;  it  was  worse  than  it  had  been   under  the 
extinct  Parliament  in  College  Green.     Nor  had  the 
representation  of  Ireland  improved;  it  was,  with  few 
exceptions,  selfish  and  corrupt,  and  confined  to  an 
oligarchy  of  creed  ;  it  had  but  little  authority  in  the 
Imperial   Parliament.     As    for  the  Irish   Catholics, 
that  is,  the  mass   of  the  people,  they   remained  all 
but  outside  the  pale  of  the  State  ;    O'Connell,  no 
doubt,  had  made  his  influence  felt  ;  but  the  cause 
of  Catholic  Emancipation,  as  it  was  called,  though 
advocated    by  Grattan    with    great    eloquence   and 
power,  seemed  to  have  gone  back,  owing  to  Catholic 
disputes.     The  social  condition,  too,  of   the  coun- 
try made  no  progress  ;   absenteeism  had  increased 
since  the  Union  ;  landed  relations  formed  on  the 
ascendency  of   the  Protestant  gentry,  and    on   the 
subjection  of  the  Catholic  peasantry,  were  essenti- 
ally bad,  and    had  perhaps  become  worse  ;  disord- 
ers and  outrages  were  widely  prevalent ;    coercion 
was  resisted,  often  successfully,  by  organised  crime. 
The   decline    in    prices,    besides,    at    the   close    of 
the   war  had   made   the  poverty   of   Ireland    more 


Entrance  into  Political  Life  323 

general  and  severe ;  teeming  millions  vere  on  the 
brink  of  starvation;  there  were  seasons  of  dearth 
and  approaching  famine.  After  1821-22  ^^-e  were 
signs  of  a  change  for  the  better  in  this  sa  ate  of 
things  ;  Catholic  Emancipation  became  tl  fading 
question  of  the  day;  it  was  advocated  ab  .  oy  the 
Whig  party,  it  was  supported  in  Parliament  by  suf- 
frages steadily  on  the  increase.  The  Catholic  Asso- 
ciation, too,  was  formed  ;  O'Connell  became  the 
tribune  of  a  people  demanding  justice  ;  in  fact,  as 
early  as  1825  Catholic  Emancipation  would  have  be- 
come law,  under  liberal  and  well-conceived  condi- 
tions, but  for  the  perverse  bigotry  of  the  Duke 
of  York.  And  Protestant  ascendency  received  a 
weighty  blow  ;  the  Protestant  Junta  at  the  Castle 
was  replaced  by  enlightened  men  of  a  very  different 
type  ;  Orangeism  was  made  to  feel  that  it  was  not 
above  the  law.  Inquiry,  too,  was  made  into  the 
social  state  of  Ireland ;  the  report  of  a  committee 
that  sat  in  1824-25  has  thrown  a  flood  of  light  on  this 
important  subject.  Much  in  the  affairs  of  Ireland 
certainly  remained  very  bad,  especially  in  a  vicious 
land  system,  and  there  was  a  great  deal  of  social  dis- 
order, but  the  future  seemed  to  be  not  without  real 
promise. 

I  shall  glance  afterwards  at  Wellington's  work  in 
the  army,  during  the  long  peace  that  followed  the 
great  war  ;  for  the  present  I  shall  notice  his  position 
in  the  State  throughout  the  period  I  have  briefly 
described.  His  antecedents,  his  character,  his  pro- 
fessional career,  naturally  identified  him  with  the 
Tory  party  ;  he  must  always  be  regarded  as  a  Tory 


324  Wellington 

statesman.     He  was  a  scion  of  the  Irish  Protestant 
noblesse,  an  exclusive  class  of  extreme  Tory  views, — 
divided  from  a  subject  people  in  race  and  faith ;  he 
had  been  a  fast  friend  of  Castlereagh,  a  thorough 
Tory :  he  had  been  associated  in  the  most  brilliant 
period    of    his   life   with    the    leading   men    of    the 
Continental  monarchies,   of  whom  Metternich  was 
the  master  spirit.     His  nature  was    unsympathetic 
and  stern  ;  far-seeing  and  sagacious  as  he  was,  he 
disliked  and  sometimes  misunderstood  popular  de- 
mands   and    movements ;    his    experiences    in    the 
Peninsula  and   in   France  made  him  an  enemy   of 
Revolutionary  Democracy  wherever  it  appeared.    As 
a  great  soldier,  too,  he  was  fashioned  to  the  habit  of 
command  ;  being  almost  unversed  in  parliamentary 
life,  he  thought  that  the  State  should  be  ruled  like 
an  army;  he  believed  that  a  government  should  be 
essentially  strong  :  he  occasionally  failed  to  perceive 
the  power  of  the  forces  political,  social,  and  eco- 
nomic, which  may  affect  a  nation  under  a  constitu- 
tional regime,  and   even  to  interpret  the  signs    of 
the  time.     Yet  he  was  never  a  bigoted  and  narrow- 
minded  Tory  of  the  bad  school  of  the  successors  of 
Pitt ;  his  wisdom,  his  prudence,  his  saving  common- 
sense,  usually  taught  him  when  the  course  of  the 
vessel   of   the    State  required   to    be  changed   and 
adapted  to  the  exigencies  of  the  hour ;  and  he  pos- 
sessed in  a  very  high  degree  the  capacity  of  true 
Conservatism  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word  ;  he  was 
never  Quixotic,  he  was,  as  a  rule,  enlightened.     And 
thus  it  was  that  he  continued  in  ofifice  supporting 
the  Government  with  an  authority  on  the  increase 


Entrance  into  Political  Life  325 

during  the  two  phases  of  the  period  to  which  I  have 
referred.  He  held  that  the  Six  Acts  and  drastic 
legislation  of  the  kind  were  unavoidable  in  the  exist- 
ing condition  of  England;  he  repeatedly  condemned 
the  violent  agitators  of  the  day.  He  also  insisted 
on  the  maintenance  of  order,  whatever  the  cost ; 
turned  a  deaf  ear  to  clamouron this  subject;  laid  down 
excellent  regulations  for  the  preservation  of  the  pub- 
lic peace  ;  defended  functionaries  who  had  fearlessly 
done  their  duty,  despite  parliamentary  and  popu- 
lar protests.  He  voted,  too,  with  his  party  during 
the  trial  of  the  Queen,  and  even  exposed  himself  to 
some  special  odium  ;  but  it  is  tolerably  certain  that 
he  disapproved  of  the  conduct  of  the  King,  and  that 
he  thought  the  whole  proceedings  unwise.  Never- 
theless, even  in  those  days  of  Toryism  well-nigh  un- 
controlled, he  did  not  always  sanction  his  colleagues' 
acts  and  measures  ;  and  it  is  very  remarkable  that 
he  strongly  urged  that  Canning  should  be  recalled 
to  office,  and  should  give  a  more  liberal  tone  to  our 
foreign  policy. 

Two  tendencies  may  be  clearly  seen  in  the  Liver- 
pool Cabinet  after  1822,  that  is,  during  the  second 
part  of  this  important  period.  There  was  a  real 
Tory  and  a  real  Liberal  party,  and  though  these  re- 
mained united  until  the  disappearance  of  their  chief, 
they  were  divided  on  many  of  the  questions  of  the 
day.  Wellington  remained  a  Tory,  but  became  a 
moderate  Tory;  he  gradually  inclined  to  the  more 
enlightened  policy  of  the  rising  generation  of  states- 
men. Thus  in  foreign  affairs  he  did  not  like  the  re- 
cognition of  the  insurgent  Spanish  Colonies:  he  had 


326  Wellington 

no  sympathy  with  the  struggle  of  the  Greeks  for  inde- 
pendence. But,  on  the  whole,  he  co-operated  loyally 
with  Canning  for  years :  he  carried  out  the  Minis- 
ter's views  at  Verona,  and  did  excellent  service  at 
that  Congress ;  he  endeavoured  to  prevent  the  Bour- 
bon invasion  of  Spain,  undertaken  to  maintain  the 
sinister  power  of  Ferdinand  ;  he  averted  for  a  time 
a  war  between  Nicholas  and  the  Turk.  In  domestic 
affairs  he  upheld  the  existing  Corn  laws,  supposed  to 
be  a  mainstay  of  the  aristocracy  of  the  land;  he 
steadily  set  his  face  against  reform  in  Parliament. 
But  he  advocated  most  of  Huskisson's  fiscal  and 
commercial  measures,  all  tending  to  the  expansion 
of  trade,  and  to  the  prosperity  of  the  nation  as  a 
whole  ;  he  cordially  supported  the  mitigation  of  the 
bad  criminal  law  and  the  establishment  of  a  police 
force  in  England  and  Ireland,  one  of  the  best 
achievements  of  Peel  in  those  days.  His  attitude 
towards  Ireland  and  Irish  affairs  was  characteristic 
of  his  sagacious  wisdom.  He  was  a  member  of  the 
dominant  Protestant  caste  ;  but  as  Chief  Secretary, 
many  years  before,  he  had  seen  that  Protestant  as- 
cendency was  a  dangerous  state  of  things,  and  he 
gave  his  full  sanction  to  the  important  change  which 
removed  the  extreme  Protestant  Junta  from  the 
Castle,  and  checked  the  arrogance  of  Orangeism  and 
its  sectarian  tyranny.  His  brother,  Lord  Wellesley, 
indeed,  had,  as  Lord  Lieutenant,  inaugurated  this 
most  salutary  reform  ;  it  became  the  precursor  of  a 
new  era  in  the  consideration  and  treatment  of  Irish 
affairs.  As  to  the  Catholic  question,  now  in  the 
forefront  of  politics,  Wellington  had  no  thought  of 


Entrance  info  Political  Life  327 

heroic  remedies :  he  wished  to  preserve  what  was 
called  the  Protestant  Settlement  in  the  Church,  the 
State,  and  landed  relations ;  he  was  opposed  to 
Catholic  Emancipation  as  a  somewhat  hazardous 
policy,  and  as  placing  the  Irish  Catholics  in  a  posi- 
tion that  might  become  dangerous  to  the  institu- 
tions under  which  they  lived.  But  he  had  no 
objection  to  Catholics  on  the  ground  of  their  faith  ; 
he  was  wholly  free  from  the  ideas  of  Eldon  and  Per- 
cival;  he  had  the  good  sense  to  perceive  when  coercion 
must  give  place  to  concession  in  the  government 
and  administration  of  Catholic  Ireland.  The  Catho- 
lic Association,  founded  by  O'Connell  in  1823-24,  had 
soon  practically  superseded  the  authority  of  the  law 
and  of  the  men  in  ofifice  in  Dublin  in  three-fourths 
of  Ireland  ;  in  Canning's  words  it  had  formed  a  State 
within  the  State :  it  was  far  more  powerful  than  the 
Land  or  the  National  Leagues  of  a  much  later  day. 
Wellington,  able  in  council  as  he  had  been  in  the 
field,  knew  when  a  position  had  become  untenable  : 
he  took  a  prominent  part  in  advocating  the  Compro- 
mise of  1825,  largely  founded  on  the  Irish  policy  of 
Pitt :  it  was  most  unfortunate  that  this  measure  never 
became  law. 

A  very  striking  feature  in  Wellington's  career  in 
this  period  was  the  authority  he  acquired  over  lead- 
ing public  men.  This,  indeed,  was  largely  due  to 
his  military  renown  :  but  it  was  also  caused  by  a 
conviction  that  he  was  a  servant  of  the  State  of  ex- 
traordinary merit  and  worth,  and  a  politician  of  no 
mean  order:  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  he  owed 
his  eminence  to  himself;  he  did  not  belong  to  one 


328  Wellington 

of  the  great  ruling  families.  This  influence  was  per- 
haps most  clearly  seen,  and  not  without  a  comical 
touch,  in  the  ascendency  he  exercised  over  George 
IV.  ;  he  disliked  the  King  and  was  disliked  by  him, 
but  he  treated  him  as  a  kind  of  royal  puppet, 
and  he  kept  him  out  of  a  great  deal  of  mischief. 
Peel  was  the  statesman  to  whom  he  was  most  nearly 
allied,  though  he  was,  perhaps,  never  one  of  Peel's 
intimate  friends  ;  this  alliance  had  memorable  results 
in  a  troubled  period  now  close  at  hand.  In  1827  he 
unfortunately  broke  with  Canning,  when  Canning  had 
been  unexpectedly  made  head  of  the  State  ;  this  was 
one  of  the  most  remarkable  mistakes  of  his  political 
life.  He  distrusted  a  great  deal  of  Canning's  policy; 
but  the  real  reason  that  he  would  not  hear  of  being 
his  colleague  was  not  mere  envy  and  jealousy,  as  has 
been  said,  but  that  he  believed  Canning  to  be  false 
and  insincere,  and  that  he  detested  his  somewhat 
questionable  parleys  with  the  Whigs.  Yet  certainly 
he  gave  proofs  of  faults  of  temper  ;  he  ought  not  to 
have  thrown  up  the  great  ofifice  of  Commander-in- 
Chief  on  grounds  that  cannot  be  fairly  justified  ; 
this  ofifice  did  not  depend  on  the  fate  of  a  Ministry. 
But  in  truth  Canning  and  Wellington  were  men  of 
opposite  natures  ;  the  brilliant  orator,  emotional,  en- 
thusiastic, optimistic,  vain,  was  a  striking  contrast  to 
the  sound-headed,  calm-minded,  stout-hearted  sol- 
dier, seldom  swayed  by  sympathies  of  any  kind. 


I 


CHAPTER    XI 

PRIME   MINISTER   OF   ENGLAND 

The  Administration  of  Canning — Hopes  formed  as  regards  his  pol- 
icy— Death  of  Canning — The  Goderich  Ministry  a  mere  stop- 
gap— Wellington  becomes  Prime  Minister — General  belief  that 
his  Government  would  be  permanent — Hill  made  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  army — Repeal  of  the  Test  and  Corporation 
Acts — Huskisson  and  the  followers  of  Canning  leave  the  Min- 
istry— Vesey  Fitzgerald — O'Connell  stands  for  Clare — The 
Clare  election— Great  results — Catholic  Emancipation  a  neces- 
sity of  State — Policy  of  Peel  and  of  Wellington — Great  difficul- 
ties in  their  way — The  Emancipation  Bill  carried — Political 
consequences — Indignation  of  the  high  Tory  party  and  of  Pro- 
testant England — The  question  of  Reform  pressed  to  the  front 
— Distress — Revolutions  in  France  and  in  Belgium — The  Re- 
form movement  adopted  by  the  Whig  party — Unwise  speech  of 
Wellington — Fall  of  his  Government — Lord  Grey  and  the  Whigs 
in  office. 


THE  conflict  between  the  old  and  the  new  ideas, 
which  had  been  apparent  in  the  Liverpool 
Cabinet,  broke  out  at  once  when  Canning  be- 
came Prime  Minister.  The  quarrel  with  Welling- 
ton, partly  due  to  personal  dislike,  was  followed  by 
the  resignations  of  the  leading  Tories,  of  whom 
Peel  was  the  most  conspicuous.  Peel,  though  in  no 
sense   an   extreme  Tory,  had  always   opposed   the 

329 


330  Wellhigton 

Catholic  cause,  of  which  Canning  had  been  the  most 
distinguished  advocate,  at  least  since  the  death  of 
the  illustrious  Grattan.  Canning  was  forced  to  look 
for  support  to  the  Whig  party  ;  he  placed  several 
of  its  chiefs  in  ofifice  ;  and  though  he  was  sustained 
by  the  mass  of  the  Tories  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, these  did  not  fully  confide  in  him  ;  his  Gov- 
ernment had  the  inherent  weakness  of  a  Coalition 
Government.  Great  hopes  were  formed  that  the 
brilliant  and  enlightened  statesman  would  inaugu- 
rate a  new  order  of  things  in  England  ;  but  these 
were  dissipated  by  his  sudden  and  untimely  death  ; 
had  he  lived  they  would  probably  not  have  been 
fulfilled.  The  great  Tory  aristocracy  distrusted 
Canning ;  they  looked  down  on  him  as  a  plebeian 
upstart ;  the  majority  were  averse  to  him  on  the 
Catholic  question.  He  had  incurred  the  special  dis- 
like of  Lord  Grey,  the  champion  of  the  High  Whig 
noblesse ;  and  though  he  had  for  the  moment  the 
support  of  the  Whigs,  he  had  always  denounced 
Parliamentary  reform,  soon  to  be  the  rallying  cry  of 
the  whole  Whig  party.  He  had  not  besides  much 
personal  hold  in  the  nation  ;  and  his  foreign  policy 
was  detested  by  Continental  statesmen,  who  had 
still  much  influence  on  the  Tories  in  England.  He 
was  succeeded  by  an  obscure  member  of  the  Liver- 
pool Ministry,  who  held  office  for  a  few  months 
only,  and  was  universally  felt  to  be  a  mere  stop-gap. 
The  Government  of  Lord  Goderich  was  also  a  Coa- 
lition Government  composed  partly  of  Tories  and 
partly  of  Whigs  ;  it  did  little  or  nothing  during  its 
brief  existence.     Wellington   returned   to   the  com- 


Prime  Minister  of  Ejigland  331 

mand  of  the  army,  a  tolerably  clear  proof  that  he 
left  that  post  on  account  of  the  feelings  he  enter- 
tained towards  Canning;  but  he  stood  aloof  from 
the  Goderich  Ministry  ;  he  truly  remarked  that 
it  had  neither  power  nor  principle.  The  Whigs 
also  fell  away  from  their  nominal  leader;  after  some 
hesitation,  George  IV.  had  recourse  to  Wellington, 
the  most  famous  of  living  Englishmen,  who  natur- 
ally was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  State,  but  prob- 
ably against  the  secret  wishes  of  the  King,  who 
dreaded  the  authority  of  a  domineering  mentor. 

Wellingt'^n  was  now  on  the  verge  of  his  sixtieth 
year  ;  he  was  in  the  fulness  of  his  ripe  experience, 
and  of  his  powerful  faculties.  The  opinion  pre- 
vailed abroad  and  at  home,  that  after  a  succession 
of  weak  Governments,  his  administration  would  be 
as  lasting  as  that  of  the  second  Pitt,  that  is  from 
1784  to  1801.  He  had  no  ri\al  in  military  fame: 
he  was  the  only  surviving  British  statesman  who 
had  taken  anything  like  a  conspicuous  part  in  the 
settlement  of  the  Continent  in  1814  and  1815.  He 
had  been  the  colleague  and  the  fast  friend  of  Castle- 
reagh  ;  and  though  he  had  backed  Canning  in  parts 
of  that  Minister's  policy,  he  had  separated  himself 
from  Canning  in  1827.  He  had  been  cordially  re- 
ceived at  the  Russian  Court  by  Nicholas,  now  becom- 
ing the  first  of  Continental  rulers  ;  he  stood  well  with 
Charles  X.  of  France  :  he  was  still  recognised  as  one 
of  the  chiefs  of  the  old  League  of  Europe.  His  in- 
fluence on  the  Continent,  in  a  word,  was  immense; 
his  position  in  domestic  politics  seemed  completely 
secure.     He  was    at    the    head    of    tlic  gicat   Tory 


;i;^2  Wellington 

following,  still  in  possession  of  scarcely  interrupted 
power;  but  he  had  associated  himself  with  the  pru- 
dent Tories,  who  were  not  hostile  to  the  spirit  of 
the  age  ;  the  ablest  certainly  of  these  was  Peel,  who 
under  him,  had  become  the  leader  of  the  House  of 
Commons.  His  tenure  of  office,  besides,  seemed 
not  to  be  threatened  by  any  of  the  immediate  ques- 
tions of  the  day,  or  by  the  prospect  of  impending 
social  troubles.  He  was  now  opposed  to  the  Catho- 
lic claims,  because  he  believed  they  could  not  be 
settled  in  the  existing  condition  of  English  parties; 
but  he  had  never  resisted  them  on  grounds  of 
principle;  and  he  had  tried  to  effect  the  compro- 
mise of  1825.  He  was  an  adversary  of  Parlia- 
mentary reform,  but  this  great  question,  if  plainly 
making  its  way,  had  not  yet  reached  the  first  place 
in  politics;  indeed  it  was  not  deemed  of  much  real, 
practical  moment.  The  country,  too,  was  in  the 
main  progressing;  agriculture  and  commerce  were 
not  unprosperous;  there  were  few  signs  of  wide- 
spread discontent;  and  Wellington,  now  universally 
known  as  "  the  Duke,"  if  not  popular,  was  justly 
esteemed  by  the  nation.  His  Government  therefore 
promised  to  be  of  long  duration;  it  had  the  appear- 
ance of  complete  stability.  But  it  fell  on  extraor- 
dinarily difficult  times;  it  was  destined  to  lead  to 
a  great  constitutional  change,  and  to  cause  the 
break-up  of  the  dominant  Tory  party;  to  encounter 
a  revolutionary  movement  at  home,  made  worse  by 
general  and  acute  distress,  and  a  violent  revolu- 
tionary movement  abroad;  to  make  the  long-dis- 
credited  Whigs  the  depositories  of  power,    and   to 


SIR   ROBERT  PEEL. 
(From  the  painting  by  John  Linnell,  in  the  National  Portrait  Gallery.) 


Prime  Minister  of  EngUuid 


ooo 


transfer  it  practically,  for  a  time,  to  the  middle 
classes  in  the  State:  and  finally  to  succumb,  after  a 
few  months,  amidst  indignation  not  wholly  unde- 
served, and  a  tempest  of  popular  passion,  which 
shook  the  institutions  of  England  to  their  base. 

The  Government  of  Wellinjrton  was  not  oriein- 
ally  a  purely  Tory  Government  ;  it  comprised  four 
of  Canning's  distinguished  followers,  men  of  liberal 
and  enlightened  views,  for  liberal  ideas  were  steadily 
increasing  in  strength.  The  command  of  the  army 
was  conferred  on  Hill,  perhaps  the  ablest  companion 
in  arms  of  the  Duke ;  all  seemed  full  of  certain  pro- 
mise for  a  time.  The  Test  and  Corporation  Acts, 
bad  legacies  of  the  seventeenth  century,  which  im- 
posed galling  restrictions  on  Nonconformists,  were  re. 
pealed  ;  it  deserves  notice  that  Wellington  refused 
to. sanction  an  indirect  attempt  to  subject  Catholics 
to  further  disabilities  in  the  State.  A  rift,  however, 
soon  appeared  in  the  lute ;  a  compromise  was  ef- 
fected in  the  exclusive  Corn  Law,  but  dissensions 
broke  out  on  a  greater  subject.  The  Tories  in  the 
Cabinet  desired  to  transfer  the  seats  of  two  corrupt 
boroughs,  that  had  been  forfeited,  to  parts  of  the 
adjoining  counties :  Huskisson  voted  for  giving 
them  to  the  great  towns  of  Birmingham  and  Manches- 
ter, still  unrepresented  in  the  House  of  Commons; 
his  resignation  of  his  office  was  somewhat  curtly  ac- 
cepted by  his  chief.  The  three  other  disciples  of 
Canning — of  these  Palmerston  was  the  most  emin- 
ent— thinking  their  colleague  wronged,  went  out  of 
office  with  him  ;  the  Administration  became  wholly 
of    a   Tory    complexion :    one    of    the    ministerial 


334  Wellington 

changes  that  ensued  had  memorable  results.  Mr. 
Vesey  Fitzgerald  was  appointed  to  the  Board  of 
Trade,  his  re-election  to  his  native  county  of  Clare 
was  considered  to  be  a  foregone  conclusion  :  his 
father  had  been  a  friend  of  Grattan :  he  was  a 
staunch  advocate  of  the  Catholic  cause;  the  landed 
gentry  of  his  county  were  on  his  side,  to  a  man  ;  and 
hitherto,  as  in  other  parts  of  Ireland,  they  had  been 
masters  of  the  votes  of  the  peasant  masses,  enfran- 
chised by  the  measure  of  1793.  But  great  events, 
ill  understood  in  Downing  Street,  had  been  for  some 
time  taking  place  in  Ireland  :  a  movement  of  extra- 
ordinary force  had  been  let  loose  which  was  sweep- 
ing away  the  old  political  landmarks.  The  failure 
of  the  arrangement  of  1825  had  incensed  O'Connell; 
the  agitation  he  had  set  on  foot  acquired  sudden  and 
enormously  increased  power ;  at  the  general  election 
of  1826,  Protestant  ascendency  received  another 
weighty  blow.  The  Catholic  Association,  already  a 
danger  to  the  State,  already  subverting  the  law  of 
the  land,  became  absolutely  supreme  throughout  the 
South  of  Ireland  :  it  was  backed  by  the  immense 
authority  of  the  Catholic  Church  ;  it  formed  a  kind 
of  government  which  made  its  mandates  obeyed. 
O'Connell  conceived  the  bold  design  of  opposing 
Fitzgerald  at  the  Clare  election,  though,  as  a  Catho- 
lic, he  could  not  sit  in  the  House  of  Commons ;  the 
power  of  the  Association  was  concentrated  in  his 
hands;  the  result  was  never  for  a  moment  doubtful. 
At  the  instigation  of  local  leaders,  in  every  district, 
and  at  the  bidding  of  their  clergy,  who  from  their 
altars  called  on  them  to  rise  on  behalf  of  freedom 


Prime  Minister  of  Englajid  n^^ 

and  their  faith,  the  Clare  peasantry  broke  away  from 
their  landlords:  the  feudal  ties  which  had  bound 
them  snapped  in  a  moment ;  O'Connell  was  re- 
turned by  an  immense  majority  of  votes  ;  the  tri- 
umph of  the  Association  and  of  the  great  tribune 
was  complete. 

A  violent  revolution  now  appeared  imminent 
throughout  Ireland,  and  in  all  her  provinces.  The 
Clare  election  had  a  portentous  influence  ;  in  Lein- 
ster,  Munster,  and  Connaught  the  peasantry  joined 
in  the  revolt ;  in  many  places  they  refused  to  pay 
rents  or  tithes,  as  had  happened  before  the  rising  of 
1798.  Catholic  Ireland,  in  a  word,  was  in  an  insur- 
rectionary state  ;  and  though  the  Association  and 
O'Connell  denounced  crime  and  outrage,  there  was 
widespread  disorder  that  seemed  impossible  to  re- 
press. At  the  same  time  Orangeism  lifted  up  its 
head  in  frenzy,  and  threatened  to  have  its  revenge 
on  its  foes :  and  though  the  great  body  of  the  Pro- 
testant landed  gentry  declared  that  concessions 
must  be  made,  Protestant  Ulster  wore  a  dangerous 
aspect.  There  were  incessant  rumours  of  a  bloody 
civil  war :  and  if  the  Catholic  leaders  preached  peace, 
they  had  the  fortunes  of  Ireland  in  their  hands  ;  a 
word  from  O'Connell  might  have  inaugurated  a 
Reign  of  Terror.  In  these  circumstances  Peel,  at 
the  head  of  the  Home  Office,  and  largely  responsible 
for  Irish  affairs,  perceived  that  the  settlement  of  the 
Catholic  question  had  become  necessary  for  the 
safety  of  the  State,  and  did  not  hesitate  to  avow 
this  belief  to  his  leader.  Peel  had  for  many  years 
opposed  the  Catholic  claims  on  the  ground  that  they 


^7,6  Wellington 

were  incompatible  with  the  political  and  social  sys- 
tem that  prevailed  in  Ireland;  he  properly  offered 
to  retire  from  his  post,  but  when  he  had  convinced 
Wellington  that  his  views  were  correct,  he  patrioti- 
cally agreed  to  act  with  him,  and  to  give  Catholic 
Emancipation  effect.  By  adopting  this  course  he 
was  no  doubt  throwing  political  consistency  to  the 
winds,  and  so  in  a  certain  degree  was  the  Duke ; 
but  the  welfare  of  the  Commonwealth  was  at  stake  ; 
and — a  fact  that  should  be  carefully  borne  in  mind 
— Wellington  and  Peel  were  the  only  statesmen  who 
could  have  carried  a  concession  of  this  kind  through 
Parliament ;  the  Whig  party  would  not  have  had  a 
chance  of  success.  The  difficulties,  however,  in 
their  way,  were  prodigious ;  George  IV.  and  his 
brother,  the  Duke  of  Cumberland,  were  furious  in 
their  anti-Catholic  zeal  ;  the  Tory  majority  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  three-fourths  probably  of 
the  aristocracy  of  the  land,  resented  a  policy  they 
deemed  truckling  and  unwise  ;  the  House  of  Lords 
and  the  Church  were  distinctly  adverse.  The  na- 
tion, besides,  was  indignant  at  what  O'Connell  had 
achieved ;  it  despised  the  Irish  Catholics  as  an  inferior 
race  ;  Protestant  feeling  ran  high  against  the  Irish 
priesthood  ;  the  Nonconformists  especially  were  ve- 
hement in  their  bigoted  language.  Had  an  appeal 
to  the  country  been  made  at  this  crisis,  Catholic 
Emancipation  would  never  have  been  granted  by  an 
unreformed  Parliament. 

Peel  and  Wellington  had  soon  agreed  to  their 
project ;  the  Duke  had  more  enlightened  views  than 
his  colleague ;    as  had  been  the  case  with  Pitt  at  the 


Prime  Minister  of  England  y^"] 

Union,  he  wished  to  make  a  provision  for  the  Irish 
priesthood,  a  salutary  and    far-sighted   policy.     But 
how  to  give  effect   to   the    measure  was  the    great 
question,  having  regard  to  the  formidable  obstacles 
in  the  way.     The  Duke  acted  as  he  had  acted  more 
than  once  in  the  field,  he  carefully  masked  the  large 
change  of  front  he  was  making  ;  he  gave   no  open 
countenance  to   the    Catholic    claims  ;  he    even    re- 
moved from   office  one  of  their  leading  advocates. 
He  has  been  angrily  blamed  for  concealing  his  pur- 
pose, and  for  not  making  it  known  to  the  heads  of 
his  party,  but   it  is  more  than  doubtful  whether  his 
position  would  have  been  improved  by  such  a   dis- 
closure.    He  had  soon  thrust  the  Duke  of  Cumber- 
land  aside;    but   when  the   Emancipation  Bill    was 
explained  to  the  King,  George  IV.  refused  his  assent 
in  passionate  phrases;  it  was  not  until  the  Ministers 
had  resigned   that  he  yielded  to  an  ascendency  of 
which  he  stood  in  awe,  and  sullenly  agreed  to  acqui- 
esce in  the  measure.     The  bill  was  brought  into  the 
House  of  Commons  in  the  session  of  1829,  and  was 
supported  by  Peel  in  a  masterly  speech  ;  but  it  was 
not  so  conciliatory  or  comprehensive  a  scheme   as 
might  have  been    expected.     The   Catholic    claims 
were  indeed  satisfied,  if  with  somewhat  unwise  ex- 
ceptions ;  it  can   hardly  be    denied    that    as    affairs 
stood,    the    Catholic    Association    was    rightly    sup- 
pressed, and  the  Irish  peasant  masses  were  rightly 
deprived  of  the  franchise.     But  there   was  no  pro- 
vision for  the  commutation  of  the  tithe  in  Ireland, 
a  reform  in  the   minds    of    our  best  statesmen   for 
years;  the  Irish  Catholic  priests  were  left  out  in  the 


338  Welli7igton 

cold  ;  O'Connell  was  not  permitted  to  take  his  seat 
for  Clare,  an  instance  of  want  of  tact  for  which  Peel 
was  responsible.  The  measure,  in  a  word,  fell 
short  of  the  proposals  of  1825,  but  it  passed  the 
House  of  Commons,  partly  owing  to  the  assistance 
of  the  Whigs,  and  partly  to  a  majority  still  pos- 
sessed by  the  Government  :  it  was  forced  through 
the  House  of  Lords  by  Wellington's  overpowering 
influence.  The  nation,  however,  was  deeply  stirred  ; 
a  furious  outcry  against  the  Ministry  arose,  increas- 
ing day  after  day  in  volume.  The  extreme  Tories 
declared  they  had  been  deceived  and  betrayed  :  the 
oligarchy,  so  potent  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
pronounced  in  many  instances  against  the  Govern- 
ment ;  the  Tory  party  seemed  rapidly  falling  to 
pieces.  The  signs  of  the  times  revealed  themselves 
in  the  rejection  of  Peel,  her  favourite  son,  by  Ox- 
ford, and  in  the  ludicrous  passage  of  arms  between 
the  Duke  and  Lord  Winchelsea.  The  prejudices 
and  the  pride  of  Englishmen  were  also  enlisted 
against  the  men  in  office  ;  they  had  tamely  surren- 
dered to  Irish  Papists,  and  to  a  noisy  and  obscure 
Irish  demagogue ;  they  had  humiliated  and  dis- 
graced England  ;  was  this  to  have  been  expected 
from  the  victor  of  Waterloo  ? 
Catholic  Emancipation  was  the  greatest  achieve- 
ment of  Wellington  in  the  sphere  of  politics.  He 
saw  that  a  great  change  in  Ireland  could  not  be 
avoided  ;  he  seized  the  occasion  with  characteristic 
judgment;  he  overcame  difficulties  from  which 
weaker  men  would  have  shrunk ;  he  gave  con- 
spicuous proof  of  his  indomitable  will  ;  he  prevented 


Prijne  Minister  of  England  339 

a  revolution  that  must  have  endangered  the  State. 
Nevertheless  the  measure  Parliament  enacted  had 
faults  and  defects ;  it  has  had  consequences  that 
have  left  their  mark  on  our  history.  The  conces- 
sion of  the  Catholic  claims  was  the  triumph  of 
agitation  organised  with  marvellous  skill ;  agitation, 
before  without  much  strength  in  England,  became 
thenceforward  a  mighty  force  in  her  politics ;  the 
Catholic  Association  was  the  parent  of  the  Birming- 
ham Union,  of  the  Anti-Corn-Law  League,  of 
the  Chartist  movement :  it  gave  an  immense  im- 
pulse to  Democracy  in  many  of  its  forms.  Catholic 
Emancipation  too,  accomplished  without  the  proper 
safeguards  contained  in  the  scheme  of  1825,  and  ef- 
fected in  a  tumult  of  popular  passion,  all  but 
destroyed  the  influence  of  the  Irish  landed  gentry, 
and  deeply  affected  the  settlement  of  the  Irish  land: 
it  introduced,  besides,  into  the  national  councils 
a  faction  which  has  had  a  great  deal  too  much 
power,  which  ought  to  have  been  kept  within  closer 
limits,  and  which  has  played  a  sinister  part  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Empire.  The  measure,  moreover, 
fathered  by  Wellington  and  Peel,  greatly  shook 
confidence  in  public  men  ;  it  not  only  shattered  the 
ties  of  party,  it  seemed  a  gross  violation  of 
the  most  solemn  pledges ;  it  had  results  akin  to 
those  caused  by  the  coalition  of  Fox  and  North. 
But  its  most  immediate,  if  not  its  most  lasting 
effect,  was  that  it  gave  a  sudden  and  powerful  im- 
pulse to  a  movement  hitherto  almost  in  the  back- 
ground, but  now  rapidly  and  portentously  brought 
to    the    front.      It    has  often    been    remarked    that 


340  Wellington 

Englishmen  do  not  like  to  deal  with  two  im- 
portant questions  in  politics  at  the  same  time ; 
when  Catholic  Emancipation  had  been  put  out 
of  the  way,  Parliamentary  reform  began  to  engross 
the  national  mind.  And  the  animosities,  the  pas- 
sions, the  divisions,  the  distrust,  engendered  in 
1828-29,  from  the  highest  down  to  the  lowest 
classes,  did  not  conduce  to  an  easy,  even  to  a  wise 
settlement  of  Parliamentary  reform. 

Having  successfully  carried  the  Emancipation 
Bill  through  Parliament,  in  a  great  measure  through 
his  personal  influence,  Wellington  endeavoured  to 
strengthen  his  forces  in  both  Houses,  which,  he  must 
have  felt,  had  been  much  weakened.  He  was  con- 
fident in  his  own  position,  and  in  that  of  his  Govern- 
ment: it  should  be  remembered  that  he  was  less  an 
object  of  party  and  popular  odium  than  Peel,  who 
had  been  more  deeply  pledged  against  the  Catholic 
claims,  and  whose  cold,  cautious,  and  reserved  man- 
ner contrasted  unfavourably  with  his  superior's  bold, 
frank,  and  soldierlike  bearing.  The  Duke,  however, 
seems  hardly  to  have  gauged  the  power  of  the  for- 
midable combination  arrayed  against  him,  composed 
as  it  was  of  many  diverse  but  most  potent  elements. 
A  large  minority  of  the  Tories  denounced  his  Gov- 
ernment ;  the  Whigs,  though  they  had  supported 
him  on  the  Catholic  question,  regarded  him  with 
growing  envy  and  dislike,  and  were  irritated  that 
they  had  been  kept  out  of  office  ;  Protestant  Eng- 
land largely  condemned  him  for  his  late  conduct. 
Besides,  some  of  his  appointments  to  high  places  in 
the  State  were  bad  ;  and  the  dictatorial  attitude  he 


Prime  Minister  of  Englanel  341 

had  been  almost  compelled  to  assume  provoked 
a  good  deal  of  discontent  in  Parliament.  Neverthe- 
less he  went  steadily  to  work  to  improve  his  position: 
he  made  overtures  to  the  Whigs,  which,  if  coldly 
received  for  the  moment,  might  in  other  circum- 
stances not  have  been  fruitless  ;  he  endeavoured  to 
rally  to  his  side  many  wavering  and  recalcitrant 
Tories.  This  balanced  strategy,  as  it  has  aptly  been 
called,  might  have  succeeded  had  its  author  had 
time,  and  had  not  a  series  of  conditions  become 
suddenly  adverse.  As  has  repeatedly  been  seen  in 
the  affairs  of  Ireland,  the  immense  concessions  just 
made  to  the  Catholics  did  not  bring  peace  or  allay 
trouble  ;  sedition  and  agitation  were  more  than  ever 
rampant ;  disorder  and  crime  distinctly  multiplied  ; 
Catholic  Emancipation,  it  was  loudly  asserted,  had 
proved  a  failure  ;  this  told  with  no  little  effect  on 
the  Ministry.  Simultaneously  there  were  at  least 
two  bad  harvests ;  in  the  three  kingdoms  every 
interest  connected  with  the  land  suffered  ;  this  re- 
acted on  manufactures  and  commerce,  more  depend- 
ent then  upon  agriculture  than  in  the  present  age.  In 
several  counties  it  became  impossible  to  pay  rent ; 
the  poor-rates  ate  up  the  produce  of  the  soil ;  the 
wages  of  labour  fell  to  starvation  point;  factories 
were  shut  up  and  furnaces  blown  out  in  many 
towns,  lately  thriving  centres  of  industry  and  trade. 
Widespread  and  severe  distress  followed :  the  re- 
sults appeared  in  dangerous  movements  in  parts  of 
the  country,  in  angry  popular  risings,  in  incendiary 
fires,  in  savage  deeds  of  violence,  in  organised  out- 
rages.    All  this  increased  and  exasperated  political 


342  Wellington 

discontent,  and  produced  a  general  feeling  in  favour 
of  a  great  change  in  the  State  ;  even  in  Parliament 
the  Government  was  fiercely  denounced,  when  it 
was  declared  in  the  Speech  from  the  Throne  in  1830, 
that  practically  little  or  nothing  could  be  done 
to  remove  or  even  to  lessen  the  many  ills  which 
afflicted  the  nation. 

The  cry  for  Parliamentary  reform  already  loudly 
heard  and  greatly  increased  by  the  prevailing  dis- 
tress, now  became  passionate,  intense,  general:  the 
existing  Parliament,  it  was  proclaimed,  would  not 
do  its  duty  or  attempt  to  improve  the  state  of  the 
country  ;  many  of  the  Tories  renounced  the  opinions 
they  had  held,  and  became  reformers  even  in  an 
extreme  sense,  partly  in  order  to  harass  and  vex 
the  Government.  The  movement  was  immensely 
strengthened  by  movements  abroad,  which,  turned 
to  account  by  popular  leaders,  made  a  profound  im- 
pression on  the  national  mind  in  England.  A  re- 
actionary minister  of  Charles  X.  issued  ordinances 
which  suspended  the  constitution  in  France,  and 
practically  destroyed  the  liberty  of  the  press ;  Paris 
rose  up  in  indignant  wrath ;  the  army  took  the  side 
of  the  multitude  ;  the  Bourbon  dynasty  was  driven 
from  the  throne  ;  the  Duke  of  Orleans  was  made 
King;  democracy  gained  a  decisive  triumph.  At 
the  same  time,  Belgium,  linked  to  Holland  by  an  un- 
natural tie,  threw  off  an  allegiance  detested  by 
nearly  all  classes  ;  part  of  the  settlement  made  at 
Vienna  was  undone  ;  a  democratic  revolution  again 
triumphed.  These  events  told  powerfully  against 
the  Duke  and  his  Ministry ;   he  was  identified    by 


Prime  Minister  of  England  343 

his  political  foes,  by  demagogues,  and  by  the  Rad- 
ical press  with  the  policy  of  Metternich,  and  of 
Castlereagh  ;  he  was  a  champion  of  absolutism  on 
the  Continent  ;  he  was  a  dangerous  man  to  be  at 
the  head  of  affairs  in  England.  Just  at  this  time 
too,  George  IV.  died  ;  his  successor,  William  IV., 
was  known  to  have  liberal  views  ;  and  though  he 
made  no  change  in  Wellington's  Government,  it 
was  loudly  announced  that  he  favoured  reform  in 
Parliament.  At  the  general  election  which  Fol- 
lowed the  demise  of  the  Crown,  seat  after  seat  was 
lost  to  the  Ministry;  in  fact,  England  pronounced 
against  it ;  the  abuses  prevalent  under  the  existing 
order  of  things,  the  anomalies,  the  iniquities,  the  in- 
tolerable state  of  representation,  which  did  not  ex- 
press the  will  of  the  nation,  and  was  the  monopoly 
of  an  oligarchy,  selfish  and  corrupt,  were  subjects 
of  invective  at  every  busting ;  country  and  town 
echoed  with  a  universal  demand  for  a  thorough  re- 
form of  a  bad  Parliament ;  this  was  urged  by  forces 
evidently  of  extraordinary  strength.  The  Whigs 
who  had  for  years  made  this  policy  their  own,  but 
who  had  hitherto  failed  to  give  it  effect,  perceived 
their  opportunity  and  cleverly  seized  it;  they  placed 
themselves  at  the  head  of  the  popular  movement : 
Parliamentary  reform  was  made  their  principal 
watchword.  Their  success  was  seen  in  the  trium- 
phant return  of  Brougham  for  York  :  and  the 
country  was  organised  to  promote  the  cause.  In 
Birmingham,  in  Manchester,  in  other  important 
towns,  nay,  even  in  several  rural  districts,  associa- 
tions  were   formed    to    bring    the    mighty    change 


344  Wellington 

about    which    was    to    inaugurate    a    new     era    in 
England. 

A  violent  revolution  appeared  at  hand  ;  some  of 
the  leading  Whigs,  essentially  an  aristocratic  class, 
afraid  of  the  ominous  signs  of  the  times,  made  over- 
tures to  Wellington  in  order  to  join  his  Government, 
and  to  effect  a  compromise  on  the  question  of  Re- 
form. These  parleys,  however,  proved  useless ; 
events  were  precipitated  by  a  very  untoward  inci- 
dent. When  Parliament  had  met  after  the  late 
election,  Lord  Grey,  the  recognised  head  of  the 
Whigs,  brought  forward  the  subject  in  a  temperate 
speech.  "  You  see,"  he  said,  "  the  danger  around 
you  ;  the  storm  is  on  the  horizon,  but  the  hurricane 
approaches.  Begin,  then,  at  once  to  strengthen 
your  houses,  to  secure  your  windows,  and  to  make 
fast  your  doors.  The  mode  by  which  this  must  be 
done,  my  lords,  is  by  securing  the  affections  of  your 
fellow-subjects,  and  I  pronounce  the  word — by  re- 
forming Parliament."  The  earnest  appeal  was  wise 
and  statesmanlike:  the  reply  of  Wellington,  peremp- 
tory, curt,  nay,  offensive,  was  an  emphatic  protest 
against  any  measure  of  reform.  "  I  have  never  read 
or  heard,"  he  declared,  "  of  any  measure  up  to  the 
present  moment,  which  can  in  any  degree  satisfy 
my  mind  that  the  state  of  the  representation  can  be 
improved,  or  be  rendered  more  satisfactory  than  it 
is  at  present.  ...  I  am  fully  convinced  that 
the  country  already  possesses  a  legislature  which 
answers  all  the  purposes  of  a  good  legislature.  .  . 
.  I  will  go  further  and  say  that  the  legislature  and 
the  present    system    of    representation    possess  the 


Prime  Minister  of  Eiiglaiid  345 

full  and  entire  confidence  of  the  country.  ...  I 
will  go  still  further  and  say  that  if  at  the  present 
moment  I  had  imposed  on  me  the  duty  of  forming 
a  legislature  for  my  country,  and  particularly  for  a 
country  like  this,  in  possession  of  great  property  of 
many  descriptions,  I  do  not  mean  to  assert  that  I 
should  form  such  a  legislature  as  you  possess  now, 
for  the  nature  of  man  is  incapable  of  reaching  such 
excellence  at  once,  but  my  great  endeavour  would  be 
to  form  some  description  of  legislature  which  would 
produce  the  same  results.  ...  I  am  not  only 
not  prepared  to  bring  in  any  measure  of  the 
description  alluded  to  by  the  noble  lord,  but  I 
will  at  once  declare,  that  as  far  as  I  am  concerned, 
so  long  as  I  hold  any  station  in  the  government  of 
the  country,  I  shall  always  feel  it  my  duty  to  resist 
such  measures  when  proposed  by  others." 

The  nation  had  distinctly  pronounced  for  reform  : 
the  new  House  of  Commons  had  been  elected  to  dis- 
pose of  the  question.  England  was  incensed  with 
the  minister,  who  had  crossed  her  will,  and  with  an 
audacity  alien  to  his  real  character  had,  without 
hesitation,  defied  her  opinions.  A  sudden  tempest 
of  indignation  swept  over  the  country,  one  of  those 
outbursts  of  popular  passion  often  seen  in  its  history, 
like  the  frenzy  of  the  Popish  Plot  and  of  the  Ex- 
clusion Bill,  like  the  wrath  aroused  by  revolution- 
ary and  regicide  France.  Disorders  and  outrages 
rapidly  increased  ;  attacks  on  property  were  made 
in  many  places  ;  Reform  became  an  insurrectionary 
cry  ;  the  institutions  of  the  kingdom  were  held  up  to 
odium  ;  the  landed  aristocracy  and  all  that  pertained 


346  Wellington 

to  it  were  savagely  decried  at  angry  public  meetings. 
"  London,"  it  is  said,  "  became  like  the  capital  of  a 
country  devastated  by  cruel  war  or  foreign  invasion." 
The  Duke  boldly  confronted  the  crisis  ;  he  took 
strong  measures  to  enforce  the  public  peace,  he  bar- 
ricaded his  mansion  of  Apsley  House  ;  he  called  on 
the  landed  gentry  in  every  county  to  uphold  order. 
But  nothing  could  stem  the  universal  torrent  ;  his 
Government  was  swept  away  on  a  minor  question  ; 
Lord  Grey  and  the  Whigs  came  into  office  on  the 
crest  of  a  revolutionary  wave,  pledged  to  carry  a 
great  measure  of  Parliamentary  reform.  Welling- 
ton left  his  post  censured  and  decried  even  by  mod- 
erate men  ;  for  a  time  he  was  the  most  unpopular 
man  in  these  kingdoms.  A  singularly  well-informed 
and  calm-minded  observer  has  placed  on  record  in 
these  words,  how  his  late  conduct  had  alienated  men 
of  all  parties,  and  even  the  great  majority  of  the 
people  of  England  :  "  With  his  Government  falling 
every  day  in  public  opinion,  and  his  enemies  grow- 
ing more  numerous  and  confident,  with  questions  of 
vast  importance  rising  up  with  a  vigour  and  celerity 
of  growth  which  astonished  the  world,  he  met  a  new 
Parliament  (constituted  more  unfavourably  than  the 
last,  which  he  had  found  himself  unable  to  manage), 
without  any  support,  but  in  his  own  confidence  and 
the  encouraging  adulation  of  a  little  knot  of  de- 
votees. There  still  lingered  around  him  some  of 
that  popularity  which  had  once  been  so  great,  and 
which  the  recollection  of  his  victories  would  not 
suffer  to  be  altogether  extinguished.  .  .  .  But  it 
was  decreed  that  he  should  fall.     He  appeared  bereft 


Prime  ]\Iinister  of  England  347 

of  all  judgment  and  discretion,  and  after  a  King's 
speech  which  gave  great,  and  I  think  unnecessary, 
offence,  he  delivered  the  famous  philippic  against  Re- 
form which  sealed  hisjate.  From  that  moment  it 
was  not  doubtful,  and  he  was  hurled  from  the  seat  of 
power  amid  universal  acclamations."  ' 

To  this  generation  it  may  appear  amazing  that 
Parliament  had  not  been  reformed  long  before  this 
period  ;  its  defects  had  been  perceived  by  Cromwell 
and  Chatham.  The  old  House  of  Commons  did  not 
represent  the  nation,  save  in  a  very  indirect  and  im- 
perfect way ;  the  landed  aristocracy  had  far  too 
much  power  in  it;  there  was  no  representation  of 
most  important  towns ;  nomination,  rotten,  and 
close  boroughs  secured  for  privileged  classes  a  bad 
influence  ;  the  anomalies  and  vices  of  the  system 
were  prodigious  and  glaring.  Yet  Burke  and  Can- 
ning had  always  defended  this  order  of  things  ;  the 
statesmen  who  had  beheld  the  French  Revolution, 
nay,  many  of  their  successors,  dreaded  organic  change 
in  a  Constitution,  even  as  it  was,  very  much  the  best 
in  Europe.  The  antipathy  of  Wellington  to  Parlia- 
mentary reform  was  due  partly  to  his  political  faith 
and  partly  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the  time. 
If  not  a  mere  Tory  bigot,  he  was  not  less  a  Tory ;  he 
wished  to  see  the  aristocracy  of  the  land  the  chief 
power  in  the  State  ;  that  "  the  King's  Government 
should  be  strong"  seemed  to  him  essential;  these 
great  objects  he  thought  practically  secure  under  our 
old    Parliamentary   regime.      Nor  had   he  any  real 


'  Greville,  Memoirs,  ii.,  84-85. 


348 


Wellington 


knowledge  of  the  Great  Britain  of  manufacture  and 
commerce,  and  of  the  great  interests  which  had  been 
growing  up  for  years  and  yet  had  very  little  weight 
in  public  affairs  ;  he  failed  to  understand  the  changed 
conditions  of  the  national  life ;  he  did  not  correctly 
discern  the  signs  of  the  time.  He  was  rather  a  mar- 
tinet than  a  thinker  in  the  political  sphere,  and  re- 
form seemed  to  him  especially  dangerous,  when 
democracy  was  gaining  triumphs  abroad,  and  was 
making  rapid  and  threatening  progress  at  home  ;  he 
was  not  wholly  in  error  when,  in  1829-30,  he  believed 
the  season  was  unpropitious  for  making  an  immense 
experiment  in  all  that  related  to  the  institutions  of 
the  State.  These  considerations  partly  excuse  the 
attitude  he  took  at  this  important  juncture;  never- 
theless his  speech  in  reply  to  Lord  Grey  was  intem- 
perate, unwise,  unworthy  of  him, — it  was  one  of  the 
few  great  mistakes  of  his  career. 


CHAPTER    XII 

FROM    1830  TO    1 841 


The  Grey  Government — It  introduces  the  Reform  Bill — Progress  of 
the  measures  brought  in — Wellington  called  upon  to  form  an 
administration — He  fails — The  Reform  Bill  becomes  law — 
Characteristics  of  the  measure — Wellington  steadily  opposes  it 
all  through — Agitated  and  critical  state  of  England — The 
Duke's  life  exposed  to  danger — The  first  Reformed  Parliament 
— Fall  of  the  Government  of  Lord  Grey — Lord  Melbourne 
Prime  Minister — William  IV.  changes  his  Ministry  and  places 
Wellington  at  the  head  of  affairs — His  patriotic  conduct — Peel 
Prime  Minister — His  first  short  administration — The  Melbourne 
Government  restored  to  office — Wise  and  moderate  attitude  of 
Wellington  in  opposition — Death  of  William  IV. — Accession  of 
Queen  Victoria — Soult  in  England — Feebleness  of  the  Mel- 
bourne Government  —  Wellington  and  Peel,  who  had  been  es- 
tranged, are  completely  reconciled  —  Fall  of  the  Melbourne 
Government — Peel  Prime  Minister. 

THE  Government  of  Lord  Grey,  which  succeeded 
that  of  the  Duke,  was  composed  partly  of  aris- 
tocratic Whigs  and  partly  of  late  adherents  of 
Canning  ;  it  was  well  for  England  that,  at  a  grave 
crisis,  she  did  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  demagogues. 
This  is  not  the  place  to  examine  at  length  the  memor- 
able events  which,  continuing  for  many  months, 
wrought  a  complete  change  in  the  unrcformed  Parlia- 

349 


350  Wellington 

ment,  and  transformed  the  old  political  system  of 
these  realms  amidst  shocks  and  troubles  that  seemed 
to  imperil  the  State.  The  first  Reform  Bill,  introduced 
by  Lord  John  Russell,  passed  the  second  reading  in 
the  House  of  Commons  by  a  majority  of  one  ;  but  the 
Ministers  were  beaten  in  committee,  and  appealed 
to  the  country.  The  new  House  of  Commons  pro- 
nounced decisively  for  a  second  bill ;  but  this  was 
summarily  rejected  by  the  House  of  Lords,  which 
denounced  the  measure  as  fatal  to  the  Constitution 
and  the  national  welfare.  The  people  of  Great  Bri- 
tain, already  with  difficulty  restrained,  and  incensed 
at  seeing  its  will  thwarted,  rose  in  several  districts  in 
angry  outbreaks ;  ominous  signs  of  social  disorder 
appeared ;  many  thinking  and  moderate  men  be- 
lieved that  England  was  going  the  way  of  France  in 
1789-91.  The  Ministers,  however,  persisted  in  their 
course ;  they  brought  forward  a  third  Reform  Bill, 
to  which  the  House  of  Commons,  of  course,  gave  its 
sanction  :  a  party  called  "  the  Waverers  "  had  been 
formed  in  the  House  of  Lords,  which  dreaded  the 
aspect  of  the  time,  and  wished  for  a  compromise ;  in 
a  great  degree  owing  to  this  influence  the  second 
reading  passed  the  House  of  Lords  by  a  small  ma- 
jority. But  the  measure  was  defeated  in  committee 
again  ;  Lord  Grey  and  his  colleagues  resigned  office  ; 
William  IV.,  who  had  become  terrified  at  the  condi- 
tion of  affairs,  called  on  Wellington  to  form  a  new 
Government.  This  attempt,  however,  completely 
failed  ;  the  Grey  Ministry  returned  to  power :  the 
House  of  Lords  sullenly  assented  to  the  third  Re- 
form  Bill,  largely  from  dread  of  a  great  creation  of 


From   iSjo  to  iS^i  351 

peers,  to  which,  it  was  said,  the  King  had  agreed. 
Parliamentary  reform  became  at  last  the  law  of  the 
land  ;  a  real  danger  to  the  State  had  been  averted. 
It  is  impossible  in  this  brief  sketch  to  describe  the 
organic  change  in  the  Constitution  which  had  been 
thus  effected,  or  even  to  dwell  on  its  momentous  re- 
sults. The  three  Reform  Bills  were  substantially 
the  same  ;  they  were  not  without  grave  and  palpable 
defects.  They  swept  away  popular  franchises  in 
some  boroughs ;  they  made  the  franchise  they 
created  too  uniform  ;  they  confined  it  too  much  to 
a  single  class :  the  farmers  in  the  counties  were  en- 
franchised by  a  mere  accident.  But,  to  a  very  con- 
siderable extent  at  least,  they  removed  the  abuses 
which  had  made  the  House  of  Commons  the  instru- 
ment of  an  oligarchic  caste  ;  they  got  rid  of  a  num- 
ber of  nomination,  close,  and  rotten  boroughs;  they 
gave  Manchester,  Birmingham,  and  other  great 
towns  the  representation  to  which  they  had  a  right ; 
and  while  they  deprived  the  aristocracy  of  illegiti- 
mate power,  they  left  most  of  its  indirect  authority 
unimpaired.  On  the  whole,  they  added  greatly  to 
the  influence  of  the  trading  and  middle  classes  in  the 
State,  but  this  the  facts  of  the  situation  required  ; 
and  that  influence  was  not  to  become  excessive,  as 
time  was  before  long  to  prove.  And  though  essen- 
tially democratic  in  their  tendencies,  they  did  not  let 
democracy  run  riot  ;  they  left  the  most  vital  parts  of 
the  Constitution  intact. 

Wellington  resisted  reform  with  the  steady  per- 
severance he  had  exhibited  on  many  a  hard-fought 
field.     His  perfect  sincerity  cannot  be  doubted  ;  the 


352  Wellington 

measure,  he  was  convinced,  would  prove  the  ruin  of 
the  State  ;  it  would  make  the  stable  administration 
of  affairs  impossible  ;  it  would  destroy  the  aristoc- 
racy, perhaps  overthrow  the  monarchy.  In  these 
views  he  was  certainly  wrong ;  yet  they  were  quite 
as  conscientiously  held  by  Peel,  the  leader  of  the 
Opposition  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  by  many 
of  the  eminent  men  of  the  time,  astonishing  as  this 
may  appear  to  the  generation  in  which  we  live. 
The  Duke  had  no  patience  with  the  "  Waverers  "  ; 
he  regarded  them  as  deserters  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy  ;  he  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  any  thought  of  com- 
promise. Undoubtedly  he  made  an  earnest  attempt 
to  form  a  Ministry  when  Lord  Grey  resigned  ;  but 
Peel,  very  properly,  would  not  consent  to  introduce 
a  Reform  Bill  similar  to  that  which  he  had  steadily 
condemned.  Catholic  Emancipation,  he  insisted,  was 
quite  a  different  case.  This  caused  a  temporary  es- 
trangement between  the  two  men  ;  but  Peel  cer- 
tainly took  the  right  course  ;  the  Duke's  argument 
that  a  Government  should  be  formed  "to  save  the 
King,"  even  at  the  heavy  price  of  reform,  cannot 
bear  examination  and  was  self-deception.  It  de- 
serves notice  that  in  opposing  reform,  the  Duke 
rallied  again  all  the  Tories  around  him  ;  the  events 
of  1829  were  forgotten  ;  but  this  was  by  no  means 
the  case  with  Peel  ;  he  was  still  regarded  with  a  good 
deal  of  distrust.  During  these  agitated  months 
Wellington's  unpopularity  passed  all  bounds  ;  he  was 
held  up  to  execration  by  demagogues  and  an  in- 
cendiary press  ;  more  than  once  his  life  was  in  danger 
from  the  savage   mob  of  London,     Yet  he  pursued 


From  iSjo  to  iS^i  353 

his  course  with  the  tenacity  characteristic  of  him  ; 
he  set  an  example  to  EngHshmcn  which  it  is  impos- 
sible not  to  admire.  Much  as  he  disliked  the  Min- 
istry of  Lord  Grey,  he  co-operated  loyally  with  it  in 
maintaining  order  wherever  it  was  disturbed ;  he 
repeatedly  warned  his  party  that  its  first  duty  was 
to  support  the  "  King's  Government,"  and  never  to 
try  to  gain  a  factious  triumph.  This  truly  patriotic 
conduct  had  an  immense  effect ;  Whigs  and  Tories 
united  in  defence  of  the  State  and  the  laws  ;  it  dis- 
tinctly checked  much  that  was  most  dangerous  in 
the  Reform  movement.  It  should  be  added  that, 
except  in  a  few  instances,  the  Ministry  acted  as  be- 
came statesmen,  and  kept  anarchy  effectually  down  : 
that  the  aristocracy  when  attacked  showed  courage 
and  spirit,  and  that  the  nation  gradually  returned  to 
the  ways  of  moderation  and  common  sense.  Never- 
theless it  must  be  acknowledged  that  when  the  first 
Reformed  Parliament  met,  in  the  beginning  of  1833, 
the  balance  of  the  Constitution  seemed  perilously 
disturbed  and  Parliamentary  Government  brought 
well-nigh  to  a  deadlock.  The  Ministry  had  such  an 
immense  majority,  that  it  appeared  to  possess  irre- 
sistible power;  the  Tory  party  in  the  House  of 
Commons  was  a  mere  forlorn  hope  ;  the  House  of 
Lords,  humiliated  and  defeated,  was  held  of  little 
account  in  the  State.  And  for  a  short  time  innova- 
tion rushed  onwards  in  full  flood  :  extravagant  pro- 
jects of  change  were  proposed  :  the  Opposition  in  the 
House  of  Commons  was  treated  by  Radical  faction 
with  contempt.  Rut  the  Ministers  set  their  faces 
against  extreme  measures  ;  their  legislation  was,  in 
23 


354  Wellington 

the  main,  well  conceived  :  and  under  the  able  and 
skilful  leading  of  Peel,  the  Tories,  thenceforward 
to  be  called  Conservatives,  regained  confidence,  and 
even  increased  in  numbers.  Omnipotent,  too,  as  the 
Government  was  deemed  to  be,  a  variety  of  causes  im- 
paired its  strength  and  gradually  made  it  essentially 
weak.  There  was  a  frightful  agrarian  outbreak  in 
Ireland,  stained  with  detestable  deeds  of  blood  ;  the 
Ministry  was  compelled  to  have  recourse  to  severe 
coercion  ;  this  incensed  O'Connell  and  his  "  Tail,"  as 
it  was  called  ;  he  broke  away  from  the  "  base,  bloody, 
and  brutal  Whigs  "  with  his  submissive  followers. 
Measures,  too,  introduced  to  reform  the  Established 
Church  in  Ireland,  produced  a  schism  among  the 
men  in  ofifice  :  four  Ministers  resigned,  as  they  would 
not  sanction  the  application  of  part  of  the  property 
of  the  Church  to  secular  uses.  Nor  had  the  Govern- 
ment a  master  mind  in  the  House  of  Commons  ; 
Lord  Althorp,  if  an  amiable  even  an  able  man,  was 
no  match  for  his  opponent,  Peel ;  Lord  John  Rus- 
sell was,  as  yet,  a  subordinate  only.  The  majority, 
moreover,  of  the  Ministry  was  so  great  that  it  be- 
came unmanageable  and  split  into  groups  ;  and  as 
disenchantment  follows  illusion,  the  wild  hopes  en- 
gendered by  the  Reform  Bill  had  soon  proved  im- 
possible to  fulfil ;  and  this  disappointment  told  on 
the  Government.  In  these  circumstances  a  Conser- 
vative reaction  quickly  set  in  ;  within  a  few  months 
Conservatism  was  distinctly  gaining  strength  in  the 
country.  A  kind  of  conspiracy,  too,  even  now  ill 
explained,  was  formed  against  the  veteran  Prime 
Minister,  in  which,  perhaps,  one  or  two  of  his  col- 


From  iSjo  to  iS^i  355 

leagues  took  part  ;  and  the  violent  harangues  of 
Brougham,  who  had  been  made  Lord  Chancellor,  in 
order  "  to  muzzle  him,"  as  was  generally  said,  dis- 
gusted hundreds  of  moderate  and  right-minded  men. 
The  Grey  Government,  which,  in  1833,  seemed  to  be 
as  absolute  as  the  Long  Parliament  was  in  1641-42, 
within  eighteen  months  was  almost  reduced  to  im- 
potence ;  Lord  Grey  suddenly  resigned  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1834. 

The  Government  of  Lord  Grey  was  not  broken  up. 
Lord  Melbourne,  one  of  his  colleagues,  became 
Prime  Minister.  He  was  in  no  sense  a  statesman 
of  a  high  order,  but  he  was  a  cautious,  astute,  and 
amiable  man,  an  epicurean  and  a  courtier,  and  he  was 
for  a  long  time  at  the  head  of  the  State.  But  his  first 
administration  did  not  last.  William  IV.  had  long 
resolved  to  get  rid  of  the  Whigs  ;  the  death  of  Lord 
Spencer,  the  father  of  Lord  Althorp,  gave  the  King 
the  opportunity  he  sought.  Melbourne  and  his 
colleagues  were  induced  to  resign ;  and  as  Peel, 
recognised  by  the  Conservatives  as  their  coming 
Minister,  was  for  the  moment  abroad  in  Rome,  Wel- 
lington was  practically  made  a  Dictator  for  a  time, 
the  Treasury  and  the  seals  of  three  Secretaries  of 
State  having  been  placed  in  his  hands.  It  might 
have  been  supposed  that  a  coup  d'etat  of  this  kind, 
which  elevated  to  supreme  power  a  soldier  lately  the 
mark  of  popular  hatred,  would  have  raised  an  outcry 
throughout  the  nation  ;  but  England  had  returned 
to  her  rational  mind.  She  acknowledged  the  great 
qualities  of  the  Duke ;  it  was  felt  that  the  best 
selection  had  been  made.     Wellington  advised  the 


356  Wellington 

King  to  make  Peel  Prime  Minister,  and  meanwhile 
discharged  his  multifarious  duties  with  characteristic 
zeal  and  attention.     Peel,  on  his  return  home,  formed 
his  first  Government,  and  appealed  to  the  country  to 
give  him  its  support.    The  strength  of  the  Conserva- 
tives was  greatly  increased  at  the  election  that  fol- 
lowed, but  it  did  not  secure  Peel  a  majority  in  the 
House  of  Commons  ;  he  had  to  confront  the  Whigs, 
infuriated  at  their  late  removal,  and  the  whole  body 
of  the  Liberal  and  the  Radical  parties.  The  conduct  of 
Peel,  however,  was  judicious  and  able  in  the  extreme, 
and  Wellington  co-operated  with  loyal  zeal,  if  their 
personal  relations  were  still  rather  strained.     In  the 
Tamworth   Manifesto,   as    it    has    been  called.    Peel 
accepted  reform  as  an  accomplished  fact,  and  indi- 
cated that  he  was  prepared  to  carry  out  an  essentially 
liberal   policy.     But  he  could  not   expect   fair  play 
from  an  Opposition  eager  to  turn  him  out ;  a  coahtion 
between  the  Whigs  and  O'Connell  was  made,  on  the 
principle  of  appropriating  part  of  the  revenues  of  the 
Established  Church  of  Ireland  to  education  and  other 
purposes;    Peel  was  placed  in   a  minority   on    this 
question.     He  was  also  defeated  with  respect  to  other 
measures.     He  resigned  in  the  spring  of  1835.    Never- 
theless, the  conduct  of  the   Duke  and   the    Minister 
had  generally  been  approved  by  Englishmen  ;  they 
had  made  an  effectual  stand  in  behalf  of  Conserva- 
tive principles  ;   the  appeal  to   the   electorate  had, 
in  a  great  measure,  restored  the  natural  balance  of 
parties;  they  had  been  beaten  by  a  far  from  credit- 
able intrigue. 

The   Melbourne   Government    was    forced    upon 


From  iSjo  to  1 8 41  357 

William  IV.  when  Peel  had  resigned  after  this  brave 
struggle.  Though  never  really  strong,  and  declining 
as  time  rolled  on,  it  continued  in  office  for  nearly  six 
years  ;  its  existence  was  prolonged  by  more  than  one 
accident.  The  state  of  political  affairs  during  this 
period  was  very  remarkable  if  we  bear  in  mind  that 
a  revolution  had  lately  appeared  imminent.  The 
Conservative  reaction  which  had  set  in,  soon  after 
1832,  went  on  with  steadily  augmented  force;  in 
England  at  least,  it  became  dominant.  The  move- 
ment gradually  drew  into  it  what  was  best  in  English 
opinion  ;  there  was  an  English  majority  in  the  House 
of  Commons  in  1839-40.  Peel  promoted  this  turn  in 
affairs  with  consummate  skill ;  he  completely  broke 
away  from  the  Toryism  of  the  past  ;  he  announced 
his  policy  to  be  that  of  moderate  progress,  and 
though  he  acted  as  a  powerful  check  on  the  Ministry, 
and  successfully  resisted  some  of  their  measures, 
he  usually  contented  himself  with  modifying  what 
was  most  open  to  objection  in  them.  By  these 
means  he  welded  together  the  Opposition  he  led  into 
a  most  formidable  power,  which  in  practice  largely 
controlled  the  Government ;  and  though  the  extreme 
Tories  among  his  followers  murmured  complaints, 
his  authority  over  his  party  was  supreme.  It  should 
be  added  that  his  position  and  his  attainments  were 
perfectly  adapted  to  a  Reformed  House  of  Commons 
after  the  frenzy  of  1831-32  had  subsided.  He  was 
himself  a  member  of  the  great  middle  class  of 
England  ;  he  was  cautious,  sagacious,  able  in  the 
extreme ;  he  was  Conservative  and  Liberal  alike ; 
all  this  fell  in  with  the  prevalent  ideas  of  the   time. 


358  Wellington 

The  Ministry,  on  the  other  hand,  if  they  retained 
their  places,  were  never  popular.  The  King 
was  on  the  watch  to  trip  them  up,  nor  was  his 
influence  to  be  despised ;  the  great  body  of 
the  aristocracy  was  opposed  to  them ;  they  had 
comparatively  little  hold  on  the  nation,  which 
regarded  them  with  mingled  contempt  and  dis- 
trust. And  though  several  of  their  measures  were 
well  conceived,  their  policy  was,  in  some  respects, 
unfortunate  ;  they  were  far  from  successful  in  foreign 
affairs  and  in  finance ;  and  if  Palmerston  and  Lord 
John  Russell  were  very  able  men,  they  did  not 
possess  the  authority  of  Peel.  These  various  circum- 
stances told  with  effect  on  the  Government  ;  but 
what  injured  it  most  was,  beyond  question,  its  alli- 
ance with  O'Connell  and  his  "  Tail,"  an  alliance  that 
ultimately  became  dependence.  Englishmen  were 
incensed  that  their  rulers  often  bowed  to  the  will  of 
an  Irish  demagogue  they  hated  and  feared,  and  of  an 
alien  and  disloyal  faction,  and  that  they  accepted 
their  insolent  dictation  on  many  questions.  It  should 
be  remarked,  too,  that  O'Connell's  attitude  in  the 
House  of  Commons  and  in  the  country  was  rude  and 
offensive,  and  that  he  was  held  up  to  public  odium 
by  the  powerful  press  of  England. 

The  estrangement  between  Wellington  and  Peel, 
which  had  long  been  marked,  continued  during  a 
part  of  this  period.  It  was  rather  increased  by  the 
circumstance  that  Peel  was  annoyed  that  Oxford 
had  made  the  Duke  her  Chancellor :  the  prize,  he 
thought,  should  have  been  bestowed  on  himself, 
the  most  distinguished  of  her  scholars  in  the  service 


From  iSjo  to  i8^i  359 

of  the  State.  The  two  men,  in  fact,  were  of  dif- 
ferent natures,  as  in  the  somewhat  analogous  case  of 
Canning  ;  they  were  not  yet  intimate  in  social  con- 
verse, though  Peel  felt  and  professed  the  sincerest 
regard  for  Wellington.  But  they  worked  loyally 
together  in  the  interests  of  the  State  ;  the  Duke  as 
leader  of  the  Opposition  in  the  House  of  Lords 
played  a  very  conspicuous  and  patriotic  part.  Ever 
true  to  his  maxim  that  the  "  King's  Government  " 
must  be  steadily  upheld  against  mere  faction,  he 
supported  the  Ministry  against  discontented  Tories, 
who  endeavoured  to  wreck  it  over  and  over  afjain. 
"He  especially  censured  the  invectives  of  Brougham, 
who,  furious  that  he  had  lost  the  Great  Seal,  held  up 
Melbourne  and  his  colleagues  to  execration  and 
scorn.  The  Conservative  Opposition  in  the  House 
of  Lords  was  thus  kept  in  harmony  with  the  Opposi- 
tion in  the  House  of  Commons  ;  the  Conservative 
cause  was  greatly  strengthened  ;  its  ultimate  tri- 
umph was  rendered  certain.  The  Duke,  too,  suc- 
ceeded admirably  in  modifying  the  legislation  of 
the  Ministry  where  this  seemed  to  require  improve- 
ment, and  in  carrying  it  through  the  House  of 
Lords  when  it  was  in  the  national  interest.  He 
supported  the  great  measure  of  Corporate  Reform, 
which  passed  into  law  at  this  period,  though,  with 
Peel,  he  changed  some  of  its  essential  features.  He 
refused  to  echo  the  outcry  against  the  new  Poor  Law, 
in  which  many  of  the  Tories  joined  ;  the  result  was 
fortunate  for  the  aristocracy  of  the  land.  As  re- 
gards Ireland  and  Irish  affairs,  which  were  verj^ 
prominent  at  this  time,  he  showed  that  he  had   no 


360  IVellmgton 

sympathy  with  Orangeism  and  its  pernicious  doc- 
trines ;  he  assisted  in  effecting  the  commutation  of 
the  tithe  of  the  Established  Church,  one  of  the 
most  salutary  reforms  of  these  years ;  he  gave  his 
sanction  to  a  compromise  on  Irish  Corporate  Re- 
form. As  regards  foreign  affairs  he  generally  gave  a 
cordial  and  honourable  support  to  the  Government. 
He  approved  of  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion  in 
Canada :  he  made  no  attack  on  the  war  with  China 
in  1840.  As  a  rule  he  supported  the  policy  of 
Palmerston  abroad,  especially  as  regards  the  alliance 
with  France,  and  the  events  that  took  place  in 
Portugal  and  Spain,  though  all  this  was  opposed  to 
the  ideas  of  18 14-15.  But  it  deserves  notice  that 
he  objected  to  the  return  of  Napoleon's  ashes  from 
St.  Helena  ;  this  has  been  called  an  unfeeling  and  a 
hard  act,  and  it  was  in  accordance  with  his  unsym- 
pathetic nature.  But  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that 
Wellington  was  not  in  the  right:  the  funeral  of  Na- 
poleon revived  the  Napoleonic  legend  and  shook  the 
throne  of  Louis  Philippe. 

William  IV.  died  rather  suddenly  in  1837;  his 
niece,  the  Princess  Victoria,  became  sovereign  of 
these  realms.  She  had  been  brought  up  in  the 
traditions  of  the  Whigs ;  her  favourite  attendants 
were  all  Whigs;  Melbourne  was  her  excellent  and 
trusted  mentor.  This  change  strengthened  the 
Melbourne  Government ;  at  the  election  which  fol- 
lowed the  demise  of  the  Crown  it  gained  a  few 
seats  in  the  House  of  Commons ;  but  even  the 
charm  of  the  presence  of  the  young  Queen,  and  the 
influence   she  exercised   on    behalf    of    her    friends, 


From  iSjo  to  iS^i  361 

only  retarded  for  a  time  the  Conservative  triumph. 
The  coronation  took  place  in  the  last  days  of  June, 
1838  ;  it  was  a  magnificent,  nay,  an  astonishing  spec- 
tacle. Though  the  railway  system  was  as  \et  in  its 
infancy,  the  world  of  London  seemed  trebled  in 
numbers;  the  royal  procession  passed  through  enor- 
mous crowds  from  the  Palace  to  the  Abbey  of 
Westminster ;  the  streets  were  decked  out  with 
banners  and  flags  extending  for  miles.  The  cere- 
mony within  the  abbey  was  imposing  and  touching; 
the  crown  was  placed  on  the  head  of  a  girl  of  nine- 
teen, who  bore  herself  as  became  the  daughter  of 
a  long  line  of  kings,  in  the  presence  of  the  envoys 
of  the  allied  Powers  of  Europe  and  the  West  and  of 
all  that  was  most  noble  and  beautiful  in  the  land  ;  the 
pomp  of  ancient  chivalry,  the  splendour  of  modern 
wealth,  the  solemn  ritual  of  the  Church  handed 
down  through  the  ages,  gave  a  grandeur  and  an 
impressiveness  all  their  own  to  the  superb  spectacle. 
The  figure  of  Soult  was  conspicuous  among  the  am- 
bassadors of  foreign  Powers ;  the  veteran  soldier 
had  just  landed  in  England  ;  he  received  every- 
where an  enthusiastic  welcome.  Wellington  treated 
his  old  adversary  as  a  favoured  companion  in  arms; 
shouting  crowds  followed  the  aged  warriors  as  they 
were  seen  riding  or  walking  together  ;  the  brother- 
hood-in-arms,  often  formed  between  antagonists  in 
the  field,  as  we  see  in  the  cases  of  Turenne  and 
Conde,  of  Eugfcne  and  Villars,  has  seldom  been  more 
strikingly  displayed.  The  Duke  took  care  that 
Soult  should  be  shown  everything  that  London, 
Woolwich,  and  Greenwich  could  show  ;  with  delicate 


362  Wellington 

courtesy  he  tried  to  stop  the  pubHcation  of  a  paper 
from  the  pen  of  the  malevolent  Croker,  which  re- 
flected on  the  Marshal's  conduct  at  Toulouse  ;  he 
even  delayed  with  equal  good  feeling  the  appear- 
ance of  a  volume  of  his  own  Despatches.  The  Brit- 
ish aristocracy,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say,  received  the 
veteran  as  a  most  honoured  guest;  he  was  greeted 
with  friendliness  and  respect  in  the  great  London 
houses  ;  all  kinds  of  attentions  were  lavished  on  him. 
Yet  there  was  one  awkward  scene  amidst  these  fes- 
tive gatherings :  the  Lord  Mayor  proposed,  at  a 
great  city  banquet,  that  the  Duke  should  speak 
to  the  toast  of  the  "  French  Army  "  ;  he  growled 
out,  "  Damn  them,  I  '11  have  nothing  to  do  with 
them  but  to  beat  them  !  " 

In  1839  the  Melbourne  Government  resigned, 
having  had  a  majority  of  five  only,  on  a  West 
Indian  question.  The  Queen  sent  for  Wellington, 
who  advised  her  to  make  Peel  Minister.  Peel  was 
actually  installed  in  of=fice.  But  her  Majesty  clung 
to  her  old  friends,  and  was  too  glad  to  find  an  oppor- 
tunity not  to  give  them  up  ;  she  refused  to  make  a 
change  in  the  Ladies  of  her  Bedchamber,  all,  with- 
out  exception,  devoted  Whigs  ;  Peel  dechned  to  be 
Minister  on  these  terms.  In  this  singular  intrigue, 
if  not  a  party  to  it,  the  Queen  gave  proof  of  a  resolu- 
tion hardly  becoming  her  youth  ;  and  as  Englishmen 
have  no  taste  for  such  schemes  of  the  Palace,  she 
continued  to  be  unpopular  for  many  months,  a  cir- 
cumstance that  appears  strange  to  those  who  did  not 
live  in  those  days.  The  Melbourne  Administration 
resumed  their  places,  but  they  were  overshadowed 


From  1 8 JO  to  iS^i  363 

by  an  opposition  that  had  the  substance  of  power, 
and  a  series  of  events  proved  adverse  in  the  extreme. 
The  policy  of  Palmerston  in  the  East  was,  indeed,  suc- 
cessful and  gave  his  colleagues  and  himself  a  passing 
triumph;  but  an  expedition  into  Afghanistan  was 
fitted  out  which  led  to  a  great  disaster  to  the  British 
arms;  the  tragedy  of  the  Khy  ber  Pass  has  not  yet  been 
foreotten.  Meanwhile  a  succession  of  bad  harvests 
had  occurred  ;  the  condition  of  agriculture  became 
very  bad ;  trade  and  manufactures  suffered  even 
more  severely.  In  this  position  of  affairs,  Chartism, 
the  forerunner  of  the  Socialism  of  these  days,  hfted 
its  head  menacingly  and  became  formidable  in  many 
of  the  large  towns  ;  thousands  of  the  artisan  popula- 
tion were  deprived  of  work  ;  mills  were  closed  ;  fur- 
naces were  extinguished  ;  industry  was  well-nigh 
paralysed  in  several  districts.  There  were  dangerous 
riots  in  some  places,  which  the  Government  did  not 
suppress  with  vigour ;  the  state  of  England  seemed 
like  that  which  it  had  been  in  1829-30.  The  finances, 
too,  were  badly  administered  ;  there  was  a  series  of 
deficits,  ominous  and  increasing  ;  the  cry  for  the 
repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  had  arisen  ;  it  was  felt  that 
public  affairs  should  be  placed  in  abler  hands. 

The  marriage  of  the  Queen  with  Prince  Albert 
revived  her  popularity  to  some  extent,  and  was  not 
without  effect  on  the  Government.  Trade,  too,  had 
become  somewhat  better  in  1841  ;  a  few  of  the 
measures  of  the  Administration — the  penny  postage 
was  the  best  of  these — were  liberal,  and  were  gener- 
ally approved.  But  nothing  could  arrest  the  decline 
of  the  Whigs  ;  the  Opposition,  they  knew,  were  their 


364  Wellington 

masters ;  they  only  nominally  held  the  reins  of  Gov- 
ernment. Peel  and  Wellington  steadily  pursued  their 
course;  the  pear  was  ripening;  power  was  passing 
into  their  hands.  By  this  time  they  had  been  fully 
reconciled  ;  but  it  is  more  than  doubtful  if  they  were 
ever  intimate  friends,  in  the  sense  of  complete  and 
genuine  friendship  ;  the  idem  sentire  de  rcpublica  re- 
mained the  bond  between  them.  In  this  position  of 
affairs,  the  Ministry  made  a  desperate  effort,  unwise 
and  unstatesmanlike,  to  retrieve  their  fortunes,  but, 
as  it  deserved,  it  became  worse  than  fruitless.  Believ- 
ing that  they  read  correctly  the  signs  of  the  times, 
they  brought  forward  a  series  of  Free-Trade  meas- 
ures, but  Parliament  refused  to  accept  these  ;  they 
had  little  or  no  effect  on  public  opinion.  At  last,  in 
May,  1 841,  Peel  brought  matters  to  a  decisive  test ; 
he  proposed  a  vote  of  no  confidence  in  the  Minis- 
try, this  was  carried  in  the  House  of  Commons  by  a 
majority  of  one.  The  Government,  however,  would 
not  even  now  resign  :  they  appealed  to  the  Electorate 
on  a  Free-Trade  cry  ;  they  were  completely  defeated 
and  at  last  left  office.  Peel  became  Prime  Minister 
for  the  second  time  ;  but  he  was  now  in  command  of 
a  great  majority  in  both  Houses;  the  nation  had 
clearly  pronounced  in  his  favor.  The  Conservative 
party  which,  in  1832,  had  been  reduced  to  a  handful 
of  men,  was  now  for  the  time  supreme  in  the  State  ; 
the  result  must  be  largely  ascribed  to  the  joint  efforts 
of  Peel  and  Wellington,  in  conducting  an  opposition 
with  consummate  prudence  and  skill. 


CHAPTER    XIII 

DECLINING   YEARS — DEATH — CHARACTER 

Wellington  in  the  Cabinet  of  Tcel,  but  without  office — He  returns  to 
the  command  of  the  army  after  the  retirement  of  Hill — State 
of  England  when  Peel  became  Minister  in  1841 — His  great 
fiscal  and  economical  reforms — Policy  of  Free  Trade — The 
Income  Tax — Peel's  administration  gradually  undermined — The 
failure  of  the  potato  in  Ireland — Discussions  in  the  Cabinet — 
Attitude  of  Wellington — Resignation  of  Peel  and  return  to 
office — The  ultimate  repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  carried  through 
Parliament — Wellington  succeeds  in  passing  the  measure  through 
the  House  of  Lords — Fall  of  Peel's  Ministry — The  Administra- 
tion of  Lord  John  Russell — Wellington  often  consulted — His 
conduct  as  Commander-in-Chief  in  his  later  years — Universal 
reverence  felt  for  him — His  death  and  funeral — His  character 
as  a  general,  as  a  military  administrator,  as  a  statesman,  and  in 
public  and  private  life. 

WELLINGTON  had  a  scat  in  the  Cabinet 
of  Peel,  but  without  office  ;  he  charac- 
teristically said  that  he  wished  to  give 
place  to  a  younger  generation  of  men.  But 
on  the  retirement  of  Hill,  in  1842,  he  returned 
to  the  command  of  the  army,  which  he  had  exer- 
cised many  years  before  ;  he  retained  this  high  post 
until  he  disappeared  from  the  scene.  Peel,  when 
he    became    Minister    for    the    second    time,    found 

2(>S 


366  Wellington 

England  in  a  sea  of  troubles  ;  disasters  threatening  in 
the  East,  discontent  and  distress  at  home,  financial 
embarrassments  on  the  increase,  a  violent  agitation 
for  the  Repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws,  a  depression  in 
most  branches  of  trade  and  commerce,  a  state  of 
public  opinion  deeply  diseased.  This  is  not  the 
place  to  examine  by  what  means  the  great  Minister 
encountered  the  difficulties  of  the  time,  and  in  what 
degree  he  relieved  or  removed  them.  The  peril  in 
Afghanistan  was  averted,  partly  owing  to  the  renown 
of  the  British  arms  and  to  the  proved  valour  of  the 
British  soldier,  partly  to  the  dissensions  of  races 
which  have  never  made  use  of  success.  A  series  of 
good  harvests  improved  the  state  of  the  country,  and 
quickened  industry  with  fruitful  results  ;  the  rapid 
development  of  the  railway  system,  if  attended  by 
speculation  which  did  much  mischief,  added  enor- 
mously to  the  national  wealth,  and  gave  employment 
to  a  huge  mass  of  surplus  labour.  These  happy 
accidents,  however,  as  they  may  rightly  be  called, 
were  perhaps  not  more  effectual  in  raising  England 
from  the  critical  situation  into  which  she  had  fallen, 
and  in  launching  her  again  on  the  path  of  progress, 
than  the  bold,  wise,  and  masterly  policy  inaugurated 
by  Peel  in  her  domestic  affairs.  His  Corn  Law, 
indeed,  was  a  mere  compromise  ;  it  did  not  disarm 
the  Anti-Corn-Law  League,  or  silence  its  powerful 
champion,  Cobden  ;  it  irritated  many  of  the  old 
Tory  party,  who  thought  the  interests  of  agriculture 
betrayed  and  looked  back  at  the  surrender  of  1829; 
it  gave  little  or  no  impetus  to  our  foreign  commerce. 
But  Peel  revived,  though  on  a  grander  scale,  the  eco- 


Declining    Years — Death — Chai'acter     367 

nomic  reforms  of  Pitt  and  Huskisson  ;  he  may  fairly 
be  said  to  have  been  the  great  apostle  of  Free 
Trade  for  England.  He  broke  down  an  exclusive 
tarifT,  ruinous  to  the  national  industry  ;  in  hundreds 
of  cases  he  abolished  or  reduced  duties  on  imports 
required  by  our  manufactures  and  trade;  he  thus 
liberated  commerce  from  most  injurious  restraints 
encouraging  industry  to  an  immense  extent,  and 
giving  an  extraordinary  impetus  to  the  general  wel- 
fare. And  he  had  the  courage — and  this  was  very 
great — to  carry  out  these  reforms,  to  defray  the 
charge,  and  to  restore  the  equilibrium  in  the  finances 
of  the  State,  by  subjecting  the  wealthier  classes  to 
the  income  tax,  imposed  hitherto  only  in  time  of 
war,  an  experiment  deemed  astonishing  in  those 
days. 

The  administration  of  Peel  still  appeared  of  un- 
broken strength,  when  Parliament  adjourned  after 
the  session  of  1845.  The  prosperity  of  the  country 
was  great ;  social  discontent  had  all  but  completely 
ceased;  the  state  of  agriculture  and  commerce  was 
full  of  promise.  The  Chartist  movement  seemed  a 
phantom  of  the  past ;  if  the  Anti-Corn-Law  League 
retained  life,  its  influence  had  been  perceptibly 
weakened  ;  England  seemed  to  be  advancing  tran- 
quilly on  the  path  of  progress.  But  a  series  of  events 
had  undermined  the  Government ;  the  Conservative 
party  had  for  some  time  been  complaining  of  its 
chief.  The  Repeal  movement  of  1843  had  assumed 
gigantic  proportions  under  O'Connell  ;  it  had  not 
been  suppressed  until  very  late;  this  alienated  many 
of  the  high  Tories.     Peel,  too,  had  introduced  more 


368  Wellington 

than  one  measure  of  reform  for  Ireland,  which 
aroused  the  suspicions  of  Protestant  England  ;  one, 
a  bill  for  the  increased  endowment  of  Maynooth,  the 
seminary  of  the  Irish  Catholic  priesthood,  aroused  a 
tempest  of  fierce  sectarian  passion.  Our  relations 
with  America  and  France  had,  besides,  been  more 
than  once  strained  ;  the  pacific  attitude  of  Lord 
Aberdeen,  Peel's  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  rather  irritated  and  vexed  the  national 
pride,  contrasting  as  it  did  with  the  pugnacity,  the 
boldness,  the  meddling,  of  Palmerston.  All  this  had 
an  effect  on  the  Ministry  ;  but  the  ascendency  of 
Peel  was  most  weakened  among  his  followers  by  his 
Free-Trade  policy.  He  had  enormously  reduced  the 
duties  on  foreign  imports,  with  admirable  results 
that  could  not  be  denied  ;  how  could  high  duties  on 
foreign  corn  continue?  was  Protection  to  British 
agriculture  to  fetter  our  commerce  abroad,  and  to 
impose  a  tax  on  the  necessaries  of  life  ?  The  mind 
of  the  Minister  was  evidently  turning  by  degrees  to 
a  relaxation  of  the  Corn  Laws,  in  a  Free-Trade  sense, 
probably  to  their  abolition  in  a  not  distant  future  :  in 
truth  their  maintenance  was  every  year  becoming 
more  difificult,  largely  owing  to  the  conclusive  logic 
of  Cobden.  The  Conservative  party  was  stirred  to 
its  depths,  especially  the  great  aristocracy  of  the 
land  ;  it  was  whispered  that  the  Minister  would  be- 
tray them  again,  as  he  had  betrayed  them  on  the 
Irish  Catholic  question ;  a  young  man  of  genius 
gave  great  force  to  the  sentiment.  Disraeli,  amidst 
the  plaudits  of  scores  of  the  followers  of  Peel,  had 
announced  that  Protection  was  going    the    way  of 


Declining    Years — Death — Character     36Q 

Protestantism  in  1828-29;  and  that  the  Government 
was  an  "  organised  hypocrisy,"  with  a  traitor  at  its 
head.  If  Peel's  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons 
had  hardly  declined,  its  fidelity  to  its  leader  was  no 
longer  assured. 

Wellington  took  no  part,  as  may  be  supposed,  in 
the  fiscal  and  economic  reforms  at  this  period  ;  these 
were  the  work  of  Peel  and  his  rising  lieutenant, 
Gladstone.  The  Duke,  however,  came  prominently 
forward  during  the  events  which  ultimately  led  to 
the  fall  of  Peel's  second  Ministry.  In  the  early 
autumn  of  1845,  the  precarious  root  which  formed  al- 
most the  only  support  of  teeming  millions  in  Ireland 
always  in  want,  suddenly  failed  in  many  parts  of 
the  country ;  there  was  a  certainty  of  dearth  which 
might  end  in  famine.  Peel,  who  had  been  Chief 
Secretary  for  Ireland  from  18 12  to  1818,  and  knew 
the  condition  of  the  mass  of  the  people,  summoned 
a  Cabinet  and  proposed  to  suspend  the  Corn  Laws, 
in  order  to  let  cereals  free  into  the  ports;  he  added 
that,  if  suspended,  they  could  hardly  be  revived  ; 
but  only  three  of  his  colleagues  concurred  in  this 
view.  Erelong  Lord  John  Russell  announced,  in  a 
famous  letter,  that  the  time  for  the  repeal  of  the 
Corn  Laws  had  come,  and  that  free  trade  in  corn 
could  not  be  deferred  ;  this  necessarily  forced  the 
hand  of  Peel ;  he  submitted  a  measure  to  the  Cab- 
inet by  which  the  Corn  Laws  would  have  been 
abolished  in  a  few  years.  The  Duke,  though  op- 
posed to  a  free  trade  in  corn,  accepted  the  project  on 
the  characteristic  plea  that  it  was  of  paramount  im- 
portance to  sustain  the  Government,  and  not  to  hand 
24 


3  yo  Wellington 

it  over  to  the  Whigs  and  Cobden  ;  but  a  leading  mem- 
ber of  the  administration  refused  to  follow  his  chief ; 
Peel  resigned,  seeing  that  his  colleagues  were  divided 
in  mind.  The  Queen  called  on  Lord  John  Russell 
to  form  a  Government ;  but  owing  to  dissensions 
with  Palmerston  Lord  John  proved  unable  to  carry 
out  his  purpose;  Peel  returned  to  ofifice  with  his 
late  Cabinet  ;  the  only  exception  being  the  dissen- 
tient member.  Peel,  in  the  beginning  of  1846, 
brought  forward  his  famous  measure  for  the  gradual 
repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws,  and  the  ultimate  establish- 
ment of  free  trade  in  corn ;  it  is  unnecessary  to 
dwell  on  the  memorable  events  that  followed.  A 
tempest  of  party  fury  broke  against  the  Minister ; 
the  mass  of  the  Conservatives  fell  away  from  him, 
declaring  that  he  had  been  pledged  to  Protection 
and  that  he  had  again  shamefully  betrayed  his  trust; 
Disraeli  made  himself  conspicuous  for  his  brilliant 
invectives  ;  he  concentrated  against  Peel  a  body  of 
angry  opinion  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The 
measure  passed  the  House  by  a  large  majority,  hav- 
ing the  support  of  the  Opposition,  and  of  adherents 
who  still  clung  to  Peel ;  but  this  success  was  for  a 
moment  only.  Peel  had  introduced  a  Coercion  Bill 
for  Ireland  in  the  early  part  of  the  session  ;  but  the 
progress  of  this  had  been  delayed  ;  the  Whigs  and 
the  Protectionists  had  voted  for  it ;  but  they  seized 
the  opportunity  to  pronounce  against  it  ;  this  "  black- 
guard combination,"  as  it  was  bluntly  called  by  the 
Duke, — and  faction  seldom  has  played  a  more  dis- 
creditable game, — placed  Peel  in  a  minority,  and  he 
at  once  resigned.     Wellington  carried  the  Corn  Law 


Declining    Years — Death — Character     371 

Bill  through  the  House  of  Lords,  insisting,  as  was 
his  wont,  that  the  Government  must  be  upheld  ;  the 
Peers,  though  detesting  it,  did  not  attempt  to  resist 
it ;  times  had  changed  since  1831-32.  It  is  very  re- 
markable that  the  outcry  raised  against  Peel  by  the 
Protectionists  did  not  affect  the  Duke  ;  it  was  felt 
that,  from  their  point  of  view,  he  was  hardly  to 
blame  ;  the  veneration  which  his  age  and  his  charac- 
ter inspired  throughout  the  nation  was  more  than  a 
sufficient  safeguard. 

The  administration  of  Lord  John  Russell  fol- 
lowed that  of  Peel ;  it  was  practically  kept  in  ofifice 
by  the  late  Minister,  who  opposed  the  Protectionists 
by  all  the  means  in  his  power ;  it  adopted  and  ex- 
tended his  Free-Trade  policy.  But  essentially  it  was 
a  feeble  Government  ;  it  had  to  cope  with  difificult 
crises,  notably  with  the  great  Irish  famine  of  1846-47, 
and  with  revolutionary  events  abroad  and  even  at 
home  ;  Palmerston,  an  object  of  dislike  to  the  Queen 
and  her  Consort,  was  a  thorn  in  its  side.  The  Duke 
was  consulted  more  than  once,  on  occasions  when  it 
seemed  about  to  fall ;  he  had  become  his  sovereign's 
most  trusted  servant,  especially  since  the  untimely 
death  of  Peel.  But,  as  a  rule,  he  confined  himself  to 
his  post  at  the  head  of  the  army  ;  the  aged  veteran 
greatly  distinguished  himself;  the  setting  sun  still 
shed  many  a  bright  ray  of  glory.  I  shall  notice 
afterwards  the  influence  Wellington  had  on  our 
military  system,  during  the  long  period  when  vir- 
tually it  had  passed  into  his  hands  ;  I  shall  here  only 
refer  to  what  he  achieved  in  the  last  years  of  his 
life.     By  this  time  he  had  exceeded  the  allotted  span 


yj2  Wellington 

of  threescore  and  ten  ;  but  though  he  was  not  free 
from  the  infirmities  of  old  age  his  martial  spirit  re- 
mained unbroken  ;  he  still  professed  himself  able  to 
defend  the  State  in  the  field  ;  he  was  still  animated 
by  his  enduring  sense  of  duty.  As  far  back  as 
1839-40,  when  a  rupture  between  Prussia  and  France 
appeared  probable,  he  had  declared  that,  with  the  con- 
sent of  his  sovereign,  he  was  willing  to  take  com- 
mand of  a  Prussian  army  against  the  enemies  he 
had  encountered  in  another  age ;  this  ofTer,  it  is  be- 
lieved, was  repeated  many  years  afterwards.  Wel- 
lington observed  with  profound  and  intelligent 
interest  the  events  of  the  first  great  Sikh  war  after 
the  disappearance  of  our  old  ally,  Runjeet  Singh  ; 
he  fully  appreciated  the  desperate  battles  that  were 
then  fought ;  the  Harding  of  Albuera,  one  of  his 
Peninsular  ofificers,  who  almost  saved  India  at  a 
terrible  crisis,  was  rightly  singled  out  for  the  praise 
he  deserved.  In  1849,  when  Gough,  a  dashing  but 
imprudent  soldier,  and,  perhaps,  too  harshly  con- 
demned at  the  time,  was  defeated  at  Chillianwalla, 
with  heavy  loss,  the  Duke  insisted  that  Napier 
should  be  sent  out  to  retrieve  the  disaster;  other- 
wise he  declared  he  would  embark  for  India  himself ; 
the  veteran  had  then  passed  his  eightieth  year.  One 
of  his  best  services  at  this  period  was  his  admirable 
plan  of  defending  London  against  a  Chartist  out- 
break, threatened  in  the  year  of  revolutions,  1848; 
his  arrangements  were  masterly  and  skilfully  con- 
cealed ;  Chartism  sank  in  ignominious  collapse.  He 
was  also  desirous,  about  this  time,  to  transfer  the 
command  of  the  army  to  Prince  Albert ;  but  the 


SIR  HENRY  HARDING. 
(After  the  painting  by  E.  Eddis.) 


Declining    Y^cars — DcatJi — Character     37;^ 

Prince   for   weighty   reasons  declined ;    tlic   veteran 
remained  at  his  glorious  post  until  his  death. 

As  Wellington's  declining  years  rolled  on,  he  be- 
came an  object  of  national  veneration  perhaps  un- 
equalled in  England.  The  renown  of  his  military 
exploits  remained  undimmed  ;  a  new  generation  re- 
cognised his  great  services  in  the  field  ;  it  was  felt 
that  he  was  a  principal  author  of  the  long  peace 
which  followed  the  French  Revolutionary  War;  as 
Napier  wrote,  the  Empire  reposed  under  the  Glory 
of  Waterloo.  He  was  still  distinctly  the  first  soldier 
of  the  time ;  Soult,  Paskievitch,  Radetsky,  were 
illustrious  names,  but  they  could  not  be  compared 
to  him  in  the  opinion  of  Europe.  The  unpopularity 
of  1831-32  had  passed  away;  the  voice  of  faction 
had  been  hushed  ;  his  sagacity,  his  wisdom,  above 
all,  his  single-minded  and  patriotic  sense  of  duty, 
had  sunk  deep  into  the  hearts  of  his  revering  coun- 
trymen. He  had  become  a  kind  of  Mentor  of  the 
Palace  for  his  still  youthful  sovereign,  who  looked 
up  to  him  with  almost  a  daughter's  affection  ;  when 
he  made  his  appearance  in  the  House  of  Lords,  its 
members  hung  on  the  words  he  uttered  ;  he  was  al- 
ways welcomed  with  a  more  than  respectful  greeting 
as  he  passed  through  the  busiest  streets  of  London. 
It  was  a  touching  sight  to  behold  the  veteran  riding 
quietly  to  do  his  work  at  the  Horse  Guards,  or  tak- 
ing his  customary  exercise  in  the  Park  ;  every  hat 
was  doffed  as  he  responded  to  the  universal  salute. 
In  this  respect  his  last  days  and  those  of  Marl- 
borough were  very  different ;  the  victor  of  Blenheim 
and  Ramillies  died  unlamented  ;  but  the  judgment  of 


t 


74  Wellingto7i 


England  fell  in  with  the  truth;  there  are  "damned 
spots"  on    Marlborough's    name;    as  the   poet   has 
said,  no  record  can  cast  shame  on  Wellington.     The 
end  of  this  history  of  glory  in  arms  and  of   faith- 
ful   service    to    the    State    came    rather    suddenly 
on   the    14th  of    September,    1852.     The    Duke,  as 
Warden  of  the  Cinque  Ports,  had  been  staying  at- 
Walmer  ;  he  had  intended  to  meet  one  of  his  nieces 
at  Dover  ;  he  fell   ill,  and   expired  in  a   few  hours. 
The  news  was  rapidly  spread  far  and  near ;  it  was 
received  on    the   Continent    not  without    emotion ; 
as  was  eloquently  said,  "  a  Pillar  of  the  old  order 
has  been  removed  from  an  edifice  tottering  under 
the  Revolutionary  storm."     From  the  Sovereign  to 
the  most  humble  citizen,  the  great  soldier  and  states- 
man was  universally  mourned  ;    a  Master  in  Israel, 
men    felt,   had    died    and    had    left    no  successor. 
The   body  lay  in  state  for   some  weeks ;    reverent 
spectators  flocked  to  see  it,  day  after  day,  at  Aps- 
ley  House,  the  London  residence  of  the  Duke ;  the 
staffs  of  a  marshal  of  all  the  great  armies  of  Europe 
were  exhibited,  and  formed  a  most  interesting  sight. 
A  public  funeral  was  solemnly  announced  ;  Queen 
Victoria   expressed  a  wish  that   Parliament  should 
associate  itself  with  it,  and  with  "  the  memory  of 
one  whom  no  Englishman  can  name  without  pride 
and    sorrow."     The    ceremony  took    place    on    the 
i8th  of  November;  Wellington  was  borne  through 
the  mourning  streets  of  the  capital  to  the  cathedral, 
which    holds  the    ashes   of    Nelson.      The   military 
pageant  was  not  very  imposing,  though  it  was  at- 
tended  by  representatives   of    nearly  all   the    great 


Declining    Years — Death — Charade)-     375 

Powers,  nor  was  the  procession  formed  by  the  chief 
ofiBcers  of  the  State  remarkable.  What  was  most 
touching  and  most  significant  was  the  enormous 
multitude,  not  only  of  the  London  citizens,  but  of 
visitors  from  all  parts  of  the  country,  who  filled  the 
streets  and  ways  of  the  city  for  miles,  and  wore  the 
solemn  look  of  a  people  in  grief, 

Wellington  was  of  the  middle  height  and  rather 
slightly  formed  ;  he  had  been  delicate  in  youth,  but 
in  mature  age  was  strong — the  epithet  of  the  "  Iron 
Duke"  is  well  known  ;  his  health  began  to  fail  after 
he  had  passed  seventy  ;  but  he  retained  his  faculties 
almost  unimpaired  ;  he  was  in  his  eighty-fourth  year 
when  he  died.  The  extant  portraits  of  him  are  not 
very  good  ;  they  are  somewhat  tame,  and  hardly  re- 
produce features  which  were  evidently  those  of  a 
very  remarkable  man.  I  only  beheld  him  when  in 
advanced  old  age  ;  his  figure  was  bent,  his  stature 
was  shrunk  ;  but  it  was  impossible  not  to  understand 
the  character  of  that  wise  countenance,  and  espe- 
cially the  look  of  that  keen,  piercing  eye,  which  always 
reminded  me  of  that  of  a  raven.  It  was  no  associa- 
tion of  ideas  that  made  you  feel  that  you  were  in 
the  presence  of  a  superior  nature  when  you  saw 
Wellington  ;  for  the  rest,  he  had  the  simple  and 
somewhat  reserved  bearing  distinctive  of  the  born 
English  gentleman  ;  there  was  nothing  showy  or 
ostentatious  about  him.  The  ground  plan,  so  to 
speak,  of  his  character  is  evident  to  those  who  have 
studied  hrs  career.  He  never  rose  to  the  topmost 
heights  of  genius  ;  he  was  deficient  in  imaginative 
force  ;  he  was  less   remarkable    for   originality  than 


376  Wellmglofi 

for  strong  common  sense.     Sagacity  was  his  chief 
intellectual  gift ;  he  was  admirable  whether   in  esti- 
mating the  prospects  of  a  campaign,  or  in   laying 
down  a  plan  of  operations  in  war,  or,  usually,  in  per- 
ceiving what  ought  to  be  done  in  politics ;  his  judg- 
ment   in    any    given    situation    was    of    the    very 
highest  value.       He  had,  also,  remarkable  quickness 
and  clearness  of  insight ;  he  confounded  his  adver- 
saries  by  his   ready  skill  in  the  field  ;  he  knew  in 
affairs  of  State  when  to  stand  firm  or  to   retreat,  at 
least  in  the  great  body  of  instances.     It  is  unneces- 
sary   to    add    that    his  professional   knowledge  was 
great ;  he  had  mastered  the  details  of  the  service  in 
youth  ;    he   was    perfectly   able   to   direct  an    army 
before  he   had  a  command  ;   his  moral  excellences 
were,  perhaps,  even   more  striking ;  he  had   extra- 
ordinary  strength    of   character,  he  was    animated 
throughout  his  long  career  by  a  steadfast  and  un- 
erring sense  of  duty  ;  this  was  the   principle  of  his 
conduct,  from  which  he  never  swerved  ;  loyalty  and 
patriotism  were  his  guiding  motives ;    he  was  sin- 
gularly devoid  of  ambition  and  personal  selfishness. 
His   perfect    integrity,  too,  was   one   of   his    finest 
qualities  ;  in  positions  in  which  he  might  have  made 
immense  wealth,  and  that  without  a  stain   on  his 
character,  he  thought  only  of  the  public  service  ;  the 
slightest  taint  of  corruption  was  odious  to  him ;   in 
this  respect  he  had  much  in  common  with  the  Patri- 
cians of  the  best  ages  of  Rome.     For  the  rest,  his 
nature  was  cold,  hard,  and  stern  ;  he  had  little  sym- 
pathy with  the  social  life  around  him  ;  he  was  never 
happy  in  the  circle  of  home.     Of  the  blemishes  in 


Declinmg    i  ears — Death —  Clia racier     2>77 

his  domestic   relations  it  is  needless  to  speak  ;   they 
were  not  grave  and  hardly  require  notice. 

More  than  half  a  century  has  elapsed  since  the  death 
of  Wellington  ;  eighty-eight  years  since  he  fought  his 
last  battle  at  Waterloo.  His  figure  stands  out  in  the 
light  of  history  ;  an  impartial  estimate  of  his  career 
has  become  possible.  It  was  the  fashion  of  his  day, 
in  England,  to  compare  him  with  Napoleon  ;  but  no 
masters  of  war  were  more  completely  different  ; 
Wellington  was  not  a  military  genius  of  the  first 
order.  The  Peninsular  War  was  his  great  achieve- 
ment ;  in  this  long  passage  of  arms  his  powers  were 
made  grandly  manifest.  With  characteristic  sagac- 
ity he  perceived  how  Portugal  could  be  defended 
against  the  French  armies,  notwithstanding  their 
immense  numerical  strength  ;  how  Spain,  in  that 
event,  could  hardly  be  subdued  ;  this  was  a  military 
conception  of  the  very  highest  merit.  In  conduct- 
ing the  contest,  too,  he  gave  proof  of  most  remark- 
able gifts;  his  plans  were  usually  profound  and  well 
laid  ;  no  general  of  the  Coalition  understood,  even 
nearly  as  well,  what  were  the  inherent  defects  of  the 
French  army,  and  how  it  could  be  encountered  and 
beaten  in  the  field.  And  his  project  of  defending 
Portugal  at  Torres  Vedras  was  a  masterpiece  ;  if  not 
wholly  original, it  was  magnificently  worked  out;  firm- 
ness of  purpose  and  force  of  character  in  war  have 
never  been  more  conspicuously  seen  than  when  he 
stood  on  this  rock  before  Lisbon  confronting  the  co- 
lossal might  of  Napoleon.  Wellington's  operations 
that  led  to  Vitoria  are  the  best  examples  of  his  combin- 
ations on  a  great  scale  in  the  field  ;  they  were  most 


378  Wellington 

ably  designed  ;  they  were  the  prelude  to  a  decisive 
victory.  And  as  we  look  back  at  the  Peninsular 
War,  and  at  the  vicissitudes  of  that  protracted  con- 
test, it  is  impossible  to  deny  that  the  British  com- 
mander was  the  principal  author  of  the  ultimate 
issue,  if  he  owed  much  to  the  discords  and  jealousies 
of  his  antagonists,  and  to  the  extravagance  to  be 
laid  to  the  charge  of  Napoleon  in  directing  opera- 
tions in  Spain  from  a  desk  in  Paris.  Justice,  too, 
should  be  done  to  the  skill  and  resource  shown  by 
Wellington  in  making  his  Peninsular  army  the  ad- 
mirable instrument  of  war  it  became,  and  in  fashion- 
ing his  Portuguese  and  Spanish  levies  into  disciplined 
and,  usually,  effective  soldiers.  On  the  whole,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  British  General  was  superior 
to  every  other  chief  of  the  League  of  Europe  in  the 
Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Wars  ;  this,  I  am 
convinced,  will  be  his  place  in  history.  Neverthe- 
less Wellington  cannot  rank  high  as  a  strategist ; 
here  he  is  not  even  to  be  named  with  Napoleon  ;  he 
was  hardly  the  equal  of  the  Archduke  Charles.  An 
attentive  examination  of  his  Peninsular  campaigns 
proves  that  he  made  many  grave  strategic  mistakes ; 
this  was  conspicuously  seen  in  the  Campaign  of  1 809  ; 
he  ought  not  to  have  fought  at  Busaco  ;  he  narrowly 
escaped  discomfiture  before  Salamanca.  Strategic- 
ally, too,  he  was  more  than  once  outmanoeuvred  in 
his  long  duel  with  Soult  along  the  Pyrenean  fron- 
tier ;  the  success  he  achieved  was  partly  due  to  his 
marked  superiority  in  the  shock  of  battle,  and  to  the 
qualities  of  his  Peninsular  army,  and  partly  to 
defects  in  the  qualities  of  his  opponents.     And   it 


Declining    Years — Death — Character     379 

is  simply  disregarding  palpable  truths  to  say  that, 
when  he  encountered  the  greatest  of  strategists,  he 
was  not  outgeneralled  almost  from  first  to  last, 
though  his  hand  was  certainly  forced  by  Bliicher, 
and  he  would  have  probably  acted  quite  differently 
but  for  his  impetuous  colleague. 

It  is  to  the  field  of  battle  that  we  have  to  repair  to 
see  the  best  qualities  of  Wellington  in  the  conduct 
of  war.  He  was  hardly  as  great  a  tactician  as  Marl- 
borough ;  he  did  not  achieve  anything  equal  to 
Blenheim  and  Ramillies.  Nor  did  he  ever  show  the 
genius  of  Frederick  the  Great  at  Leuthen  ;  but  he 
was  a  much  safer  and  more  prudent  commander  ;  he 
made  no  such  mistakes  as  were  made  at  Kolin  and 
Torgau.  But  whether  on  the  offensive  or  the  de- 
fensive,  and  especially  when  he  had  a  position  to 
Hold,  he  proved  himself  to  be  a  great  master  of 
tactics.  He  was  not  superior  at  Assaye  to  Clive  at 
Plassy  ;  but  in  boldly  attacking  he  took  the  right 
course ;  his  movements  in  battle  were  very  fine ; 
he, plucked  safety  and  victory  from  great  appar- 
ent danger.  His  passage  of  the  Douro,  under 
the  beard  of  Soult,  was  an  operation  of  admirable 
skill  and  resource :  had  he  been  properly  seconded 
the  distinguished  Marshal  would,  not  improbably, 
have  met  the  fate  of  Dupont  at  Baylen.  At  Tal- 
avera  he  rightly  made  a  resolute  stand  ;  he  might 
otherwise  have  lost  his  army  ;  and  he  inflicted  a 
severe  defeat  on  Joseph  and  Victor.  Fuentes 
d'Onoro  is  the  one  of  his  battles  in  which  his  powers 
are  least  distinctly  manifest;  he  acknowledged  him- 
self, that  he  ought  to  have  been  beaten  ;  but  probably 


-1 


8o  Wellington 


he  did  not  make  the  arrangements  before  the 
fight,  and  he  executed  admirably  a  most  difKicult 
change  of  front.  The  keenness  of  his  insight,  and 
his  remarkable  gift  of  turning  to  account  a  mistake 
made  by  an  adversary  on  the  field,  were  grandly 
conspicuous  at  Salamanca  ;  he  gained  a  great  victory 
by  a  tactical  stroke  ;  this,  Napier  has  written,  was 
the  most  brilliant  of  his  offensive  efforts.  Few  pas- 
sages of  war  are  of  more  striking  interest  than  the 
prolonged  struggle  between  Wellington  and  Soult 
on  the  Pyrenees,  before  Bayonne,  at  Orthes,  at 
Toulouse;  the  fine  combinations  of  the  French  Mar- 
shal were  baffled,  over  and  over  again,  by  the  ac- 
tivity, the  coup  d'ceil,  the  brilliant  movements  of  the 
British  commander  in  the  actual  stress  of  battle. 
And,  not  to  speak  of  his  stern  constancy,  perhaps 
never  more  magnificently  displayed,  Wellington 
gave  proof  of  the  very  highest  capacity  and  military 
skill  on  the  great  day  of  Waterloo  ;  he  showed  that, 
as  a  tactician,  he  was  a  master  of  his  art,  in  the  gen- 
eral arrangement  of  his  army  on  the  ground  ;  in 
husbanding  his  reserves  to  the  latest  moment ;  in 
screening  his  troops  from  the  destructive  fire  of  the 
artillery  which  gave  Napoleon  so  many  triumphs  ; 
and,  finally,  in  attacking  when  he  saw  that  the  day 
was  won.  His  conduct  of  Waterloo  is  his  real  title 
to  eulogy  in  the  Campaign  of  1815;  it  is  a  legiti- 
mate set-off  to  no  doubtful  strategic  errors. 

Wellington,  to  a  very  considerable  extent  at  least, 
made  his  Peninsular  army  what  it  became,  the  best 
army  in  Europe  for  its  size.  His  military  adminis- 
tration, during  the  many  years  when  he  held  the 


THE  DUKE  OF  WELLINGTON. 
(From  a  steel  engraving.) 


Declining    Years — Death — CJiaracter     381 

post  of  Commander-in-Chief,  is  hardly  entitled  to 
high  praise.  There  is  something  in  the  system  of 
war  established  in  England  which  makes  her  forces 
inefficient  in  time  of  peace  ;  this  has  been  seen  from 
the  Peace  of  Utrecht  to  the  South  African  War. 
Wellington  did  not  attempt  to  make  reforms  in  the 
army,  of  which  he  was  the  head  ;  he  allowed  it  to 
exist  in  the  routine  of  the  past ;  he  did  not  try  to 
improve  its  quality.  He  had  the  highest  opinion  of 
the  British  officer ;  but  he  did  not  lay  stress  on  his 
professional  knowledge  ;  his  idea  was  that  he  should 
be  able  to  lead  his  men  and  to  fight.  He  thought 
the  non-commissioned  officers  the  backbone  of  the 
army ;  but  he  hardly  sought  to  improve  their 
condition  ;  he  regarded  the  great  body  of  the  Brit- 
ish soldiers  as  excellent  troops  when  under  severe 
discipline,  but  prone  to  drunkenness  and  degrading 
vices ;  he  protested  against  the  abolition  or  the 
mitigation  of  the  barbarities  of  the  lash.  But  where 
he  was  most  deficient  in  chief  command  was  that 
he  would  not  recognise  the  manifold  changes 
which  the  progress  of  the  age  and  material  inven- 
tions were  making  in  all  that  relates  to  war ;  and 
that  he  would  not  adapt  the  British  army  to  the  re- 
quirements of  the  time.  He  would  not  hear  of  a 
short-service  system,  or  of  the  formation  of  a  re- 
serve ;  Brown  Bess,  in  his  eyes,  was  a  perfect  weapon; 
he  thought  rifled  guns  and  field  shells  of  very  little 
value.  But  in  this  conservatism,  it  may  fairly  be 
said,  he  trod  in  the  footsteps  of  the  chiefs  of  the 
Continental  armies  ;  Soult  and  Paskievitch  clung  to 
the  traditions  of  the  past,  in  which  they  had  been 


382  Wellington 

trained  and  had  learned  war  ;  Moltke  alone — then  an 
unknown  subaltern — had  perceived  what  the  future 
could  effect  for  the  military  art.  Yet  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  suppose  that,  as  Commander-in-Chief, 
Wellington  did  not  do  England  great  and  patri- 
otic service.  From  an  early  period  he  saw  how,  as 
has  always  happened,  British  statesmen,  under  the 
influence  of  a  prolonged  peace,  were  allowing  the 
army  to  be  dangerously  reduced  in  strength,  and 
how  the  defences  of  the  country  were  being  ne- 
glected. When  in  the  Cabinet  of  Peel  he  entreated 
that  the  subject  should  be  considered  with  care,  and 
that  the  military  power  of  the  nation  should  be  in- 
creased. But  the  time  was  one  of  economic  reform 
and  retrenchment ;  the  warnings  of  the  great  veteran 
were  but  little  heeded.  His  celebrated  letter  to  Sir 
John  Burgoyne,  written  just  before  the  tornado  of 
1848,  showed  how  insecure  was  the  position  of  Eng- 
land, and  how  exposed  to  foreign  invasion  ;  it  had 
a  decisive  effect  on  the  national  mind  ;  despite  too 
long  intervals  of  thoughtlessness  and  neglect,  the 
country  has  never  since  been  so  completely  unpre- 
pared for  war.  It  should  be  added  that  Wellington 
lived  to  see  an  increase  of  the  militia  force,  a  re- 
form he  had  always  had  at  heart,  made  by  the  first 
administration  of  Lord  Derby,  in  1852. 

Apart  from  his  brief  apprenticeship  in  the  Irish 
Parliament,  the  political  life  of  Wellington  extended 
over  a  third  of  a  century.  He  can  hardly  be  called 
a  great  statesman  ;  but  no  eminent  English  soldier 
has  ever  given  proof  of  such  statesmanlike  qualities  ; 
here   he   was   by   many  degrees   superior  to   Marl- 


Declming    Years — Death — Character     383 

borough,  consummate  in  diplomacy,  but  not  in  poli- 
tics. If  we  recollect  that  he  belonged  to  the 
Protestant  noblesse  of  Ireland,  an  exclusive  oligarchy 
of  race  and  creed  ;  that  he  did  not  enter  the  Cabinet 
until  he  was  nearly  fifty  ;  that  he  had  been  in  com- 
mand abroad  for  a  series  of  years,  and  that  his 
knowledge  of  England  was  comparatively  small,  it 
appears  surprising  that  his  political  distinction  was 
what  it  was,  and  that  he  did  so  much  as  a  civil  serv- 
ant of  the  State.  The  secret  is  to  be  found  in  his 
wisdom  and  well-balanced  judgment,  and  in  his  noble 
sense  of  public  duty  ;  it  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
besides,  that  in  _India,  in  the  Peninsula,  even  in 
France,  he  had  to  play  a  remarkable  part  in  political 
affairs.  His  antecedents  and  the  associations  of  his 
career  connected  him  with  the  Tory  party  ;  but  he 
was  usually  a  moderate  and  fair-minded  Tory;  he 
had  nothing  in  common  with  the  school  of  the  ex- 
treme followers  of  Pitt.  And  hence  it  was  that,  as 
a  general  rule,  he  adapted  himself  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  time  ;  seldom  resisted  measures  he 
foresaw  were  required  ;  was,  like  Peel,  a  Conservative 
in  the  truest  sense  of  the  word.  His  two  greatest 
achievements  in  the  sphere  of  politics  were  the 
emancipation  of  the  Irish  Catholics  in  IJ2Q,  and  his 
conduct  in  opposition  from  1833  to  1841  ;  he  ' 
accomplished  a  great  reform  most  unjustly  delayed, 
and  no  one  else  could  have  carried  it  out  at  the 
time;  he  gradually  restored  the  balance  of  parties  in 
the  State,  with  the  skilful  and  admirable  assistance 
of  Peel,  and  secured  for  a  great  Conservative  states- 
man   a    decisive   triumph.      Wellington,   no    doubt, 


■t 


84  Wellington 


made  grave  political  mistakes ;  he  rather  discredited 
himself  when  he  broke  with  Canning;  he  was  too 
much  of  a  dictator  when  Prime  Minister  ;  he  did  not 
rightly  interpret  the  signs  of  the  time ;  his  stubborn 
resistance  to  the  Reform  Bill  cannot  be  justified. 
But  he  sincerely  believed  that  Parliamentary  reform 
was  incompatible  with  the  ideal  he  had  ever  be- 
fore him,  "  that  the  King's  Government  must  be  a 
strong  government";  and  with  many  of  the  ablest 
men  in  the  country  he  was  convinced  that  reform 
would  be  fatal  to  the  State.  For  the  re&t,~Welling^ 
ton  in  politics,  as  in  all  his  public  conduct,  was 
animated  by  a,£atriotism  always,  in  the  long  run, 
acknowledged  ;  it  was  this  that  gave  him  such  weight 
in  the  national  councils. 

Wellington  was  not  an  orator  or  a  graceful  public 
speaker,  but,  like  men  of  powerful  and  clear  intellect, 
he  always  managed  to  convey  his  meaning  to  an 
audience  he  addressed  ;  not  a  few  of  his  sayings 
were  epigrammatic,  and  made  a  strong  impression. 
The  enormous  mass  of  his  despatches  on  military  and 
civil  affairs  giv^  us  a  striking  idea  of  his  great 
capacity  ;  they  are  very  superior  to  those  of  Marl- 
borough ;  they  are  written  in  a  simple  and  admirable 
style,  which  perfectly  express^the  writer's  thoughts ; 
occasionally  they  contain  terse  and  happy  phrases. 
The  Duke  was  an  excellent  country  gentleman  ;  as  a 
landlord  he  was  just  and  considerate  ;  he  was,  more- 
over, a  diligent  man  of  business ;  his  estate  of 
Strathfieldsaye,  one  of  the  gifts  of  the  nation, 
would,  he  used  to  say,  have  been  ruinous  to  any 
other  owner ;  yet  he  contrived  to  make  it  pay,  and 


Declining    Years — DeatJi — Character     385 

he  greatly  improved   it.      He  was  fond  of  the  chase 
and  other  rural  pursuits  ;  men  still  living  remember 
the  spare  figure  in  scarlet  crossing  steadily,  but  hardly 
skilfully,  a  somewhat  difficult  country.     The  Duke 
was  seen  at  his  best  in  the  social  hour,  at  festive 
gatherings  in  great  country  houses  ;  he  had  real  en- 
joyment in   these ;  he  was  occasionally  induced   to 
talk  of  his  campaigns ;  his  anecdotes   and  remarks, 
as  we  know  from  Greville,  Avcre  always  interesting, 
sometimes    of   the   greatest  value.     He    necessarily 
filled  a  conspicuous  place  in  the  world   of  London ; 
for  many  years  his  surviving  companions  in  arms 
assembled  at  his  board  at  the  Waterloo  banquets  ; 
he  was  a  constant  and   most   favoured  guest  of  his 
sovereign  ;  the  aristocracy  of  all  parties  vied  to  do 
him  honour.     Yet  he  appears  to  have  been  less  at 
home  in    London   than   among   his   friends   in   the 
country  ;  in  truth,  he  had  so  much  official  work  to  do 
that  he  had  but  little  time  for  what  is  called  society. 
As  I  have  said,  he  was  not  happy  in  his  domestic 
life  ;  his  wife  was  hardly  a  fitting  helpmeet ;  he  stood 
rather  aloof  from  his  immediate  family  ;  his  home 
was  not  blessed   by  devoted   affection.     Though  he 
was  really  attached  to  a  few  friends,  he  was  lonely, 
honoured  and  revered  as  he  was  ;  he  never  attracted 
profound    human    sympathy;    this   was   one    of  his 
defects  as  a  chief ;  he  was  respected  by  his  officers 
and    soldiers,  never  loved.     His  correspondence,  as 
may  be  supposed,  was  immense  ;  he  was  punctual 
and  precise  in  attending  to  it ;  his  replies  to  imperti- 
nent and  frivolous  letters,  which  came  in  in  thousands, 
were  to  the   point  and  often  very  amusing.     As  we 

25 


386 


Wellington 


look  back  at  that  long  and  glorious  career  of  renown 
in  arms  and  civic  virtue,  we  feel  that  the  poet  has 
written  the  truth  of  Wellington  : 

"  Rich  in  saving  common  sense 
And  as  the  greatest  only  are, 
In  his  simplicity  sublime. 
O  good  gray  head  which  all  men  knew, 
O  voice  from  which  their  omens  all  men  drew, 
O  iron  nerve  to  true  occasion  true, 
O  fall'n  at  length  that  tower  of  strength 
Which  stood  four  square  to  all  the  winds  that  blew! " 


INDEX 


Aberdeen,    Lord,    contrasted 

with  Palmerston,  368 
Albuera,  battle  of,  151 
Alexander,  Czar,  conduct  of, 
dtiring     Napoleon's    inva- 
sion of  Russia,  189,  192 
Almeida,  taken  by  Masscna, 
117;   besieged  by  Welling- 
ton, 130,  133,  136 
■  Aspem,  reverse  of  Napoleon 

at,  90 
Assaye,  battle  of,  36-38 
Austria,   attitude  of,  toward 
France    after    Portuguese 
Campaign,  140 


B 


Badajoz,  besieged  and  taken 
by  Soult,  128,  131;  siege 
of,  abandoned  by  Beres- 
ford,  150;  siege  of,  re- 
newed by  Wellington  152; 
description  of,  153;  meet- 
ing of  Soult  and  Marmont 
at,  153;  Soult  and  Mar- 
mont decline  battle  with 
Wellington  at,  154;  be- 
sieged for  the  third  time 
and  taken  by  Wellington, 
164-169 

Baird,  General,  supplanted 
by     Wellington     m     com- 


mand of  the  Army  of  the 
Nizam,  22;  victorious  at 
the  siege  of  Scringapatam, 
2  5 ;  supplanted  by  Wel- 
lington as  Governor  of 
Scringapatam,  27;  sent  to 
Egypt  mstead  of  WclHng- 
ton,  30 

Bautzen,  battle  of,  194 

Baylen,  battle  of,  56 

Beauharnais,  Eugene,  Com- 
mander of  remnant  of 
Grand  Army  after  retreat 
from  Moscow,  192 

Belgium,  revolution  in,  342 

Bcntinck,  Lord  WiUiam,  su- 
perseded Murray,  227 

Beresford,  siege  of  Badajoz 
by,  150;  raised  siege  of 
Badajoz,  150;  battle  of 
Albuera,  151;  battle  of 
Toulouse,  251,  252 

Bessicres,  Marshal,  rein- 
forced Masscna  in  Spain, 
133;  conduct  at  battle  of 
Fucntes  d'Onoro,  136; 
guarding  territory  between 
France  and  Madrid,  148 

Bliicher,  Prince,  weakness  of 
France  perceived  by,  in 
181 1,  140;  battle  of  Sois- 
sons,  247;  battle  of  Ligny, 
273-278;  operations  of 
June  17,  18 1 5,  291;  battle 
of     Waterloo,     301,     302; 


387 


sss 


Index 


Bliicher — Cont'd 

invaded  France  with  Wel- 
lington, 308 ;  advance  of, 
into  France,  312;  before 
Paris,  313;  prevented  from 
destroying  bridge  on  the 
Seine,  316 

Borodino,  battle  of,  189 

Bourmont,  treachery  of,  265 

Bulow,  General  von,  battle 
of  Waterloo,  296-304 

Burgos,  successfully  defended 
against  Wellington,  180, 
181 

Burrard,  General,  at  Vi- 
meiro,  66 

Busaco,  battle  of,  11 9-1 2  2 


Caffarelli,  General,  succeeded 
Dorsenne  in  command  of 
army  of  the  North,  171 

Canning,  George,  policy  of, 
320;  distrusted  by  Welling- 
ton, 328;  administration  as 
Prime  Minister,  329,  330; 
advocate  of  Catholic  Cause, 
death,  330 

Cantillon,  Napoleon's  legacy 
to.  317 

Caroline,  Queen,  trial  of,  320 

Castlereagh,  Lord,  replaced 
by  Wellington  in  Vienna 
Assembly,  257 

Catholic  Emancipation  Bill 
carried,  337;  significance 
ot  338-340 

Charles  IV.  of  Spain,  abdica- 
tion of,  54 

Chartism,  failure  of,  372 

Ciudad  Rodrigo,  fall  of,  116; 
blockaded  by  Wellington, 
155;  taken  by  Wellington, 
160 

Cintra,  Convention  of,  67 

Clare  election,  335 

Clausel,  Gen.,  at  battle  of 
Salamanca,  176,  177;  ral- 
lied forces  after  Salamanca, 


179;  with  Joseph  Bona- 
parte in  1813,  203;  battle 
of  Orthes,  243,  244 

Coimbra,  taken  by  Massena, 
123 

Conservatives,  new  name  for 
Tories,  354 

Copenhagen,  siege  of,  50 

Corunna,  victory  of  Moore 
over  Soult  at.  77 

Craddock,  Sir  John,  in  Lis- 
bon, 81 

Crawford,  Lieutenant,  at  bat- 
tle of  Busaco,  121;  killed 
at  siege  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
161 

Cuesta,  Gen.,  colleague  of 
Wellesley  in  advance  up 
the  Tagus  Valley,  90 ;  esti- 
mate of,  9 1 ;  battle  of  Tala- 
vera,  94-97 


D 


Dalrymple,  Gen.,  at  Conven- 
tion of  Cintra,  67 

D'Angouleme,  Due,  rising 
against  Napoleon  organ- 
ised by,  246 

Davout,  Minister  of  War,  at- 
titude of,  in  regard  to  de- 
fence of  Paris,  311 

D'Erlon,  Gen.,  reinforced 
Massena,  128;  at  battle  of 
Fuentes  d'Onoro,  136;  at 
battles  of  the  Pyrenees, 
221-224:  conduct  of,  on 
June  15,  181 5,  265;  battle 
of  Ligny,  273-278;  battle 
of  Quatre  Bras,  278-281; 
battle    of   Waterloo,    296- 

304 

Dhoondia  Waugh,  defeat  of, 
29 

Disraeli,  Benjamin,  opponent 
of  Peel,  368;  brilliantly  de- 
nounced Peel  for  his  at- 
tem-pt  to  establish  free 
trade  in  com.  370 


Index 


;S9 


Dorsenne,  General,  successor 
to  Bessieres,  in  command  of 
French  anny  in  the  North, 
148;  responsible  for  loss  of 
Ciudad  Rodrigo,  162;  suc- 
ceeded by  Caffarelli  in 
command  of  army  of  the 
North,  171 

Douro,  crossing  of,  by  Wel- 
lesley,  86 

Dresden,  entry  of  Napoleon 
in  triumph,  194;  battle  of, 
229 

Dubreton,  commandant  at 
Burgos,  180 


E 


El  Bod  on,  escape  of  Welling- 
ton from  Marmont  at,  157 

England,  condition  of.  after 
Wellington's  campaign  in 
Portugal,  148;  conditions 
in,  on  return  of  Wellington 
from  France,  318-323 

.Espinosa,  victory  of  Napol- 
eon over  Spanish  at,  75 


Ferdinand,  acknowledged  as 
King  of  Spain  by  Na- 
poleon, 241 

Fitzgerald,  Vesey,  appointed 
to  the  Board  of  Trade,  334 

Fouch^,  intrigue  of,  against 
Napoleon,  309;  made  head 
of  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, 310;  plans  of,  for 
the  restoration  of  Louis 
XVIII.,  311;  council  called 
by,  to  consider  defence  of 
Paris,  311;  negotiations  of, 
with  Allies,  311;  restora- 
tion of  Louis  XVIII.,  314 

Foy ,  General ,  sent  by  Massena 
on  mission  to  Napoleon, 
125,  127;  with  Joseph 
Bonaparte    at     battle    of 


Vitoria,  205 ;  at  battles  of 
the  Pyrenees,  223 

France,  discontent  in,  after 
failure  of  French  campaign 
in  Portugal,  141;  fall  of 
Bourbon  dynasty,  Duke  of 
Orleans,  made  king,  342 

Fuentes  d'Onoro,  battle  of, 
133-136 


Gazan,  General,  at  battle  of 
Vitoria,  207,  208 

George  IV.,  representative  of 
life  of  ruling  classes,  319; 
influenced  by  Wellington, 
328 ;  opposition  of,  to  Cath- 
olic Emancipation,  336; 
death,  343 

Gerard,  condvict,  on  June  15, 
18 1 5,  265;  battle  of  Ligny, 
273-278 

Germany,  attitude  of,  toward 
France  after  Portuguese 
campaign,  140 

Gladstone,  W.  E.,  rising 
lieutenant  under  Peel,  369 

Gnciscnau,  Field  Marshal 
Count,  lack  of  sympathy 
■wath  Wellington  before 
Waterloo,  295 

Goderich,  Lord,  Government 

of,  330 

Godoy,  favorite  of  Charles 
IV.  of  Spain.  54 

Gough,  Viscount,  defeated  at 
Chillian walla,  372 

Grahain.  Lieut.,  in  command 
of  Wellington's  left  wing  in 
18 1 3,  201;  at  siege  of  San 
Sebastian.  225 

Grey,  Lord,  leader  of  Whigs, 
speech  of  for  reform,  344; 
made  Prime  Minister  with 
Whig  administration,  346; 
resignation  of,  350;  return 
of  his  administration  to 
power,  350;  second  resig- 
nation of,  355 


390 


Index 


Grouchy,  Marshal,  opera- 
tions of,  before  Waterloo, 
294,  295;  battle  of  Water- 
loo, 296-304;  retreat  from 
Wavre  to  Givet,  309;  in 
Paris,  313 

H 


Hanau,  battle  of,  230 

Hardinge,  Lieut. -Col.  Sir 
Henry,  relief  of  Beresford 
at  Albuera  by,  151;  praised 
by  Wellington  for  exploits 
in  India,  372 

Hill,  Field  Marshal  Viscount, 
lieutenant  of  Wellington  in 
Portugal,  116;  at  battle  of 
Busaco,  1 19-122  ;  detached 
to  lay  siege  to  Badajoz, 
150;  destruction  of  bridge 
at  Almaraz  by,  170;  at 
battle  of  Vitoria,  208-210; 
battle  of  Orthes,  243,  244; 
battle  of  Toulouse,  251, 
252;  appointed  Comman- 
der-in-Chief, 333;  retire- 
ment of,  365 

Httndred  Days,  the  259;  close 
of  the,  309 

Huskisson,  Mr.,  resignation 
of,  accepted  by  WelHng- 
ton,  333 


India,  condition  of,  in  1798, 
16—22 

Ireland,  condition  of,  in 
1807,  45;  state  of,  from 
1818-1821,  321-323;  grave 
disturbances  in,  335;  Cath- 
olic Emancipation  Bill  car- 
ried, 337;  serious  outbreak 
in  1833,  354 

Irish  CathoHc  Relief  Bill  of 
1793.  6 


Joseph  Bonaparte  made  King 
of  Spain,  55;  evacuated 
Madrid,  56;  battle  of  Tala- 
vera,  94-97;  retreated  to 
Madrid,  97;  government 
of,  in  Spain,  143;  abdica- 
tion of,  143;  persuaded  by 
Napoleon  to  return  to 
Madrid,  146;  in  command 
of  Army  of  the  Centre, 
148;  conduct  after  Sala- 
manca, escape  from  Mad- 
rid, 178;  re-entered  Ma- 
drid, Nov.  2,  181 2,  182; 
retreat  of,  before  Welling- 
ton in  May,  1813,  202-204; 
battle  of  Vitoria,  210;  dis- 
graced by  Napoleon  after 
Vitoria,  211 

Jourdan,  Gen.,  battle  of  Tala- 
vcra,  94-97;  with  Joseph 
Bonaparte  in  181 3,  203; 
before  battle  of  Vitoria, 
207 

Junot,  Gen.,  march  of, 
against  Lisbon,  52;  con- 
duct of,  in  Lisbon,  60;  de- 
feated at  Vimiero,  66;  at 
battle  of  Busaco,  1 19-122, 
relations  with  Massena; 
133 

K 

Khyber  Pass,  tragedy  of,  363 
Kutusoff,   Russian  comman- 
der during  invasion  of  Na- 
poleon, I 89-1 9 I 


Lafayette,  intrigues  of,  for 
the  deposition  of  Napoleon, 
310 

Lake,  Lord,  operations  of, 
against  the  Mahrattas,  39 


Index 


391 


Lapisse,  General,  colleague  of 
Victor  and  Soiilt  in  Spain ,  7  g 

Leipzig,  battle  of.  229 

Leith,  General,  lieutenant  of 
Wellington  in  Portugal, 
116;  at  battle  of  Busaco, 
1 19—122 

Ligny,  battle  of,  273-278 

Liverpool,  Lord,  insisted  on 
Wellington's  recall  to  Eng- 
land, 256;  recommenda- 
tions of,  for  the  reduction 
of  Frarice,  315 

Lobau,  General,  at  battle  of 
Waterloo,  298 

Loison,  General,  in  command 
of    a   division    at    Bvisaco, ' 
121;    given    command    of 
Ney.  133 

Louis  XVIIL,  joined  Wel- 
lington,    312;    restoration 

of,  314 
Lutzen,  battle  of,  194 

M 

Macdonald,    Marshal,    defeat 

of,  on  the  Katzbach,  229 
Mahratta  War,  32-40 
Malo   laroslavetz,   battle   of, 

190 
Marie  Louise,  Empress,  107 
Marmont,  Marshal,  at  Sala- 
manca reorganising  Mas- 
sena's  army,  148;  joined 
Soult  at  Badajoz,  153;  de- 
clined battle  with  Welling- 
ton, 154;  failed  to  attack 
Wellington  at  El  Bod  on, 
157;  policy  of,  after  fall  of 
Ciudad  Rodrigo.  162;  pol- 
icy of,  after  fall  of  Badajoz, 
172;  estimate  of,  by  French 
soldiery,  173;  defeated  at 
battle  of  Salamanca,  176, 
177 
Massena,  Marshal,  m  com- 
mand of  expedition  against 
Portugal,  115;  estimate  of, 


116;  advance  of,  into  Por- 
tugal, 117;  defeat  of  at 
Busaco,  1 19-122;  estimate 
of  his  generalship  in  cam- 
paign in  Portugal,  125,  137; 
retreat  from  Portugal,  129, 
130;  defeat  at  Sabugal, 
130:  defeated  at  Fuentes 
d'Onoro,  133-136;  sup- 
planted by  Marmont,  137; 
refused  to  take  field  in 
Southern  France,  180; 
placed  by  Fouche  at  the 
head  of  the  National  Guard 
of  Paris,  311 

Medellin,  defeat  of  the  Span- 
ish at,  79 

Melbourne,  Lord,  made  Prime 
Minister,  355;  induced  to 
resign,  355;  restored  to 
office,  356;  second  resig- 
nation of,  362;  returned 
to  power  as  result  of  Palace 
intrigvie,  362;  fall  of  gov- 
ernment of,  364 

Mettemich,  chief  power  in 
Austria  in  181 1,  140;  dip- 
lomacy of,  during  Na- 
poleon's campaign  against 
Prussia,  195;  interview 
with  Napoleon  in  181 3,  213 

Moira,  Lord,  in  the  campaign 
of  1794  in  Holland,  10-12 

Moore,  General,  sent  to  Por- 
tugal, 58;  campaign  of,  in 
Spain,  74-79;  victory  of 
Corunna,  death.  77 

Momington,  Earl  of,  father 
of  Wellington,  2 

Momington,  Lady,  mother  of 
Wellington.  3 

Momington,  Richard  Welles- 
ley,  Earl  of,  l)rothcr  of 
Wellington,  see  Wellesley, 
Richard,  Marquis 

Moscow,  burning  of,  190 

Murat.  Gen.,  Governor  of 
Madrid,  5.J  ;  King  of  Naples 
55;  entrusted  by  Napoleon 


392 


Index 


Murat — Cont'd 

with  command  of  invalided 
troops  at  Smorgone,  191; 
treason  of,  240 

Murray,  Sir  John,  detached 
by  Wellington  to  cross 
Douro,  87;  forced  to  raise 
the  siege  of  Tarragona, 
217;  superseded  by  Lord 
William  Bentinck,  227 

Mysore,  settlement  of,  28 


N 


Napoleon  Bonaparte,  birth, 
I ;  in  Egypt,  16;  resolved 
upon  invasion  of  Portugal, 
5  2 ;  extorted  Crown  of 
Spain  from  Spanish  Bour- 
bons, 54;  reverses  of,  in 
Spain,  56;  interview  with 
the  Czar  at  Erfurt,  7  2 ;  in- 
vaded Spain,  75;  victories 
of  Espinosa  and  Tudela, 
75-76;  second  triumphal 
entry  into  Vienna,  90;  re- 
verse at  Aspem,  90;  vic- 
tory at  Wagram,  103; 
supreme  on  the  Continent, 
104;  error  in  not  conduct- 
ing Peninsular  Campaign 
in  person,  106-108;  prepa- 
rations for  campaign 
against  Portugal,  115;  di- 
rected campaign  in  Portu- 
gal, 127;  prepared  for 
Russian  campaign ,  132; 
Continent  aroused  to  ac- 
tion against,  as  a  result 
of  Wellington's  Portuguese 
campaign,  140;  national 
apathy  on  birth  of  son  to, 
141;  policy  of,  after  re- 
verses in  Portugal  and 
Spain,  144;  invasion  of 
Russia,  188-192;  conduct 
after  Russian  disaster,  1 93  ; 
battle  of  Lutzen,  entry  into 
Dresden,    battle   of   Baut- 


zen, 1 94 ;  armistice  of  Pleis- 
nitz,  196;  policy  for  ending 
war  in  Peninsula,  198,  199; 
estimate  of  power  of,  after 
Vitoria,  214;  battle  of 
Dresden,  229;  battle  of 
Leipzig,  229;  victories  of 
Vauchamps,  Montmirail, 
Montereau,  247;  reverses 
of  Laon  and  Arcis-sur- 
Aube,  248;  fall  of  Paris, 
249;  abdication  of,  249; 
escape  from  Elba,  257; 
march  from  Grenoble  to 
Paris,  258;  offered  to  ac- 
cept settlement  of  the 
Continent  made  at  Vienna, 
260;  military  preparations 
of  181 5,  260-264;  plans  for 
June  15,  1815,  265;  gained 
advantage,  266;  battle  of 
Ligny,  273-278;  estimate 
of  position  after  Quatre 
Bras,  282;  state  of  health 
before  Waterloo,  284; 
operations  of  June  17th, 
181 5,  285-292;  battle  of 
Waterloo,  296-304;  tribute 
to  English  soldiery,  304; 
treachery  of  Fouche,  309 ; 
end  of  the  Hundred  Days, 
309;  second  abdication  of, 
310;  at  Malmaison,  312; 
sent  captive  to  St.  Helena, 
310;  return  of  his  ashes 
from  St.  Helena,  360 
Ney,  Marshal,  colleague  of 
Soult,  in  Spain,  79;  battle 
of  Busaco,  1 19-122;  battle 
of  Redinha,  129;  deprived 
of  command  by  Massena, 
130;  brave  defence  of  the 
rear  in  retreat  from  Mos- 
cow, 191;  at  Dennewitz, 
229;  failure  of,  on  June 
15th  and  i6th,  1815,  270; 
battle  of  Quatre  Bras,  278- 
281;  battle  of  Waterloo, 
300;  execution  of,  318 


Index 


o9j 


O 

O'Connell,  Daniel,  efforts  of, 
for      Ireland,      322,      323; 
Catholic  Association  found- 
ed     by,       327;      opposed 
Fitzgerald    at    Clare    elec- 
tion, 334;  triumph  of,  335; 
angered  by  coercive  meas- 
ures   towards    Irish,    354; 
attitude    of,    in    House    of 
Commons,     358;       Repeal 
movement  of  1843,  367 
Oporto,  taken  by  Soult,  79 
Orthes,  battle  of,  243,  244 
Oudinot,    Marshal,    defeated 
near  Berlin,  229 


Pakenham.  Gen.,  brother-in- 
law  of  Wellington,  at  bat- 
tle of  Salamanca,  175,  176 

Palmerston,  Lord,  resigna- 
tion from  Wellington's 
■Cabinet,  333;  successful 
policy  in  the  East,  363; 
disliked  by  Queen  and  her 
Consort,  371 

Paris,  fall  of,  248 

Parliamentary  Reform  Bill, 
attempts  to  pass,  failed 
three  times,  350;  passage 
and  effects  of,  351 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  sympathy 
of  Wellington  with,  328; 
with  Wellington  advocated 
Catholic  Emancipation  in 
Ireland,  336;  made  Prime 
Minister,  356;  able  conduct 
of,  356;  resignation  of,  356; 
estrangement  with  Well- 
ington, 358;  installed  as 
Prime  Minister,  but  forced 
out  at  once  by  Palace  in- 
trigue, 362;  entire  recon- 
ciliation with  Wellington, 
364;  for  second  time  Prime 
Minister,  3C4;  difiliculties  of 


his  second  administration, 
366;  the  great  apostle  of 
Free  Trade  367  ;  ascendency 
weakened  by  Free-Trade 
policy,  368;  proposed  sus- 
pension of  Com  Laws  to 
relieve  Irish  famine  of 
1845,  369;  second  resig- 
nation of,  370;  returned 
to  ofhce  owing  to  Lord 
Russell's  inability  to  form 
government,  370;  excited 
great  opposition  by  at- 
tempting to  establish  free 
trade  in  com,  370;   death, 

371 
Philippon,  defender  of  Bada- 

joz,  153;  escape  of,  at  fall 

of  Badajoz,  169 

Pius  VII.,  Napoleon  excom- 
municated by,  141;  con- 
cessions wrung  from,  by 
Napoleon,  144 

Portugal,  rising  of,  against 
the  French,  57 

Prague,  Congress  of,  213 

Provisional  Government  of 
France,  proclamations  of, 
310 

Pyrenees,  battles  of,  221-224 

Q 

Quatre  Bras,  battle  of,  278- 
281 

R 

Redinha,  battle  of,  129 
Reille,  General,  with  Joseph 
Bonaparte,  in  June,  1813, 
205;  at  battle  of  Vitoria, 
208-210;  at  battles  of  the 
Pyrenees,  222,  223;  battle 
of  Toulouse,  251,  252;  bat- 
tle of  Ligny,  273-278 
Reynier,  General,  battle  of 
Busaco,  iig-122;  relations 
with  Massena,  133;  at  bat- 
tle of  Fuentes  d'Onoro,  136 


394 


Index 


Rolica,  battle  of,  62 

Russell,  Lord  John,  first  Re- 
form Bill,  introduced  by, 
350;  advocated  repeal  of 
Com  Laws,  369;  failed  in 
attempt  to  fonn  govern- 
ment, 370;  administration 

of,  371 
Russia,    attitude   of,    toward 
France     after     Portuguese 
campaign,  140 


Sabugal,  battle  of,  130 
Saint  Helena,  visited  by  Wel- 
lington,  43 ;  Napoleon  ex- 
iled to,  310 
Salamanca,  battle  of,  176 
San  Sebastian,  siege  of,  224- 

226 
Schamhorst,  Lieut.  Gen.  von, 
policy     of,    to     strengthen 
Prussian  army,  140 
Schwartzenberg,    Gen.,    con- 
duct of,  on  failure  of  Rus- 
sian invasion,    192;  battle 
of  Arcis-sur-Avibe,  248 
Seringapatam,  fall  of,  25 
Smolensk,  battle  of,  189 
Souham,  General,  in  pixrsuit 
of    Wellington    in   retreat 
from   Burgos,    183;    joined 
by  Joseph,  183 
Soult,    Marshal,   left  by  Na- 
poleon in  charge  of  Span- 
ish campaign,  defeated  by 
Moore     at     Corunna,     77; 
siege   of  Oporto,    79;   esti- 
mate    of,     8  2 ;     compelled 
to    abandon     Oporto,    86; 
placed    in    supreme    com- 
mand in  Spain,  92;    delay 
in      reinforcing      Massena, 
128;  in  Andalusia,  149;  de- 
feated   at    Albuera,     151; 
joined  Marmont  at  Bada- 
joz,    153;    declined    battle 
with  Wellington,  154;  pol- 


icy of.  at  time  of  fall  of 
Badajoz,  169;  recalled 
from  Spain,  197;  sent  by 
Napoleon  to  try  to  repair 
disaster  of  Vitoria,  211; 
invested  with  plenary  pow- 
ers for  reorganising  French 
armies  after  Vitoria,  217; 
estimate  of  ability  of,  218; 
battles  of  the  Pyrenees, 
221-224;  attempt  of,  to 
relieve  San  Sebastian,  226; 
preparations  against  Wel- 
lington, 230,  231;  difficul- 
ties in  Spain  in  1814,  240; 
battle  of  Orthes,  243,  244; 
estimate  of,  after  battle  of 
Orthes,  245;  battle  of  Tou- 
louse, 251,  252;  compared 
with  Wellington,  after 
Toulouse,  253,  254;  made 
chief  of  French  staff,  269; 
present  at  coronation  of 
Queen  Victoria,  361 

Spain,  rising  of,  against  Na- 
poleon, 55    _ 

Suchet,  Gen.,  in  command  in 
Aragon,  148;  conduct  of, 
in  Spain,  149;  Tarragona 
taken  by,  158;  created 
duke  of  Albufera,  181;  op- 
portunity of,  to  attack 
Wellington  after  Vitoria, 
217;  failure  to  act  with 
Soult,  231 


Talavera,    battle    of,    94-97; 

indignation  of  Napoleon  at 

battle  of,  100 
Talleyrand,    made    guardian 

of  Spanish  royal  family,  54 
Tamworth  Manifesto,  356 
Tarragona,  taken  bv  Suchet, 

158 
Test  and  Corporation  Acts, 
repealed,  333 


Index 


395 


Tippoo  Sahib,  plotting 
against  British  rule  in 
India,  15;  defeated  and 
killed  at  the  fall  of  Serin- 
gapatam,  25;  indemnity 
paid  to  the  sons  of,  28 
Toulouse,  battle  of,  251,  252 
Tudela,  victory  of  Napoleon 
over  Spanish  at,  76 

U 

United  States,  War  of  18 12 
between  England  and,  187 


Valenda,  taken  by  the 
French,  159 

Vandamme,  Gen.,  defeat  of, 
at  Culm,  ,229;  at  battle  of 
Ligny,  273-278^ 

Victor,  Marshal,  victorious  at 
battle  of  Medellin,  79;  bat- 
tle of  Talavera,  94-97 

Victoria,  Queen,  accession  of, 
360;  coronation  of,  361; 
the  difficulty  of  the  Ladies 
of  the  Bedchamber,  362; 
marriage    and    popularity 

of,  z(il 
Vimiero,  battle  of,  63-66 
Vitoria,  battle  of,  208-210 
Vitrolles,      Baron,     sent     by 

Fouche   to  negotiate   with 

the  allies,  311 

W 

Wagram,  defeat  of  Archduke 
Charles  by  Napoleon  at, 
103 

Waterloo,  battle  of,  296-304; 
reflections  on  the  battle  of, 

304-307 
Wcllesley,  or  Wesley,  family 

of,  2 
Wellcsley,    Arthur,    Duke   of 
Wellington,  see  WeUington 


Wcllesley,  Richard,  Marquis, 
brother  of  Wellington, 
scholarship  of,  3 ;  Governor- 
General  of  India,  16; 
changed  name  from  Wes- 
ley to  Wellesley,  16;  made 
Marqms  Wcllesley.  28;  su- 
perseded by  Comwallis,  as 
Governor-General  of  India, 
41 ;  returned  to  England, 
4 1 ;  summary  of  his  career 
in  India,  41-42;  Irish  re- 
form, inaugurated  by,  326 

Wellington,  birth,  i ;  family, 
2 ;  education  at  Eton,  3 ; 
education  at  Angers,  3; 
first  commission,  3;  on  the 
staff  of  Lord  Westmore- 
land, 5 ;  a  member  of  the 
Irish  House  of  Commons, 
5  ;  lieutenant-colonel  of  the 
33d  Foot  tmder  Lord 
Moira,  8 ;  distinguished 
himself  in  campaigns  be- 
tween League  of  Etirope 
and  France,  9-13;  applied 
for  post  in  the  Civil  Ser- 
vice, 13;  failed  to  secure 
civil  post,  14;  prevented 
from  going  on  expedition 
to  West  Indies,  14;  sent 
with  33d  to  India,  landed 
at  Calcutta,  15;  changed 
name  from  Wesley  to  Wel- 
lesley, 16;  failed  to  capture 
an  outpost,  24;  command 
at  the  sack  of  Seringapa- 
tam,  26;  made  governor  of 
Seringapatam,  26;  made 
military  governor  of  My- 
sore, 28;  defeated  Dhoon- 
dia  Waugh,  29;  suppressed 
corruption  in  India,  29; 
supplanted  by  General 
Baird  in  command  of  ex- 
pedition to  Egypt,  30;  the 
battle  of  Assaye,  36-38; 
ambitious  ancf  irrital)le 
spirit  of,  41 ;  visit  of,  to  St. 


39^ 


Index 


Wellington — Cont'd 

Helena,  43;  returned  to 
England,  43 ;  consulted  by 
Pitt,  43 ;  entered  House  of 
Commons,  44;  made  chief 
Secretary  for  Ireland,  47; 
marriage,  45 ;  policy  of,  in 
Ireland,  47-49;  commanded 
a  division  at  siege  of  Copen- 
hagen, 50;  made  lieuten- 
ant-general, 58;  sent  into 
Portugal  against  Junot, 
58-62;  landed  at  Mondego 
Bay,  59;  battle  of  Rolica, 
62  ;  chafed  at  tenns  of  con- 
vention of  Cintra,  67 ; 
marked  for  distinction  by 
Court  of  Enquiry,  67 ; 
placed  at  the  head  of  Brit- 
ish and  Portugviese  army, 
at  Lisbon,  79-81;  crossed 
the  Douro  in  his  advance 
against  Soult,  86;  ad- 
vanced with  Cuesta  up  the 
Tagus  Valley,  90 ;  battle  of 
Talavera,  94-97;  made 
Duke  of  Wellington,  99; 
placed  at  the  head  of  all 
the  Portuguese  forces,  no; 
defence  of  Portugal,  112- 
114;  victory  of  Btisaco, 
1 19-122;  estimate  of  cam- 
paign of  18 10-18 1 1  in  Por- 
tugal, 137,  138;  Portuguese 
Campaign  of,  aroused  Con- 
tinent to  action  against 
Napoleon,  140;  confidence 
of,  after  campaign  in  Por- 
tugal, 147;  policy  of,  after 
campaign  of  1810-1811, 
149;  preparations  for  bat- 
tle near  Badajoz,  153,  154; 
in  danger  at  El  Bodon, 
157;  made  English  earl 
and  Spanish  duke  in  conse- 
quence of  taking  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  162;  policy  of, 
after  fall  of  Ciudad  Rod- 
rigo,   1 63 ;  third  siege  and 


taking  of  Badajoz,  by, 
164-169;  policy  of,  after 
fall  of  Badajoz,  170;  vic- 
torious at  battle  of  Sala- 
manca, 176;  entered  Ma- 
drid, 178;  not  at  his  best  in 
strategy,  179;  raised  in 
British  peerage  in  conse- 
quence of  Salamanca,  179; 
left  Madrid,  September  i, 
181 2,  179;  failed  to  take 
Burgos,  180,  181;  evaded 
united  French  armies,  and 
reached  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
184;  severe  condemnation 
of  his  troops,  184;  estimate 
of,  at  time  of  retreat  from 
Burgos,  184-186;  position 
of,  at  close  of  181 2,  196; 
preparations  against  Na- 
poleon, in  1813,  200;  battle 
of  Vitoria,  208-210;  esti- 
mate of  his  ability  in  cam- 
paign leading  up  to  Vitoria, 
212;  made  Field  Marshal 
of  England,  and  Duque 
di  Vitoria,  215;  state  of 
army  after  Vitoria,  216; 
siege  of  San  Sebastian, 
225;  policy  of,  after  taking 
of  San  Sebastian,  227;  en- 
tered France,  230;  iDattle 
of  Orthes,  243,  244;  battle 
of  Toulouse,  251,  252;  com- 
pared with  Soult  after 
Toulouse,  253,  254;  raised 
to  the  highest  rank  in  the 
English  peerage,  255;  en- 
deavoured to  compose  dis- 
putes between  Spanish 
Cortes  and  Ferdinand,  256; 
sent  as  Ambassador  to 
France,  256;  surveyed 
fortresses  on  Belgian  fron- 
tier, 257:  replaced  Castle- 
reagh  in  Vienna  Assembly, 
257;  signed  treaty  pledg- 
ing England  against  Na- 
poleon,   259;    proposed    to 


Index 


397 


Wellington — Con  t  'd 

invade  France,  261;  poor 
strategy  of,  266,  267  ;  situa- 
tion before  Ligny,  273; 
battle  of  Quatre  Bras, 
278-281;  battle  of  Water- 
loo, 296-304;  tactics  of, 
at  Waterloo,  304;  invaded 
France  with  Blucher,  308; 
wisdom  and  inodcration  of, 
313;  with  Blucher  before 
Paris,  313;  his  service  to 
France,  314-317;  conduct 
of,  before  restoration  of 
Louis  XVIII.,  314;  fore- 
most man  in  Europe,  314; 
estimate  of  his  ability,  314, 
315;  prevented  dismem- 
berment of  France,  315; 
prevented  Blucher  from 
destroying  bridge  on  the 
Seine,  316;  aided  in  reduc- 
ing charges  made  by  coali- 
tions for  operations  of 
18 1 5,  316;  adjusted  com- 
pensation of  France  to 
Allies,  316;  placed  in  com- 
mand of  army  of  occupa- 
tion, 316;  attitude  towards 
in  France  from  181 5-1818, 
317;  made  Master  of  Ord- 
nance and  Commander-in- 
Chief,  318;  return  to  Eng- 
land, 318;  in  the  Cabinet 
of  Lord  Liverpool,  318; 
his  position  in  the  state 
after  the  war,  323-328; 
identified  with  Tory  party, 
324;  lack  of  sympathy 
with  the  Greeks,  326;  atti- 
tude towards  Ireland,  326, 
327;  his  influence  over 
George  IV.  and  leading 
public  men,  327,  328;  his 
sympathy  with  Peel,  328; 
break  with  Canning,  re- 
signed office  of  Comman- 
der-in-Chief, 328;  made 
Prime  Minister,  331;      his 


influence  and  position  in 
European  affairs,  331;  at- 
titude on  questions  of  the 
day  in  England,  332  ;  resig- 
nation of  Palmerston  from 
Cabinet,  333 ;  persuaded  by 
Peel  to  advocate  Catholic 
Emancipation  in  Ireland, 
336;  outcry  against,  on 
passage  of  Catholic  Eman- 
cipation Bill,  338;  opposi- 
tion to,  after  passage  of 
Emancipation  Bill,  340; 
death  of  George  IV.  and 
accession  of  William  IV., 
343  ;  answer  to  Lord  Grey's 
plea  for  reform,  344;  popu- 
lar displeasure  against, 
345,  346;  fall  of  adminis- 
tration of,  346,  347  ;  reason 
for  his  attitude  towards 
reform,  347,  348;  failed  in 
attempt  to  form  new  ad- 
ministration, 350;  attitude 
of,  towards  passage  of  Re- 
form Bills,  351,  352;  great 
unpopularity  of.  352  ;  prac- 
tically made  dictator  on 
resignation  of  Melbourne, 
35s;  advocated  Peel  for 
Prime  Minister,  resigna- 
tion of  Peel,  356;  estrange- 
ment with  Peel,  358;  made 
Chancellor  of  Oxford,  358; 
attitude  during  Melbourne 
administration,  359;  ob- 
jected to  the  return  of  Na- 
poleon's ashes  from  St. 
Helena,  360;  coronation  of 
Queen  Victoria,  361;  con- 
sideration for  Marshal 
Soult,  361,  362;  entire  re- 
conciliation with  Peel,  364; 
Peel  for  second  time  Prime 
Minister,  364;  held  seat  in 
Peel's  Cabinet,  365;  re- 
turned to  command  of 
army  on  retirement  of  llill, 
365;    carried    Peel's    Com 


398 


Index 


Wellington — Cont  'd 

Law  through  the  House  of 
Lords,  371;  most  trusted 
servant  of  Queen, _  371; 
vigour  and  ability  in  old 
age,  371-373;  plan  of  de- 
fending London  against 
Chartist  outbreak,  372; 
desired  to  transfer  com- 
mand of  army  to  Prince 
Consort,  372;  in  last  days 
held  in  universal  venera- 
tion, 373;  death,  374;  ftm- 
eral,  374;  physical  appear- 
ance, 375;  public  and  priv- 
ate life,  375-376;  estimate 
of  the  soldier,  377-382  ;  es- 
timate of  the  statesman, 
382-384;  estimate  of  the 
man,  384-386; 


William  IV.,  accession  of, 
343 ;  appealed  to  Welling- 
ton to  form  an  administra- 
tion, 350;  death  of,  360 

Wrede,  Field  Marshal,  defeat 
of,  at  Hanau,  230 


York,  Gen.,  conduct  of,  on 
failure  of  Russian  inva- 
sion, 191 


Z 


Zieten,  Gen.  von,  at  battle  of 
Waterloo,  303 


Heroes  of  the  Nations. 


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HEROES  OF  THE  NATIONS. 


NELSON.     By  W.  Clark  Russell. 
GUSTAVUS  ADOLPHUS.     By  C. 

R.  L.  Fletcher. 
PERICLES.     By  Evelyn  Abbott. 
THEODORIC    THE    GOTH.     By 

Thomas  Hodgkin. 
SIR  PHILIP  SIDNEY.     By  H.  R. 

Fox-Bourne. 
JULIUS  C^SAR.     By  W.  Warde 

Fowler. 
WYCLIF.     By  Lewis  Sergeant. 
NAPOLEON.     By     W.     O'Connor 

Morris. 
HENRY  OF  NAVARRE.     By  P. 

F.  Willert. 
CICERO.     By     J.     L.     Strachan- 

Davidson. 
ABRAHAM  LINCOLN.     By  Noah 

Brooks. 
PRINCE    HENRY    (OF    PORTU- 
GAL)     THE     NAVIGATOR. 

By  C.  R.  Beazley. 
JULIAN    THE    PHILOSOPHER. 

By  Alice  Gardner. 
LOUIS  XIV.     By  Arthur  Hassall. 
CHARLES    XII.     By    R.     Nisbet 

Bain. 
LORENZO  DE'  MEDICI.     By  Ed- 
ward Armstrong. 
JEANNE    D'ARC.     By    Mrs.    Oli- 

phant. 
CHRISTOPHER  COLUMBUS.    By 

Washington  Irving. 
ROBERT  THE  BRUCE.     By  Sir 

Herbert  Maxwell. 
HANNIBAL.     By     W.     O'Connor 

Morris. 
ULYSSES  S.  GRANT.     By  William 

Conant  Church. 


ROBERT     E.     LEE.     By     Henry 

Alexander  White. 
THE  CID  CAMPEADOR.     By  H. 
Butler  Clarke. 

SALADIN.       By     Stanley      Lane- 
Poole. 

BISMARCK.       By    J.    W.    Head- 
lam. 

ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.     By 
Benjamin  I.  Wheeler. 

CHARLEMAGNE.     By  H.  W.  C. 
Davis. 

OLIVER         CROMWELL.         By 
Charles  Firth. 

RICHELIEU.     By  James  B.  Per- 
kins. 

DANIEL  O'CONNELL.     By  Rob- 
ert Dunlop. 

SAINT     LOUIS     (Louis.    IX.     of 
France).     By  Frederick  Perry. 

LORD    CHATHAM.     By   Walford 
Davis  Green. 

OWEN    GLYNDWR.     By   Arthur 
G.  Bradley.     Si. 35  net. 

HENRY  V.     By  Charles  L.  Kings- 
ford.     $1.35  net. 

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$1.35  net. 

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W.  F.  Reddaway. 

WELLINGTON.     By  W.  O'Connor 
Morris 

CONST ANTINE  THE  GREAT.  By 
J.  B.  Firth. 


Other  volumes  in  preparation  are 


MOLTKE.     By  Spencer  Wilkinson. 
JUDAS  MACCABiEUS.     By  Israel 

Abrahams. 
SOBIESKI.     By  F.  A.  Pollard. 
ALFRED  THE  TRUTHTELLER. 

By  Frederick  Perry. 
FREDERICK     II.       By     A.     L. 

Smith. 


MARLBOROUGH.       By  C.  W.  C. 
/  Oman. 

New  York— G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS,  Publishers— London 


RICHARD  THE  LION-HEARTED 

By  T.  A.  Archer. 
WILLIAM    THE    SILENT.       By 

Ruth  Putnam. 
CHARLES     THE     BOLD.         By 

Ruth  Putnam. 
GREGORY  VII.     By  F.  Urquhart. 
MAHOMET.    By  D.  S.  MargoUouth. 


The  Story  of  the  Nations. 


In  the  story  form  the  current  of  each  National  life 
is  distinctly  indicated,  and  its  picturesque  and  note- 
worthy periods  and  episodes  are  presented  for  the 
reader  in  their  philosophical  relation  to  each  other 
as  well  as  to  universal  history. 

It  is  the  plan  of  the  writers  of  the  different  volumes 
to  enter  into  the  real  hfe  of  the  peoples,  and  to  bring 
them  before  the  reader  as  they  actuaUy  lived,  labored, 
and  struggled — as  they  studied  and  wrote,  and  as 
they  amused  themselves.  In  carrying  out  this  plan, 
the  myths,  with  which  the  history  of  all  lands  begins, 
will  not  be  overlooked,  though  these  will  be  carefully 
distinguished  from  the  actual  history,  so  far  as  the 
labors  of  the  accepted  historical  authorities  have 
resulted  in  definite  conclusions. 

The  subjects  of  the  different  volumes  have  been 
planned  to  cover  connecting  and,  as  far  as  possible, 
consecutive  epochs  or  periods,  so  that  the  set  when 
completed  v/ill  present  in  a  comprehensive  narrative 
the  chief  events  in  the  great  Story  of  the  Nations; 
but  it  is,  of  course,  not  always  practicable  to  issue 
the  several  volumes  in  their  chronological  order. 

Nos.  1-6 1,  each $1.50 

Half  leather 1-75 

Nos.   62   and  following  Nos.,  each  (by  mail,     1.50 

net    1.35 

Half  leather  (by  mail,  $1.75) net    1.60 

For  list  of  volumes  see  next  page. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  NATIONS. 


Z.  A.  Ragozin. 
S.  Baring-Gould. 
Hjalmar  H.  Boyesen. 
E.    E.    and    Susan 

Prof.  A.  Vdmbery. 
Prof.      Alfred     J. 

Arthur     Gil- 
Stanley 
Ome 


GREECE.     Prof.  Jas.  A.  Harrison. 

ROME.     Arthur  Gilman. 

THE  JEWS.     Prof.  James  K.  Hos- 
mer. 

CHALDEA. 
GERMANY. 
NORWAY. 
SPAIN.     Rev. 

Hale. 
HUNGARY. 

CARTHAGE. 

Church. 

THE     SARACENS. 

man. 
THE  MOORS  IN  SPAIN. 

Lane-Poole. 
THE      NORMANS.     Sarah 

Jewett. 
PERSIA.     S.  G.  W.  Benjamin. 
ANCIENT     EGYPT.     Prof.     Geo. 

Rawlinson. 
ALEXANDER'S  EMPIRE.     Prof. 

J.  F.  Mahafly. 
ASSYRIA.     Z.  A.   Ragozin. 
THE  GOTHS.     Henry  Bradley. 
IRELAND.     Hon.   Emily  Lawless. 
TURKEY.     Stanley  Lane-Poole. 
MEDIA,   BABYLON,  AND    PER- 
SIA.    Z.  A.  Ragozin. 
MEDIEVAL  FRANCE.    Prof.  Gus- 

tave  Masson. 
HOLLAND.        Prof.     J.     Thorold 

Rogers. 
MEXICO.     Susan  Hale. 
PHCENICIA.     George  Rawlinson. 
THE      HANSA     TOWNS.     Helen 

Zimmem. 
EARLY   BRITAIN.     Prof.   Alfred 

J.  Church. 
THE       BARBARY       CORSAIRS. 

Stanley  Lane-Poole. 
RUSSIA.     W.  R.  Morfill. 
THE  JEWS  UNDER  ROME.     W. 

D.  Morrison. 
SCOTLAND.     John  Mackintosh. 
SWITZERLAND.     R.    Stead    and 

Mrs.  A.  Hug. 
PORTUGAL.     H.  Morse-Stephens. 
THE  BYZANTINE  EMPIRE.     C. 

W.  C.  Oman. 
SICILY.     E.  A.  Freeman. 
THE       TUSCAN       REPUBLICS 

Bella  Duffy. 


POLAND.     W.  R.  Morfill. 
PARTHIA.     Geo.  Rawlinson. 
JAPAN.     David  Murray. 
THE    CHRISTIAN     RECOVERY 

OF  SPAIN.     H.   E.   Watts. 
AUSTRALASIA.     Greville  Tregar- 

then. 
SOUTHERN    AFRICA.     Geo.    M. 

Theal. 
VENICE.     Alethea  Wiel. 
THE   CRUSADES.     T.    S.    Archer 

and  C.  L.  Kingsford. 
VEDIC  INDIA.     Z.  A.  Ragozin. 
BOHEMIA.     C.  E.  Maurice. 
CANADA.     J.  G.  Bourinot. 
THE  BALKAN  STATES.    William 

Miller. 
BRITISH  RULE  IN  INDIA.     R. 

W.  Frazer. 
MODERN    FRANCE.     Andrd    Le 

Bon. 
THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE.     Alfred 

T.  Story.     Two  vols. 

THE  FRANKS.     Lewis  Sergeant. 

THE  WEST  INDIES.  Amos  K. 
Fiske. 

THE  PEOPLE  OF  ENGLAND, 
Justin  McCarthy,  M.P.  Two 
vols. 

AUSTRIA.     Sidney  Whitman. 

CHINA.     Robt.   K.    Douglass. 

MODERN  SPAIN.  Major  Martin 
A.  S.  Hume. 

MODERN  ITALY.     Pietro  Orsi. 

THE  THIRTEEN  COLONIES. 
Helen  A.  Smith.     Two  vols. 

WALES  AND  CORNWALL.  Owen 
M.    Edwards.     Net   $i.3S- 

MEDIEVAL  ROME.     Wm.  Miller. 

THE  PAPAL  MONARCHY.  Wm. 
Barry. 

MEDIEVAL  INDIA.  Stanley 
Lane-Poole. 

BUDDHIST  INDIA.  T.  W.  Rhys- 
Davids. 

THE  SOUTH  AMERICAN  RE- 
PUBLICS. Thomas  C.  Daw- 
son.    Two  vols. 

PARLIAMENTARY  ENGLAND. 
Edward  Jenks. 

MEDIi^VAL  ENGLAND.  Mary 
Batcson. 

THE  UNITED  STATES.  Edward 
Earlc  Sparks,     Two  vols. 


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